Month: June 2014
Obama’s options for Iraq
The Hill published my “Obama’s Options for Iraq” yesterday:
President Obama has chosen the tough-love option: American assistance to meet the challenge of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) blitzkrieg moving towards Baghdad will be conditional on a more inclusive political settlement within Iraq. Only a major U.S. combat deployment is ruled out. Here is my list of possible additional options, with some cons:
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Lessons learned
The ongoing conflict in Syria has brought to attention the many approaches to stabilization that range from humanitarian aid to economic development. On Wednesday, the Stimson Center, in cooperation with United States Institute of Peace, hosted Mona Yacoubian to discuss her report “Lessons Learned on Stabilization in Syria.”
As the senior advisor for Stimson’s Middle East program and former senior program officer on the Middle East at USIP, Yacoubian discussed the takeaways from previous stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans. She emphasized the following eight lessons applicable to Syria:
- It is crucial to understand conflict dynamics. We cannot ignore local politics or the impact stabilization efforts will have on the ground. Thus, it is necessary for greater community-level mapping to comprehend the conflict and the most effective means of assistance.
- Stabilization in transition must take an integrated approach. These efforts must incorporate peace-building, security, and development principles on a wider scale. A concerted effort is needed to integrate these central stabilization components under a single authority.
- We must mind the mutual dependencies that can serve as an entry point for negotiations at a local level. While Syria is in the midst of a brutal conflict with no end in sight, mutual dependencies are still present on a local and sub-conflict level. These domains pose opportunities for peace-building and stabilization efforts by concentrating on narrower disputes.
- Local negotiations need to be undertaken by local actors. We must transition from negotiation efforts led by external players to resolutions directed by resident Syrian actors. Syrians should be identified and trained to head local-level disputes and facilitate greater dialogue.
- A bottom-up approach is essential for progress on stabilization. Given Syrian regime hostility, stabilization activities should be small-scale in order to lead to gradual success. We must identify civilian council support to cooperate with local governance structures.
- Stabilization efforts should be nimble and demand-driven. This approach must be centered on the needs and priorities identified by local actors on the ground as a means of expanding dialogue throughout Syrian civil society.
- We need to engage nontraditional actors, specifically the large refugee community and Syrian youth. It is necessary to address the communities affected by both the immediate and longer post-conflict phase. Peace-building and conflict mitigation efforts should be directed in part at the continuously growing Syrian refugee population.
- Washington-based obstacles and bureaucratic impediments should be overcome. Institutional barriers that hinder interagency cooperation need to be lowered. It is vital that we lessen the large divide between high-level decision makers and actors on the ground in Syria. Bureaucratic issues continue to undermine the role of the US in effective engagement and stabilization efforts.
James Schear, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, supported Yacoubian’s report, specifically in its focus on the potential opportunities that lie at the local level. Syria’s biggest obstacle is the tri-polarity of the conflict due to the continuous fighting among the government, Islamist extremists and more moderate insurgents. It has become necessary to engage these various groups through enhanced dialogue.
“We also need to look at the importance of participation and sustainability in these stabilization efforts,” responded Mercy Corps Director of Policy and Advocacy, Ann Vaughan. Donor-driven efforts have neither the most successful nor sustainable impact because their funding doesn’t incorporate local people. We need to look at long-term sustainability, which was not considered in Afghanistan and Iraq. These countries continue to need more and more funding because stabilization efforts were short-term and didn’t focus on sustainable practices. In Syria, we need smarter and more integrated responses that proceed at a slower pace, and most importantly get local actors involved.
These lessons learned from past intervention efforts provide insight for US policymakers in looking for the most effective approach in stabilizing assistance. However, Yacoubian emphasized that there are no direct parallels between these efforts in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Syria differs from these experiences namely because there is no US presence inside the country, and the Syrian regime remains in power.
“We can use diverse expertise to distill critical lessons and nuggets of experience that can be applied to the situation in Syria…” Yacoubian concluded. Nevertheless, we must recognize Syria as unique and look within civil society for effective and sustainable approaches.
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Maliki’s fault, but…
Everyone is blaming Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki for the implosion of the Iraqi army and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) takeover of Anbar, Ninewa, Salahedin and who knows what next. He deserves blame.
But not everything said about him and situation is true. The New York Times states baldly that he failed to include Sunnis in his government. That is false. He has always had Sunnis in his government. They may have not been the right Sunnis, he certainly didn’t listen carefully to them and he has tried to arrest some of them, but they have been there all along (and still are). Maliki is not running an “inclusive” show, but Sunnis are not entirely excluded.
