Month: December 2015
Trumpeting
Falling to second place in Iowa polling behind Ted Cruz, Donald Trump has resorted to his usual tactic: a bold, headline-catching statement, this time about not allowing Muslims into the United States. The proposition is ridiculous, immoral, impractical and odious, but so is its bozotic proponent.
This time, the other Republican candidates are roundly denouncing Trump, hoping to use the occasion to push him off the hilltop and begin his slide to oblivion, where erstwhile number 2 candidate Ben Carson already is headed. Getting rid of Trump now would allow Cruz and Rubio–the only two Republican candidates who have any chance of competing for Hispanic votes–to duke it out for the nomination. That’s what the Republican establishment wants to see.
However that turns out, Trump remains significant, not for what he says but rather for the people he represents. His crowds are enthusiastic about blocking Muslims from the United States. They are the same crowds who have cheered his disdain for Mexicans, his proposal to build a wall on the border, and his coded but clear racism.
Folks with similar views have just given Marine Le Pen a big municipal election victory in France and have sought to block refugees from settling in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and other newer European Union countries. A few more terrorist successes could generate a tidal wave of illiberalism and zenophobia throughout the Western world.
That of course is precisely what the Islamic State would like to see. I may share some of the dissatisfaction with President Obama’s “no drama” reaction to recent ISIS attacks, but he is certainly correct that over-reaction is also perilous. No one wants American boots on the ground more than ISIS, since that would provide it with even more recruitment and hostage/kidnap potential than it has today. As the Turks are finding in northern Iraq, force protection is a serious proposition when coming close to ISIS.
Protecting civilians at home is also a serious challenge. It won’t help much to tell Americans that their odds of being a victim of international terrorism are infinitesimally small. The impulse to overreact to threat, and to do so quickly, is deeply ingrained, as Daniel Kahneman and others have demonstrated. And there is always the possibility that another attack on the scale of 9/11 will disrupt American life. I watched the Diane Keaton/Morgan Freeman film Five Flights Up on the way home from Zagreb Sunday. It involves a tanker truck abandoned menacingly on one of the bridges into Manhattan. It’s miraculous it hasn’t really happened, yet.
So what is to be done?
Zal Khalilzad offers the following prescription for the Middle East:
In the short-term, a comprehensive strategy will involve a U.S.-led no-fly zone to protect civilians, ground forces to defeat ISIS—which a majority of Americans now support—and heavier arms transfers to the Kurds. Longer-term, the United States will need to take the lead in transforming the Middle East politically and geopolitically, just as we did in Europe and East Asia after World War II. While military operations might generate tactical successes, the defeat of ISIS and other similar groups will require sustained partnerships with local allies to mobilize the people of the region against radical Islamism. It will also require convening regional forums and dialogues to tamp down sectarianism and encourage a positive vision of tolerance for the greater Middle East.
None of that sounds much better than the current effort, which includes many of the things Zal cites, though perhaps not to the degree he would like to see them pursued. Another effort to transform the Middle East doesn’t sound so great to me either. Last time we tried that it didn’t work so well. Note also that he is vague about where the ground forces would come from and doesn’t consider the implications of a no-fly zone with the Russians in the air. Zal gets even vaguer in discussing what to do for homeland security. He manages to offer the Communist threat as an analogy to ISIS. That doesn’t pass the laugh test.
Trumpeting is not limited to Trump. The fact is the President’s critics don’t have a lot of good ideas. I don’t think there are any that will bring a quick end to ISIS’s frightening but still small attacks. And there are lots of ways we might make things worse.
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Peace picks December 7-11
- Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum: The Future Of Goal 16: Peace and Inclusion In the Sustainable Development Goals | Tuesday, December 8 | 9:30-11:00am | SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) make a clear link between conflict and development, thanks to the powerful language about peace in the preamble to the along with the inclusion of Goal 16 on “peaceful and inclusive societies.” This emphasis recognizes that protracted conflict undermined the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in many countries, and it creates a new international focus on peacebuilding as one of the solutions to development challenges.How did the international community shift its thinking toward peace and inclusion in the SDGs, and where do we go from here? The inclusion of peace as a goal in the SDGs was not a foregone conclusion, and panelists will discuss both how advocacy helped ensure a role for peacebuilding in the SDGs and what that means for the next 15 years. They will also discuss the challenge that remains for governments, organizations, and individuals to implement and evaluate these global goals.
