Month: June 2015
Yemen: bleak outlook
Last Thursday, the Wilson Center hosted Youth and Civil Society: The Missing Powers in Yemen with Mohammad Al-Shami, a Yemeni youth activist and advocacy trainer. Haleh Esfandiari, the director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, gave opening remarks and moderated a question and answer session.
Al-Shami presented a bleak picture of Yemen’s predicament. For years prior to the current conflict, Yemen suffered from poverty, water shortages, youth unemployment, inadequate healthcare, divisions along many lines, repeated conflict, and the absence of rule of law. The government was highly centralized, weak and corrupt. Citizens needed to come to Sana’a for basic administrative needs and officials there often required bribes.
The military was seen as only representative of a portion of Northern Yemen. The National Dialogue process that occurred prior to the most recent conflict called for restructuring the military. Soldiers from the North were angered that they could lose their jobs to Southerners as a result.
The current conflict reflects the complex divisions of Yemeni society. The rebels are comprised of disparate elements, some of which are not allied with each other. Al Qaeda has filled the power vacuum in some areas, including the major city of Al Mukalla. Al Qaeda is able to provide stability and services, making those who do not necessarily agree with jihadi ideology turn to them for safety. When the war ends, reconstruction will be long and complicated. The underlying factors that led to the conflict will still be present.
According to Al-Shami, civil society in Yemen is plagued by a lack of expertise and cooperation. International donors provided some training to Yemeni civil society organizations but not crucial capacity building. Civil society organizations did not collaborate on initiatives, and multiple organizations were often inefficiently working on similar projects simultaneously.
These organizations are nevertheless the primary providers of life-saving assistance on the ground. The conflict has forced them to focus on humanitarian rather than development work. They lack supplies and largely depend on Yemen’s weak private sector for materials. Despite these challenges, Yemeni civil society organizations are distributing food and water, finding people shelter, and setting up clinics. They are able to access villages controlled by different forces and serve as the best source of information regarding events on the ground.
In Al-Shami’s view, GCC airstrikes were not the only available solution to the upheaval in Yemen. The GCC does not value civil society and has neglected civil society in its initiatives. The National Dialogue provided an opportunity for a political solution and civil society could have played a role in a peaceful settlement. As the violence drags on, it makes reaching a solution increasingly complicated. The peace talks in Geneva will be more complicated than finding a political solution from the outset would have been.
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Future Serbia
I’ve run into some flak for hosting Serbian Prime Minister Vučić at SAIS last week. Some people think providing an opportunity for someone to speak at a university represents a political endorsement of his views, past and present.
Certainly Vučić has said things in the past that I find odious, most notably this from July 1995:
one hundred Muslims would be killed for every dead Serb
I haven’t forgotten. But it is a mistake to harp too hard and too long on the past. My interest in hearing Prime Minister Vučić, and providing him a forum in which he could be heard by others, stemmed from the need to understand his vision of Serbia’s future. I’m not interested in settling scores but in bending the arc of history in a good direction.
What Vučić offered was a glimpse of a possible future Serbia, one that makes a strategic choice for Europe and gives up on the non-aligned balancing act it has performed since the end of World War II. In my book, that would be a welcome development.
Non-alignment lost its real meaning 25 years ago. All the other countries of the Balkans have already opted for Brussels, leaving Serbia surrounded by EU and NATO members and aspirants. Many maintain good bilateral relations with Russia, even while joining in Ukraine-related sanctions. Serbia hasn’t done that, despite its candidacy for EU membership.
The question is what would encourage and enable Serbia to take the necessary steps away from its traditional “non-aligned” stance. Here are some ideas worth consideration.
Internal reform
Serbia has progressed in many respects since the Milosevic era and is now in a position to claim that it is on the road towards democracy and to attracting foreign investment on a commercial basis. But it remains laggard in two key areas: media freedom and rule of law. It needs to up its game in both.
The media issue is not formal censorship but rather informal pressures and even self-censorship, often exercised through politically-appointed editors and fear of losing contracts for valuable government advertizing. In addition, politicians in Serbia frequently attack the medium, not only the message. This cows many outlets into submission–memories of what happened to media moguls who resisted Milosevic’s dominance are still fresh. The media need to be far freer to criticize without fear of retaliation.
