Day: June 23, 2014
Regional ripples from a nuclear deal
As gradual progress is made towards a potential nuclear deal with Iran, many question the implications that this agreement would have for the surrounding region. On Monday, the Woodrow Wilson Center hosted “The Iranian Nuclear Deal and the Impact on its Neighbors” to analyze the regional repercussions of a possible bargain. Abdullah Baabood, Director of the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, and David and Marina Ottaway, Senior Scholars at the Woodrow Wilson Center, discussed relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and neighboring Iraq, while Bijan Khajehpour, Managing Partner of Atieh International, analyzed the regional economic aspects of a nuclear deal.
The prospect of a nuclear bargain with Iran poses a great challenge for the GCC. According to Abdullah Baabood, each of the six GCC countries has a great stake in the Iranian nuclear deal and has many concerns regarding regional security, the economy, and the environment.
However, negotiations have been taking place secretly between Iran and the US, much to the dismay of the GCC. This is particularly insulting as the US is an important ally to the region, and a deal with Iran would be a major foreign policy issue with implications far beyond simply arms control. There is fear that Iran and the US will strike a grand bargain, resulting in the US leaving the region and Iran coming to dominate it.
The GCC fears this deal because it does not know how to interpret Iran’s status and whether or not it will strictly abide by the rules of the nuclear agreement. There is a great deal of unease about Iran spreading its wings throughout the Gulf and expanding its influence without restriction.
David Ottaway further analyzed the tumultuous relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the past several decades. The two countries have a history of intense rivalry for regional dominance that is currently at its peak. However, there have been attempts recently to initiate dialogue between the foreign ministers. The main issue in these upcoming conversations will be determining the true meaning of détente for both the Iranians and the Saudis and exactly how to handle the challenge of energy and oil, as well as sectarian divides.
With the current situation in Iraq, Marina Ottaway highlighted the need to consider how the instability will affect a nuclear deal with Iran. The current sectarian division in Iraq could pose a threat to Iran, which has continued to back Prime Minister Maliki and ultimately has more influence than the US, due to its location. However, volatility is highly unfavorable for Iran and is not ideal for contracting a regional settlement in regards to its nuclear program.
Bijan Khajehpour then discussed the economic implications within the region, assuming there will be a comprehensive nuclear bargain with Iran. There are four areas of either convergence or divergence between Iran and its neighbors. This includes:
- The energy sector
- Regional trade and cross-border investment activity
- Competition for economic and technological dominance
- International investment
The energy sector is a fundamental concern because of the growing demand for oil and gas reserves within the region. While the Persian Gulf holds nearly half of the world’s oil reserves, most states lack natural gas resources, with the exception of Iran and Qatar. Other countries will need to import gas in the near future. “Keeping pressure on Iran’s natural gas sector is to the detriment of the whole region,” Khajehpour concluded, highlighting why energy efficiency will be a point of contention with the progress of an Iranian nuclear bargain.
There is still fierce ideological and strategic competition between Iran and the surrounding region over a possible nuclear deal. It has never been clearer to Iran’s neighbors that they must get involved in this bargain to have their vital interests addressed.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Shi’astan 1, Kurdistan 1, Sunnistan 0
Here is the concluding paragraph of my piece published by the Middle East Institute Friday:
Thus the current insurgency may look as if it has Maliki cornered, but the long-term strategic balance is still with the Shi’a for geographical, demographic, and resource reasons. Sunnistan is neither a viable state nor a unified one. When the money ISIS seized in Mosul starts to run out, the thieves will quarrel with their comrades in arms. Sunnistan will not want to stay in an unhappy marriage, but it won’t be able to leave, either. Whether Maliki stays or goes, the Sunni insurgency is doomed.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Schisms in Shi’ism
With sectarian violence flaring in the Middle East, it is tempting to view the Islamic world in terms of the Sunni-Shia schism. However, there are conflicts within the Shia community itself, and on Thursday, the American Enterprise Institute hosted a multipanel event to discuss them. The first two panels focused on the struggle for legitimacy between the two competing theological centers in Iraq and Iran, and the third panel offered policy recommendations going forward. Michael Rubin moderated.
Iraqi Shi’ites are not a monolithic community, said Abbas Khadim, noting that there are two competing schools, or hawza, within Shi’ite Islam: one in Najaf, and one in Qom. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani heads the hawza in Najaf, which acts as counterweight to the Iranian hawza in Qom. According to Khadim, Sistani told him personally that he wanted to curb Iranian influence in Iraq, adding that only political parties in Iraq are interested in patronizing Iran.
Najaf was the center of Shi’ite scholarship until the early twentieth century, declining with the establishment of modern Iraq in 1921. The rise of Qom coincided with the Iranian revolution, and for thirty years it commanded more influence that its rival. According to Toby Mathhiesen, however, the number of Shia worldwide who follow Khameini has declined to around 10%, while Sistani commands a much larger following.
In practice, the panel agreed, the Iranian republic is not a secure model. While Khomeini was able to exercise power in large part through the strength of charisma, Khamenei’s lackluster personality commands far less allegiance than his predecessor. The weakness of his administration was especially apparent in 2009, when thousands of Iranians ignored his orders to remain off the streets.
Sistani’s quietist brand of Islam, meanwhile, has played a moderating role in Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. Following the bombing of Samara, for instance, his refusal to issue a call to arms to Iraq’s Shia population prevented a widening of the civil war. Even Saddam Hussein recognized Sistani as a counterweight to Iranian influence. During the 1980s, Saddam wanted him expelled, but ultimately decided that without Sistani, Iran would be able to leverage even more control within his country.
The speakers agreed that if Sunni governments allocated money for Shiite theological seminaries in their own countries, their Shia minorities would be less inclined to travel to Qom, thus curbing Iranian influence. In fact, Iranian scholars would leave Iran to study in other countries, as many did after the fall of Saddam Hussein (including Khamenei’s grandson).
The third panel was asked to address the question, “should America have a Shia policy?” According to Robert Rook, the short answer is no. This is because the Shia are not a single, indistinguishable group, any more than the Sunni are. Kenneth Pollack said that the US has a bad habit of neglecting human rights in the Middle East, most recently in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Lebanon, to name a few. Instead, America should champion the human rights we claim to espouse. By ignoring human rights abuses in Syria, he added, we have allowed the conflict to devolve into a sectarian crisis.
By focusing on the Sunni-Shia divide, we neglect the equally large gap between secular and extremist poles in Islam. The US should be backing moderates in all countries, and we should build viable opposition movements that will be able to contest extremism of all sorts. In 2007, Pollack noted, the US was able to successfully build an apolitical army. Walking away from Iraq and Syria feeds extremism. Maliki’s policies have been far more sectarian since the US left Iraq.
America has tried to ignore the Middle East for the last forty years, an approach that has failed us over and over again. Our long-term approach should be to combine diplomacy with use of force. In fact, Pollack said that the US should offer inducements (weapons systems, money or other) directly to governments in exchange for their cooperation. “We should straight up bribe” them, he suggested.
RSS - Posts
