The Russians are coming

Of course they’ve already been present in Syria for decades and throughout the current civil wars. They have been holding on tight to their naval facilities at Tartus, supplying Bashar al Assad’s forces with weapons, training Syrian forces, and protecting Syrian diplomatic interests, in particular at the United Nations. But now Moscow seems to be constructing a base for a thousand or so troops at on air field outside Latakia, 50 miles to the north of Tartus. What are they up to? What does this move signify?

Building a base of these dimensions is a serious deepening of Russian commitment to the Syrian regime. Secretary Kerry called it escalation. But it betrays the weakness of the regime more than its strength. Latakia is the heartland of Alawite support for Bashar al Assad. If it requires Russian troops for its defense, the regime is either in deeper trouble along the coast than many had imagine, or perhaps preparing to relocate Assad from Damascus. Either way, it wouldn’t be necessary if things were going well for Bashar. Those who had hoped (I once counted myself among them), that Moscow would realize the folly of its support for him are going to be disappointed.

The Russians have reason to be concerned. Syrian government forces have palpably weakened over the last two years. Regime-organized militias (National Defense Forces) and Lebanese Hizbollah, sometimes under Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps command, are now doing much of the fighting, as the regular army is disintegrating. The opposition has taken Idlib, 80 miles or so from Latakia, and much of the surrounding countryside.

They are within striking distance of Latakia, though the topography and demography will make getting there difficult. Alawite militias as well as Syrian regular forces, Hizbollah and now the Russians will defend Latakia and its approaches with vigor.

Moscow will portray whatever it is doing as support to a legitimate government fighting off a terrorist assault. The Russians I’ve talked with about Syria are fully committed to killing as many Sunni extremists as they can abroad, before they get to Mother Russia. The Islamic State has significant Chechen support. Moscow figures it is better to kill them in Syria than to risk their coming home to roost. The parallel with Bush Administration rhetoric should be noted.

Neither the regime nor Moscow will, however, make much distinction between the Islamic State and other more moderate forces that have taken up arms against Bashar al Assad. Their efforts on behalf of the regime are likely to radicalize the majority Sunni population of Syria further and help the Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra recruit cadres. Russian escalation will also sink American diplomatic efforts to bring about a political solution in Syria. Neither the regime nor Moscow has ever shown interest in a solution that displaces Bashar, which Washington regards as a sine qua non, in order to convince at least some of the rebels to stop fighting.

Moscow will enjoy acting to fight ISIS in defiance of the Americans, whose anti-ISIS Coalition has had only a modicum of success.  The situation in Syria is the mirror image of the situation in Ukraine, where the Russians are supporting insurgents and the Americans are supporting a legitimate government. Great powers, Putin feels, can do as they like, not least because that is how he thinks the Americans behave. The many differences between the trumped-up rebellion in eastern Ukraine and the all too genuine (and initially peaceful) uprising in Syria are of little interest to Putin.

So rather than just an escalation, it is better to see the Russian base-building as a further deterioration of the Syrian situation. It means heightened fighting, more displaced people and refugees, and less hope for a political solution. Europe had better brace itself for a much greater flow of what it prefers to call migrants, especially in anticipation of winter. The Russians are coming is not good news.