Month: July 2014
Tyranny’s gradations
There’s a funny story behind the July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler, Waller Newell suggested at the Heritage Foundation on Friday. A suitcase packed with explosives had been placed under his table, killing several of his top advisors. Stumbling out of the conference room unharmed, his clothes tattered, Hitler reportedly said “That’s it. No more mister nice guy.”
Because tyrants can be almost comically grotesque, they make for easy targets of humor and ridicule. At bottom, however, they are twisted and cruel, and should be opposed by anyone who supports democracy and freedom. Right?
Sometimes, Newell said, the choice is not between democracy and tyranny. It is between gradations of despotism. Americans would do well to consider if, by overthrowing one dictator, an even worse tyrant is waiting in the wings.
Americans believe that inside every Egyptian or Iraqi, a little Tocquevillian democrat is waiting to emerge. Even today, many still cling to the idea that all people secretly desire to live under the banner of liberal democracy. But what if the choice is not really between tyranny and democracy, but different types of tyranny? Newell explores this question in his new book, Tyranny: A New Interpretation.
Tyrants can be divided into three categories. The first is the “garden-variety tyrant.” These are men who dispose of entire countries for their own amusement. They rule for their own profit, without regard to their people. Nero, Mubarak, Gaddafi are a few examples.
He called second type the “tyrant as reformer.” Like the first category, these men seek to amass wealth, but they are also interested in state building. They embark on large-scale projects of public renewal. They are more restrained in their personal lives and in their cruelty. These so-called “benevolent despots” include Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Napoleon and Ataturk.
The final, and most dangerous, type is the millenarian. These men want to destroy the social order completely and rebuild it according to their collectivist, utopian vision. Examples include Stalin, Robespierre, Hitler, and today’s jihadists. They argue that the suffering of thousands of men is justified when weighed against the future happiness of millions. The Ba’athists attempted to mimic this type, but most were in fact garden-variety tyrants. The genuine millenarian tyrant wants to destroy today’s society to bring about communism, the thousand-year Reich, or a global caliphate.
The French and Iranian Revolutions began as reformist movements, but were quickly hijacked by authoritarian factions. Many new rulers, instead of transforming into democrats, will simply end up oppressing those who oppressed them. Former Egyptian president Morsi’s government was headed in this direction. Newell described Morsi’s ascent to power as a legal, Islamicizing coup, adding that al Sisi’s government is marginally preferable.
Like most Americans, Newell said he is tempted to side with Iran against ISIS in Iraq, or with the Syrian rebels against Assad. However, he cautioned against American military involvement in any of these conflicts. The Sunni and Shi’a were once united by mutual hatred for Israel and the United States. American involvement in the Syrian conflict could allow a sectarian alliance to resurface. He suggested that the recent kidnappings of three Israeli teens was an attempt by Iranian-led groups to change the subject.
An independent Kurdistan could be one of the few tangible positive consequences of the US invasion of Iraq. The Kurds tend to be friendly towards the US and Israel. Very few of them support the installation of a global caliphate.
The fall of the Soviet Union was supposed to herald the end of tyranny and usher in a new era of democracy. In fact, it unleashed a Pandora’s box of tribalism and religious warfare. Most terrorists, Newell argued, are simply tyrants in waiting. Should we undermine dictators who aren’t declared enemies of the United States, when an even worse tyrant might be waiting to take his place?
How to prevent Iraq’s breakup
The American commentariat is offering lots of advice these days on Iraq. The consensus is that Baghdad needs a broad, inclusive, national unity coalition that will have the confidence of Kurds and Sunni as well as Shia. The corollary is that Nouri al Maliki has to go.
That may be what has to happen, but it won’t happen because Kurds, Sunni and Shia have a kumbaya moment.
Iraq is already fractured: there are three distinct polities. In none of them is reaching across ethnic or sectarian lines a popular proposition right now. Kurds are grabbing what they need to be independent, which yesterday meant the oil fields in Kirkuk. Tribal Sunni and secular Ba’athists are making common cause with jihadists. Shia gave Maliki more than twice as many seats in parliament as his nearest competitor–and over 700,000 personal preference votes–because he was seen as leading a strong crackdown on Sunni insurgency.
The solution to Iraq’s current problems lies within each of the polities, not between them. Reconciliation at the national level is for later, not now.
