Month: August 2015
Strange values and colossal misjudgment
I have to give credit to New York Senator Schumer for laying out his thinking on the Iran nuclear deal. But it is thinking that betrays strange values and in the end a colossal misjudgment.
Schumer looks at three issues:
- nuclear restrictions on Iran in the first ten years,
- nuclear restrictions on Iran after ten years,
- and non-nuclear components and consequences of a deal.
He asks if the United States is better off with or without the agreement.
On the first issue, he faults both the inspection provisions and the snapback of sanctions. He ignores the unprecedented inspections of nuclear facilities and somehow finds that the US unilateral ability to precipitate re-imposition of sanctions on Iran has little value. But in the end he admits we might be a bit better off in the first ten years than without the agreement.
On nuclear restrictions after ten years, Schumer is concerned because lifting of sanctions will greatly enrich Iran and enable it then to pursue an even more robust nuclear program. He simply ignores the agreement’s provisions for permanent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and the permanent commitment by Iran not to seek nuclear weapons. He says
Iran would have a green light to be as close, if not closer to possessing a nuclear weapon than it is today. And the ability to thwart Iran if it is intent on becoming a nuclear power would have less moral and economic force.
It is strange to value a problem that we might (or might not) have 10 years from now as much as you value it today. If nothing else, you’ve had 10 years with a non-nuclear Iran to think and organize what you’ll do next. It is even stranger to suggest that after 10 years of successfully preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon that somehow doing so then would be less compelling rather than more so. If you think war might be necessary to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, you are on a lot firmer ground if Iran violates an agreement than if there are no constraints at all on its nuclear program.
On the non-nuclear issues, Schumer is principally concerned with use of the money Iran will get from sanctions relief for nefarious activities in the region and beyond. I entirely share this concern, which is well-founded in Iran’s need to satisfy its hardliners after what Schumer should admit is a gigantic defeat at the bargaining table.
But then there is the colossal misjudgment: Schumer thinks you have to believe Iran will moderate in the future in order to support the deal. That is wrong. Forget Iran’s political future.
What you have to consider is the reaction of the rest of the world to American rejection of the agreement, which Schumer completely ignores. Instead, he blithely suggests:
Better to keep U.S. sanctions in place, strengthen them, enforce secondary sanctions on other nations, and pursue the hard-trodden path of diplomacy once more, difficult as it may be.
He offers not a word about how America’s European allies, the Russians, the Chinese and the Gulf states would react to this proposition. That is where his arguments go wildly wrong.
First consider what “secondary sanctions” mean. They mean the US will tell other countries’ banks and corporations that they can’t do business with Iran. If they do, they will be excluded from the US market and their assets in the US frozen. There are few things we could do to enrage our closest allies more quickly than that. They would be thrust into the arms of the Russians and Chinese, and together try to work out financing mechanisms that escape US scrutiny and control.
Second, consider whether there would be any diplomacy to pursue. Either the agreement will collapse altogether, in which case you can bet on Iran moving quickly to get nuclear weapons, in order to forestall a US attack. No diplomatic openings there. Or the agreement will remain intact, without US participation. Iran will get sanctions relief from everyone but the US (something it did not expect any time soon anyway). Why would Iran re-engage diplomatically with the US if it can get what it wants from everyone else?
America’s allies would find themselves moving away from their trans-Atlantic connections to much deeper engagement with our adversaries. Support for the US on many issues–especially but not only the Middle East–would wane rapidly. “Secondary sanctions” levied in retaliation against American companies could wreck havoc with the world’s financial and trading systems.
What would the Gulf states do? If the agreement falls apart, they will have no choice but to race for nuclear weapons. If it doesn’t, they still need to consider whether to stick with the isolated and weakening US as a major ally or shift in other directions. I’d bet on a shift in other directions, something that has already started but could accelerate.
The Iran nuclear deal is likely to survive the Congressional challenge next month, as it would require a more than 2/3 majority in both houses to defeat it. But if it fails, we can thank strange values and colossal misjudgment. Senator Schumer is not alone.
