Month: September 2015
Uncensored
Iran’s Fars News Agency asked me some good questions. Parts of the interview were included in this article, but parts were also cut, as one might expect. I am publishing here the full text, which I hope will find its way into print also in Iran:
Q: What is your opinion about Iran’s plan to resolve the Syria tension?
A: As I understand Iran’s “plan,” it involves 1) a ceasefire, 2) formation of a national unity government, 3) a rewritten constitution and 4) national elections. This is an outline many can accept, even if some might quarrel with the order.
But “the devil is in the details” we say in English:
1) How does the ceasefire come about? Who monitors and enforces it? What sanctions are there against those who violate it? What if some armed groups refuse to participate in it?
2) Who participates in the national unity government? Does Bashar al Assad step aside or remain as president? How is the security of opposition people participating in a national unity government ensured?
3) Who rewrites the constitution? Within what guidelines? How is a new constitution approved?
4) Who calls elections? Who supervises them? Who ensures a safe and secure environment for the campaign as well as the elections? Who counts the votes?
I suspect there will be many more differences over these questions than over the four-point “plan.”
Q: The UK recently announced that the conflict in Syria will not be resolved unless Russia and Iran use their influence on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to help reach a political solution. What do these signals mean?
A: I’m not sure what the UK meant. It is certainly the consensus in Europe and the US that there is no political solution in Syria if Bashar al Assad insists on staying in power. His opposition won’t stop fighting as long as he is there. Iranian and Russian support enables him to remain. I see no sign that either Moscow or Tehran is prepared to risk losing their influence in a post-Assad Syria, which will surely resent the enormous support they have provided him.
Q: What are Turkey’s roles in Syria and the region? Do you confirm its policy in the Middle East?
A: Turkey has four main interests in Syria: it wants Bashar al Assad gone, it wants Kurds in Iraq and Syria to stop supporting the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey, it wants defeat of the Islamic State, and it wants Syrian refugees to return to Syria. The proposed “safe zone” in northern Syria and the Turkish attacks on the Kurds and Islamic State aim to achieve all four objectives, though success is still a long way off.
Q: We know that Turkey had zero foreign policy sometime and it had gains some achievements but today it has taken distance from that. What were and are their problems?
A: As noted above, it has problems with Bashar al Assad, with the Kurds, with the Islamic State and with refugees.
Q: Why is the west silent on Turkey’s support for Daesh?
A: The West has longed implored Turkey to close its border to Daesh fighters and supplies. They have tightened up a lot since ISIS attacked inside Turkey.
It is a figment of Tehran’s imagination that the West is silent. Or maybe a creation of Iran’s propagandists. One of the things most resented in the West is Iran’s implication that the West is not really opposed to Daesh. Nonsense is the polite word we use for that allegation.
Q: Has the US-led coalition succeeded against Daesh?
A: No, but it has had some successes, taking back about one-quarter of the territory Daesh once controlled, depriving it of some of its revenue and killing quite a few of its commanders.
That one-quarter is mostly Kurdish-populated territory. Taking back Sunni-populated territory, especially in Iraq, is proving far more difficult.
Q: How can Muslim countries across the region led by Iran stand against Daesh?
A: The Sunni Muslim countries of the region don’t want to be led by Iran. They are fighting Daesh, but as part of a Western-led Coalition. Iran is also fighting Daesh, but coordination is difficult so long as Iran fails to distinguish between Daesh and more moderate Syrian fighters. From the Western and I think Arab perspectives, it looks like Iran is fighting to defend Assad for sectarian reasons more than it is fighting Daesh.
Q: Let’s go to Iraq. How do you evaluate the ongoing Iran/ Iraq relation? What about the future?
A: Iran has supported Iraq’s response to Daesh quickly and effectively, fearing Daesh success in Iraq would mean trouble sooner or later also for Iran.
But it has used the opportunity in particular to support Shia militias (Hashd, Popular Mobilization Units). That is a mistake, because it exacerbates sectarian tensions in Iraq and increases the likelihood of a breakup of the Iraqi state that Tehran says it does not want.
