Day: October 24, 2014
Condemned to cooperate
Laurentina Cizza, a former Middle East Institute intern, writes:
Thursday’s event at the Stimson Center on “Iran and the World After the Nuclear Deal: Possible Scenarios” produced two main conclusions: the US and Iran will inevitably reach a deal, and the war against ISIS represents an area of competition, and possible cooperation, between Tehran and Washington. Presenters were
- Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Professor and Chair, Political Science, Syracuse University;
- Abbas Kadhim, Senior Foreign Policy Fellow, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Geneive Abdo, Fellow, Middle East Program, the Stimson Center, moderated.
A poverty of options on the nuclear issue
According to Boroujerdi of Syracuse University, both the US and Iran face a “poverty of options” when it comes to the nuclear deal. They have little choice but to continue talking. A nuclear deal is inevitable.
Despite coming to power on a wave of popular support, Iranian President Rouhani has struggled to push meaningful reforms past conservative elements of the establishment that have obstructed or criticized his policies. His honeymoon is effectively over. As a result, he has focused the momentum from his electoral victory on ending the nuclear deadlock and reviving the Iranian economy. A foreign policy victory in the form of a nuclear deal would strengthen Rouhani domestically, giving him greater political capital to negotiate with rival conservative elements on other hotly contested issues.
Western observers should view the nuclear negotiations within the context of vicious factional domestic Iranian politics. Rouhani cannot overhaul Iranian foreign policy by signing an unpopular nuclear deal. But failure to sign a nuclear deal would: a) waste the best opportunity for progress on the nuclear issue in at least a decade, and b) paralyze the Rouhani administration along a conservative-reformist divide. Boroujerdi argued that given the political costs of failure Iran and the US will eventually reach a resolution—even if not necessarily by the November 24 deadline.
The Obama administration’s dearth of foreign policy success heightens the need to reach a resolution to the Iran nuclear issue. Despite the administration’s claims that “all options are on the table,” Boroujerdi argues that the administration would never risk giving the Middle East another failed state by bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The race against ISIS
Irrespective of the outcome of the current nuclear talks, ISIS provides a palatable second option for agreement between the US and Iran. The two powers are likely to pursue their mutual goals on separate tracks while competing for regional recognition of their efforts.
Boroujerdi argued that since the ISIS capture of Mosul in July, Iran has demonstrated remarkable flexibility and pragmatism. The Iranians blessed Iraq Prime Minister Maliki’s removal, refrained from criticizing the US-led air campaign against ISIS, and began supplying weapons to the Lebanese army—not just Hezbollah. Boroujerdi suggests this new pragmatism extends to Syria as well: the Iranians would be willing to throw Assad under the bus so long as their greater strategic interests could survive without him. In Iraq, Maliki’s departure did not weaken Iran’s unfaltering influence in the country, which is concentrated in Karbala.
In the fight against ISIS, Iran has taken care to jump ahead and take credit for being the first to act. When the militants overran Mosul, Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa provided the Iraqi army with the boost of morale and reserves necessary to face ISIS. The US stood idle on the sidelines. When the US finally announced its intention to arm the Kurds, pictures emerged of Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleymani training Kurdish peshmerga forces.
Kadhim argued that members’ conflicting priorities will doom the US-led coalition to failure. Although the US wants to tackle ISIS first and Assad second, coalition members such as Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia would rather see events occur in the reverse order. Kadhim likened inviting Saudi Arabia to join an anti-terror coalition to inviting Al Capone to a coalition against organized crime. The presence of pro-ISIS members, he argued, is bound to doom the coalition. Boroujerdi echoed this concern: the US strategy of fighting ISIS and Assad simultaneously is “unrealistic.” The US—he suggested—could learn a thing or two from Iranian pragmatism.
Putin’s Serbia
A friend writes:
The front cover of Wednesday’s Blic, a wide-circulation Belgrade daily, ran a big photo of openly gay actor Goran Jevtić, who played a leading role in the film Parada and in Angelina Jolie’s film In the Land of Blood and Honey:
The front page reads “The Actor Goran Jevtic Had Sex with My Son,” and accuses Jevtić of sexually molesting a minor in a bathroom several months ago. The other front page story — which takes up less space than this one — is about tennis star Novak Djokovic’s wife giving birth to a baby boy. Under normal circumstances, the Djokovic story would be the entire front page. People in Serbia’s entertainment industry (film, TV, theater, etc.) think the trumpeting of the Jevtić story is politically motivated.
The alleged event occurred several months ago. The police have made no arrest, nor has an indictment been brought. In the meantime, Jevtić is now at risk. He dares not leave his home without security, for fear of being attacked and killed. He appears to have gone into hiding. Were he to be detained for even 24 hours, the chances that he would leave prison alive are slim. Blic has proclaimed him guilty without trial.
Blic has continued to run front-page pieces on Jevtic for the two subsequent days. I can’t recall the last time I saw such an unprovoked and flagrant media lynching in Serbia. This hits home on many fronts: rule of law (due process), right to privacy, LGBT rights, human rights, presumption of innocence, hate speech, incitement, etc.
Blic is owned by the German media house Ringier. They have been under pressure from the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) as of late and have become increasingly sensationalist in their coverage. The former ruling Democratic Party (DS) also brought pressure to bear on the media. If a paper spoke out against the DS, then their advertising revenues would dry up. Since SNS has come to power, it is also able to control the media via placement of advertizing and appointment of editors, even in privately-owned papers. The latest (2013) European Commission progress report on Serbia says:
media reporting was insufficiently analytical and was influenced by the political parties in power, including through public funding, which led to widespread media self-censorship.
The OSCE has documented increasing pressure on the Serbian media, as have others. There is little doubt that the attack on Jevtic would not occur without political backing.
For all his abuses, Milosevic permitted at least token opposition media in the form of B92, Studio B, and Danas and Nasa Borba. Today, B92 TV has been sold, Studio B is under the control of SNS, Danas has been privatized to a government friendly, and Nasa Borba went out of business. The current government wants little or no dissent.
Prime Minister Vucic will be speaking at LSE on 27 October. The event is organized/chaired by Dr James Ker-Lindsay, Eurobank Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South East Europe. Balkanistas in the UK should show up to the event and hold Vucic’s feet to the fire. An email-writing campaign to the chair might also help.
Is there anything you can do on your end to activate people and institutions to send signals to the Serbian government that international attention is being given to 1) how the media handles this; 2) how the police and prosecution handle this; and 3) how Jevtić will be able to move about without fear of being killed?
On this last point: I am reacting by publishing this note on www.peacefare.net, which is often heavily covered in the Balkans press, including the Serbian media. I don’t know Jevtić. But I am concerned that he and others be safe, indicted or not. I am also concerned with the crescendo of reports that the Serbian media are under increasing government pressure to sensationalize and politicize their coverage.