Month: January 2016
Peace picks February 1-5
- Fifteen Years of Fighting Terror: Lessons for the Candidates | Monday, February 1st | 1:00-2:30 | Open Society Foundations | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Despite a significant investment of personnel and money, current policies have mostly failed to stop violent extremism and instability from spreading across the Middle East and North Africa. Saferworld, a London-based NGO that works for peace in more than 20 countries, will release three reports analyzing lessons from 15 years of counterterror and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. The reports conclude that the U.S. approach to counterterrorism, stabilization, and state building has been counterproductive—and could be improved by focusing strategically on peace, relying less on the military, taking a tougher line on bad governance, and working more closely with civil society. An expert panel will discuss the policy and operational impacts of the recommendations derived from these case studies. The panel discussion will be followed by Q & A. Speakers include Larry Attree, Head of Policy for Saferworld, Sarah Chayes, Senior Associate for the Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Richard Fontaine, President of the Center for New American Security. Scott Shane (moderator) is a national security reporter for the New York Times.
- Pin-Down Diplomacy: How Wrestling Promotes US-Iran Ties | Tuesday, February 2nd | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Much as “ping-pong diplomacy” helped break the ice between the United States and China in the 1970s, “pin-down diplomacy” between the wrestlers of the United States and Iran has been instrumental in changing perceptions about Iranian and American society, and building bridges between sports communities and ordinary citizens. The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a discussion about athletic exchanges between the United States and Iran and the role they have played and can continue to play in promoting better understanding between the peoples of these two long-time adversaries. Speakers include Greg Sullivan, Senior Adviser for Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy in the State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs. James Ravannack has been President of USA Wrestling, the national governing body of amateur wrestling in the United States, since August 2006. Christina ‘Kiki’ Kelley is Team Leader for the US Men’s Greco-Roman wrestling team for the Olympic cycle culminating in Rio 2016. Bahman Baktiari is Executive Director of the Salt Lake City-based International Foundation for Civil Society, an organization that explores fundamental social and political shifts underway throughout the Middle East and North Africa and focuses on bridging cultural gaps and fostering a discourse of understanding. Barbara Slavin, Acting Director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council will moderate.
- Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz on Iran’s Nuclear Agreement | Tuesday, February 2nd | 11:00-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The International Atomic Agency (IAEA) has certified that Iran has curbed its nuclear program by taking a number of steps including dismantling two-thirds of its installed centrifuge capacity, reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium and removing the core of its Arak heavy water reactor. As a result, the U.S. has lifted nuclear-related sanctions. Please join us for a discussion with Secretary Moniz on exactly what steps Iran has taken, how the United States can be confident that Iran’s breakout time to a nuclear weapon has been extended to at least one year, what lies ahead for the nuclear deal and what challenges remain.
- Implications of the Collapse of Oil Prices for the Middle East | Tuesday, February 2nd | 3:00-4:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The collapse of the oil prices has shocked both producers and consumers worldwide. As the most important producing region of the world, the Middle East has been particularly affected; state revenues are down, and cutthroat competition for market share and low global demand translates into greater challenges and uncertainty. The regional economic outlook is unclear, and questions remain about the potential long-term impact of sustained low oil prices. Three experts will analyze the geopolitical and financial aspects of the sharp decline in oil prices on both importing and exporting countries in the Middle East. Speakers include David Gordon, Senior Advisor at Eurasia Group, Aasim M. Husain, Deputy Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the International Monetary Fund, and Franziska Lieselotte Ohnsorge, Lead Economist at the World Bank. Henri J. Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, will moderate the event.
- Iranian Public Opinion on Foreign Affairs on the Eve of Parliamentary Elections | Wednesday, February 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Ebrahim Mohseni, Senior Analyst at the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research will present findings from a new study of Iranian public opinion on the upcoming Iranian parliamentary elections, regional security issues, and expectations from the JCPOA. Three experts on Iran will comment on the survey results and discuss prospects for the February 26 elections, highlighting possible domestic, regional, and international implications. Panelists include William Miller, Senior Scholar at the Kennan Institute and the Wilson Center, Paul Pillar, Researcher of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and Robin Wright, Wilson Center-USIP Distinguished Fellow. Henri J. Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center will moderate.