It seems to me that a strong but non-threatening and unified Iraq is what Iran should be aiming for. I don’t see it doing that at present. Instead the IRGC is pursuing a less wise policy of arming and otherwise supporting sectarian forces that will make keeping the Iraqi state together very difficult.
Q: What is your opinion about latest Russia military developments and build up in some parts of Europe and the Arctic? I do not mean Ukraine at all.
A: The Russians have legitimate interests in the Arctic. But past experience suggests they will try to bite off more than they can chew. They are already overextended in Ukraine and the Middle East. Putin has strong domestic political support, but he lacks the money and military capacity to sustain his aggressive foreign policy.
Q: And thank you for your participating. Could you please explain about Iran/West relations after the deal?
A: I don’t see Iran/West relations much changed, except for the prospect of much greater trade and investment, especially between Europe and Iran, once sanctions are lifted. But Iranian authorities have reiterated their hostility to the United States, which always gets a lot of coverage here.
Washington doesn’t care much about that but wants Iran to stop threatening Israel’s existence and subverting Gulf neighbors through a highly sectarian policy of supporting Shia forces (sometimes political, sometimes military), especially in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon and Kuwait. Iran and the US share an interest in defeating Daesh, but active cooperation on that requires that Iran stop subversion of American friends and allies in the region. As we know only too well, subversion breeds resentment, not influence.
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Russia’s President Putin is combining his military move into Syria with a diplomatic effort to convince America that Russia and Bashar al Assad are indispensable to success in the fight against the Islamic State. Putin wants Washington to understand that Russia is a great power and cannot be ignored, in particular in the Middle East. How should Washington react?
The forward operating base the Russians are deploying near Latakia certainly represents a major escalation of Moscow’s engagement in Syria. At the very least, there is a need to deconflict Russian air operations with Coalition combat missions conducted nearby. No one needs an incident in which Russian and American forces come to blows. But that can be done quietly out of the public eye.
It is not clear yet whether the Russians intend to use their deployment to attack insurgents in Syria. Their base could be a defensive move, one intended to keep western Syria safe for the Russian naval facility at Tartous as well as for the regime’s Alawite supporters, and possibly for Bashar al Assad if he is forced from Damascus. For the moment at least, the housing being built can accommodate something like 1500 troops. That’s a far bigger commitment than the few advisors Russia has maintained in Syria in the past, but it is not a force likely to make much of a difference in the civil war in the ongoing civil war there.
If they do decide to engage against insurgents, the Russians are unlikely to distinguish between what the American-led Coalition thinks of as relative moderates and jihadi extremists associated with the Islamic State or Jabhat al Nusra. Nor are they likely to have a lot more success than the Coalition against the extremists, unless they deploy far more substantial ground forces. From the Coalition perspective, this Russian deployment is still small and aimed at least in part at the wrong targets.
So should we resist the Russian deployment, negotiate with Moscow, or do something else?
It seems to me there is an argument, expressed in the title of this piece, for not doing much to try to foil this Russian move or to accommodate it. There is little risk that 1500 Russians can accomplish much on the military side, beyond protecting western Syria from being overrun and the Alawites slaughtered. Any damage the Russians do to relative moderates won’t be decisive. It is at least as likely that the extremists will do significant damage to the Russians than the other way around.
As for the Russian argument that we should all unite with Bashar al Assad to defeat the terrorists, it really isn’t worthy of much of a response. Bashar and his forces have made it clear for years that their real enemies are the relative moderates the Coalition is supporting. Bashar has no real possibility of reestablishing control over all of Syria. His military tactics of besieging civilian areas and terrorizing their population with barrel bombs have done far more to generate terrorist recruits than to reduce their numbers. Russian forces, who honed their tactics in Chechnya, may kill a lot of people but won’t be any better at counter-insurgency warfare.
