Month: March 2015
Deal or no deal
Everyone is anticipating a nuclear deal with Iran today, or not. Either way it is the big news.
I’d bet 60/40 on a “framework” political commitment that lays out some basic and well-known parameters: limits on enriching and stockpiling uranium, slowing of plutonium production, lifting of sanctions and limits over a decade or more, and International Atomic Energy Agency verification.
I don’t expect much on what I regard as the most critical question: answers to the IAEA questions about “possible military dimensions.” No IAEA-safeguarded nuclear program has ever generated the material used in a nuclear weapons program. All proliferation has been accomplished in secret. Iran has still not clarified some of its past activities, but that issue is treated separately between Tehran and the IAEA, not in the P5+1 talks.
Any agreement is going to be difficult for both the US and Iran. Hardliners abound in both countries. Distrust is the rule, not the exception. President Obama needs to be able to argue credibly that framework agreement will in fact prevent Iran from gaining the material needed to make a nuclear weapon in less than a year, as well as ensure that we will know if a decision to produce nuclear weapons is made. President Rouhani will have to be able to argue credibly that Iran’s basic rights have been respected and sanctions significantly alleviated.
Both Tehran and Washington will need to be able to argue that a deal is better than no deal. Washington’s argument will include the inevitable fraying of the sanctions regime if there is no deal. Tehran’s argument will include the inevitable additional damage to Iran’s economy and the (unmentioned but still important) possibility of domestic instability. Both will want to avoid war, which would be devastating for Iran but also embroil the US in still another Middle Eastern conflict, without setting the Iranian nuclear program back more than a few years.
Within the P5+1 team, China and Russia will weigh heavily towards a deal that is generous to Iran. The UK, France and Germany will be closer to the US position, with France apparently arguing for a tougher stand on sanctions than the US. These other participants will be able to influence the shape of what is proposed, but it will ultimately be up to Iran and the US to accept or reject it.
I won’t be surprised if there are last-minute hitches that extend the negotiations, at least for a few hours. That is common in all international negotiations, not least because officials in capitals–in this case Presidents Obama and Rouhani as well as Supreme Leader Khamenei–will need to give a final green or red light. But it is also true that the temptation to throw in a last demand at midnight is great, since the other side by that time is anticipating a result.
Whatever is decided, or not, today or early tomorrow in Lausanne will need further technical elaboration in the months to come before the end-June deadline for a full agreement. Technical details are important. We can expect further drama in the weeks and months to come.
Iran and the US remain at odds on other Middle East issues, including most notably at the moment Syria and Yemen. Even in Iraq, where both are fighting against the Islamic State, their fundamental interests diverge. Even with a deal, peace is unlikely to break out. But a deal might well prevent things from getting much worse.
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Peace picks March 30-April 3
- General Wesley Clark: Exclusive Briefing from Ukraine’s Front Lines | Monday, March 30th | 4:30-6:00 PM | The Atlantic Council| REGISTER TO ATTEND General Clark, former NATO Allied Commander will discuss his time in Ukraine from where he just returned, met with Ukrainian military commanders and President Petro Poroshenko.
- Salafists and Sectarianism: Twitter and Communal Conflict in the Middle East | Tuesday March 31st | The Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Social media has a powerful effect on much of what happens in the world today. From inciting people to join protests on the streets of Cairo to recruiting young girls to join ISIS, social media can be seen as both a blessing and a curse. A close analysis of their Twitter accounts opens a window into their universe and the strategies they are using to increase animosity toward the Shi’a, who they believe are not real Muslims. Speakers include: Geneive Abdo, Fellow, Middle East Program, Stimson Center , and Khalil al Anani, Adjunct Professor at School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
- To Vote or Not to Vote: Egypt’s Diverse Electorate | Tuesday, March 31st| 12:00-1:30 PM | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Egyptians have gone to the polls eight times since the 2011 uprising. The latest round of polling, set to begin on March 22, was delayed by a Supreme Constitutional Court committee ruling on the constitutionality of the election law. Voter turnout and enthusiasm has ebbed and flowed but coverage of Egypt’s voters has often painted them with a broad brush, categorizing the electorate as a heterogeneous mass. How will political parties tackle the challenge of engaging voters and exploiting the motivations of different factions? Speakers include: Sarah El Sirgany is a Cairo-based journalist and television producer, contributing to regional and international publications and networks including CNN, the New York Times, Al-Monitor, and Mada Masr. Reem Awny Abu-Zaid manages the “Egypt and Elections” project at the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute. Sahar F. Aziz is President of the Egyptian American Rule of Law Association.
