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No viable alternative

The furor over the Republican letter to the Iranians and the debate over the President’s authority to reach an agreement with Iran is obscuring a vital issue: is there a viable alternative? Let’s consider the options:

1. A better agreement. That’s what Netanyahu told the Congress he wanted. He wants one in which Iran gives up its substantial (he called it vast) nuclear infrastructure. This is presumably a reference to its 20,000 or so centrifuges. Since we don’t know precisely what the agreement will provide in this area, it is difficult to comment on this option. But the fact is that no nuclear power has ever used nuclear facilities safeguarded by the Intenrational Atomic Energy Agency to produce the materials needed for a nuclear weapon. It doesn’t really matter how many centrifuges they’ve got. Diversion of this sort is readily detected. It would be the least of my worries. Intrusive IAEA inspections are a necessary part of any agreement.

2. Maintenance of sanctions. The other members of the P5+1 (UK, France, Germany, Russia and China) are unlikely to cooperate if the US walks away from what they regard as an acceptable agreement. If they eliminate sanctions, Iran would feel little pressure on the nuclear question. The US could of course maintain its own sanctions, as it likely even if there is an agreement because some of them were imposed because of human rights abuses and Iranian support for terrorism. But it is important to remember what 50 years of unilateral embargo got us from Cuba, a much more vulnerable economy: zero.

3. War. The US could presumably destroy a good portion of Iran’s nuclear program. It would require a massive attack in many parts of the country, including destruction of Iran’s air defense system. We are not talking a one-night stand here, but rather a campaign over weeks if not months. The outcome would be uncertain, but few think it would set back the Iranians from nuclear weapons more than two or three years. So we would have to repeat the effort several years down the pike. In the meanwhile, the Iranians would wreck vengeance on US troops in Iraq as well as on US allies in the Gulf. As a consequence, oil prices would jump, helping the Iranians with reconstruction and the Russians with their aggression in Ukraine.

4. Regime change. Oops. I forgot to bring my magic wand, so that may not be possible today. The Bush Administration tried hard and failed, not to mention his predecessors. President Obama has forsworn it, not because he doesn’t want it but because it is impossible to negotiate with people if you are trying to unseat them. There is no telling when the Iranian people will throw off the yoke of the Islamic Republic, much as I might wish for it. Hope is not a policy.

A nuclear agreement–with or without Congressional approval–starts to look a lot better when you take a clear-eyed look at the alternatives. Congress could of course undermine an agreement or even make it impossible to implement. But so too could the Supreme Leader or the Iranian Majles. American won’t renege if the agreement provides for a year of warning time before Tehran can make a nuclear weapon and demonstrably improves the visibility of what Iran is up through IAEA inspections. The Iranians won’t undermine an agreement that removes enough sanctions to allow some measure of economic recovery.

When you’ve got no viable alternative, compromise starts looking good.