The nine lives of Erdoğan
The day after the Turkish parliamentary elections last Sunday, the Brookings Institution hosted a panel to discuss the results, ‘Turkey’s Snap Elections: Resuscitation or Relapse?’ The panel featured Ömer Taşpınar, professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and nonresident fellow at Brookings; Kadir Üstün, executive director of the SETA foundation; Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute; and former congressman Robert Wexler, currently president of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace. Kemal Kirişci, director of Brookings’ Turkey Project, moderated the discussion.
The election results proved a surprise to most observers, with the AKP winning nearly 50% of the vote after they had been expected to gain perhaps 43-44%. As Kirişci established, they took back about 4.5 million votes in 5 months, including 2-2.5 million from nationalist party MHP and 1 million from the ‘Kurdish’ party, HDP. This places the AKP in a position of strength similar to that of 2011.
Taşpınar highlighted the disappointment that followed the June elections upset, including the failure to negotiate and build a coalition. It had been thought that disappointed voters for the MHP would migrate to the other nationalist party, CHP, but instead they switched to the AKP. Taşpınar stated that the surge in AKP voters from all parties stemmed from Erdoğan’s strategy of ‘controlled chaos,’ demonstrating that failure to vote for the AKP would mean instability, violence, and economic decline.
Üstün agreed that the electorate decided only the AKP, out of all available options, could deliver on the central concerns of Turkish voters today: security, stability, and economic development. No other party presented a positive platform, only setting themselves up as anti-Erdoğan. The HDP in particular, as a Kurdish party, had promised to the people to become an all-Turkey party, but failed after June to distinguish itself from the PKK insurgency, especially after the ceasefire ended and conflict resumed.
Tol discussed the Kurdish dynamic of the elections: after Kobani, observers had assumed the Kurdish vote had deserted Erdoğan and the AKP. However, it is now clear that the current security situation, AKP’s local electoral strategies in Kurdish areas, and conservative Kurds’ disappointment in the HDP resulted in a resurgence of Kurdish votes for the AKP. The standing conflict with the PKK, Tol observed, hurts local Kurdish civilians the most. Nevertheless, these elections are still a win for the HDP, as they attained the 10% threshold for participation in parliament.
Wexler opined that Erdoğan had the chance, during the Gezi protests in 2013, to exhibit become a transformational leader for Turkey, but he failed. Now, Wexler believes that he has a second chance, but Erdoğan must improve his relationships with Israel and other US allies in the region before the US can offer more support.
Taşpınar sees the elections as free but not fair, since media expression is increasingly restricted and opposition voices curtailed. Indeed, just two days before the election several opposition newspapers’ offices were raided. However, Wexler disagreed outright that access to information through free media had any effect on voters’ opinions, stating that voters simply had come to the conclusion that the AKP was the best party to deliver on their central interest, security. Üstün saw a more general ‘sea change’ in public opinion, but he also disagreed that the media played a large role in the election and did not support Taşpınar’s view that censorship today is comparable to the situation under previous military dictatorships.
The unexpected election result refocuses attention on consolidation of AKP rule, with potential for a renewed push for a referendum to create a stronger executive power under a presidential regime, as Taşpınar sees it. Reconciliation with the PKK is crucial to the stability of the country, but Tol does not believe the AKP is interested in giving up the fight yet. Until that happens, it is also unlikely there will be new developments in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria especially.
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