Month: June 2014
The Maliki quandary
There is good reason for the many calls for Nouri al Maliki to quit his post as Iraq’s prime minister. In office for eight years, he has accumulated a great deal of power but delivered little to Iraq’s citizens. The country still lacks electricity, water, infrastructure, educational facilities, employment and health care. While the press and civil society are freer than in many Arab-majority countries, Maliki has largely neutralized parliament and the courts. He controls many of the so-called independent institutions the Americans left behind, including Iraq’s central bank. The Prime Minister has campaigned and governed in a blatantly sectarian and increasingly authoritarian way, mobilizing Shia support and attacking (sometimes arresting) Sunni politicians.
But…Maliki is also the most popular single politician in Iraq, with over 700,000 personal preference votes in April’s election. His State of Law coalition won more than twice as many seats in parliament as its nearest competitor. His belligerence towards Sunnis is popular among Shia in the south and Baghdad. Those who call for him for him to step down, step aside or otherwise quit are ignoring the clear message of the last election: most Shia want him to stay in place and crack down on a Sunni insurgency that is a potent mixture of Sunni Islamist extremism and Ba’athist nationalism. Compromising with that is not what people who identify as Shia and suffered under Saddam Hussein want.
So what is to be done?
I don’t know, but I’d prefer the decisions be made in Baghdad than in Washington. John McCain, who wants Maliki out, should not count for more than the voters of Najaf or Basra. President Obama has gone far enough by insisting on a cross-sectarian, cross-ethnic coalition as a condition for American assistance. That may be impossible with Maliki at the helm. But it is Iraqis, not Americans, who should tell Maliki that and make it stick. McCain hasn’t had brilliant success in American politics. It is hard to picture him more successful in Iraq.
The prospects for Iraq are not good. As Peter Galbraith notes in Politico yesterday, the Kurds now have much of what they need and want to go for independence. Kirkuk, which they took over when the Iraqi army fled, can provide Kurdistan with the revenue it needs to replace the Kurdistan percentage of Iraq’s oil revenue Maliki has been withholding, in a dispute over accounting for the proceeds and over the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) decision to export its oil without Baghdad’s permission. I imagine the Americans will hold KRG President Barzani back from announcing the referendum on independence he has promised. But the day is coming. With Kirkuk and other “disputed territories” in hand, it is hard to imagine that the Kurds will want to stick around while Sunni Islamists and Ba’athists shoot it out with Maliki’s Shia supporters.
The big losers in all this are predictably the Sunnis, whose insurgent forces will not be able to take most of Baghdad even if they are successful on its western outskirts, which include Baghdad International as well as Abu Ghraib prison. The headlines if those are attacked will be big, but the strategic consequences less so. The Ba’athists and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will clash sooner or later. Even if they don’t, “Sunnistan”–Anbar, most of Ninewa, most of Salahedin, parts of Baquba and Tamim as well as a few suburbs of Baghdad–may have lots of natural gas, but it is undeveloped. Ninety per cent of Iraq’s current oil production would remain in Shia control, far away in the south. Once Kurdistan pulls out of Iraq, the Sunnis won’t want to stay in it, but they won’t have the resources or territory needed to establish a viable state.
Ironically, the Shia will, as they have the oil. But Tehran will not want an independent Kurdistan, as that would threaten Iran’s own territorial integrity, which includes the province of Eastern Kurdistan. A weak Iraq in which Iran exercises influence is what Tehran wants, not one that breaks up, threatens to redraw the map of the Levant and gives birth to ISIS’s hoped-for Sunni caliphate.
Let’s hope it doesn’t come to that. Iraq is not lost so much as it is broken. A new political pact, with or without Maliki as prime minister, is what it needs. A state worth fighting for will take years to build. Iraqis, not Americans, should be the prime movers in that process.
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Politics first
The American philosopher Alfred North Whitehead talked of the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” which is like putting the emPHAsis on the wrong syLLAble. We are at risk these days of doing that in Syria, Iraq and Libya.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rapid advance toward Baghdad is getting a lot of attention, as it should. But Sunni-based ISIS is not a military threat to a city of nearly 4 million people, most of them Shia. ISIS might target the western outskirts near Baghdad International Airport and Abu Ghraib prison, which will grab big headlines. But ISIS is not going to march into what used to be called the Green Zone.
