Normalization abnormalizes

Drilon Gashi* and Ard Morina** prepared the following post. It should not be understood to represent my own views.

As always, I am prepared to publish other well-reasoned posts or comments on this issue.

A recent decentralization agreement between Kosovo and Serbia has stoked fears that the process of normalization of relations between the two countries implies the abnormalization of Kosovo.

On December 3, Secretary of State Kerry seemed to make an unexpected stop in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital, meeting briefly at the airport with Kosovo’s leadership. Kosovo’s parliament has been dysfunctional in recent months due to the opposition’s tear-gassing of the chamber in six separate instances, most recently on Monday, December 14. The opposition led by Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination), a political movement that originated as a social activist group, has said the tear-gassing is the only way to oppose two recent Kosovo government agreements. The first, and most contentious, is an agreement with Serbia to create an Association of Serb-majority municipalities (mostly concentrated in the north of Mitrovica bordering Serbia and in other enclaves throughout Kosovo). The second is a border demarcation agreement with Montenegro to Kosovo’s west.

The use of tear gas has been widely condemned by the Western backers of Kosovo’s independence, with the European Union recently stating: “This kind of violent obstruction is neither acceptable nor will it solve any problem for the citizens of Kosovo.” The people in Kosovo, though, seem to offer a mixed reaction to the incidents. While many influential Kosovars have spoken out against the use of tear gas and against recent opposition protests, Vetëvendosje has seen growing support—a recent poll suggests the party is the second most favorable. The November poll results state that if elections were held today, 28% would support Vetëvendosje (up from 14% in June 2014) while 33% would support the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the leading party in current coalition government.

This reaction highlights the people of Kosovo’s anxiety regarding the latest agreement resulting from the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Apprehension about the agreements from the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is not new, but an Association of Serb municipalities stokes fears of a dysfunctional Kosovo. Worse, Kosovars fear it may lead to the country’s division. Doubts on the agreement have also been cited by Kosovo experts. Commenting on the Association of Serb municipalities, Daniel Serwer stated: “It is ethnically–not politically or geographically–defined and could become the kernel of separate Serb governing structures in Kosovo. That of course is the fear: a separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has rendered that country dysfunctional.” Serwer, however, believes that the Association could be implemented without compromising Kosovo’s territorial integrity.

Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, the Serb federal entity in the country, showcases an example of a failed territorial division based on ethnic lines, creating a legitimate cause for concern. Rather than trudging forward with the dialogue process, Kosovo, Serbia and the EU should focus more on sincerely addressing concerns raised and a deep crisis that could emerge from the agreement. Not doing so risks destroying the prospect of European Union membership for both Kosovo and Serbia, with the agreement leaving too many loose ends.

One important loose end is Serbia’s position towards Kosovo. Belgrade has not only shown its unwillingness to recognize Kosovo’s independence, but has aggressively campaigned to undermine it. The latest example was Kosovo’s attempt to join UNESCO, the UN science, education and cultural heritage body, where it lost the bid by two votes—due at least partly to Serbia’s active diplomatic affront to the candidacy. Serbia’s current foreign minister, Ivica Dacic, claimed that UNESCO membership for Kosovo was equivalent to “ISIS being admitted to the United Nations,” a statement that prompts the authors to mention that Dacic was a former political ally of Slobodan Milosevic, and is now one of Serbia’s most prominent leaders involved in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.

The objective of the dialogue led by the EU is “the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.” The process is largely open to interpretation. While the Kosovo government’s position is that the endgame of the process is Serbia recognizing its independence and both ending up in the EU, Belgrade sees the dialogue as an opportunity to maintain and deepen influence in Kosovo. Foreign Minister Dacic declared in 2013, “We expect Pristina to agree to our proposal for establishing a Union of Serb Communities, and we would like the European Union to act as a safeguard. This would provide us with a viable provisional solution, until we arrive at some sort of final decision on the status of Kosovo.”

