Month: March 2015
Colombia: understanding conflict
Colombia: Understanding Conflict
SAIS Conflict Management Program
Student Research Trip
Student Panel Presentation and Discussion
Moderated by Professors P. Terrence Hopmann and
I. William Zartman
Wednesday April 1, 2015
4:30 pm
Rome Auditorium
1619 Massachusetts Ave., NW
In January 2015 sixteen SAIS students spent ten days in Colombia interviewing leaders, and members of international organizations and members of the community in Quibdó and Bogotá. The objective of the trip was to gain a deeper understanding of the roots of the Colombian conflict; to evaluate the conflict management efforts that have taken place; and finally to present recommendations about how best to advance the process of long-term conflict resolution and peace-building. Students will discuss their findings and present their report.
Sponsored by the SAIS Conflict Management Program
This event is open to the public. Please RSVP to
http://colombia-report-understanding-conflict.eventbrite.com
A reception will follow
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The SuShi proxy war is likely to continue
This morning’s news that Saudi Arabia is bombing Houthi rebels in Yemen confirms what you already knew: the Middle East is engulfed in a proxy war between Iran–which supports the Houthis in Yemen, Bashar al Asad in Syria, Shiite militias in Iraq, and Lebanon’s Hizbollah–and Sunni states, including in the front lines the United Arab Emirates and Qatar as well as Saudi Arabia. Occasional Sunni-majority contributors include Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. At the same time, Iran and its allies as well as Saudi Arabia and its allies are fighting against Sunni extremists associated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
No wonder it is hard to keep score. This game is played in many dimensions. In the Sunni/Shia dimension, the United States has no dog in the fight, to use Secretary of State Baker’s unforgettable phrase. Our focus is on the fight against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, wherever they rear their brutal methods, because we fear they will inevitably target the “far enemy” (us) in due course. You might think it would be possible for Iran and Saudi Arabia to cooperate in that dimension, but instead they compete. Neither wants a victory over extremism to be credited to the other or to allow the other (or its proxies) to inherit the territory extremists once controlled.
The Sunni/Shia dimension and the anti-extremist dimension are not really orthogonal. Victory in one will affect the outcome in the other. The protagonists know it, which is one reason they are engaging in both. Iran would gain a great deal in the fight against Sunni states if Shia-allied forces win in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, Saudi Arabia would gain a great deal in the fight against Iran if it is able to put a majority Sunni regime in place in Syria and chase the Islamic State from the Sunni provinces of Iraq.
Yemen is a bit of a side show to the main theater of operations in the Levant. But geography makes it important to Saudi Arabia, in whose back yard it lies. If the Iran-allied Houthis are able to take over there, the Kingdom will feel the loss. By the same token, the Kingdom wants to see Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula defeated. Ironically, the Houthis have been at least as willing to engage on that front as the Saudi-backed Yemeni government, but Riyadh won’t see that as a plus. It wants to defeat both the Houthis and Al Qaeda.
Washington is in a difficult spot. It doesn’t want to be a protagonist in the Sunni/Shia war, but is viewed as one with every move it makes. Yesterday’s American air attacks against the remaining Islamic State forces in Tikrit were apparently undertaken only when Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi agreed to limit the role of Shia militias in retaking the capital of Salahuddin province. David Petraeus and others are being quoted as claiming that Iran is a far greater threat to the US than the Islamic State.
Likewise the nuclear negotiations are being seen through the lens of the Sunni/Shia conflict. An agreement that blocks Iran’s paths to nuclear weapons and provides at least a year’s warning of breakout has come to be viewed as strengthening rather than weakening the Islamic Republic. Sunni states apparently prefer military action against Iran’s nuclear program, which would guarantee that the Iranians do their damndest to get the bomb. But their goading of the US to war might be quickly forgotten in the devastating aftermath, as Iran would no doubt target its Gulf neighbors in any response.
