Is there a best option for Syria?

On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted ‘A look at the policy options in war-torn Syria’, a panel discussion featuring Daniel Byman, Senior Fellow and Research Director at Brookings’ Center for Middle East Policy; Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at Brookings; Will McCants, Senior Fellow and Director of Brookings’ U.S. Relations with the Islamic World project; and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director at Brookings’ CMEP. Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Research Director for Foreign Policy at Brookings, moderated as well as contributing his own views.

Each of the panellists proposed a policy for Syria. As the discussion wound up, Pollack acknowledged that though each argued that their policy was the best for future action, and could present numerous pieces of evidence to support their argument, ‘best’ in the case of the Syrian crisis is a relative term. The only real locus of disagreement between the panellists is how they evaluate risk, possibility of implementation, and potential for success, rather than over the meat of what must politically and militarily be accomplished for the country. No one wants to see the conflict endure, nor does anyone wish to see ISIS given the space to breathe or the humanitarian crisis to wear on.

Some of the policies proposed differ pretty significantly.

O’Hanlon has opted for a confederal model, or an ink-spot approach. Taking some inspiration from the Bosnian case, he envisions autonomous zones of governance with their own security forces, in order to combat Assad and ISIS both. He believes these zones will allow for bridges to be built with both Turkey and Russia, as they can prioritize relations with the zones closest to them politically, e.g. the Russians with an Alawite sector in the northwest, where Assad potentially could stay in power as well. This model would require moderate numbers of NATO boots on the ground.

Pollack, meanwhile, operates within the assumption of a unified Syria. Having analysed third-party resolutions to other civil wars, he proposed building an alternative army: large, conventional, trained outside Syria, and only good enough to face off the so-so forces of ISIS and Assad. This falls within a three-step program. First, with this army we need to create a military stalemate; then a power-sharing agreement needs to be forged, reflecting the relative power of all parties. Finally, long-term guarantees need to be established, including protection of minorities’ rights. The key is not to withdraw once military success is achieved, and to ensure the maintenance of those guarantees.

Byman, concerned with implementing policies only half-way in such an unstable environment, opts for a less intensive one: containment of local instability. This includes the more conventional border security, counterterrorism assistance, and weakening ISIS through limited air support for local ground troops. It also means better management of refugee camps, policing them with an eye to extremist threats, and providing for refugees, aiming for their integration into society in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. He acknowledges this only ‘staunches the bleeding’ rather than ends the conflict, but this at least is lower in cost than other policies.

McCants provides the ISIS view, noting that since the Syrian crisis began, the fledgling state has deployed the same tactic several times to gain control of cities and regions. It infiltrates, assassinates or imprisons those who oppose it, and proceeds to impose its rule through brutally violent tactics. These are laid out in a terror theorist’s manual, The Management of Savagery. ISIS has been able to take advantage of regional governments collapsing, as in Iraq after the US withdrawal. Previously it had been driven underground by the US army and nearly destroyed. It is able to exploit power vacuums. McCants added that a weakness of the confederal model is that it increases the enclaves’ vulnerability to ISIS tactics, especially if regional allies (e.g. Jordan, Turkey) are not sufficiently committed.

Wittes reviewed Obama’s foreign policy, noting that all his strategies have ‘foundered on the realities of a disordered region’. There has long been a gap in understanding between Washington and local actors: for instance, the Obama administration has always discounted Syria, while in local view, it is of utmost strategic and political importance. Wittes traces the current regional crisis to two underlying problems, of order and of authority. ISIS also springs from these underlying problems, which are reflected in the conflict over the role of Islam in politics. She proposes convening a regional security dialogue. The Vienna talks focus on external actors’ interests, sacrificing an accounting problems within the region.

There was indeed broad agreement across the panel on the need to incorporate local actors and local political realities into the solution, whether that meant Sunni Arab tribes, the opposition forces (including moderate Islamists), or regional governments. It is important as well that these policies include long-term political reconciliation and guarantees, whether through federated autonomy or power-sharing. Though generally unified on the need to combat ISIS militarily, the panelists also recognized that the underlying problem in Syria is Assad, his brutal war, and the power vacuum to which he has contributed.