- Kurdistan: Re-Inventing Itself, Yet Again | Wednesday, February 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This year will be a difficult year for the people of Kurdistan. The crash in oil prices, the unrelenting war against ISIS, and the presence of 1.8 million Syrian refugees and displaced Iraqis have precipitated a dire financial crisis for the Kurdistan Regional Government. Join us for a discussion on how to move forward, both regionally and internationally, in light of these challenging times facing Kurdistan. Sasha Toperich, Senior Fellow and Director of the Mediterranean Basin Initiative CTR SAIS will make opening remarks. Hemin Hawrami, Head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party Foreign Relations Office, will offer the keynote address. Panelists include Salam Mohammad Islam, Chief Executive Director at the Rwanga Foundation, and Awat Mustafa, Senior Board Member and Head of Operations and Projects at the Barzani Charity Foundation. Rebeen Pasha, WYLN Senior Fellow at the Mediterranean Basin Initiative will moderate.
- North Korea’s fourth nuclear test: How will Pyongyang’s neighbors and the U.S. respond? | Wednesday, February 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | North Korea’s recent nuclear test and possible upcoming satellite launch underscore the increasing dangers posed by North Korea’s weapons development program and its implications for international security and the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. The United States and its partners in Northeast Asia must develop and execute a coordinated strategy to address these ever larger risks, but will differences among the relevant countries prevent realization of a shared strategy? What are the longer-term implications should North Korea sustain its weapons development? On February 3, the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings will host an event to assess the wider implications of North Korea’s recent nuclear test, weigh the possible responses by the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China, and then consider the impact on U.S. policy. The event will be moderated by Senior Fellow Richard Bush, and the panelists include Senior Fellows Katharine H.S. Moon, Jonathan Pollack, and Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations. After the discussion, the panelists will take audience questions.
- Turkey’s politics and foreign policy: Bridging the populism/realism gap | Thursday, February 4th | 3:30-5:00 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), populism has become a pervasive feature of the “new” Turkey. In the latest Turkey Project Policy Paper, Nora Fisher Onar of George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies explores the tension between populism and realism as a driver of uncertainty in Turkey’s domestic and foreign affairs. The paper examines the sources, evolution, and consequences of AKP populism since 2002, including the problematic disconnect between anti-Western domestic rhetoric and the recent need for pro-Western pragmatism as Turkey’s regional ambitions have been confronted by the disorder spilling across its borders. On February 4, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) will host a panel discussion to explore the tone and substance of Turkey’s politics and foreign policy as the country emerges from a polarizing electoral cycle. Fisher Onar will present the conclusions of her new paper, “The Populism/Realism Gap: Managing Uncertainty in Turkey’s Politics and Foreign Policy.” Following her remarks, Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Alan Makovsky of the Center for American Progress, and Kadir Ustun of the SETA Foundation will offer their perspectives. The discussion will be moderated by Brookings TUSIAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci. After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.
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The good news from Tikrit
I have been curious about the situation in Tikrit, liberated from the Islamic State nine months ago. This morning’s NPR report is the best I’ve seen/heard on the subject. Sounds like a solid B grade to me, which under the circumstances is pretty good. And the first year isn’t over yet. Whatever grievances persist, returns and startup of construction are excellent signs. It is post-liberation conditions that will decide the eventual outcome of the fight against the Islamic State, not merely military prowess.
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Worsening
On Wednesday, Human Rights First hosted ‘How to Navigate Egypt’s Enduring Human Rights Crisis: Blueprint for U.S. Government Policy.’ Neil Hicks, Director of Human Rights Promotion at Human Rights First, moderated. Panelists included Brian Dooley, Director of the Human Rights Defenders Program at Human Rights First, Amy Hawthorne, Deputy Director for Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy, and Nancy Okail, Executive Director at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.
Dooley explained how difficult it is for human rights activists to operate in Egypt. He gave specific examples on human rights violations in the past few weeks. Arrests have spiked. Anyone related to activists, or who has the potential to become an activist, is suspicious to the Egyptian government. The crackdown on the media worsens, and Egypt now has the second highest rate of journalist imprisonment.
