What the Russians are proposing

Friday’s meeting on Syria in Vienna will include everyone but the Syrians: the US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. I’ll be surprised if the Europeans don’t edge their way in as well. The Egyptians will try too.

A Russian proposal, so far ignored by the English-language press, will be on the table for the occasion. A Syrian source has assured me it is real. I am hoping it is. With gratitude to MEI intern Bridget Gill for the translation from  الشرق الأوسط here it is:

1. Determining a ‘bank of targets’ shared between the nations which are conducting strikes in Syrian territory, and putting the factions that do not accept a political solution in the ‘target bank.’
2. Freezing fighting forces, whether the FSA or the regime forces.
3. Putting in motion a conference for dialogue that includes the Syrian regime, the domestic and external opposition, and the FSA. This is a dialogue which must produce:
   • A general amnesty
   • Release of all prisoners
   • Parliamentary elections
   • Presidential elections
   • Formation of a national unity government in which all parties are represented.
   • Conducting constitutional amendments that transfers several of the president’s mandatory powers to the government as an assembly (along the lines of the Lebanese model).
4. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, personally promises that the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad will not stand as a candidate in these elections, but this does not prevent the candidacy of those close to him or other figures in the regime in these elections.
5. The creation of a framework to integrate the brigades of the FSA with the regime army after the integration of the Syrian militias supporting the regime into the army.
6. Russia assures that the amnesty will include all opposition figures domestically and abroad, even those who have picked up arms, and in exchange the opposition [must] commit not to pursue al-Assad and regime figures legally in the future, whether they choose to remain in Syria or to leave it.
7. Breaking the siege in all besieged areas on the part of the regime, in exchange for [the opposition] lifting the siege on the regime’s besieged areas, and the opposition’s cessation of acts of aggression and nations’ freezing their arming of these parties.
8. Russia preserves its military bases inside Syria, on the strength of a resolution from the Security Council.
9. Russia has stipulated that some of the articles of the agreement be kept secret, among them the issue of al-Assad’s participation in the elections, out of fear of his losing control of the army and other armed forces.

I see lots of things wrong with this proposition, but it is certainly not one that should be dismissed out of hand. Assuming it is real, the Russians are essentially saying that they want out of their current bad bet on Bashar al Assad while preserving their military bases and influence in Syria. They don’t much care about the rest, though we can expect them to back someone in the elections who promises to do what Moscow wants.

The devil is of course in the other details. It wouldn’t be easy to get Moscow and Washington to agree on a target list. How would it be decided who accepts a political solution? Freezing areas of control would be difficult, as they are uncertain and often changing. Quid pro quo ending of sieges has been tried many times and hasn’t worked well so far. Amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity is not possible in the 21st century. Who conducts parliamentary and presidential elections? How is the transitional national unity government formed? How is this proposition related to ongoing United Nations-sponsored talks?

Too many people have seen the Russian intervention in Syria as a sign of Moscow’s strength. To the contrary: it was undertaken to prevent the Assad regime from losing vital territory in Latakia. Moscow is spending more than it can afford in blood and treasure on helping the Iranians preserve Assad’s hold on power. This proposal, while unacceptable in many respects, is a clear indication that the Russians are looking for a way out. While bargaining hard for improvements in this still unacceptable proposition, Washington will have to decide whether to give it to them.