Nor did ISIS take Mosul, Tikrit and other Sunni-majority towns in the north and west solely because of its military prowess. Its success is due to broad Sunni support for action against Prime Minister Maliki, who proved his popularity among the Shia in April’s election but has governed in an increasingly authoritarian and sectarian way. That’s why President Obama has made assistance to him conditional on taking a more inclusive approach. Yesterday’s meeting and declaration of support from a broad cross-section of Iraqi politicians was meant to be Maliki’s response.
What we are facing in Iraq is not merely a military challenge but rather a political challenge to a fragile state.
The outcome of this challenge may well be determined by neither Sunni nor Shia, the prime protagonists of the current fighting. Kurdish peshmerga under the command of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have already filled the vacuum left in Kirkuk by the evaporation of the Iraqi Army. The Kurds have long claimed Kirkuk as their own and won’t leave it without a fight. It is a major oil-producing area that could bring the KRG to the breakeven point: 100% of the oil produced within KRG control could generate as much revenue as the 17% of all of Iraq’s oil that Baghdad is supposed to provide. But Maliki has cut off KRG revenue for months, due to a dispute over accounting for it and over the KRG’s authority to decide on the export and sale of oil independent of Baghdad.
In the past, Kurdistan’s political independence seemed impossible because of Turkish opposition. But Turkish attitudes are changing. Ankara this year received oil directly from Kurdistan, allowing it to be stored and then sold without Baghdad’s permission. Prime Minister Erdogan has appreciated the KRG’s cooperation in tamping down Kurdish violence inside Turkey. Even the Turkish military might think an independent and relatively secular Kurdistan would be a more attractive neighbor than either an ISIS-run Sunnistan or a Shia-run autocracy.
The Kurds will not want to go their own way until ISIS is defeated or contained. But KRG President Barzani even before the latest ISIS advance was promising Kurds a referendum on independence. If he ever follows through, the vote will be overwhelmingly in favor. It is hard to picture the Sunnis staying in an even vaguely democratic Iraq that would then be 60-70% Shia. Sunnistan under ISIS control would be a real threat to the United States and to Iran, which is why Tehran and Washington are trying to make nice these days even as they compete for influence with Maliki while trying to keep Iraq unified.
Focusing exclusively on Iraq would be another fallacy of misplace concreteness. ISIS does not confine its ambitions to a single country. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are already a single theater of operations. The place to attack an enemy is where he is weakest. That might well be inside Syria rather than in Iraq. The Obama administration was unwise to let ISIS get as strong as it has in western Syria. It is late to beef up support to its competitors or help them succeed against Bashar al Asad, but it is still worth a bolder try than Washington has made so far. The issue is not just a military one in Syria either: one of the key shortcomings of the Syrian Opposition Coalition there is its inability to deliver services in liberated areas. That is a political and governance issue, not only a military one.
The same is true in Libya. I’m delighted Ahmed Abu Khattalah is in US custody and will be tried in a civilian court. But whatever role he played in Libya’s Ansar al Sharia will be filled quickly by another jihadist. The problem in Libya, as in Iraq and Syria, is a weak state that lacks legitimacy with its people and is unable to maintain even a modicum of law and order. Dealing with this problem only by training up a General Purpose Force and leaving the governance and political issues unresolved is one more fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
PS: On Iran, best to listen to Randa Slim on NPR this morning:
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Due for a rethink
As US policy towards the Middle East is floundering, the Center for American Progress (CAP) released a timely report Monday entitled “US Middle East Policy at a Time of Regional Fragmentation and Competition,” based on field research in four countries. At CAP to discuss the results of the report were Peter Mandaville of George Mason University, Haroon Ullah of the State Department, and Brian Katulis, CAP Senior Fellow and coauthor of the report.
Islamists are at the center of the regional struggle, but fissures within and between different groups are multilayered and run deep. The Sunni-Shia rivalry is only one element of the conflicts embroiling the Middle East. The intra-Sunni rivalry is another, if less prominent, aspect. The division between rich and poor countries is an additional ingredient, as wealthier states tend to fight out proxy battles in weaker and more divided nations.