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Peace picks August 10-14
1. After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics | Monday, August 10th | 12:00 – 1:30 | MEI | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a discussion of expectations across the region following Iran’s agreement with the P5+1 on its nuclear program. The historic deal may end Iran’s status as a pariah state, particularly in capitals outside the region. How have leaders in Tehran indicated they may proceed? How do the Arab states and Turkey view the implications of an Iran empowered by sanctions relief and diplomatic normalization? How might regional states react if Iran steps up its interventions in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere? And what actions are America’s allies in the region likely to want of the United States in managing Iran? Discussing these and other questions will be MEI senior fellow Robert S. Ford, MEI scholar Thomas W. Lippman, director of the Center for Turkish Studies Gönül Tol, and senior fellow Alex Vatanka. MEI’s vice president for policy & research Paul Salem will moderate the conversation.
2. Naval Aviation | Wednesday, August 12th | 9:00-10:00 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join CSIS and the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) for a discussion with Lieutenant General Jon Davis, Deputy Commandant for Aviation and Vice Admiral Mike Shoemaker, Commander, Naval Air Forces moderated by Admiral Joseph Pureher, USN, Ret. Vice Admiral Peter H. Daly, USN, Ret., CEO, USNI will provide an introduction. The Maritime Security Dialogue brings together CSIS and USNI, two of the nation’s most respected non-partisan institutions. The series is intended to highlight the particular challenges facing the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, from national level maritime policy to naval concept development and program design. Given budgetary challenges, technological opportunities, and ongoing strategic adjustments, the nature and employment of U.S. maritime forces are likely to undergo significant change over the next ten to fifteen years. The Maritime Security Dialogue provides an unmatched forum for discussion of these issues with the nation’s maritime leaders.
3. Thailand and the Changing Geopolitical Dynamics of Southeast Asia | Wednesday, August 12th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the Asia-Pacific, economic development and interconnectivity is growing alongside increasing tensions between neighbor states. This is no clearer than in the fight for building Thailand’s infrastructure. Nobuhiro Aizawa will discuss how Thailand’s 2014 coup and competing infrastructure bids are altering the geopolitics and international relations of Southeast Asia. Abigail Friedman will offer comment, and Carnegie’s James L. Schoff will moderate. Speakers include: Nobuhiro Aizawa, associate professor, Kyushu University, Abigail Friedman, founder and CEO, The Wisteria Group. Moderator: James L. Schoff, senior associate, Asia Program,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
4. The Threat from Within: Israel’s Extremist Dilemma | Wednesday, August 12th | 11:30 | FPRI (n.b. this event is in Philadephia but FPRI posts video and/or audio of its events) | REGISTER TO ATTEND | “We have been lax in tackling Jewish terrorism,” said Israeli President Reuven Rivlin this week in response to the attacks at the gay pride parade and then the firebombing of a home in the West Bank, resulting in the burning to death of an 18-month-old child. These are not isolated incidents, however, and pose a threat to the Israeli government’s authority, Israeli democracy, and add yet another impediment to peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. We have asked Barak Mendelsohn to explore the rise of Jewish extremism in Israel, the dilemmas it poses for Israel, and what might be done to alleviate it. Barak Mendelsohn is a senior fellow at FPRI and associate professor of political science at Haverford College. This past academic year, he served as a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Security at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He has already written extensively on the Messianic movement inside Israel, in addition to his work on radical Islam and jihadism. He served in the IDF for 5 years and received his Ph.D. in government from Cornell University. His books include Combating Jihadism (University of Chicago Press, 2009) and The Al Qaeda Franchise (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015).
5. From Coalition to Conservative Majority: What’s Next for UK Foreign Policy? |Wednesday, August 12th | 6:30 | British Embassy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This past May, the United Kingdom took to the voting booths and surprised many pollsters by handing a slim majority to Prime Minister David Cameron’s Conservative Party, thereby electing the UK’s first Conservative majority government in over a decade. Meanwhile, former Tory coalition partners the Liberal Democrats, led by outgoing Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, managed to hold only about 15% of their previous seats, the Labour Party lost seats and the Scottish National Party became the third largest party in the Commons. Since the election, the UK has continued to play a major role in the international foreign policy scene, from announcing its commitment to maintaining NATO’s defense spending target of 2% of GDP to playing a leading role in negotiations on the Iran Nuclear Deal. Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and the British Embassy invite you to join us for a post-election discussion moderated by Deputy Head of Mission to the United States, Patrick Davies. Mr. Davies, joined by a panel of experts from the Embassy, will discuss the new UK government, as the UK and its allies grapple with foreign policy issues such as combating ISIL, nuclear negotiations with Iran and EU reform.