I just heard on CNN that Maliki hasn’t provided oil revenue to Sunni provinces. That isn’t true. So far as I am aware, he has cut off only Kurdistan, with which he has a long-running dispute about accounting for the money and about whether its Regional Government is entitled to export oil without Baghdad’s approval. The Sunni provinces have received their share, based on population.
Some are marveling at this disaster occurring in the aftermath of a reasonably good election. It is occurring at least in part because of the election, in which Maliki conducted a sharply sectarian campaign and gained by far the largest bloc in parliament on the strength of his popularity among Shia voters. Sunni unwillingness to resist ISIS is due in large part to the feeling that Sunnis, who went to the polls fragmented rather than united, will not get a fair shake in the future, because Maliki has announced his intention to form a government with a narrow majority and therefore with less need of Sunni participation.
I’m told ISIS fans are crowing about their triumph over the states created in 1916 by the Sykes-Picot agreement. But Sykes and Picot had Mosul in the French-controlled territory with Damascus. The 1920 Treaty of Sevres had it in Kurdistan, whose fate was to be determined by a referendum. It was confirmed as in Iraq only in 1926. ISIS action so far has confirmed Sykes-Picot, not negated it.
If the Kurds do in Ninewa what they’ve already done in Kirkuk to fill the vacuum the Iraqi army has left, at least part of present-day Ninewa province is likely to end up where the Treaty of Sevres had it: in Kurdistan, whose once-promised referendum may not be all that far off if this keeps up. Turkey, which could in the past be relied upon to object, may no longer, as its companies are making lots of money in Kurdistan and Ankara may well prefer Kurdistan to the caliphate as a neighbor.
Lots of commenters are discussing ISIS’s military prowess. I’m not a military expert, but almost any army look good if its enemy abandons the field. The contest here is not really a military one but a political one. The Iraqi army’s implosion has political roots. It is due to the failure of many of its cadres to develop loyalty to a popular but sectarian leader unwilling to do what was required to make sure the Sunni community would reject extremism and contribute its best efforts to the Iraqi state.
The real question now is what the United States, Turkey, Kurdistan, Iran and what is left of Iraq will do about state failure in Iraq and what could become a much wider regional war with extremists who wish all of them ill. Uniting to fight the common enemy may be distasteful to some, but unavoidable to all.
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Survey says
Tuesday Jay Leveton presented the results of the 2014 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller survey at the American Security Project. It focuses on Arab youth perspectives, concerns and aspirations throughout the region. The survey consisted of 3,500 face-to-face interviews conducted over the past year across sixteen countries in the Middle East. The sample was split equally between males and females ranging from 18 to 24 years old. Leveton highlighted the top ten findings:
- Arab youth are embracing modern values. 46% of Arab youth believe that traditional values are outdated and belong in the past. This number has risen from only 17% in 2011, demonstrating a shift away from traditional values. This change is also reflected in the decreasing influence of parents, family, and religion on Arab youth.
- They remain confident in their national government’s abilities. Arab youth show approximately 60% confidence in the government’s ability to address living standards, economic stability, war, unemployment and terrorism. There is great surprise in this confidence, specifically in countries that have suffered from economic hardship or political instability following the Arab Spring. Approval of the impact of the Arab Spring has declined from 72% in 2012 to 54% in 2014, most likely due to the continuous civil unrest and political instability in countries such as Egypt and Syria.
- They are increasingly concerned about the rising cost of living and unemployment. 63% of Arab youth are concerned about growing living expenses, while 42% expressed significant worry over unemployment. Approximately half are apprehensive about their own national economy. However, 55% of youth in countries outside of the GCC are concerned about unemployment, while only 39% within the GCC. This is due to the GCC’s proven ability to assist in job creation, while countries in North Africa and the Levant struggle with their youth unemployment rates.
- Arab youth believe that the biggest obstacle in the Middle East is civil unrest. 55% believe that the recent uprisings and instability are the greatest impediments to the advancement of the region. 38% believe that the lack of democracy is the greatest issue, while some believe it is the threat of terrorism.
- They are increasingly looking towards entrepreneurship as a source of opportunity. 67% feel that the younger generation is more likely to start a business than in previous generations. This entrepreneurial spirit hints at the perceived opportunities in starting one’s own business, specifically in response to some governments’ inability to provide jobs for their youth.
