Month: June 2015
Contrasting perspectives on Yemen
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Thursday hosted a panel discussion on “The Conflict in Yemen: Searching for the Endgame.” Panelists included Fahad Nazer, a political analyst with the intelligence consulting firm JTG and formerly at the Saudi Arabian embassy in DC, as well as Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani, the president of TAWQ (a democracy organization), the vice president of the Khobara Center (a Sana’a-based think tank), and an advisor for Human Rights Watch. The discussion was moderated by Ambassador Stephen Seche, Executive Vice President of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington and the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen from 2007-2010.
Fahad Nazer and Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani presented different perspectives on the conflict. Nazer emphasized the Saudi view that the Houthis represent Iranian encroachment into Saudi Arabia’s backyard, while Al-Iryani expressed the view that the Houthis’ concerns are mainly domestic and that links between Iran and the Houthis are tenuous.
Nazer detailed Saudi Arabia’s history of conflict mediation in both Yemen and the Lebanese Civil War. The Kingdom has historically been reluctant militarily intervene in Yemen for fear of a repeat of Gamel Abdel Nasser’s disastrous decision to commit Egyptian ground troops there in the 1960s. The Arab Spring, Nazer asserted, caught Saudi Arabia by surprise. The fall of Mubarak, one of the Saudis’ closest allies, coupled with President Obama’s reluctance to intervene in Syria and increased Iranian influence in the Arab world, compelled the Saudis to take a more proactive foreign policy stance.
The combination of an unraveling Yemeni state, Zaidi militants in the north and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the south made Saudi military intervention in Yemen inevitable. Nazer does not view Saudi Arabia’s recent foreign policy shift as a product of Saudi Arabia’s new leadership, but argued instead that the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has been more gradual. He cited Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the Bahraini uprising of 2011 as foreshadowing the shift.
Al-Iryani detailed three factors that had prevented Yemen from descending into civil war between 2011 and 2014: the legitimacy of President Hadi’s regime, the balance of power between opposing forces in Yemen, and the international consensus that Yemen’s stability must be preserved. In a national dialogue that occurred from March 2013 to January 2014, Hadi only offered the Zaidis control over limited resource-poor territory. In Al-Iryani’s view, offering so little to the Zaidis, who comprised Yemen’s ruling elite for centuries, was a grave mistake. Unified and led by the Houthis, Zaidis took up arms against President Hadi, whose legitimacy was undermined. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh capitalized on the situation by allying himself with the Houthis.
According to Al-Iryani, the Saudi military intervention could have had the positive effect of restoring the balance of power in Yemen and bringing the Houthis to the negotiating table. But it has gone on too long. Yemenis increasingly resent the Saudi intervention. The conflict in Yemen is not wholly sectarian like most other regional conflicts, because some Sunnis aligned with Saleh are fighting alongside the Houthis. If the conflict continues, it could take on an explicitly sectarian dimension.
Al-Iryani believes that the Saudis should stop their military intervention as soon as possible and enter into negotaitions with the Houthis. The Houthis would settle for dominance in the historic Zaidi strongholds of North Yemen. Their domestic demands can be accommodated through negotiations.
According to Al-Iryani, Iranian support for the Houthis is marginal and limited to intelligence sharing and the presence of some Houthi students in Qom. A Houthi delegation sent to Tehran to discuss economic assistance came back nearly empty-handed. The Saudi view that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy is exaggerated. This view damages the previous international consensus that preserving Yemen’s stability is paramount.
Nazer, by contrast, disputed Al-Iryani’s assertion that the Houthis would be willing to settle for control over the historic Zaidi lands. The Houthis are firing rockets into southern Saudi Arabia. According to Nazer, this fact–combined with bellicose Hezbollah-type rhetoric on the part of the Houthis–justifies the suspicions of the Saudi media that the Houthis are not interested in a power-sharing arrangement. Nazer also cited the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah personnel in Yemen as evidence of more substantial Iranian meddling in the conflict.
