Month: May 2015
Forget about it
My friends at Pristina daily Koha Ditore sent me some questions this week, mostly focused on Macedonia. They published my replies today:
Q: Macedonian police for two days fought with a group in the town of Kumanovo. How have you seen these developments in Macedonia?
A: So far, I see this mainly as a law and order problem, caused by armed people who allegedly wanted to rebel. The police reacted. That is what they are supposed to do. I can only regret that so many police were killed. But we need to await a full investigation, and trial of those arrested, to get a fuller understanding of what this is all about.
Q: Many residents claimed that this is just a game by the government, after the Gruevski wire-tapping scandal, published by the opposition. Can these developments be linked?
A: I hear people suggesting that somehow the government created the incident. Anyone who spreads that rumor needs to provide evidence. I haven’t seen any. The tapes are more than a little embarrassing, but are you really suggesting that the government killed 14 people to distract attention from them? And where would you find 14 Albanians dumb enough to dress up in battle dress uniforms and carry automatic weapons, to please the Macedonian government and get themselves killed?
I suppose it is possible that the police took action last weekend against a group it had known about for some time. But if someone thought that would distract attention they were wrong: two ministers and an intelligence chief have now lost their jobs. Prime Minister Gruevski is facing strong calls for his resignation, due principally to the material in the wire taps.
Q: Is there a danger that the tension created in Kumanovo will shift into other cities in Macedonia, where the Albanians are in the majority?
A: I hope not. Albanians in Macedonia can gain nothing by supporting an armed rebellion. And they have a good deal to lose. Nonviolent pursuit of rights—both in the streets and in the courts—is part of the normal democratic process. Automatic weapons are not.
Q: How do you see the role of the Albanian political parties in Macedonia. BDI led by Ali Ahmeti continues to be part of the government, despite requests to leave the coalition with Gruevski?
A: My understanding is that even if Ali Ahmeti were to leave the government, Gruevski would still be able to cobble together a majority. And even if Gruevski fell, he might do well in the next election. So what would leaving accomplish? It might even lead to another Albanian party joining the government. No matter how unhappy they may be with a political situation, most leaders will try to figure out how to gain, not lose.
If someone wants to bring Gruevski down, they need to find a majority in parliament to vote no confidence or convince him to resign. He does not appear inclined to do so, as he won big in an election just last year. But my understanding is that there is a demonstration scheduled for May 17. If that is very big and peaceful, it could have a serious political impact. So, too, could action by the courts, if they can find the evidence and the courage. There is a good reason why an independent judiciary is vital in democracy. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Dayton plus 20
We at SAIS are marking the 20 years since the Dayton agreements (as well as the Srebrenica massacre) with a two-day conference here in DC as well as other events during rest of the year. I was asked to speak yesterday, along with Dan Hamilton, about the situation before Dayton, when the Balkan fire was spreading. Here are my speaking notes, as well as my answers to a couple of questions:
1. Thank you, Marvin [Kalb], for that kind introduction. I confess that it is hard to believe more than 20 years have passed since I first started learning about Bosnia from the Italians.
2. I was deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Rome from 1990 to 93, when the Italians repeatedly tried to convince Washington that it needed to pay attention to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and prevent problems there.
3. Somewhere in the bowels of the State Department are my lengthy cables reporting the very detailed accounts the Prime Minister’s diplomatic advisor provided on the “spreading fire.”
4. Washington’s response was equivocal: yes, we would help get the issue onto the G7 Summit agenda, but Yugoslavia was “out of area,” which meant NATO would have nothing to do with it.
5. I accompanied Secretary of State Christopher in May 1993 when he tried to sell “lift and strike,” the policy of lifting the arms embargo and striking against Serb forces, to then Prime Minister Ciampi.
6. The Italians were unequivocal: they did not want gasoline poured on the fire next door.
7. Two more years went by before NATO struck decisively, in response to shelling of Sarajevo.
8. The August/September 1995 NATO bombing of Serb forces was triggered by a “trip wire.” Zepa and Srebrenica, Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia, had already fallen. It had been agreed in NATO that an attack on Gorazde, a third Muslim enclave, would trigger a NATO response. This “Gorazde rule” was extended to three other “safe areas,” Sarajevo, Tuzla and Bihac.
