Month: July 2014
The Muslim Brotherhood’s bleak future
The Muslim Brotherhood experienced its fall from grace in Egypt just one year ago with President Morsi’s removal. The once highly organized and hierarchical party is now shattered, bringing into question the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda party. On Monday, the Middle East Institute hosted “The Muslim Brotherhood: Between the Path of Ennahda and the Threat of the Islamic State” with panelists Alison Pargeter, Hassan Mneimneh, and Eric Trager. They came to a consensus that the Muslim Brotherhood has weakened, especially in Egypt, and its strategy has become disjointed. It is currently unlikely to succeed in gaining power either in Egypt or in Syria.
The future of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is questionable after the violent clashes and unprecedented crackdown this past year. Pargeter, author of The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power, said that the party has faced significant challenges over the past twelve months in internalizing its overthrow and moving forward to regain legitimacy. It has had to face depleted finances, party leader arrests, and distrust from the public.
The current strategy has been to act defensively and shift blame away from the Brotherhood. The discourse of self-preservation has been far from successful. The international community has moved on—Sisi has taken power and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is crippled. It is trying to give the impression that the fight is still going on, but is it has not found a viable path back to political power.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has always struggled in articulating its ideology. It is now more important than ever, as the future of the party depends on institutional reform and transparency. A genuine change in political culture will be necessary if the Brotherhood is ever to gain power again. The cycle of competition between the military and political Islam will need to change if Egypt is to ever move forward, which Pargeter concluded could ultimately take more than a decade.
Trager, Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, discussed the role and future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. The party was founded in 1946 and had a tumultuous history throughout the past several decades. It was exiled in 1982 after a violent uprising, which ultimately forced the leadership to reshape its chain of command and membership strategy.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has now had to focus entirely on organizational maintenance, such as funding livelihoods and housing for its members. It is still a wealthy organization but has become very weak within Syria since its exile. It faces significant long-term challenges and is preoccupied with maintenance rather than politics. The organization will have to gain significant support within Syria if it is to ever acquire political power.
Mneimneh, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, said that Tunisians don’t want what happened in Egypt and Syria to play out in their countries. Ennahda has been the only true success story among the three. It is making strides towards democratic practice.
The Ennahda leader has spoken with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood regarding how to seek compromise. There ultimately needs to be an acceptance of diversity and inclusivity in Egypt rather than focusing on one party at the exclusion of the others. Ennahda is working to break the three main characteristics of politics in the region: paternalism, tribalism and elitism. It aims at broader pariticipation in government. This approach has proven far more successful than the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach in Egypt or Syria.
The Muslim Brotherhood has had a tumultuous few years and it is unlikely that it will gain power in Egypt or Syria anytime soon. It is preoccupied with its own survival. With no coherent strategy, there isn’t much hope for the Egyptian and Syrian branches moving forward.
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Finishing the job in the Balkans
I spoke yesterday on “Finishing the Job in the Balkans” with Dutch Foreign Ministry Europe Director Daphne Bergsma, Carnegie Europe’s Stefan Lehne, European Council on Foreign Affairs Sofia office director Dimitar Bechev and former Netherlands/NATO/EU diplomat Pieter Feith at the Hague Institute for Global Justice, former Macedonia ambassador Nikola Dimitrov presiding. Here are the notes that I prepared for myself, though I confess I departed from them to comment a bit on the International Crisis Group’s final report on the Balkans, along the lines I published yesterday:
1. The organizers of this event did me a great favor in announcing it. They reminded me what I wrote with Soren Jessen-Petersen in the International Herald Tribune:
Only when all the region’s countries are irreversibly on a course toward the E.U. will we be able to celebrate. Likely no more than five more years are required. Until then, we need to keep the Balkans on track, ensuring that Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia remain on the train.
2. That was more than three years ago. Where are the Balkan laggards now?
3. Kosovo, I’m happy to say, is making real progress, due in part to Pieter Feith, who presided over the post-independence transition there. A vigorous EU initiative with German—and off-stage American—support is reintegrating its northern municipalities. It recently ran a decent election with Serb participation. If the government formation process has been slow, that is nothing unusual in parliamentary systems.