- The country that the younger Arab generation would most like to live in is the United Arab Emirates. 39% said that the UAE is the ideal country they would move to, while 21% said the United States, and 14% said Saudi Arabia. The UAE is the model country for Arab youth in terms of the right balance of governmental responsibility, national economy, foreign relations, etc. The United States has remained high in favor in Arab youth perspectives.
- Arab youth see their country’s biggest allies to be Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 36% believe that Saudi Arabia is their country’s biggest ally and 33% said the UAE. This was followed by Qatar, Kuwait, and lastly the United States, which marks a shift away from Western countries as the largest allies.
- They have a new concern for obesity and rising health issues. Over the past year, there has been a sharp increase in the percentage of youth concerned about obesity from 12% in 2013 to 26% in 2014. An increasing number of the younger generation is worried about diabetes, cancer and heart disease. Among all countries, 52% of youth feel as though the healthcare in their country has remained the same over the past year, while 34% believe that it has improved.
- They believe that the government should subsidize energy costs and aren’t too concerned about climate change. 74% believe that energy, electricity, and transport fuel should be subsidized by the government. This comes from the rising concern about the cost of living in each respective country. While this is the greatest worry among youth, concern for climate change and the environment is a very low priority at only 6%.
- There has been a great increase in daily news consumption, specifically through online media and social networking sites. Television has been the most popular source of news for the sixth year in a row with 75% of Arab youth using it as their most frequent news source. However, a declining number of youth see the television as the most trusted source of news– 39% now view social media as the most reliable source, rising from 22% in 2013.
While the 2014 survey ranges across sixteen countries that vary in political, economic, and social characteristics, there is nonetheless a great sense of continuity in the hopes, concerns, and priorities of Arab youth in the region.
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No drama Obama needs to act
Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, has fallen to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS ). Its goal is to reestablish an Islamic caliphate, which means it wants to govern Iraq and Syria according to what it considers strict Sharia law. It already controls a big stretch of eastern Syria as well as parts of neighboring Anbar and Ninewa provinces in western Iraq.
Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki, who won a plurality of seats in the new Iraqi parliament elected in late April, has asked parliament (presumably the old one, since the new one isn’t in place yet) for a state of emergency, which would be the first since the US occupation ended. Police stations and military installations have been destroyed. Tens of thousands of people are fleeing. Military equipment, apparently including helicopters and left-behind American humvees, have fallen into jihadi hands.
Anyone who doubted the Syrian and Iraqi states would be at risk from ISIS should be rethinking. ISIS now controls substantial areas in provinces of both countries. It is possible that they are overextended and will suffer defeat, especially if Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey decide to engage. But such external intervention would also have consequences. The Kurds would be unlikely to want to leave Mosul quickly, and Maliki would be seriously weakened if he relied on Kurdish or Turkish assistance. He would likely have to pay the money Kurdistan says it is owed and also allow export of Kurdish oil directly to Turkey (which the Kurds have already done without Baghdad’s permission).
American interests are directly engaged. If ISIS can carve out a relative safe haven in eastern Syria and western Iraq, the US would want it taken down, for fear it could be used (like the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan) as a training ground launchpad for attacks on the US. The Americans could try to suppress ISIS using drones and air power, but ground forces would eventually be needed. These would not have to be American, but the US could support Baghdad or maybe even Damascus taking action against ISIS.
Some in the US will blame what has happened on President Obama’s decision to withdraw all American troops from Iraq. That is nonsense in two ways. First, it was the Bush administration that negotiated and signed the agreement providing for complete US withdrawal. The notion that it could be renegotiated to allow some American troops to stay is a fantasy, one that proved unrealizable because of stiff political opposition in both the US and Iraq. Second, ten thousand American troops still in Iraq would be far from sufficient to either prevent or react to what has happened in Anbar and Ninewa. They would be hunkered down on a base, or become obvious targets.
The Iraqis may be able to handle Mosul on their own. Anbar and Ninewa my be pacified. Eastern Syria may eventually fall to either Damascus or more moderate rebel factions. But it is all too clear that a situation the US has wanted to ignore should not be ignored any longer. The Syrian implosion is having spillover effects that amount both to humanitarian and regional security disasters. America is not safe when other states are collapsing. Doing stupid shit, as President Obama has so eloquently put it, is not the only way the US gets in trouble. It also gets into trouble when it fails to act to defend its interests early enough.
No drama Obama needs to recalibrate and find an effective way to react.