This layered set of interrelated issues (Sunni/Shia, Islamic extremists, nuclear capabilities) is a good deal to complex for even very skilled diplomats to imagine easy solutions. The Obama Administration has essentially decided to prioritize two issue: blocking Iran from nuclear weapons and fighting Islamic extremists. We’ll know by Monday, the deadline for some sort of product from the nuclear talks, if the first issue is likely to be resolved. The second is likely to be with us much longer, if only because the Sunni/Shia conflict we don’t want to be involved in will keep feeding the extremists of both varieties with recruits.
The SuShi proxy war (between Sunni and Shia) is likely to continue.
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Finding a way forward in Syria
March 16, on the fourth anniversary of the Syrian conflict, the Middle East Institute convened a panel discussion focusing on the way forward for Syria. Led by MEI’s vice president Paul Salem, the panel featured resident scholar and former ambassador to Syria Robert Ford, senior political advisor to the Syrian American Council Mohammed Alaa Ghanem, deputy director and fellow at CNAS Dafna Rand and fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Michael Eisenstadt.
Paul Salem reminded the audience about the somber development of the Syrian crisis. The conflict has cost the lives of an estimated 300,000 Syrians, has injured many more and has displaced another 9 million. The economy has been devastated, and will likely take 30-40 years to return to pre-crisis levels. Moreover, fallout from the conflict threatens both the region and the world at large. Salem argued that the US and its allies have so far been unable to cope with these challenges, as they have yet to produce a strategy that deals with the root cause of the conflict: a regime that refuses to budge or compromise.
Ambassador Ford argued that current US policy falls short of the intended goal of containing and eventually rolling back the Islamic State (ISIS). In particular, Ford noted that recruitment of Syrians to ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra continues unabated – driven by the brutality of the Syrian civil war. The bombing campaign against ISIS might be helpful as a stop-gap measure, but it will not succeed in rolling it back.
To achieve this, the US must instead push for a political transition process, Ford argued. This requires that the opposition accept negotiations with the Assad regime and that they provide war-weary regime supporters with a vision of Syria that is neither Assad’s nor the Islamists’. It also requires increased material support to the moderate opposition so that the regime feels compelled to negotiate. Ford concluded by pointing out that support for the opposition in Syria is about bringing both parties to the table, not about toppling the regime.
In a similar vein, Mohamed Alaa Ghanem argued for a more robust American response to the Syrian crisis. Ghanem pointed out that in October 2011 Syrian protesters had come out in large numbers to demand the establishment of a no-fly zone in Syria. He argued that if a no-fly zone had been established in July 2012, when the Free Syrian Army controlled a majority of populated areas in Syria, it could have meant the effective end of the regime. Similarly, Ghanem argued that the current US train-and-equip program would flounder if these forces did not have protection against the regime’s aerial bombardments. He therefore urged the US to support Turkish proposals of an air exclusion zone – a limited form of no-fly zone that would shield Aleppo and allow some space to the moderate rebels.
He also urged more significant support to the rebels, noting that the FSA-affiliated ‘Southern Front’ that is currently making progress pays their fighters about $85 per month, as opposed to Jabat al-Nusra’s $300 and IS’ $500-1000. Ghanem warned that de Mistura’s plan of local freezes would likely free up regime forces for the offensive in the south, and argued that the only framework for a political settlement acceptable to Syrians was the Geneva communique.
On a slightly more optimistic note, Daphna Rand said that the US policy of fighting the ISIS could be helpful in pushing for a transition process, provided it was leveraged the right way. Rand suggested four reasons why the two goals were related. First, the current battle map of Syria requires the removal of IS from the the North-West – particularly from the Turkish border, in order to create governing space for the opposition. Second, recent opinion polls show a significant increase in public support for intervention in Syria after the anti-ISIS campaign was announced in October 2014. Third, experience from previous interventions suggests that the US-led anti-ISIS campaign will not remain in its current limited form. Intervention will require the US to pick a side, as indicated by the current training of a non-jihadist, non-regime force. Finally, the architecture of the anti-ISIS coalition suggests that the current intervention might overcome the strategic disparity that characterized early efforts by the US and its allies, when the support for widely different groups helped fragment the Syrian opposition.