9. The sustained bombing was not limited to the Serb forces that launched a mortar against the Markale market in Sarajevo. I think it arguable that only when it got to the communications nodes of the Bosnian Serb Army did it have a really strategic impact, in combination with the rapid advance of Bosnian and Croatian forces on the ground in western Bosnia.
10. Those forces had vastly improved their capabilities and coordination over the previous two years.
11. The arms embargo was never lifted, but the US turned a blind eye to the violations Iran, Malaysia, Turkey and others indulged in.
12. One of my colleagues in Washington—a leading expert on Syria—is fond of asking me if waiting for action in Bosnia was as painful then as waiting for action on Syria is today.
13. I’m afraid it was. Maybe even more painful: the United States was then the world’s last remaining superpower, Russia posed no serious counterweight, half the population of Bosnia had been displaced and something like 100,000 would eventually be killed, out of a population of only 4.2 million or so.
14. State Department officers were resigning. There were demonstrations calling for action on Bosnia on campuses throughout the United States. Mo Sacirbey and Haris Silajdzic were on the network news and CNN virtually every evening, excoriating the US for failing to act. Congress wanted to lift the arms embargo, despite European hesitation. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Tough love
Monday’s statement by American Ambassador to Macedonia Jess Baily starts mildly enough but then goes ballistic, starting at 1’50” with criticism of the prime minister for failing to account for allegations of wrongdoing in wiretaps published by the main opposition party:
Yesterday Prime Minister Gruevski fired his interior and transportation ministers as well as his intelligence chief, all of whom have featured prominently in the wiretaps that have generated calls for Gruevski’s resignation. All this occurs in the wake of a gun battle last weekend in which 14 people alleged to be trying to foment rebellion and eight policemen were killed.
So why should anyone more than 300 miles from Skopje care about all this?
The short answer is that they shouldn’t need to. Macedonia got the best of what Western international intervention had to offer: a preventive UN deployment that protected it after independence in 1991, lots of assistance in dealing with the outflow of Albanians from Kosovo during the NATO/Yugoslavia war in 1999, candidacy for the EU membership in 2005 and full qualification for NATO membership by 2008. I’m skipping the rougher moments, but even with those the arc of history is clear: it points Macedonia toward a happy home in Euroatlantic institutions.
But it stalled along the way. Part of the problem lies in Greece, which has blocked EU accession negotiations and NATO membership in contravention of an International Court of Justice decision because it claims exclusive rights to use of the name “Macedonia.” But part of the problem resides inside Macedonia, where the political elite seems more committed to holding on to, and benefiting from, power than to ensuring the establishment of serious democratic institutions. Ivana Jordanovska accuses:
They have rigged elections, taken bribes, wiretapped more than 20,000 citizens, blackmailed businesses, created media content, imprisoned political opponents, exercised control over the judiciary and misused their power for their personal financial benefit.
In three words: abuse of power.
Prime Minister Gruevski had come to power in 2006 as a reformer, and reform he did. His economic program helped Macedonia achieve an unprecedented period of growth and (relative) prosperity. But the economy has suffered in recent years from the Eurozone’s ailments. Gruevski has turned to nationalist flag-waving, electoral fraud, restrictions on press freedom and control over the judiciary to ensure his political dominance. He won 61 of 123 seats in parliament in 2014.
In a democratic society, the normal check on abuse of power comes from the courts and the opposition. The wiretaps have demonstrated Gruevski controls the courts. Macedonia’s opposition has not only been strikingly unsuccessful at the polls but more inclined towards sensationalism than serious critique. The wiretaps have unquestionably embarrassed Gruevski and might have brought him down in a truly democratic environment, but not so far in Macedonia. A big demonstration to push Gruevski to resign is scheduled for May 17.
