Month: October 2014
Syrians are key
If there is anything remotely positive to draw from the ongoing fighting in Kobane it is that the Islamic State can be held and pushed back by local forces in Syria. In Mosul and across northern Iraq, the extremist group defeated the supposedly superior, US trained and equipped Iraqi army at lightning speed. The Iraqi forces are only starting to regroup now that political compromise has been reached in Baghdad and the West has begun to provide extensive support.
In Kobane, Kurdish fighters are poorly equipped, outnumbered, unsupported by foreign powers save for limited airstrikes, and largely cut off by ISIS on one side and by an uncooperative Turkey on the other. But after almost a month of siege Kobane has not yet fallen – despite predictions both by IS and by claims made by the former defense secretary.
Kobane may yet fall. This would be a huge failing by foreign powers who have pledged to degrade and destroy ISIS, and to prevent the town from being taken. What Kobane shows us, however, is that there are local Syrian partners with the will and strength to hold back the Islamic State.
Such partners are necessary but not sufficient to stem the ISIS tide, just as coalition airstrikes play a necessary but not sufficient role. Airstrikes can only be one part of a strategy to defeat ISIS. As it is, militants have quickly adapted their tactics to negate the effect of the strikes. ISIS has claimed it prepared a strategy to combat US air attacks in advance. Boots on the ground are needed to defend against and counter ISIS, and those boots must – where possible – belong to local actors. Supporting and coordinating with those actors is as vital as launching warplanes.
There is a third strand to an anti-ISIS strategy. While airstrikes and foot-soldiers make up the military solution, a civilian and political solution must also be reached. ISIS is a symptom of the power vacuum and social upheaval brought about by three years of vicious civil war. Address only ISIS, and its causes will remain, breeding future security threats and humanitarian disasters. A strategy to halt ISIS – and equally importantly its violent ideology – must include support for an internal dialogue among Syrians. The ultimate goal should be Syrian driven political and social reconstruction.
Just as Kobane shows that there are capable military partners out there, there are also capable civilian partners. Countless civil organizations built, led, and run by Syrian civilians have sprung up across the country in the last three years. Some have failed or been suppressed by the Assad regime, but many are thriving despite the parlous conditions and delivering services, aid, and order to Syrians of all stripes. These groups are well placed to provide a local backbone for any future rebuilding efforts.
The strategy thus far to defeat ISIS has often involved keeping Syrians themselves at arms length. But Kurdish fighters in Kobani, peaceful groups like the Syrian Civil Defense Units, and the myriad local groups already trying to build a better state from the ground up, show us that Syrians can take responsibility for their own future. We must help them achieve it.
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War without politics won’t work
Yesterday’s Brookings Institution event addressed the ongoing challenges faced by the US in Syria and Iraq. Will it Work? Examining the Coalition’s Iraq and Syria Strategy brought together Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at Brookings, and Salman Shaikh, Director of the Brookings Doha Center, with Michael O’Hanlon, Co-Director at the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence.
Pollack drew attention to positive developments in Iraq in recent months. The increasingly sectarian Nouri al-Maliki has left office, replaced by a less toxic Prime Minister. A new political process is developing in Baghdad as rival groups compromise in the face of the threat of ISIS and pressure from the Obama administration. It’s not perfect, but it is certainly progress.
The situation in Sunni parts of Iraq remains fraught. Though the ISIS offensives have been slowed across the north, expelling the group from its newly captured territory will require Iraqi military offensives. Herein lies a problem. Military action cannot be disentangled from politics. Many Sunnis believe that Maliki has left the Iraqi Army as little more than a Shi’a militia. They are unlikely to view an Iraqi Army liberating force as legitimate. But raising regional Sunni forces (a so called National Guard) could have far-reaching implications for the future of Iraq – not only in terms of its future military, but also in terms of its political structure.
