peacefare.net

Tough love

Monday’s statement by American Ambassador to Macedonia Jess Baily starts mildly enough but then goes ballistic, starting at 1’50” with criticism of the prime minister for failing to account for allegations of wrongdoing in wiretaps published by the main opposition party:

Yesterday Prime Minister Gruevski fired his interior and transportation ministers as well as his intelligence chief, all of whom have featured prominently in the wiretaps that have generated calls for Gruevski’s resignation. All this occurs in the wake of a gun battle last weekend in which 14 people alleged to be trying to foment rebellion and eight policemen were killed.

So why should anyone more than 300 miles from Skopje care about all this?

The short answer is that they shouldn’t need to. Macedonia got the best of what Western international intervention had to offer:  a preventive UN deployment that protected it after independence in 1991, lots of assistance in dealing with the outflow of Albanians from Kosovo during the NATO/Yugoslavia war in 1999, candidacy for the EU membership in 2005 and full qualification for NATO membership by 2008. I’m skipping the rougher moments, but even with those the arc of history is clear: it points Macedonia toward a happy home in Euroatlantic institutions.

But it stalled along the way. Part of the problem lies in Greece, which has blocked EU accession negotiations and NATO membership in contravention of an International Court of Justice decision because it claims exclusive rights to use of the name “Macedonia.” But part of the problem resides inside Macedonia, where the political elite seems more committed to holding on to, and benefiting from, power than to ensuring the establishment of serious democratic institutions. Ivana Jordanovska accuses:

They have rigged elections, taken bribes, wiretapped more than 20,000 citizens, blackmailed businesses, created media content, imprisoned political opponents, exercised control over the judiciary and misused their power for their personal financial benefit.

In three words:  abuse of power.

Prime Minister Gruevski had come to power in 2006 as a reformer, and reform he did. His economic program helped Macedonia achieve an unprecedented period of growth and (relative) prosperity. But the economy has suffered in recent years from the Eurozone’s ailments. Gruevski has turned to nationalist flag-waving, electoral fraud, restrictions on press freedom and control over the judiciary to ensure his political dominance. He won 61 of 123 seats in parliament in 2014.

In a democratic society, the normal check on abuse of power comes from the courts and the opposition. The wiretaps have demonstrated Gruevski controls the courts. Macedonia’s opposition has not only been strikingly unsuccessful at the polls but more inclined towards sensationalism than serious critique. The wiretaps have unquestionably embarrassed Gruevski and might have brought him down in a truly democratic environment, but not so far in Macedonia. A big demonstration to push Gruevski to resign is scheduled for May 17.

The best that can be said about the current crisis is that it hasn’t pitted ethnic Macedonians against the one-quarter or so of the population that is Albanian. So far, it is largely a squabble among the Macedonians. Last weekend’s gun battle raised the prospect of interethnic violence, as it recalled an Albanian uprising in 2001. But this time the Albanian reaction seems quite different: instead of expressing sympathy for the alleged rebels, at least some of whom appear to have come from Kosovo, they are wondering out loud whether the whole thing wasn’t a plot by the government to distract attention from the wiretapping scandal.

I find that hard to believe–how would the Macedonian intelligence service find Kosovars dumb enough to dress up in BDU’s and carry weapons into northern Macedonia? But we haven’t got any hard evidence on the issue. I suppose that narrative signals Albanian rejection of armed rebellion and is therefore a good sign, no matter how far from reality.

What Macedonia needs now is tough love. The American ambassador has essentially read Gruevski the riot act. If he fails to respond constructively and concretely, the Europeans and Americans need to be prepared to react forcefully, which means fulfilling the threat to move Macedonia back from the EU and NATO and squeezing its access to international institution funding. That won’t be easy to organize, as the Europeans will fear precipitating instability and ethnic strife. But the risks associated with allowing abuse of power to continue are greater.