The Shia community is primary. Its representatives in parliament will choose the next prime minister. Maliki commands the largest part of these representatives, but his Shia rivals Ammar al Hakim and Moqtada al Sadr together can stop him. They need not only say nay to a third term (as they have already done) but also choose his successor. That’s where they keep getting tripped up. Ditto the power behind them, which is Ayatollah Ali al Sistani. He has made it clear he doesn’t think Maliki has done well, but he needs to go further to manage the process of choosing his replacement.
That alone will not solve Iraq’s problems. There will still be a Sunni insurgency and a Kurdistan land-grab. If Iraq is to be prevented from breaking up, and a foundation laid for future reconciliation, portions of each of these communities will need to restrain their comrades in arms.
In Kurdistan, the moderating force is likely to be Iraq President Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Electoral underperformance and Talabani’s incapacitating illness have weakened the PUK in recent years, but its peshmerga forces control Kirkuk. Unless they are willing to stand and fight, a referendum and declaration of independence would be foolhardy. The PUK depends a good deal on Tehran, which will want to block secession, lest it lead to rebellion in Eastern Kurdistan, an Iranian province that borders Iraqi Kurdistan and PUK-controlled territory.
In the Sunni provinces, the question is whether the traditionally Arab and Iraqi nationalist tribes and Ba’athists will break with the jihadist leadership. The tribes and Ba’athists recognize that Sunnis lose if Iraq is broken up, because the Sunni-populated portion has little oil and gas. They want self-governance, not independence, whereas their jihadist allies want an Islamic caliphate that dismantles Iraq, Syria and possibly several other countries. That is a good reason for the Sunni population to think twice before following the jihadists over the cliff.
I am all for national reconciliation. After the war, there will be a time and a place. It takes years to make it happen. Right now the best that can be hoped for is factional moderation. Preventing Iraq’s breakup means empowering those within each community who will resist it.
Two states or else
In the last week, Israel has cratered Gaza with dozens of airstrikes. Hamas has fired hundreds of rockets into southern Israel. Following on the murders of four teenagers, Palestine could be on the cusp of a third intifada. At the Wilson Center Monday, moderator David Aaron Miller joined panelists Hussein Ibish, Shibley Telhami, and Robert Danin to discuss recent events.
Telhami noted a number of parallels between 1987, the eve of the First Intifada, and today. In the 1980s, the Iran-Iraq war dominated the headlines, and Israel-Palestine had ceased to command much attention. With the world focused on Syria and Iraq, this is also the case today. He also pointed to the weakness of Palestine’s leaders. In 1987, much of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership was living in exile. At present, they might as well be. Unable, or unwilling, to administer much of Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is wholly disconnected from the people who elected them.
The political landscape in Palestine is marred by inaction and despair, said Danin. Hamas and the PA are reacting to, rather than leading, events. With the last election more than five years ago, both lack political legitimacy. Indeed, the increasing irrelevance of the two factions was crucial to the formation of the Hamas-PA unity government.
PA leader Mahmoud Abbas has been branded a traitor for cooperating with Israelis to apprehend the men who kidnapped and murdered three Israeli teenagers. Meanwhile, 50,000 government workers have not been paid in the last month. Hamas is also in a difficult position, as they need to reign in militants while not appearing to placate Israel.
The panelists agreed that Hamas’s leadership is not inclined to intensify the conflict. Some Israeli leaders, including Netanyahu, are equally reluctant to escalate. Israel looks to Hamas to enforce order in Gaza, and is concerned with the rise of more radical movements like Islamic Jihad. Hamas is willing to play this role, but needs a political out.
The good news, said Ibish, is that if a majority of Palestinians wanted an intifada, there would be one. On the Israeli side, many are aware that if a two-state solution doesn’t happen now, it may never happen. In a political climate that has Netanyahu looking like a moderate, however, a return to negotiating table appears unlikely. Still, both sides are terrified of the rising chaos in the region. With one eye towards Syria and Iraq, they are aware that things could be much worse.
Danin noted that the current bout of violence didn’t come out of nowhere, and is not simply a product of a failed peace process. There has been an uptick in so-called “Price Tag” attacks in last few years. John Kerry is not to blame for this. Still, there is a diplomatic vacuum right now, and the US doesn’t have a strong hand to play.