This raises the question of what the future Iraqi government will look like. Many Shi’ites want to return to a Maliki era without Maliki: a Shi’ite dominated government absent the former PM’s autocratic tendencies. Many Sunnis, whose tribal leaders will be especially important in expelling ISIS, will not accept this: their preference is a decentralized autonomous zone, similar to Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds themselves want still more autonomy – if not outright independence.
Complex political manoeuvres to further these objectives will accompany any military steps against ISIS. Discussion about the makeup of Iraq’s future government cannot be put off until after a military resolution has been achieved. Military resolution against ISIS must come from political resolution in Baghdad. Western policy towards driving out ISIS must therefore pay careful attention to the importance of Iraqi political and sectarian issues.
In Syria, the situation is more complex. While Salman Shaikh sees the achievement of the US in building a coalition of Arab states to take on ISIS as important, he notes that local communities on the ground in Syria have the best chance of effectively marginalizing ISIS and the ideology it espouses. There have already been local successes against the group. Six or seven thousand Syrians have been killed fighting against ISIS. Local opposition formations have managed to expel the jihadists from cities and towns across Syria.
The US coalition has overlooked the importance of such local groups. Opposition fighters complain of a lack of coordination between combatants on the ground and the coalition air campaign. As a result, ground forces have been unable to take advantage of opportunities opened by the air strikes.
More concerning is the anger felt by anti-regime groups at the failure to target Assad’s forces. Many see the airstrikes as directly aiding the regime. Drawing attention to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimations, which put the war’s death-toll at over 200,000 (the majority killed by regime actions), Shaikh suggests that the moral argument used by the US and its allies as part of the justification for attacking ISIS will fail if the focus falls only on this one group, while ignoring Assad’s crimes. This approach will not only lose the battle for hearts and minds on the ground in Syria, but will also threaten the coherence of the coalition itself. Many of the countries now dropping bombs on behalf of the US joined the alliance not just to take on ISIS, but to remove Assad and his regime.
There is, however, a greater threat to long-term success in Syria. Both Shaikh and Pollack drew attention to the importance of working to build a political process in Syria in order to eventually rebuild the country. As in Iraq, this process cannot be an afterthought, to be made up once a military solution has been achieved. Pollack believes that Obama’s plan to degrade and destroy ISIS has missed the point. ISIS is symptomatic of the underlying problems that have been engendered by three years of civil war: deal only with ISIS and a new group will take its place. Any solution must address Assad and include a conversation about the reconstruction of the country after his departure.
Done right, Pollack envisions Syrian reconstruction, led by the UN, undertaken by preexisting Syrian civil society groups, with the US providing security and the Gulf states providing money. Lessons may be learned from successes in Bosnia, and failings in Afghanistan and in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom. State building through engaging with Syrian groups in a bottom-up approach will lay the framework for a political transition. Shaikh by contrast holds that national dialogue among the many actors in Syria is the necessary precursor to reconstruction. Through such a dialogue, Syrians should decide – and agree on – their goals for the country’s future. Encouraging and enabling this conversation will also be vital to find a way towards a lasting resolution.
Without a plan to address Assad and reconstruction, Shaikh envisions a conflict that will intensify, becoming an unpalatable contest between the regime and ISIS. The US is now involved in the Syria and Iraq conflicts. Doing nothing is no longer an option. The only question will be whether US policies will lead to a lasting solution.
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The next big thing in Syria
It’s been a few days since I’ve written about the importance of state-building in Syria, so maybe I can return to the theme. I’ve just come from a Brookings event at which Ken Pollack made an eloquent and well-argued plea in favor of what he termed nation-building, while Salman Shaikh underlined the importance of promoting a national dialogue in Syria, which is increasingly seen as important preparation for writing a new constitution, which of course is one of the vital tasks in state-building.