- Implementing Camp David: US-GCC Security Cooperation Since The Summit | Tuesday, December 8 | 12:30-2:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | President Obama convened leaders from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in May 2015 to discuss reassurance and security cooperation in light of the P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran. The United States and Gulf Arab monarchies agreed to improve future cooperation on ballistic missile defense, counter-proliferation, counterterrorist financing, cybersecurity, and a range of other issues. Six months after the summit, with the Iran deal secured and amidst the Middle East’s continuing crises, US-GCC security cooperation remains critically important. What have been the notable successes and challenges since Camp David? To what extent has progress been made in key areas? Has the region’s security situation benefitted from US-Gulf cooperation in light of the continuing fight against ISIS and other crises? Speakers include: James L. Jones, President, Jones Group International, Nawaf Obaid
Visiting Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Barry Pavel
Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security Atlantic Council, Frederick Kempe President and CEO
Atlantic Council, and moderated by Karen DeYoung, Senior National Security Correspondent, Washington Post. - Syria: Steps Toward Peace Or Deepening Intractability? | Tuesday, December 8 | 5:30pm | Brookings Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Soon to be in its sixth year, the conflict in Syria remains as deadly as ever. The consequences of an increasingly complex and seemingly intractable civil war are now also being felt internationally to an alarming degree. Recent attacks in Beirut and Paris warn of the danger of Syria’s continued breakdown. With nearly 300,000 people recorded killed, 12 million others displaced, and vast refugee flows overwhelming Syria’s neighbors and now Europe, finding a solution is nothing short of urgent. Recent multilateral meetings in Vienna demonstrated renewed diplomatic determination to negotiate peace for Syria, but significant differences remain between the conflict’s principal power-brokers.This Brookings Doha Center policy discussion aims to explore the current status of the Syrian conflict and the roles being played by an ever expanding list of actors. Does a moderate opposition still exist in Syria, and if so, what does that mean? Does the Vienna process provide hope for a durable political solution? How can the armed opposition play a role in shaping a political solution in Syria? What is the future of Salafi-jihadi militancy in Syria and what are the local, regional, and global ramifications? Speakers include, Mouaz Al Khatib, Former President, National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Noah Bonsey, Senior Analyst Syria, International Crisis Group, Charles Lister, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Doha Center.
- Manning the Future Fleet | Wednesday, December 9 | 10:00-11:00am | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND| The Maritime Security Dialogue brings together CSIS and U.S. Naval Institute, two of the nation’s most respected non-partisan institutions. The series is intended to highlight the particular challenges facing the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, from national level maritime policy to naval concept development and program design. Given budgetary challenges, technological opportunities, and ongoing strategic adjustments, the nature and employment of U.S. maritime forces are likely to undergo significant change over the next ten to fifteen years. The Maritime Security Dialogue provides an unmatched forum for discussion of these issues with the nation’s maritime leaders.
- Breaking the Silence: Societal Attitudes Toward SGBV In Syria | Wednesday, December 9 | 2:00- 3:30pm | Syria Justice and Accountability Centre | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As the Syrian conflict continues with increasing levels of violence, reports have emerged indicating that government forces and extremist groups are using sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) as a tool of war. However reliable information on SGBV remains scarce due to social stigma and survivors’ fears that they may be ostracized from their communities if they come forward with their stories. As part of its efforts to ethically and comprehensively document all violations of the conflict, including SGBV, SJAC commissioned a report from the Syria Research and Evaluation Organization (SREO) to assess Syrians’ attitudes towards survivors and perpetrators of SGBV. The results were surprising. Speakers include: Ambassador Steven E. Steiner, Gender Advisor USIP, Shabnam Mojtahidi, Legal and Strategy Analyst, Syria Justice and Accountability Center, Cindy Dyer, Vice President of Human Rights, Vital Voices, and Sussan Tahmasebi, Director of MENA, ICAN.
