Libya questions and answers

After yesterday’s talk, Daniel Serwer answered questions: 

Q: Could the international community have taken any different action after the 2011 revolution that would have led to less conflict in the past few years?

A: Yes. For a year and a half or so, the situation in Libya was looking stable and positive. The militias were not called on to disarm and for a period played a role in maintaining security. However, eventually these militias began to align themselves with political forces, embroiling armed groups in political contests. We should have been prepared to provide assistance to disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating the militias.

The Europeans in particular should take responsibility, because of migration flows and because of oil and natural gas interests.

Q: What lessons could be learned from other conflicts – such as Iraq and Syria, but also the Balkans?

A: First and foremost we need to pay attention to local circumstances. Libya does not have the same sort of political and civil society infrastructure as the Balkans did, nor the same sectarian or tribal politics as Iraq, and so the lessons that may be drawn from either are few.

The Balkans had something the Middle East lacks entirely: a sense of direction, because the European Union has made it clear that all the Balkans countries can become members once they qualify. In the Middle East, people are fed up with secular dictatorships, but they have little idea what they want in their place. Islamists are filling that gap.

In Libya as in the Balkans (and Iraq and Afghanistan), decentralization of governing authority is likely to be an important part of the solution. Devolution of power enlarges the pie and helps to empower the population with authority over important aspects of their lives.

Q: Is a central government in Libya feasible, or does power have to be devolved to regions, or should we even contemplate breakup of the country?

A: Libya is the classic case of a country cobbled together by colonialists just before independence. But division of the country into two or more parts does not make much political or strategic sense at this juncture. Firstly, Libyans by and large view themselves as Libyans – it is one of the central components of professed identity, along with ‘Muslim’. There is no Libyan consensus that the country ought to be divided, even though there are competing, regionally-based political camps as well as a relatively small fringe that advocates independence for Cyrenaica in the east. Nor is there consensus on lines of division. The oil and gas reserves would be a major bone of contention in any attempt to divide the country – they are not evenly distributed. Libya could not be equitably or peacefully divided so long as participants disagreed as to allocation of hydrocarbon reserves and territorial claims.

Re-concentration of power in a central government in a former autocracy nevertheless will be no easy task. At this point Libyans are wary of recentralization and what it may entail. What most don’t want is a character like Khalifa Haftar to gain power and become another Qaddafi-esque strongman. The only scenario in which break-up would be feasible is if the majority of Libyans vote for it in a free and fair referendum, along pre-determined lines.

Q: How serious is the ISIS threat and what should we do about it?

A: Libya is an important beachhead for ISIS, ranked only after Syria and Iraq. Libya may be where ISIS retreats to if they lose ground in the Caliphate. The hinterlands and the south could be ideal ungoverned spaces for them. We know very little from open source material about their operations in Libya, but militarily they are still relatively weak. It is unclear why they have managed to take Sirte, Qaddafi’s home town. There has been a foiled rebellion there. Their rule seems to be similar to what they do in Syria and Iraq.

It will be important for the US to be involved in training Libyan counterterrorism units, building up a confident and unified military force under a respected and professional leadership.

The EU is thinking about a peacekeeping force of 5000, which doesn’t amount to much once you figure in a 24 hour day and tooth to tail ratio. That number would be able to do not much more than guard the government and foreign embassies. How do we expect the Libyans to feel about international peacekeepers who do no more than that? Ideally, Libya needs at least 15,000 peacekeepers to help maintain order in Tripoli and Benghazi, with logistical, intelligence and air support from NATO (especially the US).

Q: What about migration from Libya? Can we expect another big flow of refugees, similar to that from Syria?

A: The humanitarian crisis is of course urgent, but it is not the root of the problem. Refugees are a symptom of years of the political turmoil and conflict. Treating the symptoms won’t solve the problem. Libya and Syria both need political solutions.

Libya is not one of the more prominent sources for refugees – it is more of a conduit for sub-Saharan and East African nationals. Libyans, who are far fewer than Syrians in any event, are also better off, having enjoyed social payments from the state for many years as well as subsidized food commodities. Some Libyans have simply been able to drive to Tunisia and take a plane to Europe. Many have also gone to Cairo. Libya is not among the top 10 countries sending people to Europe. The predominant refugee and migrant concern remains Syrians, who mainly take Eastern Mediterranean routes, usually through Turkey.