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Mr. Vučić comes to Washington
Prime Minister Vučić’s visit to Washington this week, which included a public appearance at Johns Hopkins SAIS, prompted inquiries from the Serbian media. Here are their questions and my answers:
Blic
1. How do you evaluate the results of the visit of prime minister Vučić to SAD?
A: I think Prime Minister Vučić had a very successful visit to the US. He came asking for American political support for Serbia’s European ambitions and he got it.
2. In your opinion, how his lecture look like, what were the reactions?
A: His lecture at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies was great. The reaction was enthusiastic. He left lots of time for questions and was asked some difficult ones. He tried to respond directly to them, which is what Americans like to hear. He clearly wants Serbia to be seen as a reliable international partner, one that does not over-commit to things it cannot deliver.
3. What are the key messages from that lecture and how do you interpret that message?
A: The Prime Minister made it clear that Serbia has made a strategic choice for Europe, that it is not trying to balance between Europe and Russia, but that NATO membership and Serbia’s ultimate relationship with Kosovo are still open questions.
He was modest about what Serbia can deliver in its OSCE chairmanship on Ukraine. He explained Serbia’s failure to align with EU sanctions against Russia as due to lack of EU compensation for Serbian producers who would suffer the consequences.
The Prime Minister was clear about his personal commitment to media freedom, a more efficient and independent judiciary, and resolution in the courts of responsibility for the murder of the Bytyqi brothers. Those of us interested in the Balkans will be interested to see how and when these commitments fulfilled, but the overall impression was very positive: he is thoughtful, clear and committed.
He made it clear he wants Serbia to be a factor of stability in the region, which is suffering a rise in nationalist sentiment that could lead to more problems. He is also committed to Serbia’s internal stability, which is challenged by difficult social and economic circumstances.
Tanjug
1. In short, what is your analysis of the results of the visit?
A: The Prime Minister came looking for American political support for Serbia’s European Union prospects. He got that so far as I know. He also wanted to make a good impression as someone who considers his commitments carefully and fulfills them. He succeeded at that as well. And he wanted to portray Serbia as a factor for stability in the region, which is something Americans welcome.
2. In your opinion, what was the most important issue for the US side and what for the Serbian prime minister?
A: For the US, I think the most important point was this last one: Serbia is central to the region. Its commitment to stability and peaceful conflict resolution makes a big difference in Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro. I imagine officials discussed this in some detail with respect to each of these countries.
For the Prime Minister, the main thing seems to have been gaining US political support for Serbia’s EU candidacy. I think he got that commitment in general terms. But of course Serbia has to deliver on the EU requirements, especially with respect to an independent judiciary and media freedom.
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The Perils of Macedonia
With the European Union mediating, Macedonia’s four major political parties have agreed to some sort of transition arrangement to allow voter rolls to be cleaned up and the electoral mechanism lubricated, followed by elections next April, three years earlier than necessary. This presumably offes a way out of the crisis brought on by opposition publication of wiretaps demonstrating high level government malfeasance.
It’s a win-win-win-win, as one of my correspondent’s declared. Opposition leader Zoran Zaev, who lost a parliamentary election 14 months ago, gets another opportunity. Prime Minister Gruevski so far at least is avoiding calls for his resignation. He came out just one vote short of an absolute majority in parliament last time around and may well be able to beat his rival again in 10 months. The governing coalition’s Albanian leader Ali Ahmeti is relieved of pressure to bring the government down and can still hope to do well next year. The Albanian opposition gets another bite at the apple.
But it still has a big hole in it: that transition arrangement. The opposition will want a technocratic government. Gruevski will want to hold on to at least nominal control. It is not clear how they are going to square that circle.
But once again, Macedonia has taken at least half a step away from the brink of disaster. It has done that repeatedly since handily managing to escape Yugoslavia in 1991 without the secession wars that marked independence for Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. It managed a massive influx of Albanians during the NATO/Yugoslavia war of 1999 without the often predicted dire consequences. It negotiated an end to a burgeoning inter-ethnic civil war in 2001 before things got out of hand. Macedonia is the Balkan Pauline: always in dire danger, but escaping somehow at the last moment.