- Cyber Risk Wednesday: 2016 Threat Landscape | Wednesday, December 9 | 4:00-5:30 pm | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On the cyber front, 2015 paints a dark picture. The year has been filled with massive data breaches, disruptive cyberattacks, and espionage. Neither government agencies nor private companies were safe. Nations have become increasingly comfortable with fighting their battles online, using covert cyberattacks to accompany traditional warfare in on-going conflicts in Ukraine, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Will 2016 be any different? While data breaches and hybrid warfare are likely to continue, Internet users’ awareness of cybersecurity issues has reached an all-time high, companies are pouring investments into strengthening their cyber defenses, the United States and China were able to reach a deal banning commercial cyber espionage despite the countries’ otherwise lukewarm relations, and the privacy issues are getting prime time attention. Speakers include: Luke Dembosky
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for National Security
US Department of Justice, Jason Healey Senior Fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, Ellen Nakashima National Security Reporter The Washington Post, and Mark O’Hare
Director, President, and CEO, Security First Corp. - Implementing Counterinsurgency In Afghanistan: Lessons From Village Stability Operations And Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) | Thursday, December 10 | 11:00 am | Institute of World Politics | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In 2010, towards the end of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, US Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their international partners experimented with a new way of implementing counterinsurgency, Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP). VSO/ALP is based on a “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” approach that focused on soldiers interacting with local Afghan populations, supporting traditional local tribal governance, and training local security forces. In this discussion, Dr. Lofdahl will review lessons which can be drawn from the VSO/ALP experience in Afghanistan. Speaker: Dr. Corey Lofdahl, Senior Scientist at Charles River Analytics.
- Planning for Korean Unification: What Is Seoul Doing? | Thursday, December 10 | 12:00-1:30 pm | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | South Korean President Park Geun-hye has made Korean unification a central tenet of her foreign policy strategy. More so than her predecessors, she has made reunification a tangible objective. Despite repeated attempts at reconciliation, North Korea has rejected dialogue and criticizes President Park’s unification outreach as unrealistic, seeing it as a threat to regime stability. Issues to be addressed would include the blueprints of Korean unification, how to overcome North Korean resistance, and how to achieve or pay for it. To learn more about South Korea’s plans for achieving unification, join us for a discussion with three distinguished members of South Korea’s bipartisan Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation. Speakers include: Dr. Chung Chong-wook, Vice-Chairman of the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation, Dr. Moon Chung-in, Professor of Political Science, Yonsei University, and Dr. Kim Byung-yeon Professor Economics, Seoul National University.
- Hope, Innovation, Activism: The Critical Role Of Millennials In Afghanistan | Thursday, December 10 | 12:00 – 1:30pm | Rumi Forum | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Ambassador Dr. Hamdullah Mohib will explore why this demographic matters — the role of millennials in Afghan society today, and the important role they have to play in the country’s future on December 10, 2015. A young man builds an aircraft from scratch; a teenage boy builds an internet connection out of trash scraps; a young woman uses her savings to found a coding school for girls and a women-run IT company; a group of students initiate a recycling campaign to clean up their city; young people rally on social media and in the streets to protest the unjust killing of a young woman. These are stories from Afghanistan that you don’t hear about. Roughly 75% of the population in Afghanistan is under the age of 35. While much of the media focuses on the challenges of the new government and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan today, the country’s hopeful, innovative, educated and active millennial population is defining and building the country’s future.
- Climate Security and Migration | Friday, December 11 | 10:00am – 12:00 pm | Center for New American Security | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On December 11, please join CNAS for a public event on climate security and migration. We will explore questions of how the United States, in collaboration with foreign partners, multilateral institutions, and civil society, should tackle future climate migration. What are the key initiatives, institutions and challenges involved in successfully addressing climate migration? Does the issue of climate migration fit our current framework and processes for dealing with migration? What should the international community be doing now? The events over the summer and fall in Europe, albeit not due to climate change, were illustrative of the scale of the challenges involved for policymakers and security leaders. Climatic change will add another layer to the challenges the global community will face in addressing migration, including explicitly climate change-driven migration, in the years ahead. Speakers include: Hon. Sharon E. Burke, Senior Advisor, New America, Dr. Daniel Chiu, Deputy Director, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, Sherri Goodman, CEO and President, Consortium for Ocean Leadership, and CDR Jim Moran, Senior Strategist, Emerging Policy, Deputy Commandant for Operations U.S. Coast Guard
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Building peace from the ground up
On Wednesday, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted Dr. Samir Altaqi to discuss the prospects of national reconciliation in Syria as well as the fight against ISIS. As general director of the Dubai-based Orient Research Center, Altaqi conducts research on locations throughout the Middle East. He has also founded two initiatives, the Arab-Kurds Dialogue in 2013 and the Save Syria Initiative in 2015.
Altaqi, based on reports conducted by his Center, posited that the situation on the ground in Syria has reached the point that it is more logical and practicable to set up a confederal system. The different regions have gravitated toward their neighbors and become more localized, not just in terms of security, but economically as well. Northern Syria is more integrated with the Turkish economy, while the land east of the Euphrates is increasingly turning towards Erbil.
