Reform, not revolution
On Friday, the Middle East Institute and Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) hosted Tarek Masoud, the Sultan of Oman Associate Professor of International Relations at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, to discuss a new book he co-authored, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform. I. William Zartman, SAIS Professor Emeritus, moderated the discussion. Masoud concentrated on deriving policy implications for the US from his structural analysis of why some Arabic-speaking Muslim-majority countries experienced revolts in 2011, why some regimes were able to rebuff protests, and why the results of revolts have been dismal, with the tentative exception of Tunisia.
The talk comes at a fortuitous moment, as the Nobel Peace Prize winner was just announced on Friday as the Tunisian Quartet, which contributed vitally to achieving democratic progress and stability since the mass mobilization that sparked the so-called Arab Spring and led to the departure of Tunisia’s autocrat, President Ben Ali. But personality is the least of it. Masoud and his co-authors take the position in their book that the Arab Spring was “a drama whose script was written long before its dramatis personae took the stage.” That is, there are deeply entrenched structural causes that determined the success or failure of Arab Spring movements.
Masoud suggested five policy implications.
First is that the absence of democracy in the Arab world is overdetermined; there are several decisive reasons why there hasn’t been a wave of democratic transitions. Many people have made a (questionable) cultural argument The most persuasive in Masoud‘s view is economic underdevelopment. Development generates competing political and social forces that are vital to preventing a single hegemonic power. This is one reason for Tunisia’s relative success, evidenced by the civil society-generated Quartet.
Second, Masoud views policies directed at establishing democracy as wrongheaded. What the Arab world needs are states that are durable, no matter what the regime. The effectiveness of many Arab states, which govern by fear and patronage, is rated low by the World Bank. Masoud highlighted the recent provenance of many of them, especially Yemen, as well as Muammar Qaddafi’s strikingly libertarian attitude towards governance, which led him to dismantle many Libyan state structures and atomize society. Tunisia in 2010 had a relatively effective government in 2010.
The third implilcation was simply stated: US military intervention often collapses the state, which is not useful.
Fourth: there is no pragmatic way forward without incorporating elements from the former regimes into future governments. Otherwise, there is the risk of alienating a significant cohort, which will seek to cause the new order from which it is excluded to collapse. Tunisia was advantaged in this respect as well. Its current president was associated with the previous regime.
In Syria, Masoud thought it will be necessary to reach some sort of compromise with Bashar al-Assad if a political solution is going to be achieved. Like other hereditary regimes, his is one in which the coercive and executive apparatus is tightly intermeshed. This has caused many of the monarchies to be more stable than Egypt or Libya, where there was a separation. But once armed conflict begins, this intermeshing may ensure that Assad will not stop fighting until there is no one left to fight.
The fifth and final implication is that the US should seriously consider working with Russia and Iran in Syria. Arguably, the three have more in common in this conflict than the US does with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Saudi Arabia has made it its project to undermine many different states, through the funding and arming of radical Islamists – and it is exactly this type of radical Islamism that the US is seeking to combat on a global scale. Syria needs a strong state and a stable society, not increased weaponization and battlefields drawn on ideological lines.
Though Masoud expressed hope for the region, and a desire for justice for Syria, the study he has conducted in this book with his co-authors has been one focused on the structural constraints set in place decades ago that governed political action during the Arab Spring and continue to do so now. Exploring these constraints has led him to call for a conservative policy towards the Arab world, where the state is more likely to collapse towards a state of nature than transition to democracy. We need to build states and promote economic development in the hope of producing more lasting stability.
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