In Egypt, for instance, Qatar and Turkey threw their support behind the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are backing the new military regime. Saudi Arabia sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a potential competitor, rather than just another disjointed Salafist group. A key dynamic is between countries with more resources and less division at home, who fear the success of an alternate model of governance. This complicates US policy, as it is difficult to execute a cohesive strategy in the region while Qatar and Saudi Arabia are locked in a struggle over Egypt’s future.
Mandaville said that the US must look beyond the Sunni-Shia frame to recognize that we are witnessing a potential unraveling of the entire post-Ottoman order. The aftermath of 9/11, coupled with Arab uprisings of 2011, has seen a withering away of post-WWI arrangements. The upheaval is comparable to what we saw in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, when groups whose identities had been in check during the Cold War emerged and began questioning, and ultimately restructuring, the existing order.
One of the major weaknesses of US policy in the region is our tendency to oversimplify the debate. Whether or not American troops should have stayed in Iraq misses the larger picture. American diplomatic engagement needs to be better informed about the regional dynamics of movements in the Arab world. Even after many years, the Arab nationalist-Islamist divide is still not well understood. Americans are good at understanding groups who want to attack us, but we need to peer further into what drives these conflicts in the first place.
Katulis suggested that Obama has bungled his attempts to reengage with the Muslim world. By addressing them as a separate community, he signaled that they are a single constituency, one that should be handled with kid gloves, an approach comparable to George W. Bush’s. The implication is that all Muslims subscribe to a single, transnational identity, a message that is echoed by groups like al Qaeda.
Political Islam has always existed in the background. Partial openings in the political and media environment after the Arab uprisings have allowed some Islamist groups to come to the fore. Islamism, as a point on the political spectrum, has broadened significantly. Despite Egypt’s best efforts to silence Islamists, they are here to stay. Ullah noted that, while President Sisi wants to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood’s comparative advantage in Egypt and revert to the weaker Sadat-era Brotherhood, this is not possible in modern media environment.
He also noted one positive development in America’s attitude towards political Islam, pointing to Assistant Secretary of State Patterson’s comments last week:
Some people in this region conflate Islamists with terrorists and desire to eliminate the Islamists entirely from the political scene. Our difficult fight against violent extremists is made more complicated by this viewpoint. The need for compromise is underscored by political experience in the Arab world as well as our own.
One of the myths the report attempts to debunk is the so-called moderation thesis. This is the false belief that Islamists will moderate their positions if they join the political fray. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to accommodate more moderate positions. Islamist groups have fared better in other countries in the region, including Tunisia’s Ennahda party, partly because they had to contend with a large secular/liberal bloc. Nonetheless, many mainstream Islamists have internalized only the procedural spirit of democracy, without embracing pluralism.
Another myth is that socioeconomic conditions are the primary drivers of extremism. Research has found no causal link between poverty and extremism. The key constituency for Egypt’s Salafist al Nour Party, for instance, is that country’s urban-based middle class.
One persistent challenge to foreign policy is US counterterrorist doctrine, which relegates violence committed by Muslims to the “terrorist” category. This neglects the fact that in places like the Sahel, conflicts are based on ethnic, rather than religious, differences. In Obama’s speech at West Point, he called for additional funding of counterterrorism programs, but the real problem in many of these countries stems from long-running ethnic conflicts.
Mandaville noted that the US government still thinks about the world in terms of the blocs that arose during the Cold War. We would do well to shed these outdated notions of the Middle East, although it will be difficult in light of our current investments in the Gulf and rising sectarianism in the region. As Iraq and Syria descend into sectarian-fueled chaos, it is time for the US to reexamine its strategy in region.
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Hedging all the way to the bank
It is always difficult to write about a place that you visit for only a week or so, but Qatar poses unique problems: Qatari citizens represent perhaps 10% of the population. The rest are foreigners, brought in from India, Pakistan, Kenya, Nepal, Spain and virtually every other place on earth. They make up the vast bulk of the work force, often living here in group dormitories while they send money home to their families. An Indian restaurant manager told me he could double his salary coming here (and there are no taxes). A Nepali told me he misses the green and the mountains, but living here is okay. A Spaniard rated it higher than that. Palestinians, Syrians and Egyptians (hiding out here from the restored military regime) also gave Qatar the thumbs up. Of course there is little risk to a foreigner in giving the place high marks, but the responses seemed genuine.