While 76% of the Syrian economy formerly passed through Damascus, the capital has been displaced and now sees only 17%. We are witnessing the collapse of the system of loyalties that used to support the state, and autonomous regions are crystallizing and fusing socioeconomically. In Altaqi’s analysis, the ministry of finance, the central bank, and the electricity network are the sole remaining central structures. All other state institutions have devolved, and ‘state’ employees operate on a local basis.
What is therefore needed, Altaqi believes, is a national reconciliation pact, with incentives for all parties, under the cultural and historical banner of ‘Syria’ even if politically no more than a confederation. Even if Bashar al-Assad goes, Altaqi believes the conflict won’t come to an end. Reconciliation needs to be built from the parties on the ground, with horizontal Syrian-Syrian dialogue.
Necessary steps include determining which parties are classifiable as internationalist terrorists, and eliminating the local incubator for Jabhat al-Nusra and other al-Qaeda-leaning groups. Engagement, especially with the Syrian fighters in these groups, is essential for moderating extremists. The conflict needs to be frozen, instituting local ceasefires within a larger framework for a national ceasefire.
As for international involvement, Altaqi does think that a Vienna process of some sort is necessary, but there is no agreement between the US and Russia as yet. For the US in particular, he believes officials still entertain illusions about the conflict. These include the illusion that the conflict can be contained; that an alliance between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Iran is possible; and also that ISIS will not come to the US.
There is a lack of a Yalta-style master plan between international actors to solve the crisis. Each is pursuing its own agenda in Syria, using the pretext of fighting ISIS. Tensions among them are strong – Turkey is afraid of Russia and isn’t sure NATO will back it up if the tensions increase.
The US also needs to take Sunni Arab actors seriously on the ground. As it stands, Washington has no leverage over them, though both Turkey and Saudi Arabia do. Echoing a common view, Altaqi states that it is Sunni Arabs who can effectively confront and defeat ISIS, given the right resources and opportunities.
Trained as a cardiovascular surgeon, Altaqi formulates the crisis in a medical analogy: there has been a loss of immunity because in weak states of the region. An infection has thus entered this regional body, in the form of ISIS. No matter what antibiotic you use to combat it, it will not have the desired effect without rebuilding the immune system.
Thus, national reconciliation is essential first and foremost. It would stabilize Syria, free up resources, and create bodies who can then confront the ISIS threat. In Altaqi’s view, this is what must be done.
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When is it okay to associate?
One of the serious pleasures of blogging is that you occasionally hear from serious people you have never met or even heard of who enlighten, entertain and even delight. That was the case yesterday, when I heard from John Cipperly, currently at the International Institute for Sociology of Law in the Basque Country of Spain doing an MA/PhD program while on sabbatical leave from the International Programs Division of the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), where he normally works with US government funding.
He sent a paper on “Transitional Constitutionalism and Minority Rights in Kosovo: Making Sense of the Association of Serbian Municipalities” that contains his own views (not necessarily those of the US government) and elucidates the issues before the Kosovo Constitutional Court as it considers the proposed Association, which has been much in the news lately in Serbia and Kosovo. John, whom I have never met, has clearly given these issues a lot of thought, so I hope others will find his paper (published here with his permission) enlightening, as I did.
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What to do about Bosnia and Herzegovina
Here are the notes I prepared for my participation in a conference yesterday on Jahorina, a mountain outside Sarajevo, on 2020 Vision for BiH:
1. I want to say first how glad I am to be back in Bosnia and Herzegovina after being absent for a couple of years and to thank the organizers and the US embassy for making it possible.
2. I’m also delighted to hear the very real enthusiasm that Bosnians are expressing for the Reform Agenda promoted by the EU, the World Bank and the IMF.
3. Nothing I say should be taken to suggest that they are not doing the right thing. They are.
4. But I don’t expect it to be sufficient.
5. Bosnia runs on a political economy that limits political competition, especially across ethnic lines, and enriches not the state but whoever controls its elaborate apparatus at various levels through political parties in which cronyism is the rule rather than the exception.
6. I don’t believe that is a state that can govern effectively and in accordance with European standards, so sooner or later broader political reforms are going to be necessary.
7. Let me be clear: whatever is done will have to be done by and with Bosnians. I do not anticipate that the internationals can do anything more than support those who are interested in creating more effective and functional governance.