4. It is clear enough that Kosovo and Serbia will both someday become EU members if they keep on their current courses—and they’ve pledged not to slow each other down. There are still serious obstacles—perhaps the most important is non-recognition of Kosovo by five EU members—but there is time to overcome them.
5. Macedonia has made some progress, but its human rights situation has seen some backsliding. Sad to say it remains stalled in the EU accession process. The accursed name issue haunts Skopje and Athens.
6. I won’t say much about this: I am a notorious advocate of recognizing people and countries by the names they call themselves. I don’t think modern day Athens has an exclusive claim to the name “Macedonia,” which happens to be attached to 1257 places in the United States. Failure of the Europeans to unite and insist on a resolution of this issue is in my view shameful.
7. But the worse shame is Bosnia. There the US and Europe are at odds.
8. Let me start with the conventional wisdom, which I think is correct: Bosnia is stuck because its constitution ensconced ethnically nationalist political parties in positions of power from which only more nationalist parties are be able to remove them.
9. Dayton ended the war but failed to provide the country with a central governing structure capable of negotiating and implementing the requirements of NATO or European Union membership.
10. This didn’t matter much for the first decade after the war. There were lots of things that needed doing, and NATO and EU memberships were not much of an issue. Using virtually dictatorial powers, the international community force-marched Bosnia away from war.
11. By 2005/6 the constitutional problems were all too evident. A team of Americans tried to start fixing the constitutional problem by facilitating preparation by the Bosnian political parties of constitutional amendments later known as the April package.
12. The package clarified group, individual and minority rights, as well mechanisms for protecting the “vital national interests” of Bosnia’s constituent peoples. It also included reforms to strengthen the government and the powers of the prime minister, reduce the president’s duties, and streamline parliamentary procedures.
13. They failed in parliament to achieve the 2/3 majority required by two votes. The responsibility was clear: one political party that had participated fully in the negotiations blocked passage, in order to ensure its leader election to the presidency.
14. Whatever the faults of the April package, its passage would have opened the way for a different politics in Bosnia, one based more on economic and other interethnic issues and less on ethnic identity.
15. I confess I thought its defeat would only be temporary. I thought for sure the package would be reconsidered the next year and passed.
16. I failed to understand that the moment was not reproducible. Over the past eight years, the situation has deteriorated markedly. Only one constitutional amendment has passed during that period, under intense international pressure, to codify the status of the Brcko District in northeastern Bosnia.
17. Meanwhile, the country has fallen further and further behind most of its neighbors in the regatta for EU membership and now looks likely to end up in last place, with little hope of entering the EU before 2025 or even later.
18. Those who advocate that the High Representative responsible for interpretation of the Dayton agreements be removed and Bosnia’s problems be left to the EU accession process for resolution have little evidence that will work.
19. All the leverage of EU accession did not work to get Bosnians to align their constitution with a decision of the European Court of Human Rights. Nor has it accelerated the adaptation of Bosnia’s court system to European standards.
20. So what is to be done?
21. I think there is no substitute for the Bosnians solving their own problem. They could do worse than return to the April package, fix whatever problems existed in it, and get on with the process of constitutional revision.
22. I also think there are directions that would not be fruitful.
23. Some would like to see even greater group rights and ethnic separation than provided for in the Dayton agreements. That is not in my view a fruitful direction. Apart from its impact on Bosnia, it would have the undesirable effect of encouraging separatism in Ukraine and elsewhere.
24. Others would like to further weaken the central government or allow the entities to negotiate separately their entry into the EU. Those in my view are not fruitful directions.
25. There is a simple test for any proposal for reform in Bosnia: will it make the government in Sarajevo more functional? The corollary question is whether it will accelerate Bosnian entry into NATO and the EU.
26. The April package would have done that. I think it is time to return to it and get the difficult job of constitutional reform started.
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ICG’s unfortunate Bosnia finale
I feel an obligation to explain my tweet from last week:
#Bosnia’s Future http://bit.ly/1tvlLch@CrisisGroup shows again analytical prowess does not entail good policy judgment, or even clarity.
One hundred forty characters really does not allow for a full explanation. So here goes, in 900 words.
