Libya needs all the help it can get

I had an opportunity today to talk with Hill people about Libya. Here is more or less what I said:

1. It’s a pleasure to be here to talk about Libya, which is today a country in big trouble but with some hope of finding its way out.
2. I confess to a lot of sympathy with the revolution that started in February 2011. I visited Benghazi and Tripoli that September and again in July 2012, to observe Libya’s first national elections in almost 50 years.
3. I found Libya the friendliest Arab country I have ever visited. Libyans knew who saved Benghazi and appreciated it. They ran good elections in 2012 and were looking forward to a free and democratic future.
4. But the revolution began crashing in the fall of 2012. Three years later, Benghazi is chaotic, tribal tensions are causing sporadic violence in the south and only recently has the west begun to stabilize, due to exhaustion of the Misratan and Zintani militias.
5. The country has two parliaments and two governments. The internationally recognized one is based in Tobruk and Bayda, with support from militias gathered together in a coalition called Dignity. The other is based in Tripoli, with support from militias in the Dawn coalition.
6. The big change since I wrote “Libya’s Escalating Civil War” in May is the heightened prospect of a UN-brokered political agreement, hopefully to be signed before the end of this month.
7. The agreement would create a Government of National Accord (GNA) with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) elected in June 2014 as its legislature and an advisory State Council drawn mainly from Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC).
8. This would be a power-sharing arrangement that attempts to merge Libya’s two governments into one. That is a classic way for diplomats to try to resolve civil wars.
9. But it is not entirely symmetrical. The Tripoli-based GNC would become advisory.
10. That’s the main sticking point. The proposed GNC amendments to the draft agreement would make it a second house of a bicameral parliament, with virtually equal powers to the HoR.
11. That may be a deal breaker, but there is another way out of the current impasse. The GNC may be able to make up some of what it loses institutionally in the now ongoing bargaining over deciding who sits where: the positions of prime minister, deputy prime ministers and the two ministers who will be part of the Presidency Council are particularly important.
12. That the bargaining has gotten to this stage—the musical chairs phase of ending a war (who will get a good seat and who will be left standing)—is a good sign, though no guarantee of success.
13. But even success will be no more than what the State Department people are referring to as a “70% solution.”
14. Khalifa Haftar, who commands what he calls the Libyan National Army on behalf of the “Dignity” coalition, is not likely to sign on. Nor will some hardliners associated with the “Dawn” coalition.
15. A 70% solution without international peacekeepers is a dicey proposition. Thirty per cent is a lot of potential spoilers.
16. The key issue for success will be security arrangements, especially in Tripoli. Those arrangements have not yet been made, though I understand some of the militias have begun talking informally about them.
17. Even in the best of all possible worlds, that will take time, as building the confidence of HoR members required to get them to move to Tripoli will not be easy.
18. What about international peacekeepers, at least to secure Tripoli? The Italians have indicated a willingness to lead such an effort, but it will be vital that the initiative come from a legitimate Libyan government only after Tripoli is stabilized and the HoR has moved there.
19. Arab participation, which won’t be easy or quick to arrange, is vital.
20. That will leave a perilous transition period. The Islamic State affiliate in Libya is second only to the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in posing a threat to U.S. interests.
21. Though chased recently from Derna by other extremists, ISIS has established itself in centrally located Sirte, Qaddafi’s hometown. A rebellion there last month failed.
22. ISIS despises both Dawn and Dignity. It will try to destabilize a Government of National Accord.
23. So whatever forces back the GNA will need to be prepared to fight ISIS, in addition to other spoilers who refuse to acknowledge its authority.
24. What will the U.S. role be if the 70% solution goes forward?
25. First Washington has to be prepared to press the parties in Libya to adhere to the UN-brokered agreement. This will likely include sanctioning recalcitrants. It also needs to include support for those who are prepared to support the peace process, whether nationally or locally. It would be particularly important if the Misratan and Zintani militias can be convinced to come to a truce.
26. Second, Washington needs to help ensure Libya’s neighbors back the 70% solution to the hilt. The Tunisians and Moroccans, who have hosted some of the negotiating sessions, are on board.
27. The big question mark is Cairo, which under President Sisi has in the past backed Dignity and in particular Haftar. I am told the Egyptians are ready to abandon that support.
28. Third, Washington should support any international peacekeeping mission with air and sea logistics, intelligence and air strikes.
29. Fourth, Washington will need to train Libyan forces, especially for counter-terrorism.
30. This is more controversial than it sounds, because a previous U.S.-supported effort to train a General Purpose Force (GPF) came a cropper several years ago due to misbehavior of the Libyans involved. Some refused to return to Libya. Others did worse.
31. CT training and assistance will have to occur in Libya. It will be expensive and dangerous. Congressional support for the effort will be vital. I suggest we prepare to spend as much as the $600 million we planned for the GPF, over three to five years. That will be a hard sell.
32. But we have to decide whether we are serious about defeating the Islamic State or not. A failed UN political agreement in Libya could open the door to ISIS, which is still relatively weak there.
33. We know however how quickly and suddenly ISIS can expand and take over territory.
34. Libya is an enormous country with a small population–only 6.4 million when everyone is at home, likely no more than 5 million or so today. Its hinterland would be ideal as an ISIS safe haven, giving it strategic depth as it loses territory in Iraq and Syria.
35. The Libyans deserve better, in particular if they sign on to the UN-brokered agreement. I hope we’ll be prepared to support their efforts.