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Civil society in the Syrian diaspora

While the war in Gaza dominates the news cycle, the carnage in Syria has been all but forgotten. Last week’s death toll of 700 people in 48 hours received scant coverage in the international media. Nonetheless, the civil war has given birth to a plethora of diaspora-based civil society organizations (CSOs), and their numbers to continue to grow. Some groups are apolitical, distributing food and medical supplies where they are needed. Others see humanitarianism as an opportunity to advance a political or religious agenda. As the chances for political reconciliation diminish, a number of civil society groups have emerged that eschew any political involvement at all.

Outside CSOs are split on the question of armed conflict. Some are involved in funding, or at least supporting, various armed factions within Syria. For instance, the Coalition for a Democratic Syria aims to protect “the Syrian people through a unified Syrian Armed Forces,” according to their mission statement. The Syrian American Council also lobbies for increased US aid for the Free Syrian Army, the loose coalition of rebels who are fighting both Assad and Islamist-aligned groups.

Other groups, including the UK-based Madani, argue that arming either side only fuels the conflict. Regional and international actors should instead be working towards universal disarmament. One of Madani’s objectives is to “combat the war economy” by tracing and publicly exposing organizations and governments who funnel weapons into the country. They are also working to demobilize fighters and reintegrate them into civilian life.  The group is currently mapping Syrian CSOs, and aims to ultimately create a network out of willing groups.

Any negotiations are more likely to succeed when CSOs are included in the process. Including these groups can also lend more legitimacy to a deal once it has been struck. Unfortunately, CSOs were not at the table during the failed Geneva II talks in January. The opposition was represented by the Syrian National Coalition, which has tenuous links to groups on the ground.

The failure of Geneva II gave rise to several organizations that are focused exclusively on civic projects and development, distancing themselves from politics. The newly formed Syrian Civil Coalition is one such group. They seek to bridge the divide between rival factions by providing a neutral forum for “realistically moderate” discourse. The coalition does not have a political stance, stating “It is important to avoid any inclination that aims at serving one political party.”

Their impartiality makes these groups suspect, so their impact of on the ground is limited. Some organizations that refuse to clarify their political alignment, like Jusoor, have been accused of harboring pro-regime leanings. Some activists have indicated that groups with no position on either regime or rebel forces cannot represent them. This calls into question the extent to which moderate or nonaligned groups can effect change in Syria.

Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon are sheltering close to three million Syrians, relying largely on a network of humanitarian groups to provide for them. CSOs in Jordan already had a large presence to accommodate the wave the refugees who escaped the Hama massacre in 1982. Many of these groups are connected to the Jordanian or Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and receive additional funding from Qatar. Some of the children of these refugees founded the Syrian Women’s Organization in 2006, which provides new arrivals with food, medicine, and even cash.  Turkey is also home to a large number of CSOs.   Following recent protests against Syrian refugees in Urfa, the Syrian al-Khabour Civic Forum met with local groups to try to diffuse the situation.  The Turkey-based Syrian Business Forum, which has reportedly received millions of dollars from Qatar, may be a key player in a post-Assad Syria.  The group is said to already have a significant presence in northern Syria.

Many Syrian refugees have come to play a critical, though often informal, role in the conflict. A network of activists has arisen alongside traditional aid agencies, many of which are no longer able to operate in many parts of Syria. These members of the Syrian diaspora regularly smuggle medicine, food, and even people across Syria’s porous borders. “We do everything: journalism, medical care, smuggling,” said Ahmed Almasri, a Syrian refugee who is based in Jordan. They rely on sympathetic truck and taxi drivers, as well as professional smugglers, to move their “products” in and out of Syria. A few groups, including the Islamic Charity Centre Society, have tacitly admitted to using these informal conduits to distribute aid.

This civil war has brought a dizzying array of competing political, social, and religious interests to the fore. While some CSOs are purely humanitarian driven, others are backed by outside groups with their own political agendas. Whatever their motivations, CSOs have come to play a crucial role within and outside of Syria.

Today, Assad’s regime is looking more like a criminal enterprise than a state. Even if he survives, these groups will remain critical to the well-being and survival of millions of Syrians. And if he does not, diaspora CSOs will play a decisive part in shaping that country’s future.