The ICG report is correct in fingering the Dayton constitution as the culprit responsible for the country’s current dysfunction. But when it comes to discussion of what to do about the dysfunction, it meanders into a thicket of ill-defined options, premised on this key phrase: “the Croats are a fundamental difficulty”:
In Dayton, they were forced to merge with the Bosniaks in the FBIH [Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina], partly due to the West’s effort to expatiate its sense of guilt for allowing a genocidal war of ethnic separation to go so far.
This is wrong factually, historically and (contrary to what I tweeted about prowess) analytically. No one forced them, there was no “merger,” it did not happen at Dayton and it was not done to expiate guilt feelings.
The Federation was created more than a year and a half before Dayton, in order to stop the fighting between Croats and Bosniaks (Muslims to Americans). The Bosniaks were winning that war against the Croats but needed to stop it because it prevented them from success in the war against the Serbs, which raged simultaneously. The Croats were having their clocks cleaned, with disastrous consequences for their presence in central Bosnia.
The Americans and the UN convinced Croatian President Tudjman that continuing the Muslim/Croat war would result in a “non-viable, rump Islamic state in central Bosnia that would be a platform for Iranian terrorism in Europe” (I’m quoting from many memos to the Secretary of State).
Tudjman saw the danger of such an entity on his border and decided it would be better to form a Federation, provided it offered absolute equality between Croats and Bosniaks (and he wanted it confederated to Croatia, something that was never done). The Bosniaks, who numbered at least twice and likely close to three times the population of Croats, agreed to this patently disadvantageous formula because a) it would enable them to focus on fighting the Serbs, b) Tudjman controlled the flow of arms from the Adriatic into the Bosniak-controlled territory.
At Dayton, the Croats were anxious–even determined–to maintain the Federation, because it gave them a large measure of self-governance in a structure they thought would guarantee–through its group rights provisions and ethnic quotas–dominance of Croat nationalists. They also insisted on one-third of the central Bosnian “state” government and got what they asked for. I know because Kresimir Zubak, then the (Croat) President of the Federation, came to me and asked that the Americans reduce the six (or was is seven?) member presidency to just three, one seat reserved each for a Croat, Bosniak and Serb.
The ICG report thus goes badly wrong when it suggests that the Croats need to get a better deal in the future than they got at Dayton, when they got an excellent deal that reflected their strong wartime cards. Today, they no longer have a stranglehold over central Bosnia, which is accessible from the north and east as well as the south. When asked, Croats are hard-pressed to cite specific examples of disadvantage in a Bosnia that does largely leave them to govern themselves, at least in those cantons of the Federation where they are the majority. Their one consistent complaint is that the current Croat member of the the presidency is not a nationalist and may have been elected by a margin smaller than the number of Bosniaks who voted for him.
That makes him an interethnic hero in American eyes, but it makes him insufficiently Croat in nationalist Croat eyes. The nationalists want no serious competition for that seat from non-nationalists. It is interesting to note that the analogous thing happened when Vojislav Kostunica beat Slobodan Milosevic in the Yugoslav election of 2000, by a margin smaller than the number of non-Serbs who voted for him. I never heard Serbs complain about that.
But I wander from the ICG report, which takes the Croat question as fundamental and then spins four possible options. The first is a vague muddling through that takes as its starting point a proposal from several years ago that blew up over boundaries. The second proposes a third, Croat entity, without worrying about its boundaries. Even Zagreb’s fantasists think the time for that has passed. The third proposes three non-territorial communities, cover for creation of a “virtual” Croat entity. The fourth simply dissolves the Federation, which under today’s conditions would mean independence for Republika Srpska and three-way partition of Bosnia.
Only in the fifth, shortest option does ICG doff its thinking cap to “federal but liberal Bosnia”:
The simplest solution is also the most radical: abolish entities and cantons and build the state anew without reference to community rights, protecting only individual rights.
The eleven lines devoted to this proposition betray it as a throw-away, meant to satisfy those of us in the international community thought to harbor it as our preference, but not worthy of more than cursory attention.