The best that can be said about the current crisis is that it hasn’t pitted ethnic Macedonians against the one-quarter or so of the population that is Albanian. So far, it is largely a squabble among the Macedonians. Last weekend’s gun battle raised the prospect of interethnic violence, as it recalled an Albanian uprising in 2001. But this time the Albanian reaction seems quite different: instead of expressing sympathy for the alleged rebels, at least some of whom appear to have come from Kosovo, they are wondering out loud whether the whole thing wasn’t a plot by the government to distract attention from the wiretapping scandal.
I find that hard to believe–how would the Macedonian intelligence service find Kosovars dumb enough to dress up in BDU’s and carry weapons into northern Macedonia? But we haven’t got any hard evidence on the issue. I suppose that narrative signals Albanian rejection of armed rebellion and is therefore a good sign, no matter how far from reality.
What Macedonia needs now is tough love. The American ambassador has essentially read Gruevski the riot act. If he fails to respond constructively and concretely, the Europeans and Americans need to be prepared to react forcefully, which means fulfilling the threat to move Macedonia back from the EU and NATO and squeezing its access to international institution funding. That won’t be easy to organize, as the Europeans will fear precipitating instability and ethnic strife. But the risks associated with allowing abuse of power to continue are greater.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Uneasy Kosovo, and Macedonia
Kosova Sot, a Pristina daily, asked me some questions last week and published the answers today. My responses are below (1-18), but then Sunday they sent me an additional question, about Macedonia, which appears first here:
Q: In the meantime armed conflicts occurred in Kumanovo in Macedonia where there were policemen killed, civilians and gunmen. Do you think the situation in Macedonia will escalate? Did Macedonia failed to be a state for all citizens, because Albanians are the nation’s largest after the Macedonians in this country?
A: I think it is too early to speculate on the precise political origins and objectives of the group involved in this incident. But one thing is clear to me: those who challenge state structures in the Balkans today have no justification. The states potentially involved–not only Macedonia but also Kosovo, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia–will need to be prepared to protect themselves from those who intend to use violence to achieve political ends. I’ve got nothing but sympathy for the state security officials called upon to suppress rebellion, so long as they do so in strict observance of the rule of law.
Macedonia is having a hard time. All its citizens need to reflect on how it can begin to move forward on its Euro-Atlantic ambitions. Visible motion in the direction of joining NATO and the EU would do wonders for the country’s internal stability.
1. Kosovo is on the verge of a new challenge, the establishment of the Special Court, which will handle allegations of Dick Marty’s report. Was it an necessary court?
A: No. It was made necessary by the failure of Kosovo and Albania to pursue criminal investigations of people associated with the Kosovo Liberation Army.
2. Among the persons accused in the report of Dick Marty, is the name of the former KLA leader, former Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi. Would you be surprised if his name appears also in the list of defendants?
A: Who could be surprised after years of discussion of this possibility? But I saw no convincing evidence of his involvement in the allegations of the Marty report, and I’ve seen none since then either.
3. This Court will not address, however, war crimes, acts of corruption or political killings. Would it be good that such a Court, to deal with these cases, which remain unresolved?
A: I would like to see the Kosovo courts begin to deal with these issues, as the Serbian courts have begun to do. A sovereign state is obligated to investigate all crimes on its own territory.
4. What consequences can have Kosovo, if parliament fails to vote on constitutional changes that facilitate the establishment of this Court?
A: I suppose it would slow the process of EU integration, which is already far too slow, and displease the Americans.
5. Let us talk about other developments in Kosovo. The coalition of the two major parties, PDK and LDK, is facing increased social pressure of opposition, strikes and protests. Do you think such a government is going to last, knowing that even serious surveys show a record decline in satisfaction with the performance of institutions?
A: If the coalition holds together, the government will last, no matter how many protests and strikes there are.
6. Unofficially there may be about 100 thousand people who left Kosovo during last months, especially after the formation of the new government, that for PDK it was the third consecutive mandate. Are people losing their people?