6. Assessing the Iran Nuclear Agreement: Placing Sanctions in Context | Thursday, August 13th | 10:00-11:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Sanctions are what convinced Iran to begin negotiations with the United States. However, the mechanics behind lifting sanctions and the differences among international, U.S. and European Union sanctions are complicated. All beg the question of how effective the Iran deal really is. This program will explore the role of sanctions in the Iran Deal. Our panelists will examine the structure of the sanctions regime, debate its various implications, and explore what we can do about it. Among the questions to be addressed are: What sanctions are currently in place on Iran? What is the difference between multi-lateral oil sanctions and unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran? Is it really possible for the sanctions to be “snapped back” if Iran violates the agreement? Would the sanctions regime really disband if there was no agreement? Join us as our panel discusses Iran’s new sanctions regime and what it means for the future. Panelists include: Ilan Berman, Vice President, American Foreign Policy Council, Emanuele Ottolenghi, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation. Hosted by: James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, Heritage Foundation.
7. The Iran Deal: Key Issues and Controversies | Thursday, August 13th | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for a discussion with Dr. Colin Kahl and other members of the administration on key elements of the Iran nuclear deal and its specific implications for the international community. Speakers include: Dr. Colin Kahl,
Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Adviser to the Vice President, Jon Wolfsthal, Senior Director for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, National Security Council, Chris Backemeyer, Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, U.S. Department of State. Moderator: Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS.
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Limits of US-Turkey cooperation in Syria
On Thursday, the SETA Foundation hosted a talk entitled The U.S.-Turkey “Safe Zone” Agreement: What does it mean?. Panelists included: Sabiha Senyucel, research director of the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), Mark Perry, independent author, Melissa Dalton, fellow and chief of staff at the CSIS International Security Program, and Kadir Ustun, Executive Director of the SETA Foundation. Kilic B. Kanat, research director of the SETA Foundation, moderated. The panelists believe that the recent US-Turkey cooperation in Syria will remain limited because Turkey and the US continue to have divergent interests.
Senyucel said that the recent bombing in Southeast Turkey pushed Turkey to take a more active role in the anti-ISIS coalition. Now the coalition can use İncirlik for bombings. The Kurdish issue is no longer just a domestic Turkish issue. The Turkey-PKK peace process is finished for now, but Senyucel hopes it can restart soon. The roles of the PKK, the PYD and the Syrian Kurdish entity are all linked. YPG fighters fought ISIS in Kobane, giving the Kurds international legitimacy. This changed the Kurds’ thinking about what they could achieve regionally.
After Kobane, the YPG and PKK demonstrated that they could fight ISIS on the ground and US airstrikes helped them take Tel Abyad. This concerned Turkey, which has good reason to distrust the PYD because of its links to the PKK. After the Gezi Park protests, the PKK stopped honoring its commitments and asserted de facto control over some parts of Eastern Turkey. There may have been mistakes from the Turkish side, but the Turkish government also displayed restraint. The PKK’s mid-July announcement that they were returning to arms was unjustified. Turkey is now reminding the PKK that they won’t achieve their ambitions. The US has agreed to support Turkey in this, but Senyucel isn’t sure how long this will last.
Kadir asserted that the US and Turkey can’t agree on the big picture in Syria. Obama believes the US only has limited interests; he isn’t trying to fix Syria. The PYD is a local actor that can contribute to the US’s non-strategy strategy. Turkey has tried to protect its border, host refugees, prevent the spillover of the conflict and resolve the Kurdish question. Necessity has limited Turkish actions. Turkey can’t ally with the PKK-linked PYD; the PKK has asserted de facto control over some towns in eastern Turkey and hasn’t fully committed to withdrawing guerrillas.
Turkey will allow the US to use İncirlik and will work to create a safe zone in Syria for the moderate opposition. Ankara wants a broader strategy from the US, but the US is uninterested. Will planes taking off from İncirlik help the PYD? The PYD has been reluctant to distance itself from the PKK and stop expelling Arabs from its territory. The PYD also allows Assad’s air force to overfly the territories it controls. If these things continue, the US and Turkey won’t come to a real agreement, but both sides need a broader strategy to make lasting progress.
Dalton agreed that the US and Turkey have divergent objectives. The Turks have called the recent agreement a safe zone, but the US has avoided this term. The agreement will involve enhanced border cooperation. The length of this cooperation area will be ~65 miles, but other elements are unknown:
- How deep into Syria will it go?
- Will Assad’s air force be excluded?
- Will there be cover for civilians in nearby cities outside the zone?
