Day: May 13, 2015
Tough love
Monday’s statement by American Ambassador to Macedonia Jess Baily starts mildly enough but then goes ballistic, starting at 1’50” with criticism of the prime minister for failing to account for allegations of wrongdoing in wiretaps published by the main opposition party:
Yesterday Prime Minister Gruevski fired his interior and transportation ministers as well as his intelligence chief, all of whom have featured prominently in the wiretaps that have generated calls for Gruevski’s resignation. All this occurs in the wake of a gun battle last weekend in which 14 people alleged to be trying to foment rebellion and eight policemen were killed.
So why should anyone more than 300 miles from Skopje care about all this?
The short answer is that they shouldn’t need to. Macedonia got the best of what Western international intervention had to offer: a preventive UN deployment that protected it after independence in 1991, lots of assistance in dealing with the outflow of Albanians from Kosovo during the NATO/Yugoslavia war in 1999, candidacy for the EU membership in 2005 and full qualification for NATO membership by 2008. I’m skipping the rougher moments, but even with those the arc of history is clear: it points Macedonia toward a happy home in Euroatlantic institutions.
But it stalled along the way. Part of the problem lies in Greece, which has blocked EU accession negotiations and NATO membership in contravention of an International Court of Justice decision because it claims exclusive rights to use of the name “Macedonia.” But part of the problem resides inside Macedonia, where the political elite seems more committed to holding on to, and benefiting from, power than to ensuring the establishment of serious democratic institutions. Ivana Jordanovska accuses:
They have rigged elections, taken bribes, wiretapped more than 20,000 citizens, blackmailed businesses, created media content, imprisoned political opponents, exercised control over the judiciary and misused their power for their personal financial benefit.
In three words: abuse of power.
Prime Minister Gruevski had come to power in 2006 as a reformer, and reform he did. His economic program helped Macedonia achieve an unprecedented period of growth and (relative) prosperity. But the economy has suffered in recent years from the Eurozone’s ailments. Gruevski has turned to nationalist flag-waving, electoral fraud, restrictions on press freedom and control over the judiciary to ensure his political dominance. He won 61 of 123 seats in parliament in 2014.
In a democratic society, the normal check on abuse of power comes from the courts and the opposition. The wiretaps have demonstrated Gruevski controls the courts. Macedonia’s opposition has not only been strikingly unsuccessful at the polls but more inclined towards sensationalism than serious critique. The wiretaps have unquestionably embarrassed Gruevski and might have brought him down in a truly democratic environment, but not so far in Macedonia. A big demonstration to push Gruevski to resign is scheduled for May 17.
The best that can be said about the current crisis is that it hasn’t pitted ethnic Macedonians against the one-quarter or so of the population that is Albanian. So far, it is largely a squabble among the Macedonians. Last weekend’s gun battle raised the prospect of interethnic violence, as it recalled an Albanian uprising in 2001. But this time the Albanian reaction seems quite different: instead of expressing sympathy for the alleged rebels, at least some of whom appear to have come from Kosovo, they are wondering out loud whether the whole thing wasn’t a plot by the government to distract attention from the wiretapping scandal.
I find that hard to believe–how would the Macedonian intelligence service find Kosovars dumb enough to dress up in BDU’s and carry weapons into northern Macedonia? But we haven’t got any hard evidence on the issue. I suppose that narrative signals Albanian rejection of armed rebellion and is therefore a good sign, no matter how far from reality.
What Macedonia needs now is tough love. The American ambassador has essentially read Gruevski the riot act. If he fails to respond constructively and concretely, the Europeans and Americans need to be prepared to react forcefully, which means fulfilling the threat to move Macedonia back from the EU and NATO and squeezing its access to international institution funding. That won’t be easy to organize, as the Europeans will fear precipitating instability and ethnic strife. But the risks associated with allowing abuse of power to continue are greater.
