Obama’s Syria options

Russia has in the last ten days deployed a forward operating base and ground troops in Syria, bombarded opposition forces the US supports, intentionally attacked hospitals, repeatedly violated a NATO ally’s (Turkey’s) air space and has launched long-range cruise missile attacks from the Caspian Sea. Russia is at war in Syria and signaling determination to win at any cost.

How should the US react?

Let’s assume direct military action (destroying the Russian base near Latakia, for example) is out. The United States does not want to go to war with Russia over Syria. Great power wars have a way of spinning out of control, with unintended consequences not likely to be worth our while. What else can Barack Obama do?

1. Nothing. Or more precisely he can continue to denounce the Russian behavior as self-defeating and counter-productive, as well as likely to put Moscow into a quagmire from which it will find it difficult to emerge without costly consequences. The main difficult with continuing this policy is that it risks projecting an image of weakness and inviting more Russian aggression. It isn’t likely to do much for Barack Obama’s legacy either.
2. Push the Syrian opposition into a negotiated solution that leaves Assad in place. This is what some close to the current administration have argued for. It is the most likely result of current UN mediation efforts. It would amount to surrendering Syria back to Bashar al Assad and solidifying Moscow’s and Tehran’s hold on the country. The problem with this idea is that it is unlikely to end the war, because a large part of the opposition will continue fighting, led by its most extreme elements. The Sunni world would regard this outcome as confirming America’s bad faith, dramatically reducing Washington’s influence in the Middle East.
3. Mirror Russian behavior in Ukraine. Moscow has installed a forward operating base in a third country and is acting against forces we support at the request of a friendly government in Damascus. The US could install a forward operating base in Ukraine and even act against the rebel forces Russia supports, at the request of the friendly government in Kiev. This would risk a direct clash with Russian forces, but it is noteworthy that Moscow calmed the war in Ukraine before striking in Syria, suggesting that it doubts its own capability to act in both places at the same time. The US military should not have the same problem.
4. Mirror Russian behavior in Syria. Like Moscow, Washington could strike against people it considers terrorists inside Syria: Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are both designated by Washington as terrorist organizations and both operate inside Syria. There is no logical reason to limit US action to Sunni extremists. The Shia variety is no more appetizing. Moscow’s action will make it an enemy in the Sunni world. The US is already an enemy in Iran and has little to lose there. Some Iranians would be happy to see the more extreme parts of their Islamic Republic forced to withdraw from Syria.
5. Ratchet up sanctions. Putin is upping the ante in the hope of proving himself indispensable to a solution in Syria and using a political solution there to wriggle out of sanctions. We don’t need to allow him to do that, but could instead work with European allies, whose interests in stemming the flow of refugees will be hurt by the Russian military action, to “see” him and double down. Moscow is feeling the pinch of both sanctions and lower oil prices. If the Europeans and Americans can stick together, either Putin will break or the Russians will break him. Popularity doesn’t last forever even in an autocracy if the autocrat can’t deliver.
6. Prevent Syrian helicopters from flying. The Syrian Air Force drops its “barrel bombs” on civilian areas from a relatively few remaining helicopters. Such attacks violate international humanitarian law. The UN Security Council has asked that they stop. Making clear that if they fly they will be destroyed, either in the air or on the ground, would be a relatively easy move and would signal a willingness to rebalance the military equation in the opposition’s direction.
7. Increase support for the Syrian Interim Government. The war in Syria is unlikely to be won or lost on the battlefield. Who governs best will win in the end, both at the negotiating table and in the hearts and minds of the Syrians. Our allies in the Syrian opposition need a much more concerted effort to help win the civilian contest. Their capabilities have improved. But support arrives fragmented and irregularly. It should be constant and unified. The amounts may sound big–I would guess they need hundreds of million per year to make a real impact–but that is a lot cheaper than war.

Note the absence from my list of increasing humanitarian aid. We are already spending billions on it. The time has come to expect Russia, which is now causing humanitarian problems in Syria, to step up. Washington should tell Moscow that a contribution of $1 billion per year to UN relief in Syria is the minimum expected.

The trouble with writing an “options” post like this one is that someone will inevitably claim that I supported one or the other of these ideas. So I need to be explicit: I am inclined toward 5, 6 and 7, though I confess to thinking 4 is also appealing.

We should be thinking about all of them and not crossing them off the list too soon. If Putin keeps pushing, sooner or later we’ll need to push back. Force may need to be a last resort, but it should not come too late to make a difference.