Broader US-Turkey cooperation will be needed for a long-term solution, but the anti-ISIS fight and border cooperation are likely to be the focus for now.
Perry highlighted the fact that there is unlikely to be any well-articulated US strategy from this administration, but there are three observable US policy principles:
- We maintain relations with allied regional states despite difficulties.
- Our enemy is Islamic extremism.
- There is no appetite for strong anti-Assad action.
We want Assad to lose, but don’t want his opponents to win. This is a tough line to walk with Turkey. The use of İncirlik will allow the US to gather better drone intelligence. Assad is unlikely to launch air operations in the area of the proposed safe zone because Assad doesn’t want to tangle with the US Air Force. The Obama administration’s vagueness may not be bad. The US has made many foreign policy mistakes; doing nothing is a viable option since Syria is so complex. We can protect our friends, maintain our strength, assist the victims, and remain friendly with Erdogan, without further intervention.
Barbara Slavin, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center, asked about the US train and equip program. Many of the 54 rebels that we have trained have reportedly been captured by Jabhat Al-Nusra. Slavin asked whether the possible safe zone could be an injection point for these rebels. Dalton stated that it could be used for this purpose, because there is currently no other logical injection point. However, questions about how and at what cost the US and Turkey plan to protect such a zone remain. Kadir took a similar position, noting the slowness of the program. Perry discounted the program entirely, noting that the last successful US train and equip program was in the Philippines in 1899. The US is keeping the fiction of train and equip so that we can keep our hand in the game in Syria.
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My magic wand
Someone asked for my views on whether Kosovo is equipped to deal with nationalist and Islamist extremism, as well as the best ways to counter violent extremism and the recruitment of foreign fighters. Here is how I replied:
1. The first thing that needs to be said is how different the two topics you’ve given me are.
2. When it comes to Kosovo, nationalism is endemic among both Serbs and Albanians. It was the clash of these two nationalisms that brought us war in the 1990s and prevented consolidation of the peace until recently.
3. The April 2013 Brussels agreement is as close as we’ve gotten to a peace treaty between Serbian and Albanian nationalists. It recognizes the authority of the Pristina-based institutions on the entire territory of Kosovo and implies that Kosovo will enter the European Union as a sovereign entity on its own bottom. In exchange it gives the Serbs of Kosovo a large measure of self-governance, in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan that Belgrade rejected eight years ago.
4. I’m reasonably sure that with international guidance and pressure that peace will hold, though I also believe it will not be consolidated until Belgrade bites the bullet by recognizing Kosovo and exchanging ambassadors with Pristina.
5. I’d like to see that sooner rather than later, though the inclination in Belgrade and the international community, including Washington, is to let it slide for now.
6. Delay encourages nationalist responses in Kosovo, right now in the form of support for Vetvendosje! and its promise of a referendum on union with Albania. It also encourages Kosovo to plan for larger security forces than it would otherwise need and/or burdens NATO more than otherwise would be the case.
7. So much for nationalism. It’s there, and an obstacle when we would like to see a special court created. It is also a law enforcement issue when ethnic nationalists take up weapons and insert themselves into Macedonia. But it is unlikely today to generate the kind of violence that seems to be necessary to get the international community to react.
8. Violent extremism—if by that you mean non-nationalist extremism of the Islamist variety—has in the past been rare in Kosovo. Takfiris do not grow naturally there. I have rarely met a less religious people than Kosovo Albanians, whose dominant faith during most of the last two decades has been Albanianism, not conservative Islam.
9. That is changing. The reasons are many:
• Frustration with slow economic progress,
• The languid pace of international acceptance and recognition,
• Ill-educated, unemployed, often criminal and disappointed youth,
• Takfiri propaganda stemming mainly from Saudi Arabia,
• A limited number of militant mosque leaders,
• Recruitment of fighters for Syria and Iraq.
These have combined to spawn and grow a small but notable Muslim extremist coterie.
10. It would be a mistake to exaggerate Islamist extremism in Kosovo, which is ideologically inconsistent with the kind of national liberation struggle the Kosovars conducted in the 1990s.
11. That’s what the government did when it arrested dozens and released more than half because of lack of evidence.
12. But it would also be a mistake to ignore it.
13. The good news is that the current government and more generally the ruling elite in Kosovo dislikes religious extremism and regards it as a threat to them, not just to us.
14. They sincerely would like to rid themselves of that threat and have passed legislation aimed at doing just that.
15. But legislation and law enforcement will not be sufficient in Kosovo any more than they would be sufficient elsewhere on their own.
