Month: August 2014
Peace picks August 4-8
- Morocco’s Emergence as a Gateway to Business in Africa Monday, August 4 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th Street, NW, Twelfth Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND H.E. Moulay Hafid Elalamy, Mohamed El Kettani, Hajji, and Nabil Habayeb will discuss how Morocco has emerged not only as a significant US political and strategic partner in Africa, but also as an attractive portal for investment and business headed to the continent. They will discuss US interests and the opportunities to deepen economic and commercial cooperation with Morocco and other African countries.
- Tunisia’s Democratic Successes: A Conversation with the President of Tunisia Tuesday, August 5 | 11:00 am – 12:15 pm Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th Street, NW, Twelfth Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND With both presidential and parliamentary elections due late this year, Tunisia once again faces imminent milestones in its political history. Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki will join the Atlantic Council’s Hariri Center and Africa Center for an exclusive engagement to discuss successes to date and how the country can address pressing economic and security challenges as its democratic transition continues.
- The Gaza Crisis: No Way Out? Policy Options and Regional Implications Tuesday, August 5 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a discussion examining the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the U.S. handling of the crisis, and the regional implications. Brookings Vice President for Foreign Policy and former U.S. Special Envoy to the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations Martin Indyk will share his observations and insights. He will be joined by fellows Natan Sachs and Khaled Elgindy, a former adviser to the Palestinian negotiating team.
- Putting the South Caucasus in Perspective Tuesday, August 5 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have been independent states for more than 23 years. Although geographically contiguous, they differ in language, religion, and political and security orientation. How is each country faring in state building, developing democracy, and improving economic performance? Two prominent academic experts of the South Caucasus, Professors Ronald Suny and Stephen Jones, will discuss the historical experience and current developments of the region.
- Overcoming Obstacles to Doing Business in Sub-Saharan Africa Wednesday, August 6 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In the context of the inaugural US-Africa Leaders Summit, the Atlantic Council’s will launch a new study about barriers to doing business in sub-Saharan Africa and how they can be overcome. Visiting Fellow Aubrey Hruby will discuss the inadequate infrastructure, lack of market data, and poor policy implementation in Africa. The publication will also focus on innovative solutions for surmounting such obstacles and how companies who have successfully entered African markets can provide lessons learned for future investors.
- Loved? Liked? Respected? The Success and Failure of U.S. Public Diplomacy Wednesday, August 6 | 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm Washington Institute-Near East; 1828 L Street, NW, #1050, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Washington Institute will host a debate on the value of U.S. public diplomacy. It will analyze the role of public diplomacy in the Middle East with particular attention to the crisis in Gaza, the ISIS campaign in Iraq, the ongoing conflict in Syria, and escalating terrorist threats in the region. Institute’s Executive Director Robert Satloff will stand off against the former U.S. ambassador to Turkey and Iraq, James Jeffrey in a debate moderated by Viola Gienger of the United States Institute of Peace.
- Statesmen’s Forum: His Excellency Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, President of the Republic of Mali Thursday, August 7 | 9:00 am – 10:15 am Center for Strategic and International Studies; 1616 Rhode Island Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita of Mali will discuss the progress and challenges of Mali’s post-crisis recovery, as well as the broader regional prospects for security, development, and good governance in the Sahel region. He will share his perspective on the ongoing peace process and the role that neighboring countries and the U.S. government can play in tackling insecurity and fostering reconciliation.
- President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso Thursday, August 7 | 5:00 pm National Press Club, 13th Floor; 529 14th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND President Blaise Compaore will give his assessment of the results of the US-Africa Leaders Summit taking place in Washington, D.C. from August 5th to 6th. He also plans to speak on his role as a regional mediator to resolve conflicts in West Africa.
- A Batkin International Leaders Forum with the President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Friday, August 8 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am Service Employees International Union; 1800 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND His Excellency Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, president of the Federal Republic of Somalia, will explore the future of democracy in Somalia and its many challenges and promises. Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director for Foreign Policy at Brookings, will hold a question and answer session with the president.
- Beyond North Waziristan Friday, August 8 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th Street, NW, Twelfth Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND As the Pakistani army wages a long-awaited operation, Zarb-e-Azb, against militant sanctuaries in North Waziristan, there are questions about how effectively it confronts the long-term challenge of terrorism in the region. How is the North Waziristan operation impacting militant groups operating in the region, and the overall stability of Pakistan? Can the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan work together to address sanctuaries for insurgents on both sides of the border? Major Ikram Sehgal and Hassan Abbas will highlight the progress, pitfalls, and implications of Pakistan’s strategy in North Waziristan.