This took me a bit by surprise, as I thought the event was to focus on Ken’s most recent report Building a Better Syrian Opposition Army: How and Why. That proposes building over the next year or so a new, apolitical but opposition (to Bashar al Assad) army outside Syria. I’m on board that far. The report doesn’t say much about the state-building process. Some of what it says I can’t agree with:
Once the forces of a new Syrian army had secured a chunk of Syrian territory, they could declare themselves to be a new, provisional Syrian government.
Regular readers will understand that hell will freeze over before I advocate that an army declare itself a government. That is not a formula for good, or democratic, governance. Nor will it bring stability.
What Salman had to say made more sense to me. Syrians of all stripes need to talk with each other in an open and transparent national dialogue. Up to a point, that process worked well in Yemen, where the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) insisted on it and the UN made it happen. It was failure to implement its conclusions adequately that led to the current Houthi rebellion, not failure of the national dialogue itself.
Talking is not enough. What Syrians need to do is to define their goals. Salman, who is in active communication with many stripes of Syrians, gave some hints where they are coming out: they want security, rule of law, economic prosperity and better governance. None of that is surprising. Those are in fact four of the five end states in Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, the book of civilian doctrine for state-building whose preparation I supervised at USIP. The Syrians will discover the fifth end state–social well-being–soon enough. Or they will include it in one of the other categories.
There is nothing at all wrong with reinventing this wheel. People have to discover what they want for themselves, and it won’t always come out so neatly congruent with Guiding Principles. But it is vital that goals be defined. Otherwise, the state-building process has no direction and no way of measuring progress.
The question is whether this state-building process needs to wait until Bashar al Assad is gone. I think not. It needs to begin from the grass roots in liberated areas as soon as possible. The United States has been providing support to local councils and surrogate police forces in some liberated areas. That is all to the good.
But there are two problems. The Assad regime often bombs these areas to disrupt the process of creating alternatives to its own oppressive governing structures. That has to be stopped. It could be done by establishing a no-fly zone over the whole country or safe areas along the Turkish border and perhaps in other opposition-controlled areas. But let there be no doubt: such safe areas will come under attack, likely from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as well as from the regime. We will have to be prepared to defend them, at least from air attacks (but likely also from artillery bombardment).
The second problem is preventing liberated areas from leading to de facto and eventually de jure partition. That will require they operate under the umbrella of something like Etilaf, the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC). So far, that has not generally been the case. Somehow or other, the breach has to be corrected. Ken proposes that the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General “hold sovereignty until a properly constituted new Syrian government is ready.” More or les that was done in Kosovo, but I can’t picture the Syrians putting up with it. Nor is it possible before Assad is deprived of Syria’s seat at the UN.
The international community I fear is as much part of the problem as it is part of the solution. Humanitarian assistance is usually subjected to serious coordination efforts. I trust that is the case in Syria. But reconstruction assistance rarely is. Donors like doing their own thing, often without regard to governing structures and international community coordination efforts that they in principle support. That has to be somehow avoided in Syria, which will be subjected to strong centrifugal forces of other sorts. The last thing we need in Syria is partition.
Despite President Obama’s reluctance, state-building in Syria is the next big thing. Stay tuned.
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No idea where they are going
Two-time Israeli Ambassador to the United States Zalman Shoval stopped by CSIS yesterday for his more or less annual talk about how things are going in the Middle East. I stopped in hoping to hear a compelling version of Bibi Netanyahu’s view of the world, one that makes more strategic sense than his tactically elegant maneuvers, which have left Israel isolated and ever more reliant on military force.
I didn’t get what I was looking for. Shoval sees little reason for Israel to do anything it isn’t already doing, and no reason to pursue anything like a strategic end-state.
No one in Israel thinks the recent settlement activity is really an issue. Israel has demonstrated that it is prepared to dismantle settlements that need to be dismantled if there is a peace agreement. The most recent brouhaha over building plans concerns land adjacent to another settlement in South Jerusalem, not East Jerusalem. Israel has always made it clear it will build what is necessary to protect Jerusalem and prevent it from being cut off.
