Month: March 2015
Peace picks March 9-13
- Ukraine: Public Opinion Amid War | Monday March 9 | 11:00 – 1:00 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The survey of 2,000 Ukrainians, led by political psychologist Steven Kull at the University of Maryland and administered by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, was conducted Feb. 13-22, beginning one day after the latest ceasefire was to take effect and spanning the fall of Debaltseve to Russian-backed separatists. Conducted primarily through face-to-face interviews (telephone was used in some of the conflict areas), the poll also queries Ukrainians on how they think the United States, Russia, Germany, France and the EU are handling the crisis. Speakers will include Dr. Steven Kull, Director, Program for Public Consultation, and Senior Research Scholar, Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, College Park Professor, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Representative to NATO and Amb. William B. Taylor, Acting Executive Vice President for USIP and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. Christian Caryl, Contributing Editor, Foreign Policy will act as moderator.
- A Conversation on the Middle East with Stephen Hadley| Monday March 9 | 1:00 – 2:00 | SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A conversation on the Middle East with Stephen J. Hadley, former U.S. assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, senior fellow, Foreign Policy Institute. Stephen Hadley served as the National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush from 2005 to 2009. From 2001 to 2005, Mr. Hadley served as Deputy National Security Advisor. In addition to covering the full range of national security issues, he had special responsibilities in several areas including a U.S./Russia political dialogue, the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, and developing a strategic relationship with India.
- The Future of U.N. Peace Operations | Tuesday March 10 | 9:00 – 11:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon created the High-level Independent Panel on U.N. Peace Operations on October 31, 2014, to undertake a comprehensive review of peace operations. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace on March 10 for a discussion with a delegation from the U.N. panel co-hosted with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the Better World Campaign. The independent panel is charged with reviewing the broad range of issues, including the changing nature of peacekeeping environments, evolving mandates, good offices and peacebuilding challenges, managerial and administrative reforms, planning, partnerships, human rights, and protection of civilians. Participants in the discussion at USIP will include Nobel Peace Prize winner and former President of Timor-Leste, Jose Ramos-Horta, who chairs the panel, and many of the panel’s 17 distinguished members. A U.S. government official will give a keynote address.
- Combatting Terrorism: Looking Over the Horizon | Tuesday March 10 | 12:30 – 1:30 | SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Recognizing that a military approach alone is insufficient for eradicating terrorism, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Sarah Sewall will outline the United States government’s broad-based strategy to address violent extremism. Her remarks will explain why non-military foreign policy tools, such as development, stabilization efforts, humanitarian assistance, and peacebuilding are essential to current counterterrorism efforts and to prevent the rise of future threats. Under Secretary Sewall will also discuss the successful White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, convened by President Obama in February 2015, and the vision for a multi-institutional approach – inclusive of governments, civil society, and the private sector – to operationalize the prevention strategy.
- Israel’s Upcoming Elections: What to Watch, What to Expect | Wednesday March 11 | 2:00 – 3:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Israelis go to the polls on March 17 to elect the 20th Knesset, and with it a new government. The Israeli electorate is divided over national security, economics, and the public role of religion, and as many as ten parties are expected to win seats in the next Knesset. The elections also come at a pivotal moment in Israel’s foreign relations: nuclear negotiations with Iran are approaching a decisive moment, Israeli-Palestinian relations are tense, and the Netanyahu and Obama administrations are squabbling. How important are these elections? What might the results mean for Israel’s future, U.S.-Israeli relations and Israel’s foreign policy? On March 11, the Center for Middle East Policy will convene a panel of Brookings experts to preview Israel’s coming elections and their broader significance. Speakers include Martin Indyk, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, Itamar Rabinovich, Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Natan B. Sachs, Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director, Center for Middle East Policy.
- Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions | Wednesday March 11 | 3:00 – 4:00 | Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In shaping the institutions of a new country, what interventions from international actors lead to success and failure? Elton Skendaj’s investigation into Kosovo based on national survey data, interviews, and focus groups conducted over ten months of fieldwork, leads to some surprising answers. Dr. Skendaj will discuss his book, Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions, which highlights efforts to build the police force, the central government, courts, and a customs service. Speakers include Elton Skendaj, Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Miami and John R. Lampe, Professor Emeritus, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park.
