Month: September 2014
Tunisia’s progress and peril
Next month Tunisia will hold parliamentary elections, with presidential elections following in November. These will be the first national elections held since the adoption of the new constitution in January. Their passage will represent a significant milestone in a country which represents the only success story of the Arab Spring. On Monday, Georgetown Democracy and Governance held an event on the topic of Tunisia’s 2014 Election: Security Obsessions in a Start-Up Democracy. Speaking was Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Professor of public law and political sciences at the University of Carthage, Tunis. Daniel Brumberg, Professor at the Government Department of Georgetown University moderated.
Ben Mahfoudh is positive about many aspects of the upcoming elections. He notes that although the transition to democracy following Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s ouster has been slow, and has at times been fraught with political impasses and even violence, the constitution passed on January 26 is durable and inclusive. He argues that short-cuts taken in Egypt’s and Libya’s attempts at democratic transitions have contributed significantly to failures in these countries’ revolutionary movements. While Tunisia had hoped to pass a new constitution within a year of 2011’s Constituent Assembly elections, it has found it necessary to take more time due to political disagreements. Though the drafting ultimately lasted more than three years, the extended process has helped to ensure robust, yet democratic institutions.
The process is not yet complete. For Ben Mahfoudh the greatest single concern in the weeks before the ballot on October 26 is security. As polling day nears the threat will increase exponentially, because these elections do not simply represent a single step in democratic process, but rather the culmination of the entire transition effort.
Since the Jasmine Revolution, which began at the end of 2010, Tunisia has struggled with its security challenges. Both the Libyan and Algerian borders are unstable, with significant uncontrolled movement of people, goods, and arms over both. Ben Mahfoudh estimates that up to 50% of the economy at present is black market, smuggled over the borders. There is also a burgeoning illegal weapons trade, a by-product of the Libyan civil war and ongoing conflict. The security forces have suffered from a lack of experience in dealing with these issues, and while improvements have been forthcoming there are still problems. Ongoing fighting with extremist Islamist groups in the Chaambi mountains has put further pressure on security forces. In July, 15 soldiers were killed in coordinated attacks, which have demonstrated that the insurgency in the western mountains is far from defeat.
Still more concerning is the movement of Tunisians to and from areas of unrest around the Middle East and North Africa. A large number of young Tunisians have gone to Syria in order to fight. The number of Tunisians currently in Syria is estimated at 2400, according to the Tunisian Interior Minister. Of these around 400 have already returned. Others are waiting in Libya. The threat of an attack by returnees radicalized in Libya and Syria is not something the security forces are well equipped to deal with.
This threat reaches beyond the upcoming elections. Even if they run smoothly and relative stability is maintained, many of these radicalized Tunisians still abroad will eventually look to return. In the long run Ben Mahfoudh believes a national dialogue must be held as to whether society should completely reject these young men, or whether it should try to reintegrate them. Regardless of the outcome of this future debate, their return cannot be allowed to foment violent unrest if Tunisia’s democracy is to thrive.
Security issues present a further threat to the wider democratic process ongoing in Tunisia. The country’s insecure borders and pool of potential radicals makes it unattractive to international investors. For many Tunisians the assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohammad Brahmi represented a positive turning point, through the refocused national dialogue brought about in response to the shock and national outrage that ensued. But for investors such events contribute to a sense that Tunisia’s stability is far from guaranteed. Absent significant investment, the economy is failing to pick up as fast as hoped and unemployment remains high. The Arab Spring revolutions were catalyzed by economic need as much as they were demands for greater freedom. Tunisia can bear economic hardship for a while, but if the democratic government fails to deliver in the long run there may well be a return to widespread social unrest.
In closing, Daniel Brumberg observed that Tunisia may look superficially stable from the West’s viewpoint, especially when compared to other countries in the region. There is much to be hopeful about concerning Tunisia’s political development, but if it is to succeed it must overcome its security problems – without ceding its nascent civil liberties in the process.
Watch the event here.