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Civil society inside Syria
The Syrian conflict has waged for over three years and has resulted in unprecedented levels of violence, destruction, and fatalities. While the international community has attempted to assist in peace talks and humanitarian aid, Syrians have responded within their country through the creation of hundreds of independent civil society organizations (CSO’s). These organizations are both formal and informal and have come to range in purpose to address the most pressing needs of the shattered country. Many focus on civilian opposition goals, while others seek to provide humanitarian aid or social and psychological services to the victims of the conflict.
These CSO’s have adapted their purpose and strategies as the conflict has evolved over the past three years. They have been able to learn from each other and refine their approaches to operate most efficiently despite the lack of resources. Most of these groups are not politically affiliated and choose to address their priorities in a neutral and independent manner.
In response to Assad’s oppressive regime, many civilian opposition groups have arisen since 2011, such as Building the Syrian State and the Coalition of Forces for Peaceful Change. These CSO’s work for a nonviolent, civil democratic state impartial towards all ideologies and doctrines. They advocate for equality through fundamental democratic change, dialogue, and national reconciliation. These civilian opposition groups operate both inside and outside of regime territory and are active on social media and other forms of communication to gain followers and spread awareness.
Other groups are more centered on human rights, such as the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies, the Syrian Human Rights Organization, and the Centre for Syrian Freedoms. These CSO’s call for upholding inalienable human rights and equality in front of the law instead of participating in political activities. They have worked to document crimes against humanity, as well as issue statements, publications, and reports on human rights violations. Through this research, many CSO’s, such as the Damascus Center, have now proposed bills that fit with internationally agreed upon human rights legislations.
There also has been a large rise in the number of humanitarian aid oriented CSO’s as the violence and fatalities have escalated. Every Syrian, Najda Now, Syria Charity, and many others work to provide relief and social services for civilians throughout the country regardless of race, ethnicity, or religion. They secure daily necessities and shelter for those affected by the loss of their families and homes.
Many of these humanitarian CSO’s partner with international organizations that are located outside of Syria, such as Paris-based Soriyat for Development. Syria Charity has worked to achieve strategic partnerships with various international institutions and organizations, while Every Syrian has pursued international funding to rebuild Syrian homes and businesses. Syrian humanitarian CSO’s have therefore sought to consolidate resources and strategies on an international level in order to provide aid to victims and reestablish civil society as effectively as possible.
There has been significant development within Syria in regards to the rise in CSO’s; however, these organizations have been severely hindered by fragmentation and a lack of coordination. Resources are limited and methods of communication are greatly restricted. Many of these groups are forced to work underground due to Assad’s oppressive regime, making it difficult to operate at a functional and effective level. This impedes coordination with similar Syrian and international civil society organizations, as well as defectors, in order to strengthen resources and maximize impact.
Syrian CSO’s have also had a limited role after being left out of the Geneva process. Many find fault in this exclusion because a peace agreement cannot be sustained without the help and existence of civil society. Syrian CSO’s have been addressing the fundamental needs and priorities of civilians at a local level for several years. They have been making progress towards peace and coalitions, as well as raising awareness and understanding about the conflict and regime on the ground. Thus, they should play a vital role in any future efforts to create lasting and sustainable peace.
Syrian CSO’s have played a significant part in the country’s evolution and in providing humanitarian aid in the face of the conflict. At some point, both Assad and the opposition will be pressured to accept a compromise. When that happens, Syrian CSO’s will have the experience and hopefully the resources to rebuild the country from the ground up.
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The tides of war
In Gaza the tide of war seems to be receding, though a ceasefire still seems far off. Israel seems to prefer unilateral withdrawal to an agreement that would necessarily involve Hamas. In Ukraine, Russia’s eastern strongholds of Donestsk and Luhansk are preparing for siege. Russian President Putin may well need to invade if he is to save his proxies from an increasingly effective Ukrainian army.
In Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) continues to consolidate its gains and make modest progress against not only the Iraqi army but also against the Kurdish peshmerga. But in Syria, the IS has suffered setbacks. The Western-supported Syrian Opposition Coalition is losing ground to both the regime and IS but hopes to install its next government, to be named soon, inside Syria.