- Between the Millstones: The Status of Iraq’s Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul | Thursday March 12 | 9:00 – 10:30 | POMED | REGISTER TO ATTEND | POMED, the Institute for International Law and Human Rights, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, No Peace Without Justice, and Minority Rights Group International invite to a public panel in conjunction with the release of a new report, Between the Millstones: The State of Iraq’s Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul. This report offers a detailed account of the humanitarian crises and abuses suffered by Iraq’s ethnic and religious minorities, women, and children since June 2014. It also provides an analysis of these atrocities within an international legal framework, as well as recommendations to various communities and stakeholders. Speakers include Johanna Green, Program Manager, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Sarhang Hamasaeed, Senior Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace, Mark Lattimer, Executive Director, Minority Rights Group International, William Spencer, Executive Director, Institute for International Law and Human Rights.
- Israel’s Periphery Doctrine and Search for Middle East Allies | Thursday March 12 | 2:00 – 3:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Israel’s objectives of national security and stability amidst a complex geopolitical environment led it to pursue, shortly after the founding of the nation in 1948, an overarching foreign policy strategy known as the “periphery doctrine.” Author Yossi Alpher outlines this doctrine in his new book, Periphery: Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). On March 12, the Intelligence Project at Brookings will host Alpher, a former Israeli intelligence officer, for a discussion of the components, successes, and failures of the periphery doctrine; the strategy’s recent revitalization; and how the doctrine should be adapted to meet new global challenges. Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
Sunnis don’t like ISIS
Munqith Dagher Wednesday presented at CSIS his latest findings on Iraqi public opinion concerning ISIS. A pioneer in public opinion polling in Iraq and CEO of the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, Dagher challenged common narratives about ISIS as well as more conventional wisdom about terrorism and radicalization.
CSIS Fellow Anthony Cordesman reminded the audience that the Arab world plays the primary role in the campaign against ISIS. Arabs also remain the primary ISIS casualties: State Department data show an exponential increase in terrorist attacks in recent decades, from 300 major attacks yearly between 1998 and 2008 to 4700 in 2013. Neo-salafist extremist groups have been growing rapidly, by 60% in the last two years. Moreover, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) suffers social and economic deterioration, including rapid population growth and high unemployment – particularly among youth. These challenges must be overcome if ISIS and similar groups are to be defeated.
June 9, 2014 was a benchmark in the history of terrorism, Dagher argued. The takeover of Mosul and eventually 40% of Iraqi territory by ISIS was not entirely unexpected – in fact public opinion data had indicated deep problems in the Mosul area for years. In order to understand these problems more thoroughly, Dagher began a careful study of public opinion in Iraq and Syria, relying on a combination of nationwide face-to-face polling and in-depth interviews with opinion leaders from ISIS-controlled areas. The data provide tests for three alternative explanations of ISIS expansion: religion, poverty and lack of services, and political and social factors.
The first proposition is that ISIS represents Sunni religious sentiment in Iraq and Syria. Polling data however, point to disharmony between Sunni populations and ISIS: while 90% of respondents describe religion as important to their lives, only 13% of Syrians support ISIS, whereas 94% of Iraqi Sunnis describe it as a terrorist organization. There is also a strong ideological contradiction between the local population and ISIS: 81% of Iraqi Sunnis want separation of religion from politics. Dagher also pointed to the strong pride that Mosul Sunnis have for their history, which stands in contrast to ISIS’ destruction of cultural heritage. These recent actions may be less ideological imperative than ISIS response to recent controls put in place along the border that make smuggling historic artifacts more difficult.