Credit for this latest escape goes in part to the EU, whose Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn did the honors. He reiterated the EU’s commitment to Macedonia’s European perspective, which I suppose involves some sort of assistance promise. He also made it clear the EU wants the government to stop mucking about with the media and the judiciary.
That has become the standard European and American refrain, as Gruevski–originally elected and successful as an economic reformer–has demonstrated an increasing tendency to follow Vladimir Putin’s lead on governance (not to mention Ukraine sanctions and natural gas supplies).
The villain of this episode is Greece, which has blocked Macedonia’s progress towards EU membership for years because it claims the exclusive right to use the name “Macedonia.” That means there is little gain, and much pain, in Macedonia’s politicians doing what is needed to adopt the acquis communitaire as well as align the country’s foreign and security policies with Brussels. Macedonia has already qualified for NATO membership and its soldiers have fought integrated with Americans in Afghanistan. But Greece has blocked that road to international respectability as well, despite a clear, unequivocal and binding decision of the International Court of Justice that in doing so Athens violated a 1995 commitment.
So Pauline lives to provide even more excitement in the next episode, which I imagine isn’t far off. Will Gruevski resign? Will the election be transparently free and fair? Will the judiciary and media act independently and not face repercussions? Will Albanian insurgents try to kidnap the process? Tune in next month for another exciting episode of the Perils of Macedonia.
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Serbia and the US
Kurir, a Belgrade tabloid, published this Friday interview with me today:
1. These days we saw again some really bad situations in Former Republic of Yugoslavia Macedonia, do You think that it can be more dangerous for all region, and why it happened?
A: Two things have happened in Macedonia: a wire-tapping scandal and a police raid on alleged Albanian insurgents. It seems to me the two things are distinct. Some other commentators believe they are related, in that the police may have acted to distract attention from the wire-tapping scandal. If that is what happened, the distraction failed.
I don’t know why either thing happened. We have not had the benefit of an in-depth investigation of either the wire-tapping or the police raid. The former seems to me more a domestic Macedonian issue, though I suspect there are other countries in the region with wire-tapping issues and some people believe a foreign intelligence service is involved in Macedonia. The alleged insurgents were Albanians, some of whom may have come from Kosovo, but their objectives and support network are not yet clear to me.
2. Albanian politicians again speak about project of Big Albania and that they will start to make it real. Is it the real treat for other countries in Balkans (for Serbia specific)?
A: Greater Albania is a bad idea whose time will never come. It would threaten not only Serbia but also Macedonia and Kosovo, whose constitution explicitly prohibits union with other countries. I don’t think Kosovar politicians are ready to move their capital to Tirana, or Albanian politicians ready to move their capital to Pristina. The US has consistently opposed Greater Albania and will continue to do so.
3. How Washington see this situation and what kind of relationship exist between Serbia and US in this moment?
A: You will have to ask American officials for their definitive view on this subject, but relations with Serbia seem to me pretty good. People in Washington appreciate the more pragmatic direction Belgrade has taken in recent years and want Serbia to progress in its accession negotiations with the European Union. At the same time, there are outstanding issues: Washington has recognized Kosovo and will expect Serbia to do so in the process of establishing good neighborly relations. Washington will also be interested in whether Serbia intends to proceed beyond Partnership for Peace to open a Membership Action Plan for NATO.
4. Our prime minister Aleksandar Vucic travel to America on Monday and he will meet with Vice President Joe Biden. What can Serbia expect from that meeting? Why is it important in this moment and which topics will be in focus?
A: Again you will have to ask US government officials, but I expect Washington to ask for Serbia to help maintain stability in the region by encouraging Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo to integrate more into the country’s governing structures while continuing to enjoy the considerable benefits of decentralization in both countries. I imagine the Vice President may also ask about Serbia’s relations with Russia and NATO, especially in light of Russian aggression in Ukraine, and encourage Serbia to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. He will likely also ask about the ongoing investigation of the murder of the Bytyqi brothers, American citizens killed by Serbian security forces in 1999.