If there are to be negotiations, the Coalition would do best to continue to insist that they be based on the June 2012 United Nations communique, which called for a mutually agreeable transitional governing body with full executive authority. There is no reason to abandon that oblique formula, which in practice precludes Bashar al Assad from power even if it does not name him.
So rather than take the bait, Washington would do well to keep its cool and resist the temptation to over-react. The Russian deployment wouldn’t be necessary if Bashar al Assad were strong and getting stronger. Moscow is already overstretched in Ukraine. Letting the Russians double down on a bad bet in Syria is the right approach.
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Anti-Semitism in present-day Europe
CSIS hosted a panel Wednesday on “Understanding and Combating Anti-Semitism in Present-Day Europe” featuring Gilles Clavreul, the French inter-ministerial delegate for the Fight Against Racism and Anti-Semitism; Rabbi Andrew Baker, personal representative of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Chairperson-in-Office for Combating Anti-Semitism; and Jeffrey Goldberg, national correspondent with The Atlantic. The panel was moderated by CSIS Vice President Europe Program, Heather Conley.
Clavreul and Baker highlighted the increase of anti-Semitism in recent years in public discourse, in political parties, and in minority groups. They are eager to push back and ensure Europe remains a safe and healthy environment for Jews. Goldberg had a more pessimistic outlook, believing that “there’s not much hope for the future of European Jewry.” Not only has it seen demographic decline, but Europe is now an inhospitable environment for Jews.
Clavreul highlighted that hate speech and hate-based acts have become more common in France since 2000. Jews are not the only target. The rest of Europe has also witnessed this increasing hate and xenophobia, which divide the national body politic and are antithetical to Republican values shared by a broader Atlantic community. Clavreul hopes to be able to mobilise all sectors of French society to combat hate.
Baker agreed, noting that people were slow to recognize resurgent anti-Semitism for what it was. Jewish anxieties have been growing, and recent anti-Semitic attacks across Europe have driven the point home for the public. One reason for slow identification of the problem is that in recent years many perpetrators behind hate speech and acts have been Muslim Europeans. There remains a lingering political correctness wary of highlighting crimes committed by a minority community. The panelists agreed there are two primary strains of anti-Semitism in Europe today: the old guard of right-wing Europeans, and the more recent phenomenon occurring among Muslim communities.
Goldberg has written on this issue before. Hitler accomplished the destruction of European Jewry as a vibrant and feasible community. There was no real post-war recovery, and the nature of the community has changed: three quarters of French Jews, for instance, are of North African descent. Today’s anti-Semitism, in his view, should make Jews leave Europe behind; today, North America and Israel are the centers of Jewish culture. Goldberg, together with Baker, pointed out the European tendency towards anti-Zionism, or anti-Israel sentiments that often bleed into outright anti-Semitism, especially given Europe’s historical relationship with it. Goldberg believes such an environment encourages those – mainly within Muslim extremism – who have violent impulses to act, and validates certain trends within the Muslim community.
Conley highlighted the potential implications of the migration crisis, given that the majority of refugees are Muslim: will it lead to an increase in anti-Semitism in Europe, exacerbating intercommunal tensions? The panelists and moderators agreed that the refugees needed to be assimilated, in order to provide for the security of Europe in general and Jews in particular. Baker emphasized that it is inevitable that Jews feel a degree of empathy for the plight of the thousands who find themselves forced to leave their homes, and are often confronted with closed doors. The panelists agreed that this major demographic movement will present cultural and security challenges to the Europe.
There are positive voices in Europe against anti-Semitism today. Clavreul works directly with French PM Manuel Valls, who insists that Jews are an integral part of the French community. France aspires to be an environment hospitable to Jews (and other minorities). German Chancellor Angela Merkel is another important voice. Baker highlighted the diversity of contexts and experiences within Europe. One should not paint a broadly negative picture. Clavreul believes that with increased education about the Jewish experience at the childhood level, paired with increased regulation of hate speech and especially the internet, France (and Europe overall) can begin to roll back the tide of hate.