- Europe and the Iran Negotiations: EES Seminar Series | Tuesday, March 31st | 6:00-8:00 PM | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND| Ms. Valerie Lincy is Executive Director of the Wisconsin Project, and will discuss the topic. She oversees the Project’s two principal projects, the Risk Report database and the Iran Watch website. She provides training as head of the Risk Report team that visits foreign countries. As the editor and principal investigator for Iran Watch, she bears the main responsibility for building, populating and maintaining the site, as well as writing articles for publication, organizing and presiding at roundtables, and conducting associated research.
- Deal or No Deal? Negotiating with Iran | Wedensday, April 1st | 10:00-11:30 AM | Brookings Institute |REGISTER TO ATTEND| Talks aimed at producing a political framework to resolve the Iran nuclear issue are likely to come down to the wire before the deadline at the end of March, but already leaders in the United States and Iran are facing an intense debate among key constituencies at home. Iranian hardliners have criticized potential regime concessions, while opponents of a deal in the U.S. Congress are advancing legislation that could undermine the Obama administration’s ability to implement an agreement.
- Making Sense of Chaos in the Middle East: Multiple Wars, Multiple Alliances | Wednesday, April 1st | 12:00-1:30 | Washington Institute for Near East Policy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Volcanic changes in the region are under way, with the outbreak of Sunni-Shiite wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, unprecedented tension between Washington and Israel, and U.S.-Iranian nuclear talks that appear on the verge of breakthrough. Speakers include: James Jeffrey, former U.S. ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, Dennis Ross, Robert Satloffis the Institute’s executive director and Howard P. Berkowitz Chair in U.S. Middle East Policy and Michael Singh.
- Iraq: Now and After ISIS | Thursday, April 2nd | 12:00-1:00 PM | The Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Ambassador Sumaida’ie, who recently returned from Iraq, will discuss the evolution of the struggle in Iraq is both complex and consequential. The outcome is going to be a major factor in determining the future shape of the region, and will have a significant impact on global geopolitics. The United States as well as other players should have a clear eyed assessment of where things are heading, and what needs to be done if the direction of events is not palatable.
- ISIS and al-Qaeda: Assessing Terrorist Threats to the Homeland and Beyond | Thursday, April 2nd | 12:30-2:00 PM | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND| The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (also known as ISIS) as a violent extremist group with global aspirations has raised concerns over a potential terrorist attack on US soil. As ISIS pursues its objective of establishing a state in various parts of the Middle East, it continues to recruit foreign fighters from North Africa and Europe in order to plan for attacks against the West. Recently, Belgian and Australian authorities uncovered ISIS-inspired cells on their territories and succeeded in foiling terrorist plots. So could the US homeland be an ISIS target? Speakers include: Bruce Hoffman, Director, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, Bruce Riedel, Director of the Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution and a welcome by Barry Pavel, Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security Atlantic Council.
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The Libyan dialogue: ending the impasse
The UN-sponsored Libyan dialogue has entered a final and ‘decisive’ moment according to chief mediator Bernardino Leon. Last week, Leon shuttled from Morocco (where the main political dialogue is taking place) to Brussels (meeting with representatives of Libyan municipalities) through Libya in his herculean multi-track effort to salvage the Libyan peace process. Last Tuesday, in the absence of an agreement by the parties, Leon released a six-point plan indicating what such an agreement might look like:
- A unity Government headed by a president, and a Presidential Council composed of independent personalities not belonging to any party or affiliated with any group acceptable to all parties and by all Libyans. The main members of the Presidential Council will be the president and his two deputies.
- The House of Representatives as a legislative body representing all Libyans under the full application of principles of legitimacy and inclusion.
- A High State Council inspired by similar institutions existing in a number of countries. A fundamental institution in the governance of the State.
- Constitutional Drafting Assembly.
