A small step forward, a big step backwards

Yesterday’s communique after Vienna talks is classically ambiguous. It represents a small step forward, and a big step backward. It raises as many questions as it answers.

The step forward is this: Iran is included in the 19 parties issuing the statement. It had not previously been party to multilateral talks on Syria, even though it plays a vital role in sustaining Bashar al Assad in power. Without Iranian troops, weapons, command and control as well as oil and other assistance, he would be long gone by now.

Much of what Iran has agreed to is not controversial in principle: Syria’s unity, independence, territorial integrity, the continuity of its state, human rights for its citizens and humanitarian access. However difficult to implement in practice, none of Assad’s international opponents has wanted anything else. Nor does Russia, though its concept of human rights might not coincide with ours (Saudi Arabia’s doesn’t either). There is value in getting Iran to sign on to things already agreed in the 2012 communique that until now has been the touchstone of international diplomacy on Syria. It was in fact Iran’s refusal to sign on to that communique that prevented it from attending the January 2014 Geneva 2 conference, which was the last time something resembling the “international community” met on Syria.

But there is a big piece of the 2012 communique missing from yesterday’s document: the provision for a transitional governing body with full executive powers based on mutual consent. This is a big step backwards. In its place, we got this much vaguer promise about the transition:

a political process leading to credible, inclusive, nonsectarian governance, followed by a new constitution and elections. These elections must be administered under U.N. supervision to the satisfaction of the governance [sic] and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, free and fair, with all Syrians, including the diaspora, eligible to participate.

Herein lies the devil of all details: what to do about President Assad between now and elections. The Iranians have not signed on to delegation of his authority to a transitional governing body, but only to his fate being decided in UN-supervised elections. And implicitly the Americans and their partners have backed off the demand that he give up power at the start of the transition process, settling instead for his removal at the end, if the voters so decide (or perhaps earlier if the Russians are prepared to prevent him from standing at the elections).

The Americans will argue that this is really not the case because “no credible, inclusive, nonsectarian governance” can be established with Bashar still in place. But they have certainly lost something important in the omission of reference to a transitional governing body with full executive powers established by mutual consent. That was far more explicit than the reference to “a political process.”

Were I in the Syrian opposition, I would be concerned about this step backward. But a lot still depends on whether the Russians are prepared to continue to support Assad, who is costing more in blood and treasure than Moscow can afford. The Americans believe the fight against the Islamic State in Syria can’t succeed with Assad still in place, because his brutality pushes so many Sunnis in the extremists’ direction. They need to convince Moscow that they are correct. Peeling Russia away from Assad and Iran has long been critical to prospects for peace in Syria. It still is.