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Peace picks, September 23-26
- Religious Peacebuilding: The Approach of the U.S. Institute of Peace Tuesday, September 23 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Rumi Forum; 750 First Street NE, Suite 1120, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND The Religion and Peacebuilding Center at the U.S. Institute of Peace was launched in July 2000 to analyze religious dynamics in conflict and to advance the peace-building roles of religious actors and organizations in conflict zones. For the past 14 years, the U.S. Institute of Peace has been organizing programs to address zones of conflict from a religious perspective. This presentation will present some of the lessons learned from this effort. Speakers include David Smock, director of the Religion and Peacebuilding Center and vice-president, Governance, Law & Society; Palwasha Kakar, Senior Program Officer at the U.S. Institute of Peace; and Susan Hayward, Senior Program Officer focussing on conflict prevention, resolution, and reconciliation.
- Libya’s Civil War Wednesday, September 24 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Frederic Wehrey will present the findings of a new paper on the institutional roots of Libya’s violence and present options for how the United States and the international community can assist. Wolfram Lacher, associate in the Middle East and Africa research division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Faraj Najem, director of Salam Centre for African Research in Tripoli, Libya, and a professor of public administration at Benghazi University, and Dirk Vandewalle professor of Government at Dartmouth College and the Carter Center’s field office director in Libya, will act as discussants and share their own insights. Michele Dunne, senior associate in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, will moderate.
- Iraq After America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance Wednesday, September 24 | 12:15 pm – 1:45 pm New America Foundation; 1899 L St., NW, Suite 400, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND US Army Col. Joel Rayburn will discuss his book, Iraq After America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance. In it, he notes that the authoritarianism, sectarianism, and Islamist resistance that dominate Iraq’s post-U.S. political order have created a toxic political and social brew, preventing Iraq’s political elite from resolving the fundamental roots of conflict that have wracked the country before and since 2003. Rayburn will examine key aspects of the US legacy in Iraq, analyzing what it means for the United States and others that, after more than a decade of conflict, Iraq’s communities have not yet found a way to live together in peace.
- The Legal Basis for Military Action against ISIS Thursday, September 25 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium; 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Charles Stimson, Manager of the National Security Law Program will host a conversation concerning the legality of the Obama Administration’s strategic plan to degrade and destroy the Islamic State. Key to the discussion will be whether the President should request a new Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) specific to ISIS, or whether the administration can rely either on AUMFs issued previously in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, or on the President’s Article II powers alone. Joining the discussion will be Steven Bradbury, Partner at Dechert LLP, Robert Chesney, Charles I. Francis Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law, and Steven Vladeck, Professor of Law at The Washington College of Law, American University.
- Is There a Role for Religious Actors in Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism? Friday, September 26 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm US Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND USIP will host an event featuring three panelists from its recent Symposium, who will present insights drawn from the workshop and their own experiences of combatting extremism. Violent extremism is a pressing issue today, affecting many regions and the wider global community, and efforts to counter such extremism require strategic and sensitive approaches. While civil society has an important role to play in countering extremism, religious actors are well positioned to address some of its root causes, particularly in areas in which extremism is couched in religious terms. Moderating the discussion is Georgia Holmer, Deputer Director, Rule of Law Center. She will be joined by H. E. Sheikh Abdallah Bin Bayyah, President of Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies, Pastor Esther Ibanga, President, Women Without Walls Initiative, and Vinya Ariyaratne, the General Secretary at Sarvodaya.
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Why now and what next
Today’s big story is the American-led air attack on Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) installations, mainly in and around Raqqa in eastern Syria, and on Khorasan, an Al Qaeda alumni group thought to be plotting attacks on the US homeland. As usual, there is an air of triumphalism in the press coverage, which derives mainly from the Pentagon: this and that were hit, little collateral damage was done, ISIL will have suffered serious losses. Five Arab countries are said to have pitched in to help.
But it is important to ask why this attack came now and what comes next.
The last few days have seen major ISIL advances against Syrian Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria. More than one hundred thousand thirty thousand Kurds are reported to have entered Turkey. This is a colossal number in a short time, even for a country that has already absorbed ten times that number and prides itself on being well-prepared and generous to refugees. Another 400,000 may be on the move. The attack on ISIL in Raqqa is likely an effort to stem its advances against the Kurds, protect Turkey and prevent further losses of territory. In other words, it came now because the military situation is desperate.