A: Do you mean is Kosovo losing its people? Yes, I think people are voting with their feet, as we say. Kosovars are looking for jobs and finding at least some of them in Europe.
7. The opposition is protesting against, as they call them, state capture, which in fact is a reality known to all. What do you think, how the state can be de-captured, when those same politicians are being recycled in power?
A: The proper way to remove politicians from power is to win elections. The opposition hasn’t been able to do that. It has every right to protest peacefully, but I’m not sure that will help at the polls.
8. Politicians are the richest caste in Kosovo, while businesses can hardly survive if unrelated to power. Is Kosovo being turned into an oasis of corruption, clientelism, nepotism, as in fact foreign media portrayed us recently?
A: Kosovo seems to me more or less on a par with other countries in the region when it comes to corruption, clientelism and nepotism. It is a small country where everyone knows everyone else, which makes meritocracy difficult. The wealth of politicians troubles me. Someone needs to investigate where the money comes from.
9. The rule of law is in crisis, and nor EULEX is not performing its work. This mission is covered by corruption scandals, while “big fishes”, mentioned once, remain untouchable. Do you see a dose of courage in the Kosovo justice to enable the rule of law?
A: I really don’t think foreigners can penetrate the web of economic and political interests in Kosovo or any other country. I think it takes courageous judges and prosecutors who are native to the environment. I served many years as a diplomat in Italy. Without the courageous Italian anti-Mafia magistrates, there would have been no progress against organized crime there. The Americans helped with intelligence and witness protection, but Italian courage was vital. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Full circle, for some
Ten years ago, Iraq’s Sunni provinces came within a few thousand votes of defeating the referendum that approved the new constitution, negotiated in the summer of 2005 with little Sunni participation. Today, according to former deputy prime minister Rafe Eissawi and governor of Ninewa Atheel Nujaifi (who spoke this morning at Brookings), Iraq’s Sunnis want nothing more (or less) than full implementation of that constitution, in particular its provisions for forming regions.
There is deep irony in this turnaround. The 2005 constitution was written to suit Iraq’s Shia, who are the majority in the country as a whole and can reasonably expect to command the biggest block in parliament and name the prime minister, as well as its Kurds, who wanted an autonomous region with their own parliament, laws, budget, and control over newly discovered hydrocarbon resources. A decade ago and until fairly recently, many of Iraq’s Sunnis were still plugging a centralized state, one they hoped to control, though the demographic reality made that impossible unless Iraq returned to dictatorship.
Now things have changed. With the Islamic State (ISIS) in control of most of Ninewa, Anbar and Salaheddin–three unequivocally Sunni-majority provinces–Eissawi and Nujaifi are in Washington looking for its support to arm Sunnis to take back their own provinces. Eissawi underlined that the Shia militias are as bad as ISIS in their treatment of civilians. Allowing the reinvigorated Shia militias to try to retake Mosul would be a disaster, both believe. Instead they want Sunni police and voluteers armed to do the job, preferably as a legally constituted National Guard (though the legislation creating that institution is stalled in the Iraqi parliament).
Once Ninewa is taken back from ISIS, Nujaifi envisages elections and a referendum on making the province a region, with powers modelled on those of Iraqi Kurdistan, the only existing region in today’s Iraq. The other Sunni-majority provinces would likely follow suit. Whether they would combine into a single region, or remain as separate regions, is not yet clear.
Both Nujaifi and Eissawi envisage a need to rebuild and professionalize the Iraq security forces, an effort Eissawi wants overseen by joint committees in which the Americans would be important players. This too is a turnaround: Sunnis were once upon a time main opponents of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq, which many Kurds and Shia welcomed because it rid the country of a Sunni-dominated dictatorship.
Eissawi and Nujaifi had kind things to say about Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi, but they are looking for him to do more than he has done so far. His government program says all the right things, they thought. But he is having trouble overcoming Shia resistance to fulfilling its promises. The Sunnis suffered much abuse under Nouri al Maliki, who arrested many of those who participated in the political process, assassinated many who rose up to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq, crushed those who demonstrated against him and filled Iraq’s prisons with illegal detainees. Now the Sunnis need more than a government program and the constitution. They need concrete action to open the way for return of displaced Sunnis to their homes, compensation and reconciliation.
