The emperor’s new clothes, again

I’ve read and reread the “written commitment” agreed by the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed by the leaders of 14 parliamentary parties and endorsed by the parliament last week. The European Union is treating this as an important step toward the reforms required for eventual membership. It includes a commitment to creating an “efficient and effective” coordination mechanism for the many levels of governance in Bosnia.

Give credit: the statement includes a substantial list of serious economic and social reforms. It says the right, though vague, things about rule of law, corruption, organized crime and terrorism. It doesn’t drop the constitutional reform required to implement the European Court of Human Rights Sejdic-Finci decision, but it postpones it to a later stage. Then there is fairy dust: “measures to accelerate the reconciliation process.”

That’s the giveaway. This is not so much a commitment as it is a wishlist. The wishes are Brussels’, not Bosnia’s. That’s why it took the better part of a month to push it through parliament. What actually happens to implement the commitments will depend on what the European Union presses, not on initiative from the Bosnian side. We can expect the Bosnians to continue to be passive, and sometimes passive aggressive, as Milorad Dodik was during the month it took to get this wishlist approved. Don’t hold your breath for him or other Bosnian leaders to get around to accelerating the reconciliation process.

The coordination mechanism, though it sounds good, is a disturbing idea in practice. Bosnia needs a central government that can negotiate and implement the acquis communitaire. That was the heart of the “April package” constitutional amendments, which died in the Bosnian parliament nine years ago two votes short of the two-thirds majority required. A coordination mechanism is less than half a loaf. It allows the country’s two entities, one district and ten cantons each to veto the necessary reforms. There is no way to make such an object either effective or efficient.

I suppose deft wielding of the EU’s substantial carrots and sticks might make up for these shortcomings. But we rarely see that happen. EU commissioners are far more comfortable bestowing gifts than withholding funds. There are rarely consequences of much import for defying Brussels, and quite often there are substantial rewards. No one suffered consequences for the failure to implement the Sejdic-Finci decision. Once the negotiation had failed, the Commission restored a lot of cash that had been withheld.

The EU is applauding the emperor’s new clothes. But we’ve seen this parade before. It’s not pretty, if you dare to look.