Uneasy Kosovo, and Macedonia
Kosova Sot, a Pristina daily, asked me some questions last week and published the answers today. My responses are below (1-18), but then Sunday they sent me an additional question, about Macedonia, which appears first here:
Q: In the meantime armed conflicts occurred in Kumanovo in Macedonia where there were policemen killed, civilians and gunmen. Do you think the situation in Macedonia will escalate? Did Macedonia failed to be a state for all citizens, because Albanians are the nation’s largest after the Macedonians in this country?
A: I think it is too early to speculate on the precise political origins and objectives of the group involved in this incident. But one thing is clear to me: those who challenge state structures in the Balkans today have no justification. The states potentially involved–not only Macedonia but also Kosovo, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia–will need to be prepared to protect themselves from those who intend to use violence to achieve political ends. I’ve got nothing but sympathy for the state security officials called upon to suppress rebellion, so long as they do so in strict observance of the rule of law.
Macedonia is having a hard time. All its citizens need to reflect on how it can begin to move forward on its Euro-Atlantic ambitions. Visible motion in the direction of joining NATO and the EU would do wonders for the country’s internal stability.
1. Kosovo is on the verge of a new challenge, the establishment of the Special Court, which will handle allegations of Dick Marty’s report. Was it an necessary court?
A: No. It was made necessary by the failure of Kosovo and Albania to pursue criminal investigations of people associated with the Kosovo Liberation Army.
2. Among the persons accused in the report of Dick Marty, is the name of the former KLA leader, former Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi. Would you be surprised if his name appears also in the list of defendants?
A: Who could be surprised after years of discussion of this possibility? But I saw no convincing evidence of his involvement in the allegations of the Marty report, and I’ve seen none since then either.
3. This Court will not address, however, war crimes, acts of corruption or political killings. Would it be good that such a Court, to deal with these cases, which remain unresolved?
A: I would like to see the Kosovo courts begin to deal with these issues, as the Serbian courts have begun to do. A sovereign state is obligated to investigate all crimes on its own territory.
4. What consequences can have Kosovo, if parliament fails to vote on constitutional changes that facilitate the establishment of this Court?
A: I suppose it would slow the process of EU integration, which is already far too slow, and displease the Americans.
5. Let us talk about other developments in Kosovo. The coalition of the two major parties, PDK and LDK, is facing increased social pressure of opposition, strikes and protests. Do you think such a government is going to last, knowing that even serious surveys show a record decline in satisfaction with the performance of institutions?
A: If the coalition holds together, the government will last, no matter how many protests and strikes there are.
6. Unofficially there may be about 100 thousand people who left Kosovo during last months, especially after the formation of the new government, that for PDK it was the third consecutive mandate. Are people losing their people?
A: Do you mean is Kosovo losing its people? Yes, I think people are voting with their feet, as we say. Kosovars are looking for jobs and finding at least some of them in Europe.
7. The opposition is protesting against, as they call them, state capture, which in fact is a reality known to all. What do you think, how the state can be de-captured, when those same politicians are being recycled in power?
A: The proper way to remove politicians from power is to win elections. The opposition hasn’t been able to do that. It has every right to protest peacefully, but I’m not sure that will help at the polls.
8. Politicians are the richest caste in Kosovo, while businesses can hardly survive if unrelated to power. Is Kosovo being turned into an oasis of corruption, clientelism, nepotism, as in fact foreign media portrayed us recently?
A: Kosovo seems to me more or less on a par with other countries in the region when it comes to corruption, clientelism and nepotism. It is a small country where everyone knows everyone else, which makes meritocracy difficult. The wealth of politicians troubles me. Someone needs to investigate where the money comes from.
9. The rule of law is in crisis, and nor EULEX is not performing its work. This mission is covered by corruption scandals, while “big fishes”, mentioned once, remain untouchable. Do you see a dose of courage in the Kosovo justice to enable the rule of law?
A: I really don’t think foreigners can penetrate the web of economic and political interests in Kosovo or any other country. I think it takes courageous judges and prosecutors who are native to the environment. I served many years as a diplomat in Italy. Without the courageous Italian anti-Mafia magistrates, there would have been no progress against organized crime there. The Americans helped with intelligence and witness protection, but Italian courage was vital. Read more