Beware the monopoly of power

To many in the West, the Kurds have long seemed the sanest group left in Syria, as well as the safest and most effective option as an ally in the fight against ISIS. They appear organized, united, secular, and pluralist, standing out against the backdrop of the fragmented factions of the Syrian opposition, including Islamist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.

However, the political situation within this community, and their ties to the rest of Syrian society, are more complex than this image suggests. Their dominance of the new ‘coalition’ of the Syrian Democratic Forces engaged in the offensive against Raqqa makes it important to elucidate this complexity.

The Syrian Kurdish party PYD (Democratic Union Party) is the entity that makes the news. It is running the show throughout the north and northeast of the country. Their affiliated militia, the People’s Protection Units (YPG, and the women’s equivalent, the YPJ), made headlines last summer in their battle for Kobani against ISIS, and then again in another border town, Tel Abyad, this summer.

The YPG is also leading the fight against ISIS in Raqqa now, with grudging cooperation from Sunni Arab groups. After the US decided to suspend its train and equip program, it airdropped ammunition with the intention of supporting an offensive against Raqqa, but the Sunni Arab groups participating in the newly-formed coalition, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), say they have seen none of this material aid. The YPG dominates the SDF.

Taking advantage of their military successes, the PYD established the Democratic Autonomous Government of Western Kurdistan (i.e. within Syria, as opposed to the well-established Kurdistan Regional Government inside Iraq) in January 2014, consisting of three cantons under a federated ‘Rojava’ government. Afrin canton lies to the northwest of Aleppo, Kobani on the Turkish border east of the Euphrates, and the third canton, Qamishli, falls in the northeast corner of Syria, bordering Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. The PYD in addition claims towns in the region between Afrin and Kobani, including A’zaz, Manbij, al-Bab, and Jarablus, as parts of historical Kurdistan.

The PYD administers health, education, security, and the judiciary within their cantons. They operate under an umbrella coalition TEV-DEM (Movement for a Democratic Society), which runs civil society organizations and ‘peace councils’ – civil courts – in Kurdish population centers, and aids local poor. The ‘peoples’ courts’ in the cantons are staffed by PYD members and take an eclectic approach to established and codified law, like other opposition groups, selecting from Syrian criminal law, Swiss or German legal codes and customary law.

Though the PYD has been consolidating its control of these cantons, they deny that they are seeking an independent Kurdish state, stating their aim of remaining within a whole and united Syria, though one with a higher degree of regional autonomy than before. They have publicly expressed tolerance and inclusion of other ethnicities and sects.

Bassam Barabadi and Faysal Itani reported in August that both ‘Kurdish and Arab senior sources in northern Syria’ confirmed ‘joint or divided Arab-Kurdish rule’ in liberated territories, evidencing some degree of cooperation, which is crucial for stability. The recent move to annex Tel Abyad reflects the PYD’s intentions to unite the three cantons and maintain control throughout the contiguous territories along the Turkish border.

Divisions in the Kurdish community and antagonisms with other Syrians remain. TEV-DEM is not the only coalition on the Syrian Kurdish political scene. Other less militant or nationalist parties have combined to form the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has joined the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and is politically closer to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq than the radical Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. The PYD accepts the PKK’s founder, Abdullah Öcalan, as their ideological leader.

One of the more prominent of the KNC parties is Yekiti (Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria), which has often criticized the PYD. In May, for instance, the PYD are alleged to have told two Yekiti members to leave their homes in Qamishli canton because they had criticized the PYD on TV.

In addition to earlier allegations of press intimidation and aggression against other Kurdish parties, last month the Rojava Student and Youth Union, also in Qamishli, raised concerns to local and international human rights organizations about the PYD using Kurdish-language instruction in primary schools for political and ideological indoctrination. Indeed, on Tuesday the KNC called for demonstrations in Hasaka governorate against PYD educational policies. The resulting turnout in Malikiyya (Derek) was forcefully dispersed by PYD’s internal security arm, the Asayış, which also made several arrests.

Meanwhile, Sunni Arabs and Syrian Turkmen have levelled accusations of ethnic cleansing and property confiscation directed at the YPG, after their battles with ISIS in the Kobani and Tel Abyad countryside and their consequent control of new territories. An investigation conducted by Amnesty International affirmed war crimes committed by the PYD in razing Sunni Arab villages.

Cooperation between the Kurdish cantons and rebel-held territories, or the YPG and rebel militant forces, is generally low. Rebel groups distrust the PYD and YPG because their primary goal is driving ISIS out of their territories – showing, in the rebels’ view, lack of dedication to the revolution. The YPG command has stated that they would work with Russia to combat ISIS if Russia were to present the opportunity, which garners further distrust from other opposition groups.

Kader Sheikhmous is the co-founder of an NGO, Shar for Development, which focuses on enhancing civil society, governance, and economic development in Kurdish areas of Syria. Much of its work promotes the unity and good relations of the Kurdish and Sunni Arab communities, including a bilingual magazine that is distributed in the towns of Hasaka.

Sheikhmous highlights the dangers of the international and regional actors offering support exclusively to armed groups, such as the YPG, without investing in civil society actors and economic development. USAID, for example, in 2014 sharply diminished support to Kurdish NGOs in Syria. That risks creating dependence on the YPG not just for security but for other services, in the absence of civil society, will increase the YPG’s tendency toward authoritarian behavior.

These concerns raise the question of the viability of PYD-run autonomous cantons, their suitability as a military or security ally for the US, and their role in a future Syrian state. Exclusive or excessive support for one party in the Syrian Kurdish regions will allow it to consolidate its monopoly on power and violence.

Syrians generally endorse the unity of their country and its people, regardless of ethnic or sectarian background. Kurds, Turkmen, Alawis, Sunnis, and others want to regain their normal lives and continue living together. Though the Kurdish autonomous regions have provided measures of stability and security for the civilians of the north, it will be counterproductive if it comes at the price of single-party rule and exacerbated social divisions.