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Mr. Vučić returns to Washington
Serbian Prime Minister Vučić, who visited DC in June and spoke at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, is back for a call on Vice President Biden. That meeting was postponed last time around due to the death of Biden’s son Beau.
I’m a bit surprised this visit is happening so soon. Biden is in the midst of publicly agonizing over whether to run for President next year as he mourns the loss of his son. He has a lot of things to do and might well have put off this visit until later in the year.
That the visit is occurring now is likely a tribute to the importance Washington attaches to Serbia as well as American interest in finishing up the transition of the Balkans from Communist backwater to European showcase. Serbia itself is an important part of the process, and it can also help to resolve issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo, the two main remaining trouble spots in what used to be Yugoslavia. Belgrade has much less to offer in Macedonia, the third weakest link in the chain that links the Balkans to Europe.
Vučić will face some unfinished business in Washington. The Prime Minister has made promises about bringing to justice those responsible for murdering two Albanian Americans, the Bytyqi brothers, in July 1999. Those promises have not yet been fulfilled. Biden I trust will raise that with him, as others did during the June visit. The Vice President may also urge restraint in responding to the formation of a Association of Albanian Municipalities in southern Serbia, the mirror image of the Association of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo. What’s good for the goose, he may suggest, is good for the gander, provided the laws of the respective countries are observed.
Apart from the flow of Middle Eastern refugees through the Balkans, the issues haven’t changed much in the last three months: Vučić be seeking American support for Serbia’s EU ambitions, which he’ll get along with a dose of suggestions from Washington as to how to accelerate and improve Serbia’s prospects: reform of the judicial system, buying natural gas from Azerbaijan rather than Russia, aligning Serbia with EU Ukraine-related sanctions against Moscow, implementing the “normalization” agreements between Belgrade and Pristina.
The Prime Minister will also be appearing at the American Chamber of Commerce, where he will presumably pitch American investment in Serbia as well as Serbian exports. Commercial issues of this sort are decided in the U.S. by the private sector, not the government, which can’t do much more than jawbone American companies and try to facilitate their contacts with the Serbian government and private sector. An appearance at the Chamber helps grease the skids.
Vučić will also give a talk at Brookings, where I imagine Serbia’s relationship with Moscow will be a focus of attention, not least because his host is Russia expert Fiona Hill. While the Prime Minister often emphasizes that Serbia has made a definitive choice for the West and EU membership, Serbian President Nikolić and others associated with the government seem less convinced. The Prime Minister is likely to emphasize the importance of Balkan road, rail, aviation and energy infrastructure in ensuring the region is linked strongly to Europe and the West.
So this visit will be in part a reprise and in part an extension of the Prime Minister’s previous encounters in DC, which left a good impression. It’s a sign of how much has changed that the good news these days comes from the Balkans, and even from Serbia.
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Peace picks September 14-19
1. Iran’s Regional Role After the Nuclear Deal | Monday, September 14th | 2:00 – 3:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | An internal debate is occurring within Iran about its regional role in the aftermath of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program. Nasser Hadian will present the findings of his new paper which argues that Iranian policymakers are divided between those who believe Iran must act more forcefully to help stabilize its neighbors and those who advocate a more minimalist approach– contrary to perceptions that Iran is solely determined to expand its intervention in regional conflicts, particularly as they formulate their own JCPOA posture, US policymakers should be aware of this debate, seeking ways, where possible, of working with Iran to decrease conflict and to prevent traditional US allies from exacerbating instability. The Iran Task Force, chaired by Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat, seeks to perform a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal political landscape and its role in the region and globally, and explore opportunities for an improved relationship with the West. It is supported generously by the Ploughshares Fund. Speakers include: Nasser Hadian, Professor, University of Tehran, Bilal Saab, Senior Fellow, Middle East Peace and Security Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council. Moderated by:
Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.
