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How to prevent Iraq’s breakup

The American commentariat is offering lots of advice these days on Iraq.  The consensus is that Baghdad needs a broad, inclusive, national unity coalition that will have the confidence of Kurds and Sunni as well as Shia. The corollary is that Nouri al Maliki has to go.

That may be what has to happen, but it won’t happen because Kurds, Sunni and Shia have a kumbaya moment.

Iraq is already fractured: there are three distinct polities. In none of them is reaching across ethnic or sectarian lines a popular proposition right now. Kurds are grabbing what they need to be independent, which yesterday meant the oil fields in Kirkuk. Tribal Sunni and secular Ba’athists are making common cause with jihadists. Shia gave Maliki more than twice as many seats in parliament as his nearest competitor–and over 700,000 personal preference votes–because he was seen as leading a strong crackdown on Sunni insurgency.

The solution to Iraq’s current problems lies within each of the polities, not between them. Reconciliation at the national level is for later, not now.

The Shia community is primary. Its representatives in parliament will choose the next prime minister.  Maliki commands the largest part of these representatives, but his Shia rivals Ammar al Hakim and Moqtada al Sadr together can stop him. They need not only say nay to a third term (as they have already done) but also choose his successor. That’s where they keep getting tripped up. Ditto the power behind them, which is Ayatollah Ali al Sistani. He has made it clear he doesn’t think Maliki has done well, but he needs to go further to manage the process of choosing his replacement.

That alone will not solve Iraq’s problems. There will still be a Sunni insurgency and a Kurdistan land-grab. If Iraq is to be prevented from breaking up, and a foundation laid for future reconciliation, portions of each of these communities will need to restrain their comrades in arms.

In Kurdistan, the moderating force is likely to be Iraq President Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Electoral underperformance and Talabani’s incapacitating illness have weakened the PUK in recent years, but its peshmerga forces control Kirkuk.  Unless they are willing to stand and fight, a referendum and declaration of independence would be foolhardy. The PUK depends a good deal on Tehran, which will want to block secession, lest it lead to rebellion in Eastern Kurdistan, an Iranian province that borders Iraqi Kurdistan and PUK-controlled territory.

In the Sunni provinces, the question is whether the traditionally Arab and Iraqi nationalist tribes and Ba’athists will break with the jihadist leadership. The tribes and Ba’athists recognize that Sunnis lose if Iraq is broken up, because the Sunni-populated portion has little oil and gas. They want self-governance, not independence, whereas their  jihadist allies want an Islamic caliphate that dismantles Iraq, Syria and possibly several other countries. That is a good reason for the Sunni population to think twice before following the jihadists over the cliff.

I am all for national reconciliation. After the war, there will be a time and a place. It takes years to make it happen. Right now the best that can be hoped for is factional moderation. Preventing Iraq’s breakup means empowering those within each community who will resist it.