Michael Eisenstadt argued that the US policy in Syria amounts to supporting an insurgency. Since insurgencies are inherently political, this requires coordination between political and military efforts. Such coordination so far has not been forthcoming, in part due to muddled thinking about the use of military power. Obama’s mantra on Syria has been that there are no military solutions to the conflict – an approach that the Assad regime clearly disagrees with.
According to Eisenstadt, it is clear that some form of military action is required to bring about a diplomatic solution to the Syrian conflict. Moreover, US Syria policy appears to be held hostage by the ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran. Eisenstadt stressed that these negotiations should not constrain US options in Syria and pointed to the fact that the Iranians themselves do not appear to be notably constrained in their Syria policy.
The US needs to recognize its role in perpetuating the conflict. US inaction has been a recruitment bonanza for ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and encouraged the perceived passive alliance with Iran in Iraq. The fact that early airstrikes protected minority groups but not Sunnis has helped cement a view of the US as opposed to the Syrian revolution. Einsentadt concluded by warning against separating US policy in Syria from Iraq. Without according equal weight to efforts in both countries, the US cannot succeed in defeating ISIS.
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Justice, justice you shall pursue
Albatrit Matoshi of Pristina daily Zeri asked me some questions Monday. My answers were published today:
Q: Is there a legal basis to establish the United Nations Special Court for crimes in Kosovo if Kosovo institutions fail to do such a thing?
A: I suppose the international community could try to impose a new court, as it did with ICTY. But I doubt that would happen. In principle, I would like to see the Kosovo institutions handle as much of the process of investigating and prosecuting war crimes as possible. But the will and means seem to be lacking.
Q: Do you think it is clear the role of the Special Court and the fact that who will work on it, which will be the role of the current judges of EULEX or even of international judges?
A: Nothing is clear to me about the Special Court yet, as so far as I know many issues have yet to be decided and publicized. Ask the EU, which has taken on this issue.
Q: Do you think that eventually the special court will clean Kosovo’s political scene?
A: I’m not sure what “clean Kosovo’s political scene” means, but the purpose of the court will presumably be justice, not political cleansing.
Q: What is the significance of this Court for Kosovo?
A: The important thing for Kosovo’s citizens to appreciate is that there are rules that apply in any armed conflict. Even in an entirely justified war, war crimes may occur. In the first instance, every country is responsible for the behavior of its own fighters. There is nothing unusual about the international community expectation that Kosovo fighters be held responsible. I wouldn’t want my liberation war stained with war crimes.
Q: How do you think this process will last and how many people will be involved?
A: How would I know? The process usually lasts much longer than anyone expects.
Q: Was there any possibility to avoid the creation of this Court if the Kosovo judiciary will have done its job better or has been inevitable process?
A: Yes. Had the Kosovo judiciary pursued war crimes cases more aggressively and effectively, there would be little need for this Special Court.
But there are also limitations. I’m not sure the Kosovo courts can be expected to pursue crimes that may have occurred in a neighboring country.
Q: Do you think the Kosovo political scene will be affected more by the creation of this Court?
A: There are obviously political differences over the creation of the Special Court. Those need to be resolved within Kosovo’s political institutions. That is what they are for.
Q: Can establishment of this court have negative effects on the situation in Kosovo and how?
A: I know creation of the court is hard. But it is important for Kosovo to demonstrate its willingness to see war crimes allegations investigated and prosecuted in a fair and objective way.