Oddly, ICG never does discuss returning to the 2006 “April package,” which it describes as “the nearest BiH got to comprehensive constitutional reform.” Not surprising, as the April package would not satisfy Croat nationalist ambitions, which is the not so hidden agenda lurking in this unfortunate finale to ICG’s long series of reports on Bosnia, many of which are far more worth reading than this one.
More on the April package option in a future post.
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Afghans want legitimacy
As Afghanistan awaits the result of the second round of elections, countless allegations of fraud have arisen between candidates Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, bringing the legitimacy of this first peaceful transfer of power into question. On Wednesday, the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) discussed “Afghanistan’s Future: Politics, Prosperity, and Security Under New Leadership” with keynote speaker Ambassador James Dobbins, Ambassador Omar Samad, Clare Lockhart, and Hassan Abbas.
While some argue that US efforts in Afghanistan have been futile, Ambassador Dobbins, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the US Department of State, said this is inaccurate. Political and economic investments have yielded substantial changes over the past decade. The economy has expanded by more than 400%, the literacy rate has doubled, and longevity has increased by 20 years. UN Development Programme studies have shown that Afghanistan has made more progress than any other country over the past decade. Afghan society has experienced remarkable changes, specifically in its evolution into an urbanized, informed and technological nation.
These social and economic changes are largely a result of the significant US commitment to Afghanistan, which will decline in the near future. According to Dobbins, the success of the transition ultimately depends on three factors. First is the shift to an Afghan-led and managed security force. This process is largely complete. Second, declining US and international financial support will affect the national economy. Third is the behavior of neighboring states. The instability surrounding Afghanistan and the possible influx of militants could have a significant impact on how the country will transition to self-reliance.
While this will be a challenging process in the future, the most potent issue that Afghanistan currently faces is its electoral dilemma. Ambassador Samad, Senior Central Asia Fellow at New America Foundation, discussed the complex political process surrounding the presidential election. A corrupt system has taken hold. The fraud allegations in the recent presidential election are very real. President Karzai has used patronage to create a political mafia. It is vital for the country to restore trust in the system and legitimately elect a new leader. Afghans view this election as a reflection of their newfound political voice and free will. Afghans have had enough—they are committed to a credible election.
Clare Lockhart, Director and Co-Founder of the Institute for State Effectiveness, emphasized the preservation of constitutional law in the Afghan political system. It is vital to maintain the legitimacy of the constitutional order as a means of counteracting political and economic deterioration. However, this should be addressed not from a political dialogue standpoint, but rather from a conflict resolution approach. Afghan leaders must consider what inclusivity truly means and learn from the mistakes of the Bonn Agreement of 2001.
“People will not accept fraud. They want a mechanism that is credible,” concluded Abbas. It must be clear who won and exactly how Karzai’s successor will move forward. According to Abbas, the US needs to provide the confidence that justice will be done and that the rightful winner of the election will take office.
Afghans are more than ready for a legitimate election. They have waited ten long years to gain their political voice. They will not stand for candidates stuffing the ballot box.
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Gaza agonistes
Israel early this morning approved a truce in Gaza, with talks in Cairo to follow. Hamas has not responded yet. It is time to ask what Israel’s week-long air offensive and Hamas’ rocket barrage have achieved. What military or political objectives were advanced?
Israel’s stated military objective was to end the threat of rocket attacks from Gaza once and for all. It still seems far from that goal. No more than 20% of Hamas’ rockets are thought to have been used or destroyed. Weeks, perhaps months, more of air attacks would be required to get close to the literal goal of Operation Protective Edge. Some think a ground invasion would also be necessary. The last time Israel did that the war lasted three weeks in 2008-9.
A possible alternative to a ground invasion is what Israel was preparing to do over the last few days in northern Gaza: urge the civilian population to leave limited areas and use special forces to attack only specific locations where rockets, launchers or their minders reside, without trying to hold territory. This approach might yield the results of a ground attack without its burdens, though the risks to the special forces are significant.
