The tides of war

In Gaza the tide of war seems to be receding, though a ceasefire still seems far off. Israel seems to prefer unilateral withdrawal to an agreement that would necessarily involve Hamas. In Ukraine, Russia’s eastern strongholds of Donestsk and Luhansk are preparing for siege. Russian President Putin may well need to invade if he is to save his proxies from an increasingly effective Ukrainian army.

In Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) continues to consolidate its gains and make modest progress against not only the Iraqi army but also against the Kurdish peshmerga.  But in Syria, the IS has suffered setbacks.  The Western-supported Syrian Opposition Coalition is losing ground to both the regime and IS but hopes to install its next government, to be named soon, inside Syria.

A definitive end to any of these wars seems far off. Each of the contestants–half non-state actors–has enough outside support to prevent defeat, even if none of them appears strong enough to achieve anything close to victory. Bashar al Asad is no more likely to govern all of Syria in the future than Nouri al Maliki is likely to govern all of Iraq. The Islamic State has taken large but largely empty portions of eastern Syria and western Iraq, but it is unlikely to take Baghdad or Damascus. Ukraine may re-establish its authority in Donbas, but only if Russia allows it to happen. Israel won’t reoccupy Gaza, but will instead try to get the Palestinian Authority to play a major role there in the post-war period.

Contemporary warfare is no longer about victory and defeat of clashing armed forces in the classic sense but rather about degrees of control over the civilian population. It is “war amongst the people,” in the phrase UK General Rupert Smith coined. Civilians are not bystanders, collateral damage is not collateral, military objectives are political. A definitive end to war of this sort is unlikely, absent definitive international intervention. The best that can be hoped for is a political settlement that channels conflict into nonviolent directions, at least for a time. We did better than that in the Balkans, but only because Europe and the United States were not only willing to intervene militarily but also insert tens of thousands of troops to stabilize the situation.

The tides of war may be receding a bit now in Ukraine and Middle East, but the respite isn’t likely to last. War amongst the people gives the people a lot of reason to resent the enemy and little reason to reconcile. Non-state actors may melt away but survive to fight another day. Unless states make a conscious and concerted effort to resolve fundamental political issues, they are likely to find themselves fighting non-state actors over and over, as Israel has done with Hamas and Hizbollah. IS’s current explosion in Iraq is not its first. Its antecedents were behind the 2006/7 insurgency that the Americans successfully overcame with the cooperation of Sunni tribes. But that success did not lead to a broad political settlement.

The search for such a settlement is what leads to calls for “national dialogue.” Yemen’s was thought to be relatively successful, though implementation is proving difficult. Libya is trying to launch one, but violence in both Tripoli and Benghazi has made it not only difficult but dangerous. The international intervention many Libyans would like is unlikely. The restored Egyptian autocracy is uninterested in national dialogue. It is forging ahead without trying to return its Islamist and liberal opponents to a political role. Israel doesn’t want Hamas included in the Palestinian Authority government. Nor does Kiev want the separatist leaders incorporated back into its polity.

The tides of war may be receding for the moment, but the odds are they will return, perhaps stronger than ever.