2. Addressing Nontraditional Security Threats in South Asia | Tuesday, September 15th | 9:30 – 10:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | India is positioning itself to play a leading role in Asia and globally. The Modi administration is investing in strengthening security relationships, accelerating economic growth, and increasing trade to champion this new outlook. However, India faces several nontraditional security threats, which may limit its power trajectory if not addressed effectively. Latha Reddy will discuss the policy implications of these threats- including water security, climate change, and cyber warfare- and how India will play a leading role on these issues within and beyond its borders. Speakers include: Latha Reddy, Former Deputy National Security Adviser of India and Huma Haque, Atlantic Council Associate Director, South Asia Center.
3. Development policies to foster stability in West Africa | Tuesday, September 15th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | West Africa is making impressive progress in economic growth, democratization, and regional cooperation. While the recent rise in violence and conflict as well as drug trafficking, piracy, extremism, and other emerging threats have sparked concerns over its future development, efforts to prevent conflicts have also improved, contributing to overall stability. In a new report, ‘The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa,’ the World Bank examines the diverse drivers of fragility-from issues related to land ownership, to a growing youth population with expectations for inclusion, to accelerated development of the extractives industry-and suggests development interventions that can contribute to peace and stability. Countries in West Africa such as Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia offer lessons in building resilience, highlighting the important role of development policy to address these challenges. On Tuesday, September 15, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative and the World Bank will co-host a discussion about these dynamic trends in West Africa. After a brief presentation by the report’s author Alexandre Marc, chief specialist of the World Bank’s Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group, Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon will moderate a discussion among Marc, Amadou Sy, director and senior fellow of the Africa Growth Initiative, and Raymond Gilpin, dean of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, exploring the nature and reality of these threats as well as potential for development solutions to address them.
4. Post Agreement: The Role of Natural Gas in Iran’s Energy Future | Tuesday, September 15th | 12:00 – 1:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for a panel discussion on the future of Iranian energy, particularly natural gas, in a post-sanctions world. The panel of Atlantic Council fellows includes Dr. Sara Vakhshouri, President of SVB Energy International, Barbara Slavin, Washington Correspondent for Al-Monitor, and Dr. Brenda Shaffer, Visiting Researcher and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University. Yeganeh Torbati of Reuters will moderate the interactive discussion on the following issues and more:
- The latest insight on the Iran agreement in light of the pending US Congressional vote
- Iran’s energy policy priorities in the near and medium term, particularly as it relates to natural gas
- The outlook for foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector
- The geopolitical implications of Iranian natural gas development.
5. Protecting Civilians in Syria: Parameters of the Problem and Policy Options | Wednesday, September 16th | 11:30 – 1:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Images of dead Syrian children washing ashore in Turkey may serve to overcome that which is charitably described as “Syria fatigue:” widespread American and international apathy in the face of a grotesque and growing humanitarian abomination in which civilians are deliberately targeted for murder. This is a catastrophe with policy consequences. What are its dimensions and what options exist for mitigation? UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reported that the United Nations and its partners were unable to deliver food and aid to over 422,000 people in besieged areas in July. On August 13, US Representative to the United Nations Samantha Power decried the Syrian regime’s dropping of over 2,000 barrel bombs over a six-week period; the following weekend barrel bombs killed over 100 people in the Damascus suburb of Douma. Meanwhile, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Chief Antonio Guterres said the number of refugees is forecasted to reach 4.27 million by year end. While the United States expands its coalition with new partners to fight the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL), the Assad regime atrocities answered with words but no action bolster ISIS in its worldwide recruitment. Please join Ambassador Frederic Hof of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and a panel of distinguished experts for a discussion centering on the protection of Syrian civilians: the parameters of the problem and policy options for its mitigation. Panelists include: The Hon. Frederic C. Hof, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Rola Hallam, Medical Director, Syrian Civil Defense, Valerie Szybala, Executive Director, Syrian Civil Defense, and Raed Saleh, Head, Syrian Civil Defense.
