Categories: Daniel Serwer

Not in the cards

Yesterday I published a piece by Matthew Parrish suggesting that Iraqi Kurdistan (plus some of Syrian Kurdish territory) is headed towards independence. He imagines the path may be a relatively easy one, compared to the painful history Kurdistan has already endured.

I don’t agree.

My objections have nothing to do with the Kurdish case for independence. That is pretty good: they were promised it at the end of World War I, they have been mistreated both within Iraq and Syria for long periods, they were chased from their homes and out of Iraq, and they were gassed by the Baghdad government. This is a history comparable to Kosovo’s (though the Albanians were never gassed).

Unlike that former Serbian province, the Kurds do not have a UN Security Council resolution that promises them an eventual decision on their political status and the UN did not administer their territory for the better part of a decade. But they were protected by a UN-authorized no-fly zone that allowed them to develop substantial and relatively democratic governance. The distinction amounts to little net difference.

The case against Kurdistan’s independence is not based on Kurdistan’s merits but on geopolitical factors. Turkey, as Matthew suggests, has already accepted Iraqi Kurdistan’s de facto independence and deals with it pretty much as an independent state. It remains unclear what its reaction to de jure independence would be, but let’s assume it would accept (though recognition would only come if independent Kurdistan forswore any pretensions whatsoever to Turkish territory, as Matthew suggests).

That is the only good news. Matthew’s presumption that Iran would somehow come around is dubious. Tehran has made it absolutely clear that it fears the irredentist sentiment Kurdistan’s independence would unleash, endangering the peace and stability that has generally reigned in the Iranian province of eastern Kurdistan and uncorking other ethnic resentments throughout a country whose Persian population is likely no more than 60% of the total. Iran is not going to welcome an independent Kurdistan.

Just as important: Arab Iraqis would not accept an independent Kurdistan either. The presence of large oil reserves in territory that the Kurds now control, which Matthew cites as a plus for independence, is one reason. Another is Sunni fear of what would be a large Shia majority in an Iraq without Kurdistan. The Sunnis would be unlikely to secede from Iraq without Kirkuk and Baghdad, which they would fight for. Peaceful separation, like that of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, requires prior agreement on the lines of separation, which doesn’t exist today in Iraq and isn’t likely to exist in the future.

Nor would the international community welcome an independent Kurdistan. The Americans will oppose it because of the precedent it would set for the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The Russians will oppose it because of the implications for its ethnically non-Russian republics. The Europeans will be worried about Catalonia. The Chinese about Tibet. Kosovo, which still is not a UN member, was an exception that proves the rule, not a new rule.

In any event, the Kurds aren’t likely to go for independence anytime soon. At current oil prices and production levels, Kurdistan is not financially viable. While Matthew may imagine peaceful coexistence with the Islamic State (yes, he does), few in Turkey or Kurdistan can. Ankara and Erbil as well as Baghdad all know that they need American, European and Gulf help to defeat the self-declared caliphate. Complicating matters by declaring independence will not improve the Kurds’ prospects for needed assistance.

Could things change? Of course. Certainly oil prices can go up, though likely not as high as they were, because anything above $80 per barrel will open the “tight” oil and gas spigot. Kurdistan will need something like that price (and 10 years or so of drilling) to be better off with 100% of their own oil revenue than 17% of Iraq’s. Kurdistan could come to terms with Baghdad on where to draw its border, which would remove one important casus belli. Turkey could settle its problems with its own Kurds and Syria could throw out the Islamic State. Iran could turn into a cream puff. But little of that is likely to happen in the foreseeable future.

Bottom line: Kurdistan is not headed towards independence anytime soon, despite the merits of its case.

 

Daniel Serwer

Share
Published by
Daniel Serwer

Recent Posts

No free country without free women

Al Sharaa won't be able to decide, but his decisions will influence the outcome. Let's…

4 hours ago

Iran’s predicament incentivizes nukes

Transparently assembling all the material and technology needed for nuclear weapons might serve Iran well…

6 hours ago

Getting to Syria’s next regime

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria was swift. Now comes the hard part:…

3 days ago

Grenell’s special missions

Good luck and timing are important factors in diplomacy. It's possible Grenell will not fail…

1 week ago

What the US should do in Syria

There are big opportunities in Syria to make a better life for Syrians. Not to…

1 week ago

More remains to be done, but credit is due

HTS-led forces have done a remarkable job in a short time. The risks of fragmentation…

1 week ago