- National Security Council.
- Municipalities Council.
While these points are neither comprehensive nor specific, they would represent significant achievements. Unsurprisingly they are also fraught with difficulty.
The first point has long been seen as the main aim of the dialogue process. Leon has suggested that a list of potential members of the unity government is under discussion and might be agreed upon by the end of the week. Not surprisingly, this point is the source of considerable disagreement: in the polarized Libyan political field, finding personalities acceptable to all parties is hard. According to the governments in Tripoli and Tobruk, their opponents are described respectively as Gaddafi supporters or Islamist terrorists.
The second point is also likely to spurn a significant degree of controversy. By insisting that the House of Representatives be Libya’s legislative body, Leon’s plan is essentially rejecting the legitimacy of the parallel parliament in Tripoli, the General National Council (GNC). The Tripoli government argues that the GNC is the only legitimate parliament, drawing support from a Supreme Court decision from last fall (although the process and implications of that decision have been questioned). Meanwhile, the House of Representatives operating out of Baida in East Libya remains the sole internationally recognized legislative assembly in Libya. It has been suggested that the GNC, or elements from it, may be included in the High State Council and that balance between the two assemblies would thereby be achieved. More details are needed to see exactly how this balance pans out.
The fourth point would likely mean an extension of the current Constitutional Assembly, operating out of the Eastern city of al-Bayda. The Constitutional Assembly has long been regarded as one of the few non-politicized institutions in Libya, although its president, Ali Tarhouni, arguably is closer to the Tobruk government than to the authorities in Tripoli.
The two last points of Leon’s plan arguably reflect the parallel tracks in the negotiations, involving militias on the one hand, and Libyan municipalities on the other.
It appears that the threat of Islamic State (IS) expansion into Libya has pushed the parties to come to the table. Militias loyal to both Tobruk and Tripoli are currently engaged in fighting IS: the former against an increasing IS presence in Benghazi, and the latter against their main base in Sirte.
Both sides however appear capable of ‘multitasking’: Khalifa Heftar, Tobruk’s military lead, recently launched a campaign to liberate Tripoli while Tripoli jets have carried out airstrikes on Zintan, whose militia is allied with Heftar. A number of these airstrikes have been launched with the intention of derailing talks: in the latest round in Morocco, the departure of the Tripoli delegation was delayed due to bombing of the capital’s only remaining airport.
A return to a political solution still appears a long way off. Even in the event that the UN succeeds in bringing about a unity government, such a government will risk being just as fragile as the transitional governments that preceded it. Unless the fundamental problems of Libyan politics are dealt with – particularly the issue of integrating the militias within the framework of the state – real progress will not be achieved.
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A better plan than premature recognition
I confess to being a fan of both Matt Duss and Michael Cohen, respectively President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace and a Fellow at the Century Foundation. Like them, I am also a supporter of the two-state solution and a territorial settlement based on the 1967 borders, with mutually agreed land swaps. But they are wrong in thinking that the United States should recognize the state of Palestine. The time will come, but the situation is not yet ripe for this major diplomatic move.
Even they seem to have their doubts about giving Palestinian President Abbas the recognition “seal of approval.” But the best arguments against diplomatic recognition have little to do with Abbas, who they admit refused an American-proposed framework for a settlement, resists Palestinian Authority responsibility for Gaza’s borders and has postponed elections indefinitely. The bigger problem is that there is no Palestine to recognize: governance is split between the West Bank and Gaza and the purported state territory (and capital) is uncertain. The fact that 130 countries have recognized Palestine demonstrates that the “organized hypocrisy” we know as sovereignty is poorly organized at best.
The better move for the United States is to dust off the settlement framework it presented to Abbas in March 2014, complete the details, add a deadline for declaration of a Palestinian state and try to get it approved in the UN Security Council, which is something the current French Presidency would welcome. This would correct one of the original shortcomings of the Middle East peace process: the UN General Assembly, not the Security Council, decided the 1948 partition. It would also be an unequivocal step towards a two-state solution, without however giving Abbas the shiny trophy of American recognition he covets but does not merit.