It is not at all clear what comes next. The Free Syrian Army and its supporters are not strong in eastern Syria and likely will be unable to take advantage of the air strikes. The Kurdish forces may be in a better position, though they will have been weakened and scattered by recent ISIL advances. ISIL will quickly embed its forces with the civilian population, making it difficult to strike further from the air without major collateral damage.
Unfortunately this means is that the air strikes may be creating ungoverned spaces in which we have no means to prevent radicalization and haven for international terrorists. While perhaps necessary to save the Syrian Kurds from mass atrocities, there is no reason to believe we have the capacity to follow up with serious efforts to fill the vacuum we create.
The Administration has been slow to recognize the emerging problems in Syria and Iraq. Now it is acting more quickly than its allies can consolidate the gains. ISIL may not be a state, but it is more than a small terrorist group. Best to regard it as an insurgency against both the Syrian and Iraqi states. Winning will require a counter-insurgency strategy (clear, hold and build), not just a counter-terrorism strategy (kill, chase or capture them). You can begin to clear insurgents with air attacks, but finishing the job and moving on to holding and building will require capacities on the ground that we appear still to lack.
PS: Here is today’s related panel on the occasion of the Bipartisan Policy Center threat assessment of “Jihadist Terrorism” with Peter Bergen, Mary Habeck and Will McCants:
Broadcast live streaming video on Ustream
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Yemen and Afghanistan
What do Yemen and Afghanistan have in common? They have both reached power sharing agreements in the last couple of days. In Afghanistan, President-elect Ghani has agreed to share power with runner-up Abdullah, who is to be named “chief executive” operating under the President’s authority but sharing the President’s appointment and some other powers. In Yemen, the northern Houthi insurgents are slated to get a bigger slice of power in Sanaa, which they have invested, capturing key installations.
Power sharing is never easy, but sometimes necessary.
In Afghanistan, it will deprive the electorate of what it apparently voted for, which is Ashraf Ghani as president. At the same time, it will avoid a clash that might have become violent, or paralyzing. Abdullah and his supporters are convinced that only fraud could have caused his first-round lead to evaporate. They prevailed on the election commission not to release the final tally, which apparently had the margin as 55/45. Ghani, while insisting on the chief executive reporting to the president will be delegating implementation of government policy to someone he has been criticizing for many months.
In Yemen, the gap is even wider. The Houthi, who are Shia, are expected to share power with the Sunni Islah party. The rivalries among President Hadi, former President Saleh and various military warlords are intricate. Saleh notoriously described governing Yemen as dancing on the heads of snakes. Now Hadi will be dancing with partners on the heads of snakes. But there was no alternative: the surprising military success of the Houthi, who descended on Sanaa from their northern enclave, made it imperative to negotiate a power sharing arrangement, which UN envoy Jamal Benomar obligingly did.
In Ghani’s case, we know in surprising detail what he will try to accomplish. He literally wrote the book on Fixing Failed States. There he put rule of law, a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence and administrative control at the top of the list. Next comes sound management of public finances (he is a former finance minister) and investments in human capital (he is also a former chancellor of Kabul University). Social policy, market formation, management of public assets and effective public borrowing complete his “framework for rebuilding a fractured world.” While I imagine as president Ghani will concentrate his own efforts on the justice and security priorities, he will be an exigent taskmaster in the other areas as well.
No Houthis are writing textbooks in English to my knowledge. The best guidance we have on what is supposed to happen in Yemen is the detailed power sharing agreement itself, which sets out specific deadlines and a detailed process for naming a new, more inclusive, government. It also dictates a series of priority economic, social and electoral reforms as well as security arrangements in Sanaa and other areas of Houthi military activity. The agreement is even more specific than Ghani’s book, which as a generally applicable text needed to maintain a higher level of abstraction. But already the Houthis are said to have refused to sign the annex providing for their own disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
So what are the odds that these agreements will be implemented as written and hold past the next six months or so? Not good. Experience suggests that they will be renegotiated, perhaps repeatedly. But that is the good news. Their purpose is to avoid or end violence. So long as the protagonists are engaged in trying to ensure implementation of an agreement by peaceful means, we should be satisfied that the agreements are serving their main purpose. And in Africa it has been shown that peaceful outcomes after elections correlate not with successful power sharing but rather with repeated renegotiation of power sharing agreements!