6. Serbia’s future: Challenges and opportunities for regional stability, reconciliation, and integration |Wednesday, September 16th | 4:00-5:00 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On September 16, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings will host Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić for a public address on Serbia’s outlook, and how the country can enhance political and economic stability and cooperation in the region and reaffirm its European perspective. In his remarks, the prime minister will explore challenges and opportunities for the country and the continent as a whole, including the rapidly-growing influx of migrants and refugees and the importance of reconciliation in overcoming the difficult legacies of the past. Vučić became Serbia’s prime minister after his party’s victory in the March 2014 elections. Previously, from 2013 to 2014, he served as first deputy prime minister in charge of the fight against corruption and crime, and as minister of defense from 2012 to 2013. He is also the leader of the Serbian Progressive Party, which he helped to found in October 2008. Brookings Senior Fellow Fiona Hill will provide introductory remarks and moderate a question and answer session following Prime Minister Vučić’s remarks.
7. Iran in Central Asia and the Caucasus | Wednesday, September 16th | 5:00 – 7:00 | SAIS-Rome Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Discussion of Iran in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
8. Anwar al-Awlaki, Yemen, and American counterterrorism policy | Thursday, September 17th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On September 30, 2011, the U.S.-born radical Islamic cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, was killed by an American drone strike in Yemen, marking the first extra-judicial killing by the United States government against a U.S. citizen. Placed at the top of a CIA kill list in 2010 by the Obama administration, al-Awlaki was known for his intimate involvement in multiple al-Qaida terrorist plots against U.S. citizens, including the 2009 Christmas Day airline bombing attempt in Detroit and the 2010 plot to blow up U.S.-bound cargo planes. His calls for violent jihad remain prominent on the Internet, and his influence has turned up in many cases since his death, including the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 and the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris early this year. In a new book, “Objective Troy: A Terrorist, A President, and the Rise of the Drone” (Crown, 2015), The New York Times national security reporter Scott Shane, drawing on in-depth field research in Yemen and interviews with U.S. government officials, charts the intimate details of the life and death of al-Awlaki, including his radicalization, his recruiting efforts for al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and the use of drone strikes by the United States to prosecute its counterterrorism goals. On September 17, the Intelligence Project will host Shane to examine the roles played by al-Awlaki in al-Qaida plots against the United States, al-Awlaki’s continued influence on terrorism, and the current state of al-Qaida today. Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. Following their remarks, Riedel and Shane will take questions from the audience.
9. U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: Priorities and Challenges | Thursday, September 17th | 1:00-2:00 | SAIS – Nitze Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Dean Vali Nasr and the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS invite you to join them for: U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: Priorities and Challenges with Ambassador Anne Patterson, assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs and Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, senior fellow, Foreign Policy Institute.
10. Veiled Ambition: A Simulation of Iranian-American Relations in the Middle East | Saturday, September 19th | 11:15-6:00 | George Washington University, Philips Hall | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant broke onto the international stage, terrifying millions and forcing the United States to re-examine its policies in the Middle East. Since that time, the United States has successfully brokered a nuclear deal with Iran, Yemen has fallen to Shia rebels, and the Islamic State has continued to wreak havoc throughout northern Iraq. The Middle East possesses an undeniable strategic interest to the United States: both for its natural resources, and for the valuable allies the United States has made in the region. With Shia influence increasing throughout Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, the National Security Council must once again analyze its strategic priorities: is the United States willing to work with Shia militias to counter the threat of the Islamic State? Can, or should, the United States convince Saudi Arabia to work with a Shia Yemen to eliminate the al Qaeda threat in the region? How should western actors approach the Syrian Civil War, an unending crisis for nearly four and a half years.
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Libya questions and answers
After yesterday’s talk, Daniel Serwer answered questions:
Q: Could the international community have taken any different action after the 2011 revolution that would have led to less conflict in the past few years?
A: Yes. For a year and a half or so, the situation in Libya was looking stable and positive. The militias were not called on to disarm and for a period played a role in maintaining security. However, eventually these militias began to align themselves with political forces, embroiling armed groups in political contests. We should have been prepared to provide assistance to disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating the militias.
