peacefare.net

Normalization abnormalizes

Drilon Gashi* and Ard Morina** prepared the following post. It should not be understood to represent my own views.

As always, I am prepared to publish other well-reasoned posts or comments on this issue.

A recent decentralization agreement between Kosovo and Serbia has stoked fears that the process of normalization of relations between the two countries implies the abnormalization of Kosovo.

On December 3, Secretary of State Kerry seemed to make an unexpected stop in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital, meeting briefly at the airport with Kosovo’s leadership. Kosovo’s parliament has been dysfunctional in recent months due to the opposition’s tear-gassing of the chamber in six separate instances, most recently on Monday, December 14. The opposition led by Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination), a political movement that originated as a social activist group, has said the tear-gassing is the only way to oppose two recent Kosovo government agreements. The first, and most contentious, is an agreement with Serbia to create an Association of Serb-majority municipalities (mostly concentrated in the north of Mitrovica bordering Serbia and in other enclaves throughout Kosovo). The second is a border demarcation agreement with Montenegro to Kosovo’s west.

The use of tear gas has been widely condemned by the Western backers of Kosovo’s independence, with the European Union recently stating: “This kind of violent obstruction is neither acceptable nor will it solve any problem for the citizens of Kosovo.” The people in Kosovo, though, seem to offer a mixed reaction to the incidents. While many influential Kosovars have spoken out against the use of tear gas and against recent opposition protests, Vetëvendosje has seen growing support—a recent poll suggests the party is the second most favorable. The November poll results state that if elections were held today, 28% would support Vetëvendosje (up from 14% in June 2014) while 33% would support the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the leading party in current coalition government.

This reaction highlights the people of Kosovo’s anxiety regarding the latest agreement resulting from the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Apprehension about the agreements from the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is not new, but an Association of Serb municipalities stokes fears of a dysfunctional Kosovo. Worse, Kosovars fear it may lead to the country’s division. Doubts on the agreement have also been cited by Kosovo experts. Commenting on the Association of Serb municipalities, Daniel Serwer stated: “It is ethnically–not politically or geographically–defined and could become the kernel of separate Serb governing structures in Kosovo. That of course is the fear: a separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has rendered that country dysfunctional.” Serwer, however, believes that the Association could be implemented without compromising Kosovo’s territorial integrity.

Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, the Serb federal entity in the country, showcases an example of a failed territorial division based on ethnic lines, creating a legitimate cause for concern. Rather than trudging forward with the dialogue process, Kosovo, Serbia and the EU should focus more on sincerely addressing concerns raised and a deep crisis that could emerge from the agreement. Not doing so risks destroying the prospect of European Union membership for both Kosovo and Serbia, with the agreement leaving too many loose ends.

One important loose end is Serbia’s position towards Kosovo. Belgrade has not only shown its unwillingness to recognize Kosovo’s independence, but has aggressively campaigned to undermine it. The latest example was Kosovo’s attempt to join UNESCO, the UN science, education and cultural heritage body, where it lost the bid by two votes—due at least partly to Serbia’s active diplomatic affront to the candidacy. Serbia’s current foreign minister, Ivica Dacic, claimed that UNESCO membership for Kosovo was equivalent to “ISIS being admitted to the United Nations,” a statement that prompts the authors to mention that Dacic was a former political ally of Slobodan Milosevic, and is now one of Serbia’s most prominent leaders involved in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.

The objective of the dialogue led by the EU is “the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.” The process is largely open to interpretation. While the Kosovo government’s position is that the endgame of the process is Serbia recognizing its independence and both ending up in the EU, Belgrade sees the dialogue as an opportunity to maintain and deepen influence in Kosovo. Foreign Minister Dacic declared in 2013, “We expect Pristina to agree to our proposal for establishing a Union of Serb Communities, and we would like the European Union to act as a safeguard. This would provide us with a viable provisional solution, until we arrive at some sort of final decision on the status of Kosovo.” Read more