A second explanation for the growth of ISIS is that it corresponds to high levels of poverty and failure of the state to provide services. This is often put forward as an explanation of radicalization more generally. However, Dagher could find no statistically significant differences between areas controlled by ISIS and areas outside of ISIS control in terms of unemployment. There is also no significant difference between Shia and Sunni household incomes. Dagher also pointed to the growth of ISIS in Libya, a country that has long enjoyed a relatively high level of development, according to UN Human Development Reports.
Instead, Dagher suggested that political and social factors are key to explaining ISIS’ growth. A number of indicators point in this direction. In the months leading up to the takeover of Mosul, 83-91% of Sunnis believed that Iraq was going in the wrong direction, registering high levels of discontent, insecurity and distrust of the state and the justice system. Sunnis also reported a drastic decline in national sentiment: while 80 percent saw nationality as the primary basis for their identity in 2008, only 40 percent did the same in 2014. Distressingly, similar results of growing insecurity and distrust were found in recent opinion polls in Libya and Yemen.
While these numbers paint a somber picture of the political situation in Iraq and the region more generally, there are also hopeful indications. Since the Maliki government was removed, trust in government made a tremendous jump, from 4% to 47%. There is also significant support for the international anti-ISIS coalition. These figures should give impetus to Iraq’s allies to focus on tackling the underlying political and social factors that have contributed to the rise of ISIS.
Dagher cautioned about the destabilizing role of Shia militias and the influence of Iran in the current fight against ISIS. Among Sunnis, the view of the Shia militias is extremely negative. This is hardly a surprise – Shia militias have displaced, killed and imprisoned Sunnis throughout the areas they have conquered. There is good reason to be highly critical of the use of Shia militias to defeat ISIS. The current offensive against Tikrit is one example – according to Dagher the embattled Tikritis would prefer ISIS over the Shia militias. If we want Sunni communities to fight ISIS, we must help them overcome the pervasive political and social problems they are facing and persuade them there is in fact hope at the end of the tunnel.
Dagher’s slide presentation is available here.
Another March madness
I was reminded this week of the CNAS report If All Else Fails: The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran, by Colin Kahl, Jacob Stokes and Raj Pattani in 2013 when Colin was out of government. It makes particularly interesting reading in the run-up to a possible nuclear deal with Iran. March is the make or break month for at least a framework agreement.
The report is a reminder of what we are going to need to do if there is no agreement and Iran manages (whether or not there is a military strike on its nuclear facilities) to get nuclear weapons. Our objectives would then number 11:
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Prevent direct Iranian use of nuclear weapons;
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Prevent Iranian transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists;
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Limit and mitigate the consequences of Iranian sponsorship of conventional terrorism, support groups and conventional aggression;
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Discourage Iranian use of nuclear threats to coerce other states or provoke crises;
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Dissuade Iranian escalation during crises;
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Discourage Iran from adopting a destabilizing nuclear posture that emphasizes early use of nuclear weapons or pre-delegates launch authority;
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Persuade Israel to eschew a destabilizing nuclear posture that emphasizes early use of nuclear weapons or hair-trigger launch procedures;
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Convince other regional states not to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities;
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Limit damage to the credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. nonproliferation leadership;
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Prevent Iran from becoming a supplier of sensitive nuclear materials; and
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Ensure the free flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf.
While some of these objectives are already operable (especially the last), it is eminently clear that Iranian nuclear weapons would be a major challenge. According to Kahl, Stokes and Pattani, the responses would have to include:
Deterrence to prevent Iranian nuclear use and aggression through credible threats of retaliation by:
- Strengthening U.S. declaratory policy to explicitly threaten nuclear retaliation in response to Iranian nuclear use and strengthening commitments to defend U.S. allies and partners;
- Engaging in high-level dialogue with regional partners to extend the U.S. nuclear umbrella in exchange for commitments not to pursue independent nuclear capabilities;
- Evaluating options for the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear forces;
- Providing Israel with a U.S. nuclear guarantee and engaging Israeli leaders on steps to enhance the credibility of their nuclear deterrent; and
- Improving nuclear forensics and attribution capabilities to deter nuclear terrorism.