I’ve garnered a few data points on the Qataris themselves. This really is an absolute monarchy at the national level, where a few people make all the key decisions. There is no system or habit of consultation with tribal leaders, as in Bahrain. Only at the municipal level are there elections, but the issues there are strictly local ones.
Among the 200,000 or so Qataris, everyone knows everyone else’s family ties, even if they don’t know the individuals. Some families are more prestigious than others, but others may be wealthier (e.g., those that spent time in Iran after a war with Bahrain and came back with trading and other business skills). Sectarian relations are less problematic than in Bahrain because both the monarchy and the majority are Sunni. Most men content themselves with one wife. Most women cover in public, but to varying extents. The presence here of South Asians is regarded wryly: before natural gas made Qatar wealthy, Qataris used to go to Pakistan and India to work.
Many view the monarchy, which has no religious function, as reasonably wise and benevolent, which isn’t surprising given the sky-high per capita GDP. Even the scandal regarding Qatar’s successful 2022 bid to host the World Cup does not appear to be generating a lot of interest. The international press coverage of World Cup labor practices has raised consciousness about the unfairness of tying immigrant visas to specific employers (which we happen also to use in the US). Support for education and infrastructure is very much in evidence: new roads, mass transit and universities seem ubiquitous. So too are giant shopping malls, luxury apartments, fancy restaurants, and Ferraris parked by the curb. Cranes and yachts everywhere:
I am reminded of a radio ad for a men’s clothing store from many years ago: “money talks and nobody walks.” There are sometimes sidewalks, but only the foreigners use them. Electricity and water are free, for everyone. I turned off the air conditioning in my hotel room upon arrival and haven’t turned it back on. Few complain about the heat outside because no one goes there, though most Qatari men dress in thobes and assure me it is much more comfortable. It is often still above 100 degrees Fahrenheit at midnight.
Qatar does not yet have anything like Bahrain’s fabulous national museum, which displays ample evidence of its pre-Islamic civilization. I am told a national museum is under construction. But Doha already has a fabulous Museum of Islamic Art that reminds a Westerner of how much brighter the so-called dark ages were in Muslimdom than in Christendom. Here is just a random sample that had the virtue of not being behind glass:
A large portion of the iconic museum’s holdings are Persian and Turkish, but there is lots of good stuff from North Africa, Syria, Iraq and on into central Asia. The message is clear: Qatar is not just a tiny kingdom, but a vanguard of civilization for the entire Islamic world, transcending national, ethnic and sectarian distinctions.
Doha, which houses 80% of the kingdom’s population, is more Brasilia than Amsterdam, at least from a visitor perspective. Its forests of oddly shaped and designed twenty- and thirty-story office buildings flashing light shows at night give way on the outskirts to low rise villas behind high walls. The Souq Wakif is pleasant enough, but clean and orderly to those who have enjoyed the market places in Cairo, Damascus or Aleppo (in better times). Doha’s version feels more like a pleasant World’s Fair pavilion. At the high end of commerce there is “The Pearl,” an artificial island of fasionable shops, luxury apartments and big yachts.
While the world is focused on the collapse of Iraq, less than 500 miles northwest, Doha seems calm almost to a fault. Has someone here helped to finance the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that is wrecking havoc there? Or are they financing the more moderate Islamists tring to counter ISIS? I’m not likely to discover the answer to that question, as the Qataris who know such things haven’t been accessible to me.
Reserved to a modest fault, the kingdom nevertheless prides itself on getting along with everyone (especially Iran in addition to the US) and generally succeeds, except for the Saudis, who are arch rivals, at least for now. Hedging is the classic diplomatic strategy of small countries. Qatar’s rulers are good at it. The place is thriving.