8. Let me tell you what I would be thinking about if I were a Bosnian. In fact, I am cribbing shamelessly most of what I am about to say from Srdjan Blagovcanin and Boris Divjak, whose paper on the Bosnian political economy published by the Center for Transatlantic Relations I recommend highly.
9. I would be thinking there is no silver bullet: no single thing that can fix all that ails the political economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
10. I would therefore be thinking about trying several things and seeing if they can’t be woven into a coherent strategy.
11. First, I would be thinking about building a constituency against corruption and in favor of accountability, one that would demand internal democracy in political parties, preservation of the open-list electoral system, single-member electoral constituencies, an end to political appointment of executives in state-owned enterprises and privatization and procurement conducted in strict accordance with EU rules.
12. Second, I would be trying to get parliament to cut red tape, freeze government hiring, and require state-owned enterprises to publish budgets and financial reports.
13. Third, I would be trying to convince the Europeans to condition future assistance on appointment of judges solely on the basis of professional qualifications.
14. Fourth, I would be encouraging prosecutors to focus on large-scale and high-level corruption cases, with asset freezes and travel bans implemented by the Europeans and Americans where need be.
15. Fifth, I would be encouraging nongovernmental and media exposure of malfeasance by requiring an end to media subsidies, open competition for government advertising and civil society funding, and strengthening of the role of ombudspeople, auditors and regulatory agencies.
16. Sixth, I would be asking hard questions about the size and weight of the government structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a view to clarifying responsibilities and eliminating as many duplicative bureaucracies as possible. The central state has to have the authority to negotiate and implement the requirements of EU membership. The coordination mechanism between the two Bosnian “entities” in my view is no substitute for proper authority at the state level.
17. Ultimately, I think there is no avoiding fundamental constitutional reform. In order to become a member of the EU and NATO, Bosnia will require a shift away from the Dayton order of group rights to a more Western concept of individual rights. There is no escaping the broad implications of the Sejdic Finci decision.
18. How can these things be accomplished? We’ve seen in Romania what a motivated citizenry can accomplish in a remarkably short period of time.
19. Bosnians are less inclined to large-scale street demonstrations, but unless the politicians hear directly and loudly from voters, either in the streets or at the polls, they are unlikely to risk Sanader’s fate.
20. The Reform Agenda is a good start. But it is not the end.
I heard quite a few ideas from others during the day-long conference. Here is a sample:
- Public hearings on nominees to important government positions in order to emphasize merit over clientalism
- Evaluations of the effectiveness of legislation, either by civil society organizations or a parliamentary body
- Intensive voter education
- Mandatory electronic voting
- A more independent judicial system capable of quicker decisions
Towards the end of the day, one Bosnian emphasized big improvements since the war on two dimensions: freedom of expression and entrepreneuralism. The former is clear. I would add freedom of movement, which is now well-established throughout the country (or so Bosnians of all ethnicities tell me). The latter I still have my doubts about, but I hope it is true. More opportunity in the private sector and less focus on government would do wonders to improve the mood in a Bosnia at peace but still struggling with the issues that caused the war.
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Kosovo’s rough patch
Arbana Xharra of Pristina daily Zeri asked some questions. I answered:
Q: Mr Serwer, you were familiar with the political developments in Kosovo for the long time. What where your expectations 16 years after the war and 7 from declaring independence for Kosovo? How do you see the recent confrontation within the Kosovo parliament?
A: I don’t really remember my expectations in 1999, but I did not then believe that independence would necessarily be the outcome. It was Serbian failure after the war to do anything whatsoever to “make unity attractive” that made independence inevitable. For me, the failure to count the Kosovo Albanians on the voter rolls in its 2006 constitutional referendum, in order to meet the 50% threshold for voting by registered voters, was the final straw.
As for the situation in the Kosovo parliament, I deplore the violence and disruption, which has no place in a democratic institution.
Q: Where does this situation leads Kosovo? There is a barricaded opposition that seems is not going to resign from their requests?
A: The opposition is entitled to its opposition. But it cannot block the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions.
Q: What do you thing about the Association of Serb Municipalities. Does this agreement define ethnically those municipalities? As we know a separate Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina has led to a dysfunctional state.
A: I am not a fan of the Ahtisaari provisions on the Association of Serb Municipalities. But Kosovo accepted the Ahtisaari plan as the basis for independence and needs to implement it faithfully. I think that can be done in a way that avoids the threat to the Kosovo state that a “Serb entity” would represent. The ethnic veto provisions in the Bosnian constitution are far more extensive than anything in the Kosovo constitution.