The Sunnis may have come full circle, but the Americans and Baghdad have not. The Obama Administration is trying hard to limit its commitments in Iraq to the minimum necessary to roll back ISIS. It wants in particular to avoid putting Americans into combat roles. It may be willing to try to help both Kurds and Sunnis get from the Baghdad government what they say they need to defeat ISIS. But that will require more of a Shia turnaround than we have seen so far.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
A grand bargain, with the Gulf not Iran
Expectations for next week’s Wednesday/Thursday summit at the White House and Camp David with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) heads of state (or their proxies) vary greatly. Simon Henderson, who follows the Gulf from the Washington Institute, says
the definition of success for this summit will more likely be a limited agreement than an historic pact.
Joyce Karam suggests something more substantial: the summit may allow a bargain in which the Gulf states drop their opposition to a nuclear deal with Iran in exchange for the US allowing the Gulf a freer hand in countering Iranian surrogates in Syria and possibly Yemen.
The Americans have not seemed inclined in this more grandiose direction. They remain worried about who might take over in Syria should Asad fall. They have also leaned in favor of a ceasefire or humanitarian pause in Yemen, where the Saudi-led intervention has not done much to roll back the Iranian-supported Houthis while rousing nationalist sentiment among Yemeni civilians, who are suffering mightily because of the fighting.
Those concerns are serious ones, but events on the ground in Syria may not permit the Americans to remain aloof much longer. Rebel forces there have gained ground both in the north, near Idlib, and in the south, between Damascus and the Jordanian border. Regime forces seem unable to respond effectively, though Lebanese Hizbollah and Iranian fighters continue to prevent outright disaster for Asad. The divisions among Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (the three main financiers of the Syrian revolution) that in the past have hampered rebel effectiveness are diminishing. The Americans might prefer to await training of their vetted rebels to bring down Asad, but he is unlikely to last the years it will take to put a significant number of them back on the battlefield.
In Yemen, the Gulf protagonists have less reason for optimism. Intervention there against the Houthis has not done more than slow their advance south. In the meanwhile, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining ground. The Houthis don’t like Al Qaeda any better than the Saudis do, but it is hard to picture a political solution at this point that allows them to combine to fight their common enemy. They are inclined to forget Ben Franklin’s admonition: either we all hang together, or we all hang separately.
A Gulf/American pact in favor of more concerted efforts to counter Iran’s regional trouble-making could be helpful to the Obama Administration at home, where it faces continued bipartisan opposition to the nuclear deal. Yesterday’s 98-1 Senate approval of legislation giving the Congress a 30-day opportunity to debate and vote on the nuclear deal sets up an important debate for early August, provided the nuclear deal is reached by the end of June. The strongest argument against the nuclear deal is likely to be the prospect of an emboldened Iran free of sanctions using its considerable wealth to subvert the Arab states of the Gulf and Levant. Freeing the Gulf to counter Iranian efforts in Syria and Yemen would be one way of responding to the Administration’s critics at home.
The problem is that it may not work. The Gulf states, which have armed themselves far beyond the Iranians’ wildest dreams, continue to bumble when it comes to military action and diplomatic weight. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has succeeded in building up effective surrogates in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. In Yemen and Bahrain, the Iranians have taken advantage of local grievances to make a lot of trouble. The Gulf states fear the lifting of sanctions for good reasons. Even under sanctions, Iran has done well diplomatically and militarily. What might Tehran be able to do once sanctions are lifted and hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenue return to its coffers?
The summit next week is an unusual one. Whether your expectations are great or not so great, there are real issues to discuss between Washington and its Gulf interlocutors. An agreement that combines a nuclear deal with more effective action to stem Iranian regional trouble-making would be a serious outcome. Rather than the grand bargain with Iran the Republicans and Israelis fear, we may be seeing the emergence of a grand bargain with the Gulf.
RSS - Posts