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Peace picks June 16-20
1. Fifth Annual Conference on Turkey Monday, June 16 | 9:00 am – 5:00 pm National Press Club 529 14th Street, NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Center for Turkish Studies at The Middle East Institute presents its Fifth Annual Conference on Turkey. This year the conference will assemble three exceptional panels to discuss the country’s tumultuous domestic politics following recent elections, the future of democracy in the country, and Turkish foreign policy. The event will feature a keynote speech by Efkan Ala, Turkey’s Minister of the Interior. SPEAKERS Amb. Robert Ford, Ibrahim Kalın, Amb. Robert Pearson, Judith Yaphe, Gönül Tol, and more.
2. What to Expect from the Al-Sisi PresidencyMonday, June 16 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was sworn in on June 8. In his inauguration speech, al-Sisi spoke of his intent to lead Egypt in an inclusive manner. Following the resignation of the interim cabinet, al-Sisi will form a new cabinet. Marina Ottaway of the American University in Cairo and Emad Shahin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will share their opinions of what the future of Egypt will hold.
3. U.S. Middle East Policy and the Region’s Ongoing Battle over the Muslim Brotherhood Monday, June 16 | 12:30 pm – 2:00 pm Center for American Progress 10th floor, 1333 H St. NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND In the three years since popular uprisings swept across the Middle East, the status of the Muslim Brotherhood has become a deep point of contention among regional states. Key countries in the Middle East and North Africa are sharply divided over the status of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. During this time, U.S. policy has been hesitant as the United States has sought to define its position in reaction to both the uprisings themselves and the new era of competition among regional states they produced. The uneven U.S. responses to the Arab uprisings and the regional competition that has been sparked offers several important lessons learned for U.S. policy in the future. SPEAKERS Peter Mandaville, Professor, George Mason University, Haroon Ullah, State Department Policy Planning Staff, and Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress.
4. Transparency, Oversight and Accountability in the UN System: Problems and How to Fix Them Monday, June 16 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Associated Press reported this year that that the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services failed to pursue a number of cases of corruption over the last five years. How emblematic are these incidents of the UN system? What has changed, what still needs doing, and what levers are effective in pushing reform? SPEAKERS Robert Appleton, former Chairman of the United Nations Procurement Task Force, and Special Counsel to the UN Iraqi Oil for Food investigation, Edward Patrick Flaherty, Senior Partner, Schwab Flaherty & Associates, and James Wasserstrom, Senior Advisor on Anticorruption, U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
5. How to Unwind Iran Nuclear Sanctions Monday, June 16 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Atlantic Council; 1030 15th St NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND With the deadline for an Iran deal fast approaching, a key element will be how to coordinate US and European sanctions relief with Iranian confidence building measures. The Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force invites you to the launch of two papers outlining options for unwinding nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. Authors Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service and Cornelius Adebahr of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will explore US and EU sanctions, respectively, looking at the evolution of sanctions over the past decade and the most feasible path to providing meaningful relief in the event that Iran agrees to significant curbs on its nuclear program.
6. Whistleblowers: A Critical Anti-Corruption Tool & Challenge Tuesday, June 17 | 11:45 am – 2:15 pm AU Washington College of Law; 4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Whistleblower laws, incentives and protections are critical to fighting corruption, but implementation in practice is a challenge. Professor Robert Vaughn, noted scholar and author of “The Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Laws” and James Wasserstrom, Anti-corruption Advisor, US Embassy Kabul Afghanistan and a whistleblower on corruption in Kosovo, will discuss best practices and pitfalls.
7. Is the US AWOL in the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America? Tuesday, June 17 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm AEI; 1150 17th Street, NW Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND Mexico and Central America are struggling with rampant organized crime, fueled by US demand for illegal drugs. Central American nations are too weak or too complicit in criminality to confront the powerful, multibillion-dollar criminal enterprises that collaborate with Colombian cocaine smugglers, a Venezuelan narcostate, illegal arms smugglers, and Hezbollah to threaten the security and well-being of the Americas. Rep. Matt Salmon (R-AZ), chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, will assess the threat to US interests and recommend policy options, and a panel of experts will discuss. SPEAKERS Jerry Brewer Sr., Criminal Justice International Associates LLC, Richard J. Douglas, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, and Iñigo Guevara, CENTRA Global Access.