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Deal or no deal?
Einstein quipped, “politics is more difficult than physics.” As the deadline for a nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 approaches with a host of issues unresolved, this observation seems especially prophetic. The Wilson Center Tuesday assembled a panel to disentangle some of these questions: Jon Wolfsthal of the Monterey Institute; Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center; Daryl Kimball, of the Arms Control Association; and Stephen Hadley of USIP, who moderated.
There are many reasons to be skeptical that such a deal can be successfully concluded: Iran has a long history of noncompliance, and there is considerable opposition among hardliners in both countries. Furthermore, America’s track record for negotiating similar deals has not been stellar: in 2003, for instance, the six-party talks with North Korea broke down. Nonetheless, the panelists agreed that the circumstances surrounding the current round of negotiations warrant a measure of cautious optimism.
With regards to a timeline, Wolfsthal contended that only a long-term deal should be on the table. This would reduce Iran’s break-out capability, as well as provide space for confidence building measures that could further dissuade Tehran from seeking the bomb. Nonetheless, the US must remember that, unlike Iraq, Iran is not a vanquished state: negotiators therefore cannot impose permanent limits on the Iranian nuclear program. Even the Iraqi sanctions regime lasted seventeen years—that is, it was time-bound.
Kimball pointed out that Russia’s cooperation is crucial to the long-term success of any accord. They have agreed to supply Iran’s Bushehr reactor with fissile material until 2021; if the agreement is not renewed, Iran could be justified in their demands for expanding the number of centrifuges. In the longer run, if Iran can demonstrate a need for indigenously produced nuclear power, there might be an opening to phase out first generation centrifuges and replace them with a smaller number of more efficient IR-2M centrifuges.
Litwak noted that the challenges underlying the nuclear agreement speak to larger questions facing Iran. As Kissinger once asked, “Does Iran want to be a nation or a cause?” Hardliners in both countries remain one of the primary obstacles to the success of negotiations. Conservatives in Tehran want to develop Iran’s nuclear capacity in order to solidify their country’s standing as a regional power and ensure regime survival. By disarming, Iran might leave itself vulnerable to regime change.
It remains to be seen if President Rouhani is able to sell a deal to Tehran, as ultimately it is up to the Supreme Leader to weigh the cost of alienating hardliners in Tehran against the economic pain caused by sanctions. President Obama’s two-track strategy, combining pressure and outreach, only sharpens the choice. The cycle of reformist and reactionary presidents who have come to power over the years may reflect shifts in Khameini’s willingness to oppose hardliners in Tehran. Tellingly, in last few weeks, Khameini has openly tried to quell dissent over the nuclear deal.
There is also considerable opposition to a deal in the United States. Democrats and Republicans alike are demanding that sanctions relief be conditioned on Iran’s compliance on issues like human rights. The president must find leaders on both sides of the aisle who are willing to sell the deal to their respective parties. Negotiators, and Congress, must disentangle successive tranches of sanctions. Human rights issues will not go away even if nuclear issue is resolved.
Litwak emphasized that the Iranian nuclear program was not designed in response to a perceived existential threat, as is the case with Pakistan and Israel. Ultimately, Iran is not intent on building a nuclear weapon; they only want to demonstrate the ability to create a nuclear weapon. They are well aware that any move towards actual weaponization could lead to a regional and international conflagration.
Any agreement with broad international support will be distasteful to Israel, which will press its US ally for vigorous verification of compliance and other assurances. There must be mechanisms embedded within any agreement to ensure compliance, including snapback sanctions and even authorization of force if Iran does break-out.
The US doesn’t trust Iran or Russia, but is nonetheless able to conclude deals with them. In order for these negotiations to succeed, they must be based on verification, not trust. It is important to keep in mind what will happen in the absence of any deal at all: we will be unable to verify Iran’s enrichment capacity; enrichment could continue; and without additional inspections, Iran could expand its capacity in secret.
There is a crucial difference between the failed talks with North Korea and current negotiations: a large portion of Iranian society wants to rejoin the international community. This desire provides negotiators with levers that were unavailable with North Korea. Arriving at an agreement will not be easy. It will have to be flexible enough to allow for Iran’s growing energy needs and satisfy the country’s hardliners, yet tough enough to persuade a skeptical Congress that Iran’s break-out capacity has been eliminated.
Nonetheless, the panelists agreed, the best time for a nuclear deal is now. Rouhani’s election was a clear signal that Iranians are prepared to negotiate.
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