Q: Did Ahtisaari leave the door open for the Serbian government interference in Kosovo?
A: Serbia has a legitimate interest in the welfare of Serbs in Kosovo. The Ahtisaari package left the door open to ways in which that interest can be exercised. Kosovo should be aiming for analogous mechanisms by which it can ensure the welfare of Albanians in Serbia.
Q: How is Kosovo moving toward the Euro-Atlantic integration? Kosovo remained the only isolated country in Balkans with no visa liberalization. Why?
A: You’ll have to ask the European Union why. I think it is clearly a mistake to leave Kosovo as isolated as it is. But of course Pristina needs to demonstrate its willingness to fulfill the obligations that come with visa liberalization and other EU privileges. The current refugee crisis will no doubt make the EU even more exigent than normal in requiring fulfillment of those obligations.
Q: How long it will be a journey of Kosovo to the EU?
I don’t think it needs to be long–look at Montenegro, which has made remarkable progress in a short time. Kosovo has the advantage of building EU-compliant governance from scratch. The big challenge will be implementation of the acquis communitaire. Rule of law is likely to take longer than many other things. But Kosovo could be well on its way within 10 years.
Q: Why has Kosovo failed to become a member of UNESCO? Is Belgrade pressure getting the support of international politics?
Belgrade wielded all the leverage it could to block membership in UNESCO, which required a two-thirds majority in the UNESCO assembly. That threshold proved too difficult. But there will be other occasions, including in other international organizations. Belgrade may have gained some leverage from what happened at UNESCO, but it lost an opportunity to solidify the considerable commitments Kosovo made during the process.
Q: Does Kosovo have an advantage of being able to build its security force from the ground up to meet NATO requirements’?
A: Yes, I think that is an enormous advantage, one that could lead to quick NATO membership once the security force is created.
Q: Corruption and organized crime is one of the biggest problem in Kosovo, also according to the international reports. Did EULEX mission failed on dealing with “big fishes” in Kosovo?
A: I have not been impressed with EULEX, but what is the alternative? I think it hard to argue that more “big fish” would be prosecuted if there were no international rule of law mission in Kosovo.
Q: There were rejections from most of the political parties regarding the establishment of Special Court. What are your expectations toward this additional international project?
A: I think the Special Court is a lot better than the alternatives: extending the mandates of either ICTY or the ICC. The fact is that crimes were committed against both Serbs and Albanians after the 1999 war in Kosovo. They need to be investigated and perpetrators prosecuted. Without individuals being held accountable, the blame falls on the Kosovo Liberation Army.
Q: Islamic radicals are seen recently as a great threat for the secular constitution of Kosovo. More than 300 people from Kosovo are believed to have joined ISIS or Al Qaeda in the Middle East. What is the US stance on the reason that lead to this big problem for the newest country in Europe?
A: I don’t provide a “US stance.” Speaking personally, it seems to me that we are seeing a dramatic increase in Kosovars willing to fight for a cause I find heinous but they find attractive. Lack of job opportunities, isolation, foreign funding of extremists, disappointment in the benefits of independence, disillusion with corrupt governance–all these play a role in inspiring Islamic State recruits.
Q: Kosovo used to be more secular state; do you notice the change of the society toward religion?
A: I haven’t visited Kosovo in a few years now. But Kosovars visiting me in Washington report a big change. Kosovars used to be very secular and even anti-religious. That is apparently changing. That doesn’t worry me–people are entitled to pursue whatever religion they want. It is the appeal of violent extremism that worries me.
Q: Kosovo was poor also during the Milosevic regime, is it believable to say that because of the economy bad situation Kosovars are joining this new Islam ideology?
A: Kosovo was also brutally repressed during the Milosevic regime, and the global environment did not present many examples of success by violent extremists. Then was then. Now is now.
Q: We hear recently that for the US, Russia poses the greatest threat….How do you see Russian attempt to gain ground in the Balkans? Do you think that Russia’s role in the Balkans is increasing?
A: Russia is doing in the Balkans what it is doing elsewhere: trying to block what it views as NATO expansion into its sphere of influence. It has good reason to worry about that: Slovenia, Croatia and Albania are already members of NATO, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo want to be members, and Bosnia and Serbia are likely to follow eventually. Many of Russia’s moves are counter-productive. The annexation of Crimea and the seizure of part of eastern Ukraine as well as the “independence” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia illustrate all too clearly what happens to your country if it happens to lie near Russia and is not a NATO member.
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