If it is too late for a two-state solution, Telhami said, then one state, with equal citizenship, is the only morally acceptable alternative. This scenario is unlikely, however. In fact, Kiryat Arba and other settler groups have already taken advantage of the chaos to establish new outposts in the West Bank. Danin countered that a one-state “solution” does not exist. Ultimately, there is no smorgasbord of outcomes. The possibilities are binary: a two-state solution, or unremitting bloodshed.
Since 1967, Israelis have wielded the power of the strong, while Palestinians have wielded the power of the weak. It is within this context that children become targets, and diplomacy gives way to blood debt. There is only one way out of this cycle of violence, and that is through a two-state solution.
If the peace process can be revived, Netanyahu might yet have a role to play. After all, the history of peacemaking is a history of transformed hawks.
Independence is overrated
I’m late with this post, but so be it. Independence is overrated. Here’s why I say so.
Consider American independence. Declared July 4, 1776. Then seven years of war with Britain, renewed for a couple of more in 1812. Followed by a vast westward land grab against Native American resistance and a four-year Civil War that set records for fraticidal homicide.
Think America is uniquely violent? Try Sudan: almost 40 years of civil war, independence in 2011, then civil war within South Sudan starting last year. Or Kosovo: declared independence the first time around in 1992, war in the late 1990s, independence finally in 2008, still trying to establish full sovereignty over its territory and full recognition by the international community.
The downsides of independence are particularly relevant at the moment. Scotland will vote on independence September 18. If it passes, it won’t precipitate war, but it will cause a major headache for the European Union. Catalonia would like to follow suit, but Spain’s constitution does not provide for a referendum. The Catalans may proceed anyway, creating another major headache for the EU.
If either of these referenda pass, it will make a referendum in Kurdistan, which is guaranteed to pass, all the more likely. Parts of eastern Ukraine already held referenda earlier this year, but they were ambiguous and no independence has resulted. Instead, Kiev is making progress in reclaiming territory. If ever eastern Ukraine were to succeed in seceding, Transnistria, a breakaway province of Moldova, would follow.
South Ossetia and Abhazia, both breakaway bits of Georgia, have already declared independence, but recognition has been hard to come by. They are far from independent, but no longer governed as part of Georgia.
The point is not that independence is a mistake. Certainly the United States was not going to remain forever a British colony. Serbia did nothing for nine years after the war with NATO to make unity attractive to Kosovars. Sudan behaved pretty much the same way towards South Sudan. Independence for Pristina and Juba was the best remaining option, not the worst.
The point is that even the best option is not without difficulties. Clean breaks like Slovakia’s with the Czech Republic are the exception to the rule. While de-colonialization after World War II was absolutely necessary and desirable (for the sake of the nother countries as well as their colonies), it rarely produced the glorious results its advocates advertised. And it sometimes produced mass atrocities on a prodigious scale, as in the partition and independence of India and Pakistan, not to mention the continuing conflict in the Middle East arising from Palestine’s partition and Israel’s independence.
I enjoy July 4 as much as the next American. But it had very different implications for Thomas Jefferson, who was able to keep his slaves far longer than would have been the case had America been ruled from London, and his fellow signer of the declaration John Adams, who had to accept the “peculiar institution” in order to ensure independence. They both died on July 4, 1826, satisfied I suppose that the first 50 years of the republic were worthy of their revolution but unaware of the accounting on slavery still to come.
We celebrate independence with fireworks, drink and flag-waving patriotism. But we ignore all the complications. There are usually a lot of them. Independence is overrated. More on that later, as I consider the case of Kurdistan.
Peace picks July 7-11
- Transitional Justice in Colombia: What Lessons Can Be Learned from Other Countries? Monday, July 7 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Washington Office on Latin America; 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Since peace talks commenced in October 2012, the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have reached agreements on three key points—land, political participation, and drug policy—further than any prior peace process. Yet while hope for an agreement is growing, significant obstacles remain. Professor Jo-Marie Burt, Senior Fellow at WOLA, has closely followed transitional processes throughout Latin America, including most recently in Guatemala and Peru. In conversation with Senior Associate Gimena Sanchez, she will provide lessons learned from those experiences that could help shape the debate in Colombia.
- Whither the Palestinians Monday, July 7 | 4:00 pm – 5:15 pm Woodrow Wilson Center, Sixth Floor; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Iraq and Syria may be dominating the headlines, but the Israeli-Palestinian issue remains a volatile and unpredictable piece of the Middle Eastern puzzle. Hussein Ibish, Senior Fellow at American Task Force on Palestine, Shibley Telhami, Peace and Development Professor at the University of Maryland, and Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives, will discuss the Palestinians and their politics, including the recent unity agreement, the impasse in the peace process, and the prospects for elections in the West Bank and Gaza.