Defense to deny Iran the ability to benefit from its nuclear weapons and to protect U.S. partners and allies from aggression by:
- Bolstering U.S. national missile defense capabilities;
- Improving the ability to detect and neutralize nuclear weapons that might be delivered by terrorists;
- Improving network resilience to reduce the threat posed by Iranian cyber attacks;
- Maintaining a robust U.S. conventional presence in the Persian Gulf and considering additional missile defense and naval deployments;
- Increasing security cooperation and operational integration activities with Gulf countries, especially in the areas of shared early warning, air and missile defense, maritime security and critical infrastructure protection; and
- Increasing security cooperation with Israel, especially assistance and collaboration to improve Israel’s rocket and missile defenses.
Disruption to shape a regional environment resistant to Iranian influence and to thwart and diminish Iran’s destabilizing activities by:
- Building Egyptian and Iraqi counterweights to Iranian influence through strategic ties with Cairo and Baghdad, leveraging assistance to consolidate democratic institutions and encourage related reform;
- Promoting evolutionary political reform in the Gulf;
- Increasing assistance to non-jihadist elements of the Syrian opposition and aiding future political transition efforts;
- Shaping Iran’s nuclear posture through a U.S. “no-first-use” pledge;
- Persuading Israel to eschew a preemptive nuclear doctrine and other destabilizing nuclear postures;
- Establishing crisis communication mechanisms with Iran and exploring confidence-building measures;
- Limiting U.S. military objectives in crises and conflicts with Iran to signal that regime change is not the goal of U.S. actions; and
- Providing the Iranian regime with “face-saving” exit ramps during crisis situations.
Denuclearization to constrain Iran’s nuclear weapons program and limit broader damage to the nonproliferation regime by:
- Maintaining and tightening sanctions against Iran; and
- Strengthening interdiction efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, to limit Iran’s access to nuclear and missile technology and stop Iran from horizontally proliferating sensitive technologies to other states and non-state actors.
I suppose there is some universe in which the United States can do all these things successfully and at the same time shift its strategic attention out of the Middle East towards countering an aggressive Russia and a rising China, but it is not the real universe in which you and I live.
Prime Minister Netanyahu argued that an agreement would pave Iran’s way to a bomb. But that was a rhetorical flourish, not serious analysis. The worst that can be said of an Iran/P5+1 agreement is that it is irrelevant: Iran is more likely to sneak out through a clandestine program than break out by diverting nuclear material from its civilian nuclear program. I can see no way an agreement that expands IAEA inspections can make it easier for Tehran to divert nuclear material to a bomb-building effort. And the military strike option–which would certainly cause Iran to try to accelerate bomb-making efforts–would remain open if there are violations of an agreement.
Containment requires far more of Washington than it can reasonably be expected to deliver. That is a good reason for preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. And an agreement is the best bet for that. Anything else would be March madness.
The Gulf beyond oil
Elizabeth Kiefer, a master’s student at SAIS, reports on the Carnegie Endowment discussion this week of the Chatham House report Future Trends in the Gulf.
Panelists:
Jamil De Dominicis, Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Program, Chatham House
Kristen Smith Diwan, Visiting Scholar, Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University and lecturer at American University’s School of International Service
Jane Kinninmont, Deputy Head and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Program, Chatham House
Matar Ebrahim Matar, Former Member of Parliament, Kingdom of Bahrain
Moderator:
Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Jane Kinninmont provided a brief summary of the new Chatham House report. While the Gulf States are often seen as a bastion of stability, a number of factors that have generated tensions between civil society and Gulf governments such as high population growth, increased internal migration, lavish economic spending, government nepotism, the public’s dissatisfaction with current land ownership policies, lack of employment opportunities for women, and the uneven distribution of wealth. The proliferation of information via Twitter and satellite television has created the expectation among Gulf citizens of greater government transparency and generated calls that citizens be included in international and domestic policy debates.