Hamas’ objective was to continue the rocket attacks as a signal of political resistance. Hamas has no clear military objective. The thousand or so rockets launched so far have caused no significant damage (and haven’t killed anyone). But the rocket fire unnerves the Israeli population and brings on air attacks that Hamas uses to rally both Palestinian and international sympathy and support. From Hamas’ perspective, prolonging the air attacks is a good thing, provided Israel is unable to stop or siginficantly slow the rocket fire. It is still possible Hamas will refuse the truce and talks Egypt has proposed.
This is a formula for a long war, even if the truce goes into effect. Israel will continue because it wants to destroy the rockets. Hamas will continue because it wants the support and sympathy the air attacks bring. Egypt and the United States, which combined forces to end the 2012 eight-day air/rocket war between Hamas and Israel, are less likely to be effective this time around: President Sisi because Hamas is a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, the Americans because they seem to have lost their grip on Prime Minister Netanyahu. President Obama has offered American mediation, but no one has seemed interested.
What has all this got to do with last month’s murder of three Israeli teenagers and the apparent revenge murder of a Palestinian-American teenager? Nothing really. As in many other international incidents, the trigger that precipitated war is now mostly forgotten. The conflict has a dynamic of its own and is unlikely to stop until both sides start seeing diminishing returns.
Where does that leave those of us who think adding this war to the mess in the Middle East is not a good idea? And what comfort is there for the civilian populations involved?
The region is ablaze. Civil wars rage in Syria and Iraq, Libya and Yemen are a short step from joining them, Lebanon and Jordan are at risk, Egypt is restoring military dictatorship and repressing domestic resistance. The Americans are preoccupied with trying to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran (next Sunday is the initial deadline, extendable in principle by six months, if need be). This is not a good time for yet another Middle East conflict.
It is particularly bad for civilians. The numbers of casualties so far in the Israel/Gaza war are relatively small–according to the Palestinians, the Israeli air attacks have killed fewer than 200 people, about half of them allegedly civilians. Considering the amount of ordnance dropped, this is a remarkably small number, but more or less ten times as many have been injured. A few more weeks of this and the numbers would no longer look small. And each one represents a family tragedy, with future consequences.
Social conditions in Gaza were already dramatic. Its demographic, economic, educational, nutritional, and housing conditions were all worsening, from an already distressed state. The war will accelerate the deterioration. Israelis may get some relief eventually from Hamas rocket attacks, but the Palestinians can expect nothing to improve. Nevertheless, Hamas is likely to survive and even thrive on the resentments war generates. Rallying around the flag of the current government is a common reaction of those subjected to air attacks.
Gaza is in agony. While desirable, a truce will do little to relieve the underlying desperate conditions.
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Peace picks July 14-18
1. Ending Wars to Build Peace: Conflict Termination Workshop Monday, July 14 | 8:30 am – 1:00 pm United States Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Designing a conflict termination strategy is an essential but often overlooked component of warfighting. Improperly planned or incorrectly implemented, a failure to effectively terminate a conflict will leave open the original issues that brought on the war and likely create the conditions for future conflict. The U.S. Institute of Peace, U.S. Military Academy’s Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations and RAND Corporation invite you to an event featuring notable experts sharing their observations and concerns about the issue of war termination, its planning, transition and challenges. SPEAKERS: Gideon Rose, Author, How Wars End, Amb. Jim Jeffery, Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Hon. James Kunder, Former Deputy Administrator, USAID, Lt General Mark Milley, Commander, U.S. Army III Corps, and Dr. Rick Brennan Senior Political Scientist, RAND.
2. Ukraine: The Maidan and Beyond Monday, July 14 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm National Endowment for Democracy;1025 F Street NW, Suite 800, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The forthcoming July 2014 issue of the Journal of Democracy will feature a cluster of eight articles on Ukraine. Please join NDI as four of the contributors elaborate on the subjects discussed in their articles. Serhiy Kudelia analyzes the evolution of Ukraine’s political system during the past four years and why it led to the downfall of President Viktor Yanukovych. Lucan Way assesses the role that civil society played in bringing down Yanukovych and the challenges that it will now face. Anders Aslund examines the “endemic corruption” that has long plagued Ukraine and goes on to suggest how the new government can rebuild the country’s economy. Finally, Nadia Diuk considers the longer-term significance of the Maidan Revolution.