5. Does Mr. Biden help Serbia on its way to EU, and how?
A: I think the US has already been helpful in encouraging the EU to give Serbia candidacy and open accession negotiations. Mr. Biden has been particularly strong on these points, even before he became Vice President. Now it is up to Serbia to meet the requirements of the acquis communitaire as well as conform its foreign policy to European requirements.
6. How America sees relationship between Serbia and Russia?
A: Washington regards Serbia’s efforts to cozy up to Russia more with amusement than concern, except where Ukraine is concerned. That is a serious issue, one in which people in Washington think Belgrade should see clearly that Russia’s aggression is unacceptable and risks undermining Serbia’s own position on Kosovo. The “independence” and subsequent annexation of Crimea, as well as the supposed independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, should make Serbian officials think twice about their visits to Moscow.
7. Do You think that in one moment Serbia will turn its back to Russia and accept suggestion from Washington to supply itself with gas from Azerbaijan?
A: I don’t know. I imagine it depends in part on commercial terms to which I am not privy. But anyone in Belgrade should by now see clearly that excessive energy dependence on Russia undermines a country’s sovereignty and puts at risk its relations with the EU and the US. Serbia should be looking for long-term alternatives to Russian gas supplies and tying itself more tightly to the EU.
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The Kurds’ new clout
Last month, the Middle East Institute’s (MEI) Turkish Studies program hosted a panel entitled “The Kurds’ New Clout in U.S. Ties with Turkey and Iraq” which focused on the challenges and opportunities in U.S. relations with Turkey and Iraq in light of the growing regional influence of the Kurds. This growing influence, with the Kurds emerging as a key player in the fight against the Islamic State, has put US relations with the governments in Baghdad and Ankara to the test.
How will US collaboration with Iraqi Kurdistan affect US-Turkish and US-Iraqi relations? What will the implications be for the future of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)?
Panelists included Mohammad Shareef, founding member of the London Kurdish Institute, Denise Natali, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Gönül Tol, founding director of MEI’s Center for Turkish Studies, with Daniel Serwer moderated.
Shareef outlined the regional, economic, and political factors that define Iraqi Kurdistan as an emerging regional power. The logical conclusion was apparent: sooner or later Kurdistan would achieve independence, as a natural consequence of its growing strength and importance.
Denise Natali believes, however, that Kurdistan’s success needs to be viewed in the context of the region’s increasingly complex and unstable environment, as well as America’s other relations in the region. There is no ‘clear cut’ US Kurdish policy, as Washington views Turkey’s Kurdish PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) as a terrorist group, while the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga forces are fighting alongside the US in Iraq.
Notwithstanding that cooperation, the White House remains committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq. This became a point of contention during President Barzani’s recent visit to Washington, when it was made clear that US military support would have to pass through Baghdad.
Gönül Tol outlined Turkey’s changing relationship with the United States on issues such as ISIS, economic cooperation, and rapprochement with Turkey’s Kurds. Turkish fear that the US wants to break up Turkey was allayed with the 2008 Turkey-US security agreement. Ankara’s relationship with the KRG mirrors this progression. Turkey opened a consulate in Erbil and has expanded bilateral trade centered on the natural gas and oil.
Natali believes that the Kurds might have overstepped in their territorial acquisition in Iraq—will they be able to pay for the lands and administer effective control over these areas? Considering the KRG is 17 billion dollars in debt, this remains to be seen. Mohamad Shareef believes that the KRG can be economically viable. A highlight is the 2006 Liberal Investment Law, which has offered vast benefits for foreign investors.
Serwer agreed that perhaps the Kurds have taken on more land than they can realistically control, but this could result in a ‘land for peace’ exchange. Kurdish independence has been postponed due to ISIS, but this issue is sure to resurface in the next 2-3 years, as the Iraqi Kurdish people overwhelmingly support independence. But in the absence of agreement on the borders of Kurdistan, independence could lead to more war, not less.
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