- Facing a Revisionist Russia: Discussion from Carl Bildt Tuesday, July 8 | 9:00 am – 10:30 am Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th Street, NW, Twelfth Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Europe must find a way of dealing with the new, revisionist Russia, even as it faces the growth of political forces with ties to Moscow and seeks to lessen its own energy dependence. Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt has long been at the center of European efforts to develop a coherent EU foreign policy, including towards Russia. One of the initiators of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, he has been keenly involved in EU relations with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. He will discuss his views on European Union and transatlantic relations with Russia, as well as recent developments within the EU and the impact on EU foreign policy.
- Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Lens Tuesday, July 8 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Johns Hopkins University- SAIS; 1740 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Georgia Holmer, senior program officer in the Center for Gender and Peacebuilding at the U.S. Institute of Peace; Mike Jobbins, senior program manager for Africa at Search for Common Ground; Irfan Saeed, senior policy advisor in the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Haroon Ullah, member of the U.S. Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, will discuss violent extremism in the twenty-first century that threatens world stability.
- Iran Sanctions: What the U.S. Cedes in a Nuclear Deal Tuesday, July 8 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am US Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The panelists will address the complex questions and challenges of sanctions in the Iran nuclear talks. It’s the last of three discussions hosted by an unprecedented coalition of eight Washington think tanks and organizations to coincide with the last three rounds of negotiations. SPEAKERS Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Institution, Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service and former CIA analyst, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Center for New American Security, and Robin Wright, USIP and Woodrow Wilson Center.
- Modern Day Slavery: What the U.S. Government and the International Community Can do to Combat Migrant Labor Abuses and End Human Trafficking in the Gulf Tuesday, July 8 | 3:00 pm – 4:00 pm United States Capitol Visitor Center, Room 268, Washington, D.C. Sarah Leah Whitson, Human Rights Watch, James Lynch, Amnesty International, James Suzano, Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain, as well as Shawna Bader-Blau, Solidarity Center of the AFL-CIO, examine the legal and customary systems in the Gulf that govern migrant labor, as well as the status of migrant and trafficked workers in GCC countries, and what Congress can do to combat migrant labor abuses and end the suffering of victims of human trafficking.
- Afghanistan’s Future: Politics, Prosperity, and Security Under New Leadership Wednesday, July 9 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Asia Society; 1526 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Across the country, millions of Afghans have cast their ballots to select the next president. The second round of elections was held on June 14, 2014, with two candidates, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. While Afghans await the results of the election, Ambassador Omar Samad, Senior Central Asia Fellow at New American Foundation, Clare Lockhart, Director of the Institute for State Effectiveness, and Hassan Abbas, Senior Advisor at Asia Society, will explore from different perspectives what Afghans and Americans can expect in each of these areas in the new Afghan administration and with the U.S. military drawdown.
- Voices from the Middle East: The Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of New Story Leadership Thursday, July 10 | 9:00 am – 12:00 pm Johns Hopkins SAIS, Nitze Building; 1740 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Ten students from Israel and Palestine will share their stories and projects on this topic.
- Ethiopia’s Democratic Transition: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back Thursday, July 10 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm National Endowment for Democracy; 1025 F Street, NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Despite the introduction of a new constitution in 1995, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has suppressed meaningful democratic change during its two decades in power. The resulting gap between popular expectations and Ethiopia’s political reality has increased frustrations among citizens, and ongoing violence, indicating the depth of unresolved tensions. Merera Gudina Jefi will evaluate the EPRDF regime’s performance by outlining the contours of the country’s political development and identifying major democratic setbacks. He will offer recommendations for domestic actors, including the Ethiopian government and opposition parties, and for the international community, including the diaspora.
- BRICS Summit 2014: Agenda and Implications Friday, July 11 | 10:00 am – 12:00 pm Brookings Institution; 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Brazil hosts the leaders of Russia, India, China, and South Africa for the 2014 BRICS Summit on July 15-17, days after the end of the World Cup. This BRICS summit will take place against the backdrop of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the Russia-China gas deal, the election of Narendra Modi in India, the likely establishment of a BRICS Bank, and the Rousseff-Biden talks to improve U.S-Brazil relations. The panel will discuss the summit and examine its implications for U.S. foreign policy and the broader international order. Bruce Jones, senior fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy (IOS), will lead the conversation, which will feature Brookings Foreign Policy scholars Fiona Hill, Kenneth Lieberthal, Harold Trinkunas, Tanvi Madan and Thomas Wright.