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Peace picks March 23 – 27
- Boko Haram, the Islamic State’s West African Franchise | Monday March 23 | 12:00 – 1:00 | Hudson Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Boko Haram swore fealty to the Islamic State earlier this month. The Nigerian Islamist terrorist organization, infamous for the abduction of 276 Chibok schoolgirls last April, has a long record of violent atrocities. Recently, it has increased attacks on marketplaces and public spaces, indiscriminately murdering moderate Muslims and Christians alike. How will this new affiliation impact the operations and reach of Boko Haram? To assess the humanitarian situation in Nigeria and the global security implications of an alliance between two of the world’s deadliest terror groups, Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom Director Nina Shea will host a discussion with Bukky Shonibare and Emmanuel Ogebe. Bukky Shonibare is a strategic team member of the #BringBackOurGirls Campaign and the coordinator of Adopt-A-Camp, a program that assists internally displaced persons in Nigeria. She will provide her firsthand account of conditions on the ground. Emmanuel Ogebe, a human rights lawyer from Nigeria, will evaluate the broad impact of the new alliance between Boko aram and the Islamic State.
- Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: Learning from 2013-2014 & Looking Ahead | Monday March 23 | 3:30 – 5:00 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | President Obama has raised the possibility of another push for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement before he leaves office. With stability on the ground already severely at stake, it is imperative that any renewed attempt take account of lessons learned from last year’s round of failed talks. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Center for a New American Security on March 23, for a discussion with Ilan Goldenberg, the chief of staff to the U.S. special envoy during those talks and author of the new report Lessons from the 2013-2014 Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Negotiations. What suggestions and recommendations can we draw from a process that built upon and at times diverged from the path of previous diplomatic efforts? How can they be leveraged by the U.S., the international community and the parties themselves to move forward constructively toward a peace agreement? Goldenberg will be joined by a panel of experts who will offer an assessment of the report’s findings and recommendations, particularly in light of lessons learned from earlier rounds of negotiations. The panel will include William B. Quandt, Professor Emeritus, Department of Politics, University of Virginia and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution. Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Director of Arab-Israeli Conflict Programs, USIP, will
- Jerusalem: Divided or Indivisible? | Tuesday March 24 | 9:30 – 11:00 | Foundation for Middle East Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Israel has controlled East Jerusalem for almost 50 years. During that time, Israeli authorities have been responsible for municipal services, housing, and urban planning for Jerusalem’s more than 300,000 Palestinian Arabs. Yet even as Israeli politicians proclaim that Jerusalem will never be divided, the contrast between its Jewish and Palestinian neighborhoods is starker than ever. The poverty rate for Palestinians in East Jerusalem is near 80%, physical infrastructure in Palestinian neighborhoods is poor, public facilities are few and far between, and a chronic housing shortage leads Palestinians to resort to unpermitted construction, for lack of alternatives. Simultaneously, Israeli settlement and building and construction further consolidates Israeli control over the city, undermining prospects for a political resolution on the city. The inequity and friction between Palestinians and Jews in Jerusalem is in many ways a microcosm of the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. FMEP invites to hear from Yudith Oppenheimer from Israeli NGO Ir Amim as she outlines key findings from its report, “Jerusalem: The Rising Cost of Peace,” a longitudinal mapping of developments on the ground from the introduction of the Clinton Parameters in 2000 until today. In context of the findings, Yudith will discuss the current forecast for a political resolution on the city. Yudith is joined by Nava Sheer (Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights), who will present on the challenges facing those who advocate the development of planning policies and practices that are more just and respectful of human rights, and responsive to the needs of local communities in Jerusalem.
- Facing Terrorism: A Lebanese Perspective | Wednesday March 25 | 12:00 – 1:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Lebanon is surprisingly quiet while the region around it is literally burning. The country is facing many challenges, from the vacancy in the presidency to Hezbollah’s involvement in the fight in Syria to the presence of over one million Syrian refugees. Because of the government’s war on terror, Lebanon has succeeded in keeping a lid on the sources of tension in the country while fighting extremism and fending off terrorism. Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk, a key figure in this fight to keep the country stable and secure, will discuss fighting extremism in Lebanon and how to keep Lebanon from becoming involved in the surrounding wars.
