Stabilizing Syria

Fred Hof, Bassma Kodmani and Jeff White want to set the stage for peace in Syria by creating a 50,000-strong Syrian National Stabilization Force (SNSF). Ideas of this sort have been bandied about for years, but this is a more in-depth look than I have seen elsewhere.

Objective

Its objective would be a political one: to establish legitimate state authority, which has collapsed in the current multi-party civil war, on Syria’s entire territory. Ten times the size of the force supposedly being trained yearly by the US and other countries, Hof, Kodmani and White expect the SNSF to be able to confront both the Islamic State and the rump regime of Bashar al Asad as well as protect Syrian civilians, starting in protected areas but eventually expanding to the whole country.

So far, so good, in theory. Military experts will have to judge whether a force of the size, training and equipment they propose will be sufficient to the task. My own guess is that even at these expanded dimensions, the SNSF would find the fight the expanded mission a difficult one, but the authors think it might be sufficient to induce the regime to come to the negotiating table and cut a deal. The SNSF would then be able to expand further as the army of a new Syria and focus its full attention against the Islamic State and other extremist forces.

Will it fight extremists?

Therein lies one problem. It is not clear that Syria’s more moderate rebel forces are prepared to fight the Islamic State (ISIS), which many Syrians dislike but still regard as vital to the fight against the Asad regime. Civil war favors radicalization. Syrians are not immune. Moderates tend to leave. Extremists stay to fight. The Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al Nusra (JN), appears to have a good deal of support among Sunnis inside Syria. Its personnel is largely Syrian, it has a reputation for honesty, and it fights regime forces with vigor.

Command and control

Another problem with the SNSF is command and control. The US and other countries have recognized the Syrian National Coalition (aka Etilaf or SNC) as the legitimate political representative of the Syrian people, but the authors of this report accept the US Government assessment that it is too fragmented and disconnected from realities inside Syria to function effectively as a command and control authority.

So in its stead they propose formation of an ad hoc advisory group. This is awkward. How do you accept the SNC as the sole political representative of the Syrian people, then deny it authority over the military forces expected to win back the country in their name? How do you get away with picking your own favorites to form the advisory group? SNC itself is the product of US-led diplomacy, which may be a source of its problems. What makes us think another iteration will improve Syrian cohesion or representativeness?

Washington issues

Perhaps the biggest problem with this SNSF proposal lies in Washington DC, not in Syria. It would require expansion of the US mission in Syria beyond countering terrorist groups like the ISIS and JN as well as commitment to combat support, as the authors discuss extensively. The Obama Administration has been reluctant to go down that road. Congress is not pressing in that direction. Reluctance to get involved in trying to fix yet one more Middle Eastern country is palpable.

I suppose there is someone in the bowels of the Pentagon and perhaps the State Department who is hoping that the precedent of US/Iran parallel efforts against the Islamic State set in Iraq can be repeated in Syria, where Hizbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards are now a mainstay of the Asad regime, even if claims of Iranian “occupation” of Syria seem to me hyperbolic. Restoration of autocracy is working in Egypt, some may think, why shouldn’t it also work in Syria? If we can fight on the same side against the Islamic State in Iraq, why not also in Syria?

The short answer is that the government in Iraq is a legitimate one that represents the will of its people. Syria’s government is not, despite Asad’s pretend “election” last year. SNSF has virtues, if only because it would end such daydreaming by positioning the US unequivocally in opposition to the Asad regime. Protection of civilians in a few liberated areas, in the north along the Turkish border and in the south along the Jordanian border, would itself be a great virtue and give Iran, Russia and the regime pause. Neither Russia nor Iran is likely to stick with Bashar al Asad until the bitter end, if only to protect their equities in what comes next.

Bottom line

To make a long story short: SNSF is not likely to march triumphantly into Damascus any time soon. But committing to something like it would allow the US to engage in Syria more effectively than it has done so far.