The Kosovo Serb political elite seems to have now fallen in line with Belgrade’s intentions. Kosovo’s power sharing arrangements between majority Albanians and minority Serbs were a hybrid at the outset. The Ahtisaari Plan, the document drafted by the UN Security General’s Special Representative for a status solution for Kosovo, recommended an independent Kosovo with guarantees for Kosovo Serb and other minority community rights. It serves as the guiding legal framework for Kosovo as a single sovereign and integrative state, with a multiethnic society. Furthermore, the Plan, based on the European Charter of Self-Government, entitles municipalities to form associations “for the protection and promotion of their common interests, in accordance with the law.” This piece suggests that the Association, based on the form it is taking and the Kosovo Serb political context, which will be discussed below, runs counter to a single sovereign and integrative Kosovo.

The Plan foresees power sharing by Albanians, Serbs and other communities in the country’s national institutions, with minority communities, namely Serbs, having affirmative representation in national bodies. While not advocating “ethno-federalism,” or the partition of Kosovo’s territory between Albanian and Serb-majority areas, the Plan did foresee Serb-majority municipalities with autonomy in local government matters.

The Association of Serb-majority municipalities goes beyond local government level autonomy in that the Association has decentralized functions (termed “full overview” in the agreement) on local democracy, economic matters, education, local primary and secondary health, urban and rural planning, and other areas. The Association would have an Assembly, an Assembly President, a Council, a Board, and an Administration appointed by the Board. Ironically, it would also have its own coat of arms and flag. While symbols for these types of bodies are common elsewhere, they have a different meaning when they represent a unifying body for an ethnic group that is a part of a country it doesn’t recognize. In addition, the Association would be funded by “contributions, grants, donations as well as financial support from other associations and organizations, domestic and international as well as from the Republic of Serbia.” Belgrade’s financing of the body enhances its ability to maintain influence over Kosovo’s Serbs, with the goal of meddling in Kosovo’s internal affairs more broadly.

Although Kosovo Serb community leaders previously cooperated with Kosovo institutions, their political leadership has now come together in Lista Srpska or the Serb List, unified under one body that has openly declared itself as an agent of Belgrade’s policies, which implies the Association will be against Kosovo’s independence. A former senior Kosovo government leader informed the authors that virtually all political party-level cooperation between Albanians and Serbs has come to a halt as a result. Albanian and Serb parties previously campaigned together in Kosovo’s national and local elections. The process of normalization of relations between two countries seems to imply the abnormalization of Kosovo.

During his visit to Kosovo, Secretary Kerry stated: “We have invested far too much, ourselves, together, in Kosovo’s future to put it at risk.” The US, overtaken by more pressing global issues, has gradually faded into the background as the EU has taken the lead in the Balkans; however, the US has been supportive of the latest agreements between Kosovo and Serbia. As Kerry rightfully points out, Washington  has offered over a billion dollars  in investment to Kosovo in the past 20 years. This does not include the bombing campaign against Serbia and Serbian targets in Kosovo during the Kosovo intervention, which cost an estimated 7 billion dollars.

Given the disconnect between goals and interests of actors involved, Kosovo and the region need a more serious commitment from Brussels and Washington. The Balkans is now largely at peace, but agreements like the one on the association risk unraveling exactly what the United States and others have invested so much to prevent.

Setting off tear gas in a parliament chamber ought to be condemned. Yet, condemning the use of tear gas without seriously questioning its underlying causes and the wider anxiety the people of Kosovo have with the dialogue agreements is not a promising way to normalize Kosovo-Serbia relations and lead the countries towards the EU. Serbia has shown no lack of political and diplomatic ploys to challenge Kosovo’s international subjectivity. These schemes are meant also to disrupt Kosovo’s territorial integrity. As a staunch supporter of Russia in the Balkans, with no sincere commitment to a military alliance with the West, Serbia seems primed to undo the commitment of the US, EU and other partners to an independent and indivisible Kosovo. The Association of Serb municipalities offers a fitting vehicle to do just that.

*Drilon Gashi is a development professional based in Washington, D.C. He spent three years working in Kosovo, consulting the Kosovo government and conducting research on Kosovo-Serbia relations.

**Ard Morina is an analyst on global trade and security issues, focusing on the Balkans. He holds a Master of International Affairs from the New School in New York, where he wrote his thesis on recent Serbian policy towards Kosovo.