8. 2014 Global Peace Index: Measuring Country Risk and Opportunity Wednesday, June 18 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Center for Strategic and International Studies; 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND What is the state of global peace in 2014? What are the risks that threaten the peacefulness of nations and communities? How can our foreign policy and aid interventions better prioritize the mitigation of risk? The 2014 Global Peace Index discussion will explore these questions, detailing recent trends in militarization, safety and security, and ongoing conflict. It will also include a presentation of a new country risk framework, which quantifies current knowledge around the structural drivers of peace and conflict to identify countries most at risk today of falls in peacefulness. SPEAKERS Gary J. Milante, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Paul B. Stares, Council on Foreign Relations, Alexandra I. Toma, Peace and Security Funders Group, Daniel Hyslop, Institute for Economics and Peace. Moderated by Robert Lamb, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
9. Assessing Threats Facing the U.S.-Korea Alliance Wednesday, June 18 | 12:00 pm – 6:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel will deliver the keynote address of the second annual U.S.-Korea dialogue hosted jointly by the Wilson Center and the East Asia Foundation of Seoul. Register for this half-day conference, where opinion leaders from Korea and the United States will discuss their concerns for the future and seek ways to increase cooperation and mutual political, economic, diplomatic, and security benefits. SPEAKERS Daniel Russel, Jane Harman, Ro-Myung Gong, Thomas Fingar, Cheol-hee Park, and more.
10. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War Thursday, June 19 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Pakistan’s army has dominated the state for most of its 66 years, locking the country in an enduring rivalry with India over Kashmir. To prosecute these dangerous policies, the army employs non-state actors under the security of its ever-expanding nuclear umbrella. Based on decades of the army’s own defense publications, Christine Fair’s book argues that the Pakistan military is unlikely to shift its strategy anytime soon, and thus the world must prepare for an ever more dangerous future Pakistan. Other speakers include David Sedney, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, and Michael G. Waltz, President of Metis Solutions and former Special Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney.
11. Mideast Shi’ites Defy Iranian Domination? Thursday, June 19 | 12:00 pm – 2:15 pm American Enterprise Institute; 1150 17th Street NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Iran’s Islamic Revolution unleashed a wave of sectarianism, which has flooded the Middle East. But while many have characterized Middle Eastern Shi‘ites as under the sway of the Islamic Republic, Shi‘ites from countries like Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, and Azerbaijan have worked to resist Iranian influence. Join analysts from the United States and across the Middle East to discuss strategies to preserve communal independence and how the United States can successfully work with Shi‘ite communities outside Iran. This event will coincide with the release of a new report based on firsthand fieldwork in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and Azerbaijan. SPEAKERS Abbas Kadhim, Brenda Shaffer, Michael Rubin, Ahmed Ali, Ali Alfoneh, Kenneth M. Pollack, and more.
12. How to Bring a Dictator to Justice: The Hissen Habré Trial Thursday, June 19 | 3:00 pm – 4:00 pm National Endowment for Democracy; 1025 F Street NW, Suite 800, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND From 1982 to 1990, Chad witnessed thousands of political killings under the regime of its former president, Hissen Habré. Twenty-four years after the end of his rule, litigation against Habré has finally gained critical momentum in Dakar. As a member of the international team of lawyers prosecuting the case, Delphine Djiraibe is well placed to tell the story of how Habré was brought to trial and to explore the potential impact on transitional justice in Chad. She will reflect on the legal process thus far, discuss where the trial stands today, and consider next steps in Senegal and beyond. Her presentation will be followed by comments by Dave Peterson, of the National Endowment for Democracy; the discussion will be moderated by Sally Blair of the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
13. The Solution to the Cyprus Problem: Famagusta, Energy, and Public Relations Friday, June 20 | 12:00 pm – 1:45 pm Hudson Institute; 1015 15th Street NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND 2014 marks the 40th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Following numerous failed attempts to reach a settlement, a Joint Declaration agreed to in February has galvanized new reunification efforts. The Hudson Institute hosts an important conversation on this situation with Alexis Galanos, Mayor of the city of Famagusta and former Speaker of the Cyprus House of Representatives. As the mayor of a city in the northern, Turkish-occupied part of the island, Galanos will share his unique perspective on current and future prospects for the reunification of Cyprus. Hudson Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for American Seapower, Seth Cropsey, will moderate the discussion.
