Good cop, bad cop
I could sign up to 90% of what the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the European Union say today in the Washington Post. They want the US Congress not to pass new sanctions on Iran, for fear that would split the P5+1 (that includes the US, Russia and China as well as the Europeans) and wreck the prospects for a nuclear deal with Iran. The Israeli intelligence establishment apparently agrees, even if Prime Minister Netanyahu does not.
Knowledgeable people who follow the talks closely also oppose additional sanctions now, but for different reasons. Some think a nuclear deal that goes beyond the current Joint Plan of Action (JPA) is unlikely. The question would then become who–the Iranians or the Americans are the prime candidates–scuppers the deal, either before it expires at the end of June or during another six-month extension. From an American perspective, it is preferable that the Iranians take on the responsibility, thus increasing the likelihood that the P5+1 would remain united and then respond with tightened sanctions.
I’ve argued that in a sense none of this matters. The overt Iranian nuclear program is not the problem. There is simply no history of anyone developing nuclear weapons using materials produced in a program monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. So why should we care about the JPA at all? It provides access and accountability for activities that are not the problem.
Access is the point. If we are going to have early warning that Iran’s covert nuclear activities are moving towards developing a nuclear weapon, we are going to need access. The JPA provides it. While there are no doubt means of knowing what is going on clandestinely in Iran that do not depend on the IAEA, its inspectors are an important source of knowledge about the Iranian program and its purposes. Had we listened to Hans Blix, the IAEA director general before the invasion of Iraq, we might have saved ourselves a lot of trouble.
This argues for continuation of the JPA, even though the target of its monitoring is likely to involve material that will never be diverted to a nuclear weapons program. The technology is a different matter. Iran is not so well-endowed with physicists and engineers that it would want, or be able, to develop enrichment or reprocessing technology from scratch, independent of its IAEA-monitored efforts. If there is a separate, clandestine activity the IAEA is likely to garner hints of it. That is precisely what we should want.
So scuppering the JPA is not a good idea for the US. But many who know Iran well believe it is necessary in order to get a nuclear deal to make it clear what will happen if there is no more permanent nuclear deal. This is where Congress comes in. The Administration is already playing good cop, threatening to veto new sanctions. Congress can play bad cop, even without passing new legislation.
Congress could prepare a bipartisan bill (with broad support in both Houses) that imposes tough new sanctions but is put on a slow track to approval. That would constitute a clear and compelling message. Of course this would have to be carefully coordinated with other P5+1 members, and we should expect the Iranians to retaliate with a bill in the Majles that sends an equally clear and compelling message about what Tehran will do if the JPA breaks down without a new agreement in place.
The Iranians will of course understand what we are up to. But there is no need to hide it. There is only a need to anticipate, prepare to impose new sanctions if the need arises, and play the diplomatic game well. That Tehran will appreciate.
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