- The Many Faces of Tyranny: Why Democracy Isn’t Always Possible Friday, July 11 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND History has not ended. Across the world today, we are witnessing both a heroic struggle for democracy and reform and the disturbing strength of tyrannical regimes and movements. Whether it be the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, the aggressiveness of Putin’s Russia or the increasing bellicosity of China, the forces of democracy and the forces of tyranny are in a dead heat. Waller R. Newell, Political Science Professor at Carleton University, asks how should the West respond? How should we make the difficult choice between better and worse kinds of non-democratic authority when overthrowing today’s dictatorship may only bring about a much worse totalitarian alternative tomorrow?
Help, or else
Things are not going well for Iraqi President Nouri al Maliki, whose calls for foreign assistance have grown increasingly frantic. While Iraqi Kurds agitate for an independent state, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) consolidates power in northern and western Iraq. At the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Lukman Faily Tuesday tried to make a case for increased military assistance to Iraq. His argument came down to this: if you don’t help us, someone else will.
The Obama Administration is understandably reluctant to send weapons into what has become an increasingly sectarian conflict. However, the ambassador said that his country needs American assistance “to turn the tide against ISIS.” Until more robust US aid materializes, Iraq cannot decline offers of assistance from other countries, including Iran, Syria, and Russia. Iraq will not get involved in the Syrian conflict, but he said that Maliki “welcomes” Assad’s help. He added that Iran and Iraq have a shared history, and Iran considers many of Iraq’s Shi’a shrines as within their sphere of influence. “Their expertise is welcome.” The two will continue to cooperate as long they face a shared enemy.
He claimed that ISIS has been cleared in Tikrit, contradicting a number of media reports. The area remains heavily booby-trapped, however, and Iraq’s security forces cannot win with ground troops alone. Echoing Maliki’s earlier statements, Faily said that air supremacy is key to defeating these insurgents. A political solution must arrived in tandem with military force.
Faily, who is Kurdish, said that the Iraqi constitution was written to ensure Kurds are adequately represented, and 95% of Iraqi Kurds agreed to these provisions. While acknowledging Kurdish president Massoud Barzani’s aspirations for an independent state, he said that Kurds are still expected to play a role in shaping Iraq’s future. He left open the question of whether Kurds deserved their own independent state. Still, as long as ISIS controls the border between Iraq and the Kurdish region, it will be difficult for the two sides to cooperate against ISIS. His government welcomes Kurdish cooperation, but an independent Kurdish state is not feasible in the current political situation.
I asked the Ambassador if he would be willing to involve ex-Ba’athists, including those who have colluded with ISIS, in any future reconciliation process. He answered that no members of ISIS could be included, but that he welcomes any homegrown elements of the insurgency, as long as they have “not been involved in bloodshed.”
Time Magazine’s Michael Crowley asked the ambassador about an attack on the al Askari, or Golden Dome, mosque, one of the holiest shrines in Shi’a Islam. Al Qaeda destroyed the mosque in 2006, sparking a civil war that claimed thousands of lives. Faily admitted that the outer perimeter of the mosque had been hit, and several people were killed, but would not say if the shrine itself had been damaged. He added that ISIS had been evicted from Samarra, calling the attack a “hit and run” operation.
Faily also acknowledged that dozens of Sunni prisoners had been executed while in custody of Iraqi forces and Shi’a militias, and said the government “was looking into it.”
300,000 people were displaced when ISIS came into Mosul, and 120,000 in Tal Afar. These displaced people also threaten Iraq’s stability, and his government needs material support from the US to deal with them. Last week, he told US Secretary of State John Kerry, “We need your help now. Do not put conditions” on assistance to Iraq, because the threat is to immediate. He called this an “acid test” for the US-Iraq relationship.
Both the US and Iraq are “forever tied together because of the lives we lost and the treasure we spent in the past decade in the fight against terrorism.” ISIS is not only a threat to all Iraqis, but regionally and indeed internationally. If they are allowed to consolidate the gains they have made, ISIS will have a safe haven from which to launch attacks on American interests. And if America does not help, Russia, Syria, and Iran are more than happy to step in.