Israel would of course oppose Security Council approval of a peace plan and ultimatum, even if it left open key issues for Palestine and Israel to resolve in subsequent negotiations. Prime Minister Netanyahu wants to hold on to the West Bank indefinitely, his post-election “correction” notwithstanding. Washington needs to break definitively with this ambition, signaling to the Palestinians and the Arab world generally that America will not be held hostage by its Israeli ally’s hunger for all the land west of the Jordan River. With Republicans in Congress lining up behind Netanyahu, it is vital and urgent that the Administration irreversibly sign on to a Security Council plan that makes Palestinian sovereignty inevitable, without however recognizing it prematurely.
The odds of successful implementation of such a Security Council resolution with Netanyahu in power are minimal. But the move would push both Netanyahu and Abbas in the right direction: towards direct, bilateral negotiations of outstanding issues, perhaps with the aid of a UN special envoy. The Americans have exhausted their willingness to mediate the Israel/Palestine dispute. It is time to return it to the United Nations, where it really belongs.
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Euro-Atlantic integrations and good neighborly relations
I did not make it to Skopje for the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) conference on this subject today due to a flight cancellation, but I did speak to the assembled by Skype early this morning DC time. Here are the notes I used:
1. Macedonia is a country of which I am very fond, not least because it has demonstrated its capacity to react effectively to crisis.
2. You are in the midst of a crisis today, one that has cast doubt on the integrity of the institutions your democracy has built over the past quarter century.
3. There is nothing unusual about political crises in democracies. The United States has enjoyed democracy for over two centuries. We still have political crises that revolve around abuse of power, some would say far too often.
4. Nor are we immune from publication of confidential communications.
5. The first resort in any crisis should be to your own institutions: your president, your parliament, your courts, your ombudsman, your press and civil society.
6. It is my hope you will use these institutions to the maximum degree feasible in clarifying, investigating, and eventually prosecuting those whose behavior is contrary to the law.
7. Parliamentary oversight is particularly important. Boycotts in a democracy really serve no purpose but to cut off those who boycott from making a contribution.
8. But there are situations that require more than a country’s own institutions. None of us live in a vacuum, but small countries need to worry more about how neighbors, friends and allies react.
9. You are not the United States, with centuries of a consolidated constitution, friendly neighbors north and south, a giant economy and two great oceans to protect your shores.
10. You are a small, land-locked European country with aspirations to join NATO and the EU.
11. I support those aspirations, which are not so far from realization.
12. Your soldiers have proven themselves, integrated with the Vermont National Guard, in combat in Afghanistan. The defense reforms you undertook after the Ohrid Agreement have put you on track for NATO membership.
13. The European Commission has repeatedly determined you are ready to open negotiations for accession to the EU. Economic reform starting about a decade ago boosted your prospects.
14. But your southern neighbor, Greece, had already blocked both the EU and NATO tracks before the current crisis struck. Countries, like bicycles, need forward motion, or else they fall over.
15. Now you have to pick yourselves up.
16. I am a friend of Macedonia, but I need to tell you frankly that the leaked telephone conversations, and the taping of those conversations, have damaged your international standing. They reflect shocking abuses of political and state power.
17. I doubt you can bank on either NATO or the EU even treating you as well as you have been treated in recent years, which was already unsatisfactory from your (and my) point of view.
18. You are going to need international help to recover. My understanding is that the European Parliament has offered, and your authorities have accepted, mediation.
19. That is good and even necessary, but not sufficient.
20. I wouldn’t of course want to prejudge the outcome of the mediation, but you need to think hard about how to restore both domestic and international confidence in your governing institutions.
21. Macedonia needs a parliament in which all the country’s political forces sit comfortably.
22. It needs a government that welcomes criticism and dissent.
23. It needs a presidency that represents all the citizens.
24. It needs independent courts that pursue malfeasance effectively and impartially, even when committed by the highest authorities, or by the political opposition.
25. No foreigner can tell you how to achieve these things. You know better than I do.
26. But let me offer two suggestions to restore international confidence:
a) End the winner-take-all political mentality that has prevailed in recent years;
b) Make your institutions more transparent and your politicians more accountable.
27. One possible approach would be a technocratic government to prepare new elections. But I don’t see how you can displace the existing one, which commands a wide majority. Even withdrawal of DUI would not guarantee fall of the government, which is not inclined to resign.