Rule of law in Serbia suffers two ailments: slowness and lack of independence. Commercial disputes can drag on for decades. Tycoons and war criminals are too often protected from prosecution. One of the prime suspects in the murder of the Bytyqi brothers, American Kosovars killed in 1999 by Serb security forces, is a member of the prime minister’s political party and serves on its executive board. The courts need to be liberated and encouraged to pursue malfeasance wherever it occurs, provided they follow proper procedures. Read more
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No easy answers
Lots of people were asking yesterday about President Obama’s decision to send more trainers and equipment to Iraq, mainly for Sunni fighters. Here is more or less what I’ve been saying:
Q. Why is the US sending troops to Iraq at this time?
A. They are sending more troops because the current effort is not succeeding. The Islamic State has lost some territory in the past year, but it has also gained territory and appears no closer to defeat than it was a year ago. Beefing up the training and equipment, in particular for Sunnis, is a move in the right direction, even if it is not likely the last one.
Q. What does this represents in terms of strategy?
A. In terms of strategy, not much. The objective is the same—to defeat ISIS—and this is a marginal addition of resources with which to try to do it. I don’t see any big shift in strategy with this decision.
Q. How is that going to help, if any, the fight against ISIS?
A. The key here is to try to get more Sunni tribal members into the fight. If and when the Sunni population wants to be rid of ISIS in a serious way, it will happen.
But that also depends on what the Sunni population can expect if they join the fight. Will they gain political and economic weight in Baghdad or in their own provinces? Will they be treated properly by the Iraqi authorities and adequate provision made for stabilizing and reconstructing their communities? There are no clear answers to these questions yet. The military dimension is not the only one that counts.
Q. Do you think the US is doing enough to help the Iraqis in their fight? If not, what more should the US does?
A. Most military experts think an important missing link is people on the ground to “spot,” that is target, the air strikes, which have been relatively few due in part to fear of collateral damage. But putting Americans into that role risks their lives and would raise questions about whether the effort is sustainable. Training Iraqis to perform that function risks its use to settle scores.
Like many other issues in the Middle East these days, there are no easy answers.
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Bush, not Obama, decided Iraq withdrawal
As Republican candidates for President continue to raise the question of withdrawal from Iraq, “blaming” the supposed mistake on Barack Obama, I am reprinting from a previous post (published on May 2, 2014) the true story:
The notion that it was President Obama who decided to withdraw troops from Iraq is simply wrong. Here is a first-person account from Bob Loftis, who led the failed negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA):
[The decision to withdraw US troops] happened in mid-2008 [during the Bush Administration]. My team and I were instructed to work on an agreement that would allow a long term US military presence. At no time did the issue of withdrawal arise, even when the term “SOFA” became politically toxic in Baghdad. SOFA talks were suspended in May 2008, with the focus placed on negotiating the Strategic Framework Agreement (which would have some vague references to “pre-existing arrangements” (i.e. certain parts of CPA17). I then heard in September 2008 that…there were new SOFA talks which were about withdrawal. The “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq” was signed on 17 November 2008 by Ryan Crocker: Article 24 (1) states “All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”
People will tell you that President Bush thought the agreement would be revised in the succeeding administration to allow the Americans to stay in some limited number. But that doesn’t change the fact that it was Bush, not Obama, who decided on US withdrawal.
Once in office, Obama did try to negotiate permission for the Americans to stay. Prime Minister Maliki didn’t want to give up jurisdiction over crimes committed by US troops. Hard for me to fault the President for not yielding on that point, especially in light of the arbitrary arrests and detentions Maliki has indulged in since. Nor do I think US troops in the mess that is today’s Iraq would be either safe or useful.
Note added in 2015:
The circumstances that today are giving President Obama reason to send more troops back to Iraq are dramatically different from any that could have been anticipated in 2008 or 2009. But at least now they are going back to an Iraq whose government welcomes them. Withdrawal was not a mistake. It was a reaction to the political realities both in Washington and Baghdad. Second guessing is a fool’s game, especially when conducted by Donald Trump and Rudi Giuliani.
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Defeating ISIS in Iraq
Monday the United States Institute of Peace hosted Saleem Al-Jubouri, speaker of Iraq’s parliament, on the causes of violence and instability in Iraq and what he believes Iraq needs to do going forward to fight ISIS. USIP President Nancy Lindborg delivered the opening remarks. Acting executive vice president William Taylor moderated. Here is a link to a video of the entire event.