16. In my view, the most important antidote to recruitment is the one that has worked elsewhere: community efforts, based on former extremists and their families.
17. But that will not suffice. At the risk of stating the blazingly obvious, what Kosovo needs to prevent radicalization is what any of us would wish for it even if radicalization were not an issue: more rapid progress towards the EU, formation of its army and entry into NATO’s Partnership for Peace, effective implementation of the Brussels agreement, more capable and less corrupt institutions, better education, more jobs and security services both alert and cautious to avoid making matters worse.
18. Now, where did I leave that magic wand….
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A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal
On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran. Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated. Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.
Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.
In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces. Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill. The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.
Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence. They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.
Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.
Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart. They believe the US is appeasing Iran.
Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there. Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy. Change in Iran won’t happen fast. Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.
Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran. However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians. Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war. Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.
Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides. They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state. They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch. Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others. They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison. Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria. Iran needs a reality check.
Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it. There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now. The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum. The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.
Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly. The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious. The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling. Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively. Now only 12% do. The Arab street is suspicious of the deal. The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people. The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad. Assad is a costly budget item for Iran. When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.
Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done. The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.
Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.
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Magic numbers
The magic numbers are 44 House Democrats and 13 Senate Democrats. Those are the thresholds opponents of the Iran nuclear deal need to reach to achieve veto-proof majorities in both houses of Congress, assuming all Republicans vote against.
Rob Satloff says defeat of the deal would be no big deal. John Bolton says it would be a good thing. Suzanne Nossel says it would be a disaster. Who is right?
Nossel in a word. But let’s go through the drill.
Satloff argues that defeat in the Congress might either push President Obama to
- reopen the negotiations, seeking a “better deal,”or
- seek to implement the agreement without Congressional approval.
For Case 1, Rob offers no explanation of why the Iranians would agree to renegotiate. For Case 2, he suggests the Iranians would abide by the terms of the agreement, despite not getting the sanctions relief that was the primary purpose of their engagement in the negotiations. This runs contrary to both what the Iranians have said–that they will proceed apace if there is no deal–and what they have done in the past. The Iranian nuclear program mushroomed (to use an unfortunate metaphor) after the Bush administration ignored Tehran’s feelers about reaching an accommodation and refused to talk about anything but dismantling its nuclear program.
In both cases, Rob fails to consider the reaction of the Chinese, Russians, Europeans and Gulf States.
This is fatal to his argument. With rejection of the agreement in the US Congress, the united front against Iran getting nuclear weapons would quickly evaporate. The Chinese and Europeans, who have been salivating at the prospects for increased trade with Iran, would have no reason to go along with reopening the negotiations. If the Iranians do appear to be implementing the agreement, multilateral sanctions would rapidly disappear, leaving the US isolated and unable to get the European support required if the “snapback” provision is to be used.
Bolton argues that the snapback provision is not only useless but harmful to American interests, because it sets a precedent for getting around the UN Security Council veto. He cites as a negative example a Cold War era effort by Dean Acheson to do an end-run around the UNSC through the General Assembly. That effort caused no harm Bolton admits, but he is unfazed. He is sure snapback is bad, even if the experience he cites was not. It’s hard to imagine why the New York Times published that argument.
Let’s get real. Rejection of the deal in Congress would most likely lead to three “no”s:
- No International Atomic Energy Agency inspections;
- No multilateral sanctions;
- No constraints on the Iranian nuclear program.
Iran would be free, if it wants, to move ahead towards nuclear weapons, not in 10 or 15 years, but right now. If President Obama or his successor were to decide on attacking the Iranian nuclear program, he would be on his own without allies and without the grounds Iranian violation of the agreement would provide.
That is not the worst of it though. American clout with all concerned would decline markedly. With Iran presumed to be racing for a nuclear weapon, the Saudis, Egyptians and Turks would need to keep pace. The Europeans think they led what they call the EU3+3 (P5+1) in the negotiations. Rejection in Congress would pull the rug out from under our closest allies. Russia and China would deem the US unreliable, even as they respectively pursue arms and energy deals with Tehran.
Rejection in short would be a milestone comparable to the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations not much more than 100 years ago. It would break the faith with Europe, reduce US clout with less friendly world powers, initiate a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and limit America’s ability to lead on many non-nuclear issues.
President Obama will speak about all this today at American University. I trust he’ll have those magic numbers in mind.
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