Bibi supports a two-state solution, but much of his Likud party and most of his coalition are opposed. The right wants to keep the West Bank and ignore the demographic problem.
The Palestinians haven’t changed their views at all since 1967. They do not want a successful negotiation because that would mean giving up the right of return. President Abbas, like Arafat, is not prepared to accept that. He is old and has no obvious successor. He wants to hang on longer. He will pursue meaningless international recognition rather than reach an accommodation.
The region is a mess. But Iran is still a bigger threat than the Islamic State, which has not yet focused on Israel. President Sissi is a better partner for Israel than even former President Mubarak. Israel achieved its main military objectives in the Gaza war, which in practice the United States supported. The Sunni Arab states did not object loudly. Israel could have reoccupied Gaza but decided not to do so. Hamas is beginning to rebuild the “attack” tunnels that stretch into Israel, which is prepared to proceed with civilian reconstruction before de-militarization.
The relationship between Israel and the United States is still strong, even if some of the anti-Obama remarks by Israeli leaders are regrettable. The security ties have never been stronger. Israel is aware that younger American Jews are less attached to the Jewish state than their parents, but this is a problem that can be managed. The idea of rapprochement between Israel and Sunni Arab states is exaggerated. They have an interest in fighting the Islamic State and countering Iran, but little else in common. The original Saudi Arabian peace plan has some merit, but not the Arab League version. Egypt might be willing to help with a peace agreement by providing land to the Palestinians in Sinai.
The Americans of varying political persuasions I talked to after this presentation walked out shaking their heads. This is an Israel nominally obsessed with its own survival but indifferent to the real threat of Palestinian anger and frustration on its border, the annoyance of its American allies, and the consternation of the international community. Constrained by its burgeoning right wing, it offers little or nothing to the Palestinians and blames them for not seizing the opportunity. Then it takes what it wants, feigning surprise when that deepens the enmity.
The Israelis think they can muddle through, without any idea where they are going.
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This is helpful, but misleading
This is helpful, a continuously updated map of US and allied bombings in Iraq and Syria:
But it is also misleading. Those little bursts suggest that the anti-ISIS coalition is doing its job. And the air attacks may look the same in Iraq and Syria but the impact is so far dramatically different. Someone has to have not only boots, but loafers on the ground. Syria and Iraq need governance and rule of law at the end of this war, not military occupation.
In Iraq, there is at least some hope of real results. The peshmerga are trying to take advantage of the air strikes to push back ISIS. But the Iraqi security forces still have not shown up in any substantial way. Nor is there much hope they will any time soon. No more than half are still viable, and those seem far from able and willing to fight ISIS effectively. The best that can be said today about the war against ISIS in Iraq is that Iran has ordered its forces, and the militias it supports, not to attack US forces. Strange bedfellows.
In Syria, the Americans are not even trying to coordinate with rebel insurgent forces. Turkey is standing by watching while ISIS lays siege to the northern Kurdish town of Kobane, on the Turkish border. The Syrian Kurds are anathema to Turkey because they support the Kurdish rebellion inside Turkey. Nor do the Syrian Kurds get much military support from the Iraqi Kurds, who cooperate with Turkey against the Kurdish rebels inside Turkey.
In neither Iraq nor Syria is it clear what will happen if the anti-ISIS coalition is successful.
At least in Iraq there are governors and provincial councils who in theory are the properly constituted authorities. But the predominantly Shia Iraqi security forces will not be welcomed by large parts of the population in Ninewa,Salaheddin and Anbar. Hopefully the newly formed National Guard, which will recruit on a provincial basis, may be able to exert control, but it won’t be easy.
In Syria, there are lots of anti-regime civil society organizations, including local administrative councils, but they struggle to provide even minimal services to a population that has suffered mightily through more than three years of war. The regime attacks civilian populations in liberated areas, focusing on hospitals, schools and other structures vital to the quality of life. Opposition adherents are no longer so sure as once they were that they want to preserve the Syrian state or the Syrian army. But the nascent Syrian Interim Government (SIG) would be hard-pressed to take over if the regime were to collapse tomorrow.
