Day: April 7, 2015
Bridging the Gulf
Cinzia Bianco, an analyst for the “Mediterranean and Gulf” programme at NATO Defence College Foundation whom I met on a recent visit to Rome, offers this guest post, based her “The Changing US Posture in the Gulf as an Opportunity for Regional Cooperation. The role of the EU,” paper presented at the Fifth Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), University of Cambridge, 25-28 August 2014. Her full paper will be published with others from the GRM by the Gerlach Press.
The commitment of the United States in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as well as Al Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has silenced rumors about imminent American disengagement from the Gulf in order to pivot to the Asia Pacific. This commitment stems chiefly from the proliferation of terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa, which poses a threat to the US national security.
Nonetheless it has become clear that the US shows fatigue in managing unilaterally this ever-boiling, resource-consuming region. In favoring a “leading from behind” approach, the Obama administration has demonstrated a lack of coherent leadership in navigating the regional challenges, which include state failures in Syria, Yemen and Iraq as well as the consequences of a nuclear agreement with Iran. The US needs to find a way to prevent leaving a hazardous vacuum by relying on an ally to try and build a more stable, long-term strategic outlook in the Gulf. Despite all of its well-known weaknesses, that ally might be the European Union (EU).
The EU has the the potential and interests to step forward. Despite ups and downs, the EU has been involved for decades in direct dialogue with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), made a big commitment in post-war Iraq and has almost uninterruptedly maintained communication open with Iran. Conflicts in the Gulf would directly affect Europe, whose geographic proximity raises the stakes. Europe is much more dependent than the US on the Gulf for oil and gas supplies. Its trade and investments volume could be hugely disrupted, as Gulf ports are Europe’s gateways to Asia. EU-GCC investments are far more significant than that involving the US.
These motives should be sufficiently compelling to encourage the EU to take on a more proactive role in the region, which would also consolidate its place as a global strategic player.
The presence of a heavy-weighted American military umbrella has not sufficed to protect the region from the emergence of the unconventional threats that are tearing it apart. The regional problems are, at their roots, not military but political and require courageous political responses. Since grievances and conflicts in the Gulf are mushrooming along sectarian fault lines – empowering Sunni and Shi’a extremism in a way that endangers internal as well as external stability of almost all regional countries–it is sectarianism that needs to be addressed head-on, by putting all Gulf countries around the same table. A truly effective dialogue on security in the Gulf needs active participation from Saudi Arabia, and cannot be built without or in spite of Iran and Iraq. Given the considerable distrust between the Sunni and Shi’a in the region, only the EU and the US together have enough political capital to entertain such a challenging enterprise.
The approach in the Gulf should start with limited cooperation on practical issues, in an incremental process of confidence-building focusing on many shared challenges and opportunities. All parties share critical resources, not only oil and gas fields but also water, whose management is strategic in such an arid region and needs to be coordinated. Joint patrolling of regional waters, under the umbrella of existing international initiatives, to fight the transnational criminal networks that engage in illicit trafficking and piracy, might be one step towards normalization.
Nothing can be done without a structured regional dialogue on the sociopolitical front, supporting existing fora of inter-sectarian dialogue and fighting extremist narratives. Tuning down the sectarian narrative at all levels, from leadership to population, might be the only way to prevent spillover from Syria, Iraq and Yemen into the broader region. The most concerned countries should in fact be Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Frameworks of this sort have failed to prosper in the past, but always in the presence of huge level of hostility between the US and Iran. The main GCC fear is that Iran always works to extend its influence in the Gulf, by playing the Shia communities against the Sunni rulers. Arguably, however, critical engagement rather than classic deterrence would the most effective approach to prevent this behavior.
As much as this idea may seem daunting, neglecting the challenge of sectarian-based extremism and allowing deep-seated conflicts to escalate would put national and international strategic interests at great risk. In order to return the Gulf to long-lost stability, bold steps are required, as well as the ability to adapt quickly to a changing strategic outlook, that might soon include the rehabilitation of Iran in the international arena. A visionary plan for a regional rapprochement based on shared challenges and shared opportunities might in the upcoming future become the best possible option.
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A better place to start from
More or less half of American voters will cast their ballots for the Republicans in 2016, so it behooves us to examine seriously what they propose to do about Iran’s nuclear program. Jeb Bush has been inaccurate and hazy. Rick Perry is clearer. So let’s consider his proposition, which consists of sanctions, regime change and war.
The problem with ratcheting up sanctions is getting others to follow the US lead. Russia, China and the Europeans have gone along with the Obama Administration’s strengthening of sanctions because they saw it as part of a broader diplomatic effort intended to reach an agreement with Iran. The Obama Administration made it clear war was an option only if negotiations failed. No one would be under that impression if Rick Perry becomes president. He aims to compel Iran to give up its nuclear program, which would lead quickly to the other members of the P5+1 (that’s UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) deciding to abandon the effort. Unilateral US sanctions, as we’ve seen with Cuba, are destined to fail.
If sanctions fail, Perry suggests a push for regime change. That would revive a longstanding American ambition, one that failed for 35 years until President Obama put it on ice. Of course Perry might be better at it than Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush (41), Clinton, Bush (43) and Obama, but the odds on that proposition are not good. The Islamic Republic will fall some day, because it is incapable of meeting the aspirations of the Iranian people. But when that might happen is anyone’s guess. In the meanwhile, supporting the aspirations of Iran’s Kurdish or Baloch separatists, as has been done at times in the past, is frighteningly risky in today’s Middle East, where state structures are already at risk in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya.
Then there is war, aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But in order to do that, the US will need also to destroy its air defenses and somehow prevent Iranian attacks on shipping in the strait of Hormuz. With no prospect of a negotiated solution, Russia is bound to export modern air defenses to Iran. Weeks if not months of bombing would be required. The only really reliable way to protect shipping is to seize the Iranian side of the strait, an option no doubt included in US planning. In the meanwhile, oil prices would spike back to $100 and more per barrel. Any multilateral effort to negotiate an end to Iran’s nuclear program would die an ignominous death.
The net result of the military effort by most estimates would be no more than a two or three year setback for Iran’s nuclear program, which would be redoubled in the aftermath. While some may hope for regime change after a US attack on Iran, experience suggests that the initial reaction will be for Iranians to rally around the flag. The government would squelch any nascent pro-democracy efforts as treacherous and hardliners would be buoyed. That might change later, but there are no guarantees.
Let’s ignore for the moment the possibility–a real one–that Iran will cheat on its obligations under an agreement along the lines of the one already outlined. Can anyone seriously argue that setting the Iranian nuclear program back 10 or 15 years, as provided for in the “framework” agreement, is not better than the Perry formula of sanctions, regime change and war?
I think not, but that still leaves the verification issue. The agreement is strong on verification, but not fool proof. Iran could conceivably establish an entirely separate nuclear program, starting from uranium ore, that would escape the scrutiny of international inspectors and the import controls provided for in the framework agreement. It could also renounce the agreement and expel the inspectors, or even withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty, as North Korea did.
But if it did so, we would be much more likely to get cooperation from others on sanctions, regime change and war. The framework agreement looks like a far better place to start from than no agreement at all.
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