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Where strong men rule
I spent most of last week in Moscow talking with Russian Middle East experts. It was a deeply saddening experience. Not because of the Middle East: that is a gloomy subject even in Washington DC. It was above all Ukraine, but more broadly Putin’s Russia that darkened the mood.
First, the good news: Moscow looks good, the Russians I met were friendly and helpful, and the Bolshoi Opera is once again open. Contrary to my expectations, downtown the skyline has not changed much, Lenin is still in Red Square (though it is unclear how often his mausoleum is open or whether anyone bothers to visit it), and traffic is light compared other European capitals. Skyscrapers have not been allowed in the center. I saw them only at a distance from the Foreign Ministry, near the Arbat market. Most of the older buildings in the center are renovated, some like the GUM department store beautifully. Ditto the churches.
Walking streets lined with high-end fashion as well as low-end chic lace the center. As in the Gulf petro-states, the number of customers seems inadequate to support the investment. Recently enforced parking rules have cleared the streets of double parked cars and limited the number of people interested in paying a couple of dollars per hour for a space. Drivers are surprisingly respectful of pedestrians and each other. Public spaces (Red Square, parks, walking streets) are well-groomed. Security guards, private and public, are everywhere. Order prevails, at least in the center.
The smiling Moscow I found on the street evaporated quickly in the meetings I attended. Ukraine cast a long shadow. American and Russian leaders, the Russians said, are not communicating. There is a lack of trust. The media are biased. Russia has pursued integration with the rest of the world only to find itself blocked by sanctions, even after the recent ceasefire in Ukraine. US/Russia relations are at a nadir. Is it wise to sacrifice global issues for the sake of Kiev? Fascism is reemerging in Ukraine, which the West is using as a pretext for blocking Russia. All Russia wants is for Ukraine not to join NATO, for the Black Sea not to become a NATO lake threatening to Russia, and for the Russian navy to remain in Sevastopol. Crimea did not join Ukraine voluntarily. There is no reason why it shouldn’t return to Russia.
From the American perspective, the Russians are in denial. They deny their army has anything to do with the rebellion in Ukraine. They ask Americans to understand that Ukraine for them is an emotionally searing internal question, apparently unaware that this implies that they do not recognize the independence or sovereignty of their neighbor. They deny Ukraine the right to make a free choice about joining the European Union and NATO. They fail to mention the downing of the Malaysian airliner, the deaths of Russian soldiers, or the photographic evidence of Russian army tanks and other heavy equipment crossing the border. They insist that Russia is in no way involved in Ukraine, even while trying to justify anything Moscow and its proxies might be doing there.
The Russian attitude on Ukraine is linked to broader themes. The Russians I spoke with do not regard Moscow as having lost the Cold War. It liberated itself from the Soviet Union, defeated totalitarianism and initiated a democratic transition on its own. While this was achieved under Boris Yeltsin, no one has anything good to say about him. President Putin is viewed as the best available leader, attractive because of his efforts to restore Russian power. Nostalgia for that power is palpable: even a casual conversation produces admiration for the Soviet Union. Czarist Russia is not far behind in the memory pantheon. The opposition to Putin is all more nationalist than he is, claim his defenders. Americans should view Russia as an equal, a superpower that Washington should treat with caution and respect.
It is not easy to convey what the Russians had to say about the Middle East with this static in the air. Harking back to Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational diplomacy,” we were told rigid American ideologically driven efforts to export democracy triggered the Arab uprisings, even though democracy is inappropriate for traditional societies in which family relations are predominant. The UN, the G7, the G8 and the G20 are all fronts for American ambitions, which are driven by an “energy elite” thirsting for hydrocarbons (no mention was made of America’s soaring energy production and reduced dependence on imports). Ukraine is part of the American democratization program. Ultimately, Washington aims at regime change in Moscow.