A definitive end to any of these wars seems far off. Each of the contestants–half non-state actors–has enough outside support to prevent defeat, even if none of them appears strong enough to achieve anything close to victory. Bashar al Asad is no more likely to govern all of Syria in the future than Nouri al Maliki is likely to govern all of Iraq. The Islamic State has taken large but largely empty portions of eastern Syria and western Iraq, but it is unlikely to take Baghdad or Damascus. Ukraine may re-establish its authority in Donbas, but only if Russia allows it to happen. Israel won’t reoccupy Gaza, but will instead try to get the Palestinian Authority to play a major role there in the post-war period.
Contemporary warfare is no longer about victory and defeat of clashing armed forces in the classic sense but rather about degrees of control over the civilian population. It is “war amongst the people,” in the phrase UK General Rupert Smith coined. Civilians are not bystanders, collateral damage is not collateral, military objectives are political. A definitive end to war of this sort is unlikely, absent definitive international intervention. The best that can be hoped for is a political settlement that channels conflict into nonviolent directions, at least for a time. We did better than that in the Balkans, but only because Europe and the United States were not only willing to intervene militarily but also insert tens of thousands of troops to stabilize the situation.
The tides of war may be receding a bit now in Ukraine and Middle East, but the respite isn’t likely to last. War amongst the people gives the people a lot of reason to resent the enemy and little reason to reconcile. Non-state actors may melt away but survive to fight another day. Unless states make a conscious and concerted effort to resolve fundamental political issues, they are likely to find themselves fighting non-state actors over and over, as Israel has done with Hamas and Hizbollah. IS’s current explosion in Iraq is not its first. Its antecedents were behind the 2006/7 insurgency that the Americans successfully overcame with the cooperation of Sunni tribes. But that success did not lead to a broad political settlement.
The search for such a settlement is what leads to calls for “national dialogue.” Yemen’s was thought to be relatively successful, though implementation is proving difficult. Libya is trying to launch one, but violence in both Tripoli and Benghazi has made it not only difficult but dangerous. The international intervention many Libyans would like is unlikely. The restored Egyptian autocracy is uninterested in national dialogue. It is forging ahead without trying to return its Islamist and liberal opponents to a political role. Israel doesn’t want Hamas included in the Palestinian Authority government. Nor does Kiev want the separatist leaders incorporated back into its polity.
The tides of war may be receding for the moment, but the odds are they will return, perhaps stronger than ever.
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Sanctions are a long game
This week the European Union and United States imposed new sanctions on Russia in response to its continuing support to rebels in eastern Ukraine, including provision of a missile system that allegedly brought down Malaysia Air flight 17 last month. Most commentary asks whether the sanctions will force Russian President Putin to change course. Few anticipate that they will. Some think the sanctions will make him double down. There is evidence of Russian shelling across the border into Ukraine as well as flows of Russian armaments and personnel to the rebels.
Sanctions rarely have an immediate effect. Yes, they may raise the costs of a policy, but Putin wouldn’t be pursuing the course he is on in Ukraine if he didn’t think it vital to his own, or Russia’s, interests. The sanctions may lessen his support, in particular from the oligarchs who control major sectors of Russia’s economy, but Putin is riding so high and is so fully in control that a dip in his popularity is unlikely to have much impact on his thinking. His goal is to re-establish Russia as a world contender, which means he has to worry (a lot) about what any loss would mean for future engagement vis-a-vis the US.
I know of little evidence that the impact of sanctions is maximal when they are imposed. It accumulates with the passage of time. Even if the effectiveness of sanctions declines, the economic impact is cumulative. So the Russians may shrug off energy and banking sanctions today, but in two or three years may be anxious to get rid of them.
There is ample anecdata to support the notion that negotiating an end to sanctions is what brings substantial results. That is what we are seeing right now with Iran: the draconian sanctions had little impact when they were imposed, but they weakened the country’s hardliners and several years later sanctions relief is something Tehran is prepared to pay for (though we don’t yet know how much).
That attitude came about partly as the result of a change of government. Few think President Ahmedinejad, were he still in power, would be negotiating limits on Iran’s nuclear program. Iranians elected President Rouhani in hopes of improving the country’s economic condition, which requires sanctions relief. He can’t deliver on the economy, which was his main campaign promise, without a nuclear deal that brings sanctions relief.
It is unlikely Putin will change his mind on Ukraine, even if some of his supporters would like him to do so. Today’s chat with President Obama, in which he Putin is said to have acknowledged the risks of escalation, signifies little. He will up the ante as far as he thinks he needs to go to ensure victory, all the while denying involvement. Sanctions are a long game. Their significance will likely await Putin’s successor, or perhaps even his successor plus one. In the meanwhile, Ukraine will have to try to win on the battlefield.
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