Focusing on the deterioration of human rights since the Arab Spring, Okail said the Egyptian government’s response has always been quick, cosmetic fixes, rather than long-term solutions. The government is addressing symptoms, rather than causes, leading to no real positive impact in the long run. The unrest in Egypt happens because of the problems that were not properly addressed. These problems existed prior to the Arab Spring, which did not cause them
Okail also said the current regime uses control instead of power: control happens in the absence of power, and violence occurs as a result. When a leader has real power, s/he does not have to force constituents to act accordingly. Using intelligence agencies, heightening security, implementing force, and controlling the media are all approaches the current government employs in order to maintain its authority.
Hawthorne said the scale of violence by the state is troubling and tears at the social fabric. Today’s rate of disappearances did not happen under Mubarak, who targeted Islamist groups. This government targets anyone viewed as a threat to security and stability. Over 5,000 apartments were searched near Tahrir Square. Why is the government cracking down so hard on potential activists? Hawthorne suggested people within the regime are worried about what dissent will do to stability. President Sisi bears most of the responsibility for what is happening, even if he does not have complete control over the whole government.
Addressing the American role, Hawthorne said US influence in Egypt is at a low point, limiting Washington’s credibility, political capital and ability to affect change. Relationships with the Egyptian government are difficult. Relationships with human rights activists is are complicated. The root of the challenging relationships is the distrust of the US. The United States does not embrace Sisi, but still gives aid to Egypt. Hawthorne recommended that the US should investigate where its aid ends up, but this is difficult to do, as the Egyptian government is not transparent.
The U.S. should focus on four things moving forward:
- Listening to Egyptian partners. What these people prioritize, the US should also prioritize. These priorities may change, and the US should observe why they change.
- Paying attention to human rights defenders and civil society organizations. They are trying to hold the Egyptian government accountable for human rights abuses.
- Consistency when speaking on Egyptian human rights issues. Inconsistency breeds to skepticism.
- Honestly assessing government officials. A normal relationship should not be maintained as long as human rights violations are occurring.
Overall, the human rights situation in Egypt seems to be worsening. Verbal condemnation of human rights abuses simply is not enough. Perhaps taking away a significant amount of aid would be a way to put real pressure on the Egyptian government to change its approach towards journalists and activists.
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The confessional/ethnic temptation
Henri Barkey writes in The American Interest:
The U.S. government [should commit] itself to the creation of a confederal democratic Syria that is divided along confessional and ethnic lines. In its most elementary form, the new Syria would be divided along three main areas, Alawi/Christian, Sunni, and Kurdish, with Damascus remaining as the capital although temporarily run by a UN administration.
How simple! How neat! How symmetrical!
How homicidal.
I’d be the first to admit that something like this confessional/ethnic cantonalization is emerging from the chaos of Syria’s civil war. The Kurds have established several cantons of what they are calling “Rojava” along the Turkish border. Alawites, Shiites and Christians are retreating from central Syria to the west. The Islamic State dominates a good part of the east, though there is no single “Sunni” area but rather a patchwork of them. Ultimately some sort of equilibrium may emerge organically that resembles what us conflict management nerds call a mutually hurting stalemate, one of the key conditions for a negotiated outcome.
But that is a different proposition from US advocacy of confessional and ethnic cantonalization, which implies someone in Washington or New York drawing lines. That would lead quickly to ethnic cleansing, because each group would seek to establish unquestioned dominance over its own territory. There is no single concentration of Sunnis. Creating one can be done, but only by force. What will happen to Alawites and Christians who have managed to survive in Sunni areas through the war, but now find themselves on the wrong side of some line drawn in Washington? What will happen to the Sunnis who inhabit western areas of Syria, none of whose provinces were majority Alawite before the war? Those who don’t “belong” will be chased out, forced across the lines into what someone in Washington or New York has designated as their homeland.
If you don’t like Sykes-Picot, you are sure not to like Henri’s proposition.
The only group in Syria that would jump at it is the Islamic State. It would get recognition of its dominance in parts of eastern Syria. That alone should give any American pause. It should also have made the editors of a publication called The American Interest hesitate.
Worst off would be Damascus, where Henri proposes the UN govern, temporarily. But Damascus is as mixed as all of Syria, with significant populations of Sunnis, Shia, Alawites, Kurds and Christians. Ethnic cleansing there would take particularly brutal and unforgiving forms as each of those groups tries