- Voices of Civil Society in Iraq | Wednesday March 25 | 12:00 – 2:00 | National Endowment for Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As part of the World Movement for Democracy’s Civic Space Initiatives (CSI), the World Movement will hold an event to discuss a landscape of civil society in Iraq. The event will serve as a launch of the World Movement’s new CSI video, Fatima. Fatima Al-Bahadly, featured in the film, will be one of the featured panelists. The CSI video shows how she deals with challenges and works with various communities, such as youth, women, religious minorities, and the public sector (provincial council). Amina Hassan, who was behind a camera and produced the Fatima video, is also an extremely courageous activist. Because of her media/journalism work, she was shot three times by militants some years ago, but she survived. And, today she is committed to continuing working to address social issues through media production. The activists will be joined by Zainab al-Suwaij, from the American Islamic Congress in Washington DC. Laith Kubba, Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa, National Endowment for Democracy, will act as moderator.
- Fragility and Extremism in Yemen, Again |Thursday March 26 | 9:00 – 10:30 | Bipartisan Policy Center | Yemen seemingly only attracts U.S. attention when tied to a terrorist attack or plot: the USS Cole in 2000; Anwar al-Awlaki’s incitement to terror since 2004; the “underwear bomber” in 2009; the cargo plane plot in 2010. The country’s long-simmering political fragility and endemic civil wars largely escape notice. Now, both dynamics are at play simultaneously: just days after Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took credit for the Kouachi brothers’ attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the Iran-backed Houthis have overrun the capital and forced the resignation of the Yemeni government. Please join us for a discussion of recent events in Yemen and how they will affect U.S. counterterrorism efforts and regional dynamics. The panel debate will feature Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, William D. Murray, Founder, Alphom Group and former Senior Executive, Central Intelligence Agency. The debate will moderated by Mark Hosenball, Journalist, Reuters.
- The Way Forward in the U.S.-Afghanistan Security Partnership | Thursday March 26 | 11:00 – 12:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join us as Abdullah Abdullah, Chief Executive Officer of Afghanistan, discusses the way forward for the U.S.-Afghanistan partnership. How can the two countries continue to work together to ensure Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability? What kinds of support do the Afghan security forces require to stave off Taliban advances? What should be the long-term U.S. role in helping to stabilize the country? Following months of political tensions over disputed election results, the two main contenders, Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ashraf Ghani, agreed last fall to a power sharing arrangement in which Ghani became the country’s new President and Abdullah was sworn in as his Chief Executive. The two leaders will be in Washington for an official visit March 22-25. Jim DeMint, President, The Heritage Foundation, will act as discussant.
- States of Fragility: Post-2015 Ambitions | Friday March 27 | 10:30 – 12:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | More than 1 billion people live in countries affected by armed conflict or by the fragility of their societies. Fragile states are often vulnerable to conflict because their populations tend to see their governments as ineffective, illegitimate, or both. As a group, they are the ones that lag furthest behind in achieving the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. USIP invites to a discussion on a new report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions,” sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank. The panel will include Melissa Brown, Director, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID, Alexandre Marc, Chief Technical Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and Violence-Cross Cutting Solutions Area, World Bank Group, Brenda Killen, Deputy Director, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD, Jolanda Profos, Peace and Conflict Adviser, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD, Sarah Hearn, Associate Director and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation. Andrew Blum, Vice President of Program Management and Evaluation, USIP, will moderate, and Nancy Lindborg,
President, USIP, will hold the opening remarks. - Discussion with Prince Moulay Hicham of Morocco on the Future of Authoritarianism in the Middle East | Friday March 27 | 11:00 – 12:30 | Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs | Morocco’s Prince Moulay Hicham Ben Abdallah El Alaoui is an established voice calling for political reform and greater democracy in the Arab world. As an author, scholar, and philanthropist, he has been deeply involved in establishing creative initiatives for scholarly research on the Middle East on topics including democracy, climate change, governance, and authoritarianism. He will share his expertise on current regional issues during his lecture.
