The Gaza enigma

The current Gaza war is an enigma. Israel’s “mowing the grass” strategy, if it can be called by that offensive label, condemns it to repeated military efforts intended to provide respites from attacks without the prospect of an acceptable long-term political outcome. Hamas’ use of rockets and infiltration that kill few people but terrorize many seems calculated to shore up its reputation for “resistance” but likewise to lack a political end state.

Yet when some Israelis and Palestinians describe what it is they would like to see happen, there is a hint of similarity. Hamas’ proposal for a ten-year truce includes

…lifting the Israeli siege in Gaza through the opening of its borders with Israel to commerce and people, the establishment of an international seaport and airport under U.N. supervision, the expansion of the permitted fishing zone in the Gaza sea to 10 kilometers, and the revitalization of Gaza industrial zone.

Or, as a statement from Gaza “academics, public figures and activists” put it:  “we call for a ceasefire only when negotiated conditions result in the following:

• Freedom of movement of Palestinians in and out of the Gaza Strip.
• Unlimited import and export of supplies and goods, including by land, sea and air.
• Unrestricted use of the Gaza seaport.
• Monitoring and enforcement of these agreements by a body appointed by the United Nations, with appropriate security measures.”

The devil, as always, is in the details, which I suppose are covered in that stunningly undramatic phrase “with appropriate security measures.”

Once the current conflict is over, Israel is not going to want Hamas to be free to import more rockets. But even a retired Israeli Brigadier General writes:

Weakening Hamas may ultimately produce a cease-fire arrangement that prevents the remilitarization of Gaza — with Egypt effectively sealing its border with the territory — and deters Hamas from using violence. Such an outcome may allow for the opening of Gaza’s crossings to extensive humanitarian assistance and economic development channeled through the Palestinian Authority, to the benefit of the people of Gaza rather than Hamas.

There is of course a potentially big gap between “unlimited” and “unrestricted” in the Palestinian version and “extensive” in the Israeli version, but both statements seem to recognize that the Gaza status quo ante was not sustainable. I find it hard to believe Hamas will ever agree to anything resembling demilitarization, but depriving it of longer-range rockets may not be beyond possibility. Deputy National Security Adviser Blinken pushed the demilitarization line yesterday on NPR.

Anyone who has been to Gaza understands that its relationship with its nearest neighbors is a major determinant of the welfare of its people and their economy. Cut off from Israel and Egypt, it is an open air prison. Unless Egypt is prepared to take it back, an option some Israelis would like to pursue but few Egyptians would countenance, Gaza needs commerce with Egypt and Israel even to begin to thrive.

This isn’t as visionary as it may sound to some.I am reminded of a colleague who keeps Kosher and attended a meeting in Gaza in the period between the two intifadas. Could the hotel supply Kosher food? Of course, it replied, through contacts in Israel.

There are Palestinians and Israelis who don’t want their common interest in commerce to prevail over mutual loathing and military confrontation. The current destruction in Gaza will make the road back to a more normal relationship long and hard. Palestinians will seek justice. Israelis will want security. It will sound as if they agree on nothing.

But still it is important to keep in mind that wars end, people return to more normal discourse, relationships and commerce. Jews and Arabs have known periods of strife, or worse than that, and periods of coexistence, or even more than that. The enigma is not forever.