Al-Jubouri, a Sunni, blamed ISIS’s rapid rise to power on the government’s sectarian policies, corruption, and marginalization of Sunnis. The government did not heed his warnings. Iraq is now a country of displaced persons who represent a recruitment opportunity for ISIS.
The role of the Iraqi state in what lies ahead is critical. For Al-Jubouri, a stable state is the guarantor of the well being of minorities and the marginalized. In the struggle between state and non-state institutions, institutions based on elections must be maintained.
In order to defeat ISIS, the Iraqi government must foster reconciliation between Iraq’s different ethnic groups by moving away from confessionalism and regional polarization and towards greater efficiency. Al-Jubouri regards Prime Minister Abadi as a partner in the reconciliation process, which faces many challenges. No single group is to blame.
According to Al-Jubouri, Sunni tribes will only take the risk necessary to fight ISIS if they believe that they will end up better off after ISIS is defeated. They will not risk of fighting ISIS if they believe new extremists will fill the vacuum. When the tribes previously took up arms against Al Qaeda in Iraq, some of those who successfully defeated AQI were subsequently arrested by the government for carrying weapons. If the tribes defeat ISIS, they must be protected under the law once the dust settles.
Al-Jubouri said the proposed law to create a National Guard is intended to ensure that all sectors of society are partners in Iraq’s security. It was supposed to be organized by governorate. But in practice, the National Guard may be just another armed group and could provide legal cover for the Shi’a Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs).
Al-Jubouri does not view the influence of the PMUs as wholly negative. Southern Iraqis are giving their lives to repel ISIS from areas far from their homes. However, the PMUs are not disciplined and suffer in some cases from bad leadership. They have been involved in burning and looting of some captured areas.
The ideal is to strengthen official government forces and forbid all other parties from carrying weapons. But current circumstances are exceptional. The Shi’a have the PMUs, the Kurds have the Peshmerga, but the Sunnis lack a means to confront terror. The Sunni tribes must be armed, with guarantees that the weapons will reach the local population.
The Speaker’s message regarding foreign intervention in Iraq was dichotomous. Iraq needs the help of its closest friend, the US, and the international community, which should increase military assistance and push Iraq towards a more inclusive political process. However, neighboring countries’ (especially Iran’s) attempts to influence Iraqi affairs for their own gain is a problem. No country should intervene in Iraq’s internal affairs.
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Peace picks June 8-12
1. Water Pricing in an Age of Scarcity | Monday, June 8th | 2:00-3:30 | World Resources Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | From California to Karachi, climate change, population pressures, and economic growth are exacerbating water stress conditions around the world. The IMF and World Resources Institute invite you to a timely dialogue of policymakers, economists, and water resource experts on new approaches to water pricing to manage rapidly increasing risks in an efficient, equitable, and sustainable manner. A panel discussion and questions and comments from the floor will follow. Speakers include: David Lipton, Deputy Managing Director, IMF, Charles Iceland, Director, Aqueduct Project, World Resources Institute, Helen Mountford, Director of Economics, World Resources Institute, and Kalpana Kochhar, Deputy Director, Asia and Pacific Department, International Monetary Fund. Moderated by Lawrence MacDonald, Vice President for Communications, World Resources Institute.
2. Asan Seminar: “The ROK-US Alliance: Facing Missile and Nuclear Threats on the Korean Peninsula” | Monday, June 8th | 3:00-4:30 | The Asan Institute for Policy Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Speakers include: Choi Kang, Vice President for Research, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Thomas Karako Senior Fellow, International Security Program & Director, Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Woo Jung-Yeop Research Fellow and Director, Washington, D.C. Office, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
3. Public Forum with Dr. Saleem Al-Jubouri, Speaker of Iraq’s Parliament | Monday, June 8th | 3:15-4:30 | United States Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Dr. Saleem Al-Jubouri will be visiting Washington to meet with U.S. officials and members of Congress at a critical time for Iraq and its international partners fighting ISIS. ISIS’ capture of Ramadi and its sabotage of the country’s largest oil refinery, at Baiji, underscore the threat the group poses to the Iraqi people and state. Amid the war, the Council of Representatives is considering legislation on topics–such as the National Guard and the federal court system–that are critical to addressing governance and security problems that gave rise to ISIS. After making public remarks, Dr. Al-Jubouri will respond to questions in a discussion moderated by USIP’s acting executive vice president, Amb. William Taylor. Opening remarks by Nancy Lindborg, the president of USIP.