- Colombia: Peace from the Regions | Friday March 27 | 3:00 – 4:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Colombia Peace Forum is a series of policy discussions sponsored by USIP to support a peaceful resolution to one of the world’s longest-running internal armed conflicts. At our March 27 forum, a panel of experts will analyze how a peace accord might be implemented on the ground. How will it build on existing efforts? And how can it be made inclusive and participatory? The session also will take up questions of the linkages among the regions and with the central government; the rights and needs of citizens; and ways to enhance citizens’ participation and effectiveness in promoting peace in the regions. The program will be conducted in Spanish with a simultaneous English translation for those who attend the event. The webcast will be in Spanish and an English video of the event will be available a day or so after. Speakers will include Virginia M. Bouvier, Senior Advisor for Latin America Programs, USIP, Andrés Santamaria Garrido, President, National Federation of Ombudspeople (Personeros), Adela Aguirre, Ombudswoman of Pasto, Department of Nariño and Marino Córdoba, Afro-Colombian Peace Council (CNPA) and Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians (AFRODES).
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The Levant will never be the same
I spoke Thursday morning at the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome on “The Fight Against ISIS and US Middle East Policy.” The powerpoint I used is attached.
Questions focused on Iran and whether it might play a positive or negative regional role if a nuclear deal is reached. My guess is that it may continue to play a negative role, because the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will lose something in a nuclear deal and may require compensation. That could come in the form of a free hand to pursue aggressive Iranian objectives in the region, including not only Syria and Iraq but also in Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain.
There is, however, one important constraint on Iran: partition of Iraq or Syria would be against its interests, as it would likely lead to problems in the Iranian province of Eastern Kurdistan. Iran will not want its strong support for Shia militias in Iraq or for the regime in Syria to precipitate partition of either of those countries. The question is whether they will recognize the danger before it becomes irreversible. In my view, it is important to have Iran inside any future multilateral talks on Syria, precisely to expose them to the risks of going too far.
A couple of people raised the question of how the ISIS is financed. I know of no one with a really good answer to this question. I certainly don’t have one. It is clear enough that they used to get lots of money from trading in oil and oil products, but the anti-ISIS coalition has destroyed a good deal of their capacity to refine (and the drop in oil prices hits them too). They gained a good deal of hard cash from banks in Mosul, but that is a non-renewable resource. My impression is that Gulf funding has largely dried up, though it may still continue from private sources.
One person asked about the mutual silence of ISIS and Israel. They seem to be leaving each other alone. I think that is a temporary bit of restraint. Both recognize the danger and enmity of the other but are not willing yet to engage. That condition won’t last forever. Israel wants to be sure ISIS does not gain control of its border with Syria. ISIS will go after Jerusalem when it feels strong enough to do so.
A good deal of the discussion, including Riccardo Alcaro’s enlightening introduction, revolved around the question of how stability might be brought to areas liberated from ISIS as well as the necessity of doing so. General Allen has only just begun the process of talking with the Iraqis about stabilization. There are no easy answers, but security, governance and essential services will need to be provided. We are a long way not only from defeating ISIS but also from ensuring that the war does not create vacua that even more radical groups might seek to fill.
If you think of the war against Islamic extremism as having begun with the US attack on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001, it is clear we have been more successful in fragmenting and spreading the enemy than in containing him, much less defeating him. That’s due in large part to stabilization failures, not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere. It would be better not to repeat that experience, though I have little confidence we have either the means or will required.
The war has displaced and impoverished many millions. Minorities are on the run. Relative majorities are frightened and distrustful. States are failing. Borders are evaporating. Extremism is reaping rewards. Moderation is fading. The Levant will never be the same.
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