The Russians see what is happening in Syria as vindicating their support for Bashar al Assad, even as they repeat the refrain that they are not necessarily attached to him personally. The Russian port facilities at Tartous are not vital to Moscow. The Russians attribute the emergence of Islamic extremists, in particular the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to American mistakes and even to American assistance. At the root of the crisis is the American invasion of Iraq, which gave power to the Shia and incited the Sunni rebellion in both Syria and Iraq.
Fearing that it will eventually infect Russia’s Muslim population, the Russians want ISIS defeated. It will take a long time. The US should team up with Russia for the fight. Russia can be helpful in identifying and blocking foreign fighters, especially Chechnyans coming not only from Russia but also from Austria and other European countries. Bombing ISIS in Syria without permission of Damascus would be wrong and likely counter-productive. Arms sent to the opposition will end up in the hands of jihadists. Rejection of the election results in Syria while accepting them in Ukraine demonstrates America’s double standard. Assad has to play a role in the Syrian transition. Russia may prove useful in promoting intra-Syrian dialogue, though the regime has not yet accepted this idea.
My last night in Moscow was spent at a marvelous performance of Mussorgsky’s “Boris Godunov.” This iconic Russian opera features a guilt-ridden hero who rises to the throne by murdering the heir apparent. Guilt was not something I found in Moscow last week, but confidence in strong men was much in evidence.
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Demonization obscures a good argument
Eric Edelman, Dennis Ross and Ray Takeyh write in the Washington Post:
The Islamic Republic is not a normal nation-state seeking to realize its legitimate interests but an ideological entity mired in manufactured conspiracies. A persistent theme of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s speeches is that the United States is a declining power whose domestic sources of strength are fast eroding. In today’s disorderly region, Iran sees a unique opportunity to project its influence and undermine the United States and its system of alliances.
This is nonsense. Ideology and conspiracy theories hardly distinguish Iran from other nation states, including many that are friendly to the US. Nor do speeches by a leader claiming the United States is a declining power whose domestic sources of strength are fast eroding. That is a view many of our friends as well as our enemies hold. Iran’s effort to project its influence and undermine the United States and its system of alliances is the very definition of a state pursuing what it believes are its legitimate interests. Iran may be an an enemy, but it is still a normal nation-state.
This demonization of Iran and its anti-US policies is combined with much more powerful and important arguments against cooperating with the Islamic Republic: its goals are inconsistent with US goals, and such cooperation would reduce the likelihood of gaining the Sunni Arab cooperation necessary to defeat the Islamic State (IS).
The inconsistency of ultimate goals might be overcome. After all, the US cooperates with many countries whose ultimate goals it does not share, provided their cooperation brings net benefits. This is true not only for unavoidable powers like China and Russia, but also for friendly but problematic countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Right now every IS fighter Iran’s proxies in Hizbollah do away with is one less for American allies in Iraq and Syria to deal with. If Hizbollah is going to weaken the IS and do away with a few of its own fighters in the process, realists in Washington should count the result as positive.
Cooperation with Iran could however have a negative impact on the Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria as well as the Sunni participants in the international coalition against IS. That is a strong argument against aligning openly with Iran, even if IS is also their enemy. We would not want a victory for Bashar al Asad in Syria or for Shia militias in Iraq. If Sunnis mistakenly came to believe that we do, they would be far less inclined to fight IS or to support the coalition the US is trying to cobble together.
Secretary Kerry Friday left the door open to contributions from Iran. That would better be done in private than in public, but it is unavoidable. Tehran has compelling interests in helping its friends in Baghdad and Damascus to fight the IS. Washington can’t stop it any better now than it could when it occupied Iraq. But the Americans would be wise to ensure that Syrians and Iraqis of all sorts view the US as helpful, not only in the effort to defeat the IS but also in efforts to rebuild legitimate and friendly democratic regimes in both places. That is where American interests diverge from Iran’s.
Iran has tried for decades to portray the United States as the Great Satan. We are not, and neither are they.
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