3. Doing Business in Burma: Human Rights Risks and Reporting Requirements Tuesday, July 15 | 8:15 am – 10:00 am Center for Human Rights & Humanitarian Law; 500 8th St. NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In 2012, the U.S. lifted economic sanctions on resource-rich Burma, sanctions that had been in place for over a decade. American businesses are required to publicly report to the State Department on the potential human rights, environmental, and political impacts of their investments if they exceed $500,000. Some of the questions that will be addressed: How can the Reporting Requirements guide companies and their attorneys in assessing and managing the risks that accompany new investment in Burma? Why is the information contained in the reports valuable to the State Department and other organizations? SPEAKERS: Amy Lehr, Attorney, Foley Hoag LLP, Jason Pielemeier, Esq., U.S. Department of State/DRL, Genevieve Taft, Global Manager of Workplace Rights, Coca-Cola, and Jennifer Quigley, Executive Director, U.S. Campaign for Burma.
4. New Story Leadership for the Middle East Congressional Forum Tuesday, July 15 | 10:00 am – 2:00 pm New Story Leadership; Cannon House Office Building, 200-299 New Jersey Ave SE, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND New Story Leadership for the Middle East is presents their class of 2014, featuring presentations from young Israeli and Palestinian leaders who are living, working, and learning together this summer in Washington, DC. Young voices throughout the world have decisively spoken up for change, demanding new leadership, greater freedom, and the right to choose their own futures. Now a new generation of Israelis and Palestinians wants to engage you in an emerging conversation by sharing their stories and their hopes for peace.
5. For the Least of These: A Biblical Answer to Poverty Tuesday, June 15 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Heritage Foundation;214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND While much progress has been made toward poverty alleviation, many well-intentioned efforts have led Christians to actions that are not only ineffective, but leave the most vulnerable in a worse situation than before. Is there a better answer? Combining biblical exegesis with proven economic principles, For the Least of These: A Biblical Answer to Poverty equips Christians with both a solid biblical and economic understanding of how best to care for the poor and foster sustainable economic development. With contributions from fourteen leading Christian economists, theologians, historians, and practitioners, For the Least of These presents the case for why markets and trade are the world’s best hope for alleviating poverty. SPEAKERS: Dr. Anne Bradley, Dr. Art Lindsley, Michael Craven, and Derrick Morgan.
6. The Madrid 3/11 Bombings, Jihadist Networks in Spain, and the Evolution of Terrorism in Western Europe Tuesday, June 15 | 2:00 pm – 3:50 pm Brooking Institute; 4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Ten years after the terror attacks in Madrid, Professor Fernando Reinares, a senior analyst within Elcano Royal Institute, has published a definitive account of the attacks. Reinares provides evidence showing that the decision to attack Spain was made in December 2001 in Pakistan by Moroccan Amer Azizim and that the Madrid bombing network began its formation more than one year before the start of the Iraq war. Spain battles the challenge of jihadist radicalization and recruitment networks that are sending fighters to join the wars in Syria and elsewhere. On July 15, the Intelligence Project at Brookings will host Professor Reinares for a discussion on his book’s revelations, the empirical data on the evolution of jihadism in Spain and the future of terrorism in Western Europe.
7. Forgotten, but Not Gone: The Continuing Threat of Boko Haram Tuesday, June 15 | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm International Institute for Strategic Studies; 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The furor of the #BringBackOurGirls movement has faded rapidly and Boko Haram’s insurgency, now in its fourth year, has again been largely forgotten by the international media, despite the fact that violence has continued in the form of mass killings, attacks in the capital, Abuja, and new abductions. Virginia Comolli will be discussing the implications of Boko Haram’s insurgency for Nigeria, repercussions for other West African countries and the role of non-African partners in dealing with the security challenges the group presents. Comolli is the Research Fellow running the newly established IISS Security and Development Programme.