While the Gulf States were originally receptive to change in the wake of the Arab Spring, these regimes are now less likely to accommodate local demands for openness as a result of the turmoil that has accompanied transitioning states. Governments are now repressing civil dissent and resisting calls for political transformation. Some of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, have increased social spending in an effort to buy off local dissent, but this strategy is not sustainable in the long-term due to declining oil revenues and poor economic policies.
Kinninmont argued that these regimes must pursue economic policies that move beyond oil to create knowledge-based economies. Such a shift must be accompanied with parallel public discussion about what a “new deal” with a state that provides fewer subsidies and expects greater inputs from its citizens entails.
Western countries are sending mixed messages to Gulf states. Continued military and security assistance, without pushes for democratic reforms or increased social spending, have reinforced negative Gulf behaviors.
Jamil De Dominicis noted the space for constructive political dialogue in the Gulf States has decreased since 2011. He is particularly alarmed about the practice that many states are pursuing of revoking the citizenship of political dissidents. Dominicis advocates that Gulf states take a long-term approach towards transition that redefines the relationship between the state and citizen beyond the accumulation of wealth.
Kristen Smith Diwan noted that the West needs to view its strategy with Gulf states beyond the lens of oil and gas. The new security environment in the Middle East will make Western political concerns in the Gulf more difficult to address. Many Gulf states are using new legal frameworks and media laws, enacted under the guise of anti-terrorism efforts, to crack down on peaceful opposition. She highlighted the use of such tactics in Kuwait and Bahrain, where several moderate clerics who spoke out against government policies were sentenced to prison. The parliaments in many Gulf States are now less representative of the region’s political landscape due to free speech restrictions.
Diwan echoed Dominicis‘ concerns about taking away citizenship, noting that revoking citizenship is a highly effective and symbolic tactic to repress dissent. Policies that drive peaceful political dissent underground risk creating violent extremist groups in the coming years.
Matar Ebrahim said Gulf youth are increasingly following economic, human rights, and democracy issues on Twitter. Their governments are increasingly committing human rights abuses and even torture against those who protest. The current political environment is not sustainable and is driving foreign companies out of the region due to security concerns.
Ebrahim said that there were three scenarios that could play out in the region. The first is continuation of the status quo, which he believes is not sustainable and would ultimately precipitate inevitable but difficult political transitions in Gulf states. The second scenario involves a political “opening up” in Saudi Arabia, which would have ripple effects in the region. The third and most likely scenario is a political transition in a small country such as Bahrain, which could serve as a model for others. Ebrahim noted that the time for change was now, as the economic outlook for Bahrain is particularly bleak.
Bluster with consequences
Prime Minister Netanyahu was better today in Congress than yesterday at the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee. But still blustering.
He argued that the nuclear deal with Iran currently under consideration is bad because
- it leaves a lot of nuclear infrastructure in place (enabling what he regards as a minimal one-year breakout time);
- Iran could evade the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections or evict the inspectors, as North Korea did;
- It would leave Iran unconstrained in a decade.
Netanyahu wants a better agreement that continues sanctions and restrictions on the nuclear program until Iran stops its aggression and support for terror in other countries (he mentioned Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon in this connection) and ends its threat to annihilate Israel. Failing this, Netanyahu wants no deal.
Netanyahu failed to explain how the US would be able to get the kind of deal he is talking about. The Europeans, Russia and China are unlikely to continue sanctions if the current deal is not concluded. Without multilateral sanctions, Iran would still be feeling some pressure from the oil price collapse and unilateral US sanctions, but it is hard to picture Tehran signing on to something more restrictive with a disunited international community than with a united one.
Netanyahu also said explicitly that he prefers no deal to the current deal, which he described as paving the way for an Iranian nuclear weapon. That’s loony. Without some sort of deal–at least extension of the interim Plan of Action–Iran would be free to race for a nuclear weapon without constraints other than the existing IAEA inspections. If Netanyahu thinks they are inadequate in the deal being negotiated, which beefs them up significantly, why would they be any better without a deal?