The Europeans in particular should take responsibility, because of migration flows and because of oil and natural gas interests.
Q: What lessons could be learned from other conflicts – such as Iraq and Syria, but also the Balkans?
A: First and foremost we need to pay attention to local circumstances. Libya does not have the same sort of political and civil society infrastructure as the Balkans did, nor the same sectarian or tribal politics as Iraq, and so the lessons that may be drawn from either are few.
The Balkans had something the Middle East lacks entirely: a sense of direction, because the European Union has made it clear that all the Balkans countries can become members once they qualify. In the Middle East, people are fed up with secular dictatorships, but they have little idea what they want in their place. Islamists are filling that gap.
In Libya as in the Balkans (and Iraq and Afghanistan), decentralization of governing authority is likely to be an important part of the solution. Devolution of power enlarges the pie and helps to empower the population with authority over important aspects of their lives.
Q: Is a central government in Libya feasible, or does power have to be devolved to regions, or should we even contemplate breakup of the country?
A: Libya is the classic case of a country cobbled together by colonialists just before independence. But division of the country into two or more parts does not make much political or strategic sense at this juncture. Firstly, Libyans by and large view themselves as Libyans – it is one of the central components of professed identity, along with ‘Muslim’. There is no Libyan consensus that the country ought to be divided, even though there are competing, regionally-based political camps as well as a relatively small fringe that advocates independence for Cyrenaica in the east. Nor is there consensus on lines of division. The oil and gas reserves would be a major bone of contention in any attempt to divide the country – they are not evenly distributed. Libya could not be equitably or peacefully divided so long as participants disagreed as to allocation of hydrocarbon reserves and territorial claims.
Re-concentration of power in a central government in a former autocracy nevertheless will be no easy task. At this point Libyans are wary of recentralization and what it may entail. What most don’t want is a character like Khalifa Haftar to gain power and become another Qaddafi-esque strongman. The only scenario in which break-up would be feasible is if the majority of Libyans vote for it in a free and fair referendum, along pre-determined lines.
Q: How serious is the ISIS threat and what should we do about it?
A: Libya is an important beachhead for ISIS, ranked only after Syria and Iraq. Libya may be where ISIS retreats to if they lose ground in the Caliphate. The hinterlands and the south could be ideal ungoverned spaces for them. We know very little from open source material about their operations in Libya, but militarily they are still relatively weak. It is unclear why they have managed to take Sirte, Qaddafi’s home town. There has been a foiled rebellion there. Their rule seems to be similar to what they do in Syria and Iraq.
It will be important for the US to be involved in training Libyan counterterrorism units, building up a confident and unified military force under a respected and professional leadership.
The EU is thinking about a peacekeeping force of 5000, which doesn’t amount to much once you figure in a 24 hour day and tooth to tail ratio. That number would be able to do not much more than guard the government and foreign embassies. How do we expect the Libyans to feel about international peacekeepers who do no more than that? Ideally, Libya needs at least 15,000 peacekeepers to help maintain order in Tripoli and Benghazi, with logistical, intelligence and air support from NATO (especially the US).
Q: What about migration from Libya? Can we expect another big flow of refugees, similar to that from Syria?
A: The humanitarian crisis is of course urgent, but it is not the root of the problem. Refugees are a symptom of years of the political turmoil and conflict. Treating the symptoms won’t solve the problem. Libya and Syria both need political solutions.
Libya is not one of the more prominent sources for refugees – it is more of a conduit for sub-Saharan and East African nationals. Libyans, who are far fewer than Syrians in any event, are also better off, having enjoyed social payments from the state for many years as well as subsidized food commodities. Some Libyans have simply been able to drive to Tunisia and take a plane to Europe. Many have also gone to Cairo. Libya is not among the top 10 countries sending people to Europe. The predominant refugee and migrant concern remains Syrians, who mainly take Eastern Mediterranean routes, usually through Turkey.
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