28. Another suggestion I’ve heard is to solve the “name” issue that has slowed your reform push, but I see little possibility of that in Greece’s current circumstances, much as I would like to see it.
29. Even entry into NATO as The FYROM seems a bridge too far, much as I would like to see it.
30. Any solution to your current crisis will need to ensure both that people cannot be taped illegally and that legal wire tapping will not be used for political gain. More generally, it will also need to ensure that political parties cannot abuse power or the state apparatus for partisan purposes.
31. That implies a far more independent judiciary and a far more active press and civil society than you enjoy today.
32. DUI is an important part of the picture and needs to think about how it can contribute to restoring confidence in government institutions. That means first and foremost making certain that its own behavior is impeccably clean.
33. DUI also needs to think about how it can collaborate with its coalition partners and the opposition parties to ensure transparency and accountability across the political spectrum.
34. A commission of inquiry into the wiretapping and its political exploitation is one possibility, perhaps with international participation. A white paper recommending political reforms could help Macedonia find its way through the current morass.
35. Your country is facing great challenges, but also great opportunities. You’ve gone a long way with economic reforms. Now you have to go the distance with political and judicial reforms. The things you are learning about your current system aren’t pretty, but they are real.
36. Fix them, and you can expect strong support from the Americans. I’ll let the Europeans speak for themselves.
PS: This is apparently what it looked like as I spoke:
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The Islamic Republic and the Kingdom
This morning’s news confirms that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has jinned up a Sunni alliance (including Egypt, Turkey, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan as well as several other countries) to battle the (sort of Shia) Houthi rebellion in Yemen, which the Shia-majority Islamic Republic of Iran backs. No one likes to label wars sectarian, but avoiding it doesn’t make them less so.
Sectarian wars are identity conflicts, which makes them particularly difficult to resolve. No one likes to compromise their identity. During conflict, the multiple (and sometimes common) identities we all sport in more normal times are often shorn in favor of a single one. Middle East experts will all tell you that seeing what is going on exclusively through a sectarian lense is a mistake. But it is a mistake that in a first approximation comes all too close to reality during conflict.
It is increasingly clear that it won’t be possible to manage the conflicts in the Middle East country by country, which is the way diplomacy normally works. War does not. Syria and Iraq are one theater of operations for the Islamic State and for the Iranian-backed militias fighting it. Lebanon could be engulfed soon. Iran supports the Houthi rebellion in Yemen in part because of the Sunni rebellion in Syria.
The Sunni/Shia dimension of these conflicts puts the Americans in an awkward spot. They don’t want to take sides in sectarian war. Their major concerns are not sectarian but rather nuclear weapons, terrorism and oil. So they find themselves supporting Iranian militias in Iraq and as well as their (allegedly moderate) Sunni opponents in Syria and Yemen. The result is that Sunnis feel abandoned by their erstwhile ally even as Iranians accuse the Americans of originating Sunni sectarianism in the Middle East. We are in a lose-lose bind.
Getting out of it is going to require more skilled regional diplomacy than we have demonstrated so far. We need to be able to do two things at once:
- bring home a serious product from the nuclear talks with Iran early next week, and
- counter Iranian aggression and proxies in Yemen and Syria
If the nuclear talks fail, expect to see escalation on all sides: in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. But if the nuclear talks succeed, that will not mean peace in our time, as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will seek a free hand in pursuing its activities abroad to compensate for limits on the nuclear program. Only preparedness to counter the IRGC will convince it otherwise.
The Administration has wisely kept the nuclear talks focused mainly on the Iranian nuclear program. But the time is coming for a wider discussion with Iran of its interests in neighboring countries and the counter-productive way in which it is projecting power through Shia proxies. We’ll also need to be talking with America’s Sunni friends, especially Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, about the opening they provide to Iran by discriminatory and exclusionary treatment of Shia in their own populations.
A classic security dilemma has emerged between Sunni and Shia in many parts of the Middle East. What one group does to make itself more secure the other group sees as threatening. Escalation is the consequence, but that won’t work. Neither Sunni nor Shia will win this war. Eventually the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom will need to reach an accommodation. How many will die before they do?
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