Looking beyond the bluster, there were a few interesting commissions and omissions in the speech. Netanyahu dropped the explicit threat of war. He did say Israel can defend itself and will stand alone if necessary, but he neither demanded that the US go to war against Iran nor stated clearly what Israel would do. He presumably has come to understand that the military option is a bad one: it won’t succeed in destroying everything, it would accelerate Iran’s nuclear efforts and it would have to be repeated in a few years time. Iran’s nuclear program involves many installations, some of which are buried deep underground. Even the US would have trouble damaging it beyond repair.
I share Netanyahu’s concern with Iranian behavior throughout the Middle East (and occasionally beyond, witness the terrorism it sponsored in Argentina). I’m not sure he is correct that Iran is as radical as ever, but let’s concede that premise. He imagines maintaining sanctions will be useful in moderating Iranian behavior or bringing about regime change. There are two problems with this hypothesis. There is no reason to believe it true–countries isolated by sanctions often become more radical, not less–and there is no way to maintain the sanctions.
So what we got this morning was more classic Netanyahu: bluster without any serious effort to explain how his newly discovered alternative, a better deal, could be achieved. I trust the speech will help him in his electoral campaign in Israel, if only because it shifts the debate there away from his vulnerabilities (economic and social policy) and towards security, which favors the Israeli right wing (though not necessarily Netanyahu himself). Here in the US, it will make life harder for the Obama Administration, as it implicitly roused the Congress to oppose any deal Secretary Kerry brings home.
I suppose Speaker Boehner, who invited Netanyahu to address Congress without informing the White House, is satisfied and hopes this show will help him face down a brewing revolt against his leadership among House Republicans. Netanyahu hopes Israelis won’t notice that he has put the country’s relationship with the United States at risk. I hope both lose those bets.
PS: Some Israelis seem to agree with me:
Chutzpahdik
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s warm-up pep talk today at AIPAC (the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee) was a classic chutzpahdik performance: he claimed respect for President Obama and his office, appreciation for unprecedented US assistance, and insistence on the importance of bipartisan support in the US for the close relationship with Israel. He even lauded his wife, who has been a serious source of embarrassment.
Netanyahu cited agreement between the US and Israel that Iran should not have nuclear weapons but disagreement on the methods to achieve that goal. Israel, he said, has to worry about its survival, whereas the US worries about its security. Netanyahu claimed Israel can and will defend itself, citing the attack on the Osiraq reactor, the invasion of Lebanon and other instances where the US and Israel disagreed. Israel weathered these disagreements and will weather the current one because of common values and (metaphorical as well as real) family relationships.
The alliance, Netanyahu said, is strong and get stronger.
This is fantasy. Netanyahu has done serious harm to relations with the United States by disrespecting its president, accepting a one-party invitation to address the Congress, bringing his re-election campaign to Washington, and opposing an agreement with Iran without proposing an alternative that would make Israel more secure. He has split the American Jewish community, most of which is far more interested in an agreement not only with Iran but also with the Palestinians than Netanyahu is. Israel is losing ground steadily and irreversibly among young American Jews.
We’ll have to wait for tomorrow’s speech in Congress to hear Netanyahu’s substantive arguments against a nuclear agreement with Iran that lengthens the time it would need to make a nuclear weapon to a year and imposes strict monitoring requirements.
It is hard to picture how Israel would end up better off without such an agreement. Iran would then be free to pursue nuclear weapons at whatever pace it decides. Israel lacks the military punch required to take out dozens of often underground nuclear facilities farther from its territory than the single Syrian and Iraqi reactors it destroyed in the past. Even if it could damage vital nuclear facilities, the Iranians would reconstitute their program and forge ahead, making it necessary to attack the nuclear facilities again within a few years. The sanctions regime that has slowed the Iranian nuclear program and brought Tehran to the negotiating table will fall apart if there is no agreement.
I can agree with Netanyahu’s concerns about Iran’s support for terrorism. Not just its nuclear program but also its support for extremists in many parts of the world are deplorable. But unless he has an alternative worth considering, tomorrow’s speech on the nuclear issue will be nothing but more bluster.