8. Petrocaribe, Central America, and the Caribbean: Who Will Subsidize the Future? Wednesday, July 16 | 8:30 am – 10:30 am Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th St. NW, 12th Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND US Vice President Joe Biden used his recent trip to Latin America to announce a new initiative to promote energy security in the Caribbean. Is it enough? Join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center for a timely discussion on the future of Petrocaribe. The huge Venezuelan oil subsidy enters its tenth year, and continues to provide Caracas with political support from its closest neighbors – but at what cost to the region? Given Venezuela’s economic demise, will Petrocaribe continue delivering into the future? Now is the moment to examine energy alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America. This event will launch the Atlantic Council’s new report, Uncertain Energy: The Caribbean’s Gamble with Venezuela, authored by Arsht Center Senior Nonresident Energy Fellow David L. Goldwyn and his associate, Cory R. Gill.
9. The Resurgence of the Taliban Wednesday, June 16 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In autumn 2001, U.S. and NATO troops were deployed to Afghanistan to unseat Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers. Yet, despite a more than decade-long attempt to eradicate them, the Taliban has endured—regrouping and reestablishing themselves as a significant insurgent movement. Hassan Abbas, author of The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier, will examine how the Taliban not only survived but adapted to regain power and political advantage. Carnegie’s Frederic Grare will moderate.
10. Citizens, Subjects, and Slackers: Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes Wednesday, June 16 | 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Marc Berenson’s unique surveys of Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians, conducted from 2004 to 2012 regarding their attitudes towards paying taxes, illustrate that Polish citizens express a far greater willingness and support for paying taxes than Russian citizens, who, in turn, are more willing taxpayers than Ukrainian citizens. Unlike Poles, whose compliance is related to their trust in the state, and Russians, whose compliance is related to their fear of the state, Ukrainians, showing the lowest support for tax obedience, have reacted to state efforts to increase compliance with less fear and little trust. This suggests that post-transition governments must find ways to create and build up levels of trust on the part of citizens in their state, but that bridging the exceptionally high and long-held levels of distrust in the Ukrainian state will remain an extreme challenge for those seeking a new rule-of-law Ukraine. Kennan Institute Global Fellow, Amb. Kenneth Yalowitz, will provide discussion.
11. Fixing the US Department of Veterans Affairs: Prospects for Reform Thursday, June 17 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am American Enterprise Institute; 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Recent scandals at medical centers for veterans have trained a spotlight on longstanding inefficiencies within the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). In the case of the VA’s disability system, a nearly century-old approach to wounded veterans still prevails. The widespread consensus is that the problem goes much deeper than falsified waiting lists and delayed access to care, and necessitates a global overhaul. What would a renewed vision of veteran care look like, and how should we clarify the objectives of the VA’s disability system? In the interim, what short-term reforms are practical? Join AEI as House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Chairman Jeff Miller presents a blueprint for reform, followed by a discussion with experts in health care, disability, and public administration. Other speakers include Michael H. McLendon, Joseph Antos, Richard V. Burkhauser, Peter Schuck, and Sally Satel.
12. Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia with Professor Aaron Friedberg Thursday, June 17 | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm IISS; 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND China’s military build-up, particularly the expansion of its long-range nuclear forces and its development of ‘anti-access/area-denial’ (A2/AD) capabilities, poses a serious threat to both the American position in East Asia and the security of other regional powers. The growth of these forces challenges Washington’s ability, and perhaps its willingness, to project power into the region. This could call American security guarantees into question, eventually undermining the United States’ place as the dominant Asia-Pacific power. Left unchecked, perceived shifts in the regional military balance away from the US and its allies towards China could also raise the risks of miscalculation and deterrence failure. Professor Aaron Friedberg of Prince University will be launching his new Adelphi series book, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia.” He will be joined by discussant Elbridge Colby, the Robert M. Gates Fellow at the Center for New American Security.
13. Putting Military Personnel Costs in Context: Analysis by AEI and BPC Friday, July 18 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am Russell Senate Office Building; Constitution Avenue and 1st Street, NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND According to a new study by the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the per capita cost of military personnel on active duty increased by 42 percent over the last decade. Overall, growth in cost was much faster than growth in the number of people serving. AEI and BPC invite you to a conversation about the cost trends impacting America’s professional volunteer force and their implications for the future. SPEAKERS: Linda Bilmes, Charlie Houy, Scott Lilly, Ann Sauer, and Charles Wald.
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