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A candidate speaks
With the epidemic of violence sweeping through Iraq and Pakistan, Afghanistan has remained surprisingly calm as it enters the second of round of elections today. The first round of voting in April saw Afghanistan’s highest turnout in history, which was especially remarkable in light of the security situation. However, there has been speculation that the second round of election will be marred by apathy and security concerns. In a telediscussion Thursday sponsored by Atlantic Council, Afghan presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah rejected this notion, expressing confidence that turnout today would surpass the numbers seen in April. He acknowledged that fraud continues to be an issue, but one that election monitors can mitigate.
US-Afghan relations have deteriorated under President Karzai, who is believed to have supported Zalmai Rassoul for president. Abdullah promised to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) if elected, noting this was crucial to Afghanistan’s future. The Afghan government should have signed the BSA long ago, he said, adding that a lot of damage has been done by the uncertainty created in the absence of any agreement. “Iraq refused to sign a similar agreement,” he noted, vowing not to make the same mistake. The government exists to protect its citizens, not to “sacrifice the rights of citizens under the shadow of peace.” Political stability would pave the way for economic stability: a stable Afghanistan will provide incentives for a wealthy Afghan diaspora to reinvest in the country.
Karzai’s refusal to sign the BSA, coupled with uncertainty surrounding the timeline for US troop withdrawal, has fueled corruption, Abdullah said. The lack of political will among Afghans politicians to tackle fraud was also a major problem. An anti-corruption bill is currently languishing in Parliament; if it is not passed in the next few days, Afghan banks will be blacklisted from the international system. Rule of law has not been a priority in Afghanistan. Abdullah promised to change this by reaching out to those who have not been tainted by corruption.
He also promised to improve his country’s strained relationship with Pakistan. Both nations are struggling to combat terrorism, and both stand to benefit from improved cooperation on security and economic issues. The fact that the two countries will soon be under new leadership presents a unique opportunity to improve what has been contentious relationship.
Abdullah was asked to address the exchange of the five Taliban prisoners for American prisoner of war Bowe Bergdahl. He expressed concern that those who have been released will rejoin the battlefield, noting that a number of prisoners released under similar circumstances quickly returned to combat. He would not speak to the possibility of transferring militants like Mullah Fazlullah to Pakistan, saying only that he opposed the presence of terrorists of any nationality on Afghan soil.
Although his father was Pashtun, Abdullah is usually identified as Tajik, the dominant ethnic group of the Northern Alliance. The Taliban, meanwhile, tend to be composed of ethnic Pashtuns. However, he rejected the notion that his election could aggravate tension between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns as outdated. “People should not start equating Pashtuns with the Taliban,” he warned, noting that many of the terrorists who occupied Afghanistan did not belong to any major Afghan ethnic group, including Osama bin Laden. He pointed out that he won Herat, a largely Pashtun province, by more than 60%.
One lesson from Iraq is that sectarian policies simply do not work. He promised that his administration would include all tribal and ethnic groups. He said that the difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is that in Afghanistan, Talibanization has been rejected. Afghanistan, he maintains, does not face the levels of sectarianism seen in Iraq.
He also dismissed the findings of poll showing a tightening of the race between rival Ashraf Ghani and himself. It nonetheless appears that Ghani, an ethnic Pashtun, may have gained some supporters from Afghanistan’s Uzbek population after choosing Uzbek General Abdurrashid Dostum as one of his running mates.
Asked why Afghanistan should matter to the US, Abdullah said Americans should consider what brought them to Afghanistan in the first place. The US should not forget that in 2001, the Taliban controlled 80% to 90% of the country, and had turned it into an al Qaeda safe haven. While Obama has promised to complete the withdrawal of American troops by 2016, Abdullah said he hopes that “zero option will not mean zero cooperation.”
The international community has invested a great deal of blood and treasure in Afghanistan. Abdullah argued that best way to honor these sacrifices would be to sustain the achievements that have been made over the last ten years. Whether or not Afghanistan’s first democratic transition can survive endemic corruption, or the Taliban’s attempts to disrupt it, remains to be seen.
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