If President Obama wants to avoid American boots (and loafers) on the ground in Syria, he needs to get much more serious about building the capability of the Syrian opposition to govern effectively, at least in liberated areas. I’d like to see a map not just of those little star bursts but of ink spots of opposition control, all under the authority of the SIG. We are far from that day.
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Peace picks October 6-10
- The Hidden History of Dialogue with Cuba: What Obama Needs to Know About Talking to Havana Monday, October 6 | 9:00 | Brookings Institution | Register to Attend | The Latin America Initiative (LAI) in Foreign Policy at Brookings will host William M. LeoGrande, professor of government at American University, and Peter Kornbluh, director of the Cuba Documentation Project at the National Security Archive, to present their new book, Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana. They will discuss the findings of their research, and offer recommendations to guide present and future U.S. negotiators. They will be joined by Julia E. Sweig, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies. Ted Piccone, senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion
- The History of the Future of Syria Monday, October 6 | 12:00 | Woodrow Wilson Center | Register to Attend | Over the past four years, Syria and the entire Middle East have witnessed unprecedented changes. This lecture will look back on these events in the expectation of determining what may come next. Special attention will be paid to U.S. foreign policy, the growth and proliferation of terrorist organizations such as ISIS, the fate of minorities in the region, and the state of cultural patrimony. Christian Sahner, author of Among the Ruins: Syria Past and Present, and doctoral candidate at Princeton University will be speaking.
- Entrepreneurship for Human Flourishing: The Role of Business in Overcoming Poverty Tuesday, October 7 | 12:00 – 1:30 | American Enterprise Institute | Register to Attend | When it comes to helping the poor, conventional wisdom tells us that charity is the answer. But that isn’t necessarily true. In “Entrepreneurship for Human Flourishing” (AEI Press, 2014), Peter Greer and Chris Horst of HOPE International argue that this commonly held view overlooks the real engine of true human flourishing: entrepreneurial businesses, which sustain productive development long after charitable giving dries up.
- War without Debate: The Constitution, Intervention, and the Strikes against ISIS Tuesday, October 7 |12:00 | Cato Institute | Featuring Gene Healy, Vice President, Cato Institute; and Christopher Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; moderated by John Maniscalco, Director of Congressional Affairs, Cato Institute. When Congress authorized the arming and training of Syrian moderates to combat ISIS, it explicitly stated that this action should not be construed as an authorization for the introduction of U.S.armed forces into hostilities. Yet, on the orders of President Obama, the United States has begun bombing ISIS targets within Syria. Did the president violate the Constitution, which grants Congress the exclusive power to “declare War”? If intervention is in America’s national security interest, how should the mission be defined and how should it be achieved?
- ISIS and the End of the Middle East as We Know It Thursday, October 9 | 12:30 – 2:00 | Woodrow Wilson Center | While Western attention is caught by the rise of the so-called “Islamic State”, the real story may be the dissolution of order in the Middle East. How do we understand ongoing political and geopolitical shifts in the region and the rise of new types of actors such as the “Islamic State”? And what, if anything, can and should Western powers do? Volker Perthes is the executive chairman and director of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin. He received his doctorate from the University of Duisburg in 1990 and his habilitation in 1999. From 1991 to 1993, Perthes was an assistant professor at the American University of Beirut; he joined SWP in 1992 and headed the Research Group “Middle East and Africa” for several years. His previous teaching positions include the universities of Duisburg, Münster, and Munich; currently, Perthes is a professor at Humboldt University Berlin and Free University of Berlin. In addition, Perthes serves on various national and international bodies such as the Advisory Research Council of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) (as chairman), the International Advisory Council of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), the TCCI Advisory Board of the Turkish Industry & Business Association (TÜSIAD), and the TTIP Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. Perthes is a frequent commentator in German and international media.
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