peacefare.net

Relief yes, complacency no

Ten days ago I noted the negative impact a “yes” vote in the Scottish referendum would have on Ukraine. It would have encouraged separatists there, as well as in Catalonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and other places. Whatever the merits of independence for Scots, the geopolitical implications would have been dreadful.

So what does the strong “no” vote mean? The message is nuanced. The outcome deprives separatists elsewhere of momentum, which is important in politics. But the “no” came about in part because London was willing to offer more devolution, especially of authority to tax and provide welfare. If fulfilled, this will allow Scotland to pursue its preference for a stronger welfare state than London is inclined to do under its Conservative-led governments. Edinburgh’s tea party wants to spend more, not less.

It is also important that Scotland has essentially no human rights complaints against Westminster. Scots have enjoyed the full benefits of liberal democracy in one of its bastions. That of course is not the case everywhere. The lesson Madrid, Kiev, Baghdad, Sarajevo, Pristina, Tbilisi and other central governments should draw from the Scottish experience is that they should provide maximum freedom to their citizens and devolution to provincial and local governments, consistent with the integrity of the state.

What that last phrase means is the heart of the matter. It will mean different things in different places. Iraqi Kurdistan lies at one extreme. Its Kurdish population has every human rights reason to want independence, including mass atrocities inflicted with chemical weapons, expulsion of its population from the country, and unequal treatment. The main remaining authority Baghdad has over Erbil is to deny Kurdistan oil revenue and prevent it from exporting its own oil, which it has been doing since January. Kurdistan still remains part of Iraq because the Americans, Iranians and (to a declining extent) the Turks insist on it. That geopolitical resistance may not last forever.

In other situations, it may be sufficient to allow minority populations a large measure of local authority (especially over language, culture and education) along with economic and political benefits. This is what Kosovo has successfully done with most of its Serbs, who live south of the Ibar river. It now needs to do the same with those who live north of the Ibar, which includes four municipalities that have always had Serb majorities easy access to contiguous Serbia.

Ukraine is the most difficult case right now. Its constitution requires that any referendum be undertaken in the whole country, not in unhappy provinces. Even Russia–which annexed Crimea supposedly on the basis of a referendum–has not recognized the pseudo-referenda and independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, the two main eastern communities harboring rebels against Kiev’s authority. The paramilitary forces there will have to be demilitarized, demobilized and reintegrated in due course if Ukraine’s territorial integrity is to be preserved. But devolution of authority to local governments is included in the Moscow/Kiev ceasefire agreement and will be important if the hostilities are to be brought to a definitive end.

Maintaining state integrity–in Iraq, Kosovo, Ukraine and elsewhere–will be much easier than if Scotland had approved independence. But nowhere is it easy once abusive or corrupt central authority loses its legitimacy with segments of the population. Relief should not lead to complacency. If state structures are to be preserved, central governments will need to respect the rights and culture of all their citizens while providing tangible political and economic benefits as well as local control over important aspects of their lives.