4. Turkey: Parliamentary Elections and their Aftermath | Tuesday, June 9th | 9:30-11:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The June 7 Turkish elections are shaping up to be one of the most contested, if not critical, of recent times. At stake is whether the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will succeed in achieving the majority it needs to initiate a process to change the constitution and transform the country into a presidential system. Participants will discuss the election results and consider how these will affect Turkish domestic and foreign policy in the months to come. Speakers include: Henri Barkey, Bernard and Bertha Cohen Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University, Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, and Gönül Tol, Founding Director, Center for Turkish Studies, Middle East Institute.
5. Breaking Down Turkey’s General Election| Tuesday, June 9th | 12:00-1:30 |Center for American Progress | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Turkey’s general election on June 7 is shaping up to be the closest in a decade. A few percentage points either way could determine if the governing AKP will secure another majority in parliament or be forced to form a coalition for the first time in its 13 years of rule. President Erdoğan’s quest to transform Turkey and strengthen its presidency also hangs in the balance. Finally, after years of increasing international concern about Turkey’s domestic political freedoms, and with the United States relying on Turkey in the effort to stabilize Iraq and Syria and combat ISIS, the outcome and conduct of the election is likely to heavily influence U.S. policy towards the region and determine the mid-term course of Turkish democracy. Welcoming remarks by Michael Werz, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress. Panelists include: Soner Cagaptay, Director, Turkish Research Program, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, Nora Fisher Onar, Transatlantic Academy Fellow, German Marshall Fund, Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford, and Suat Kınıklıoğlu, Mercator Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress.
6. Chairman’s Forum with Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba | Tuesday, June 9th | 12:30-1:30 | The Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba, Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the United States of America, will join Stimson Chairman Ambassador Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr. to share his experiences and insights into U.S. foreign policy. This informal, strategic conversation will take place at the Stimson Center.
7. The Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat In The Middle East | Wednesday, June 10th | 10:00-11:30 | The Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Despite a decade-long international campaign to reduce the threat from man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), terrorists and insurgents continue to acquire and use these highly effective, lightweight missiles. Among the most severely affected regions are the Middle East and North Africa, where armed groups have acquired MANPADS from looted government depots and international trafficking networks. The panelists will provide an overview of illicit proliferation of MANPADS in these regions, the threat that these missiles pose to military and civilian aircraft, and prospects for mitigating this threat. Speakers include: C.J. Chivers, Reporter, The New York Times Investigations Desk & The New York Times Magazine and Matt Schroeder, Senior Researcher, Small Arms Survey. Moderated by Rachel Stohl, Senior Associate, Stimson Center.
8. Building Self-Reliance and Prosperity in Afghanistan | Thursday, June 11th | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Afghanistan has made enormous progress in reconstruction, development, and lifting per capita income. Despite steps taken to lay the foundation for economic stability and growth, reduce poverty, and achieve social and development objectives, political and security uncertainties weighed on economic performance in 2014. They weakened confidence and growth declined to 1.5 percent in 2014. Within this context, the IMF remains closely engaged in Afghanistan with a staff-monitored program to address vulnerabilities and help manage risks going forward, and to build self-reliance and prosperity. IMF Mission Chief Paul Ross will discuss Afghanistan’s economic prospects and challenges that must be addressed to ensure that the country continues to develop and grow its economy. Moderated by Amb. James B. Cunningham, Senior Fellow in the South Asia Center and the Zalmay Khalilzad Chair on Afghanistan, Atlantic Council.
9. Youth and Civil Society: The Missing Powers in Yemen | Thursday, June 11th | 12:00-1:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND |Mohammad Al-Shami, a youth activist and advocacy trainer from Yemen and a Leaders for Democracy Fellow at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, will discuss the different stakeholders and positions in Yemen and review what is happening on the ground. He will also draw attention to the struggles and consequences that Yemenis face if the conflict continues without an immediate solution. In addition, Al-Shami will highlight the importance of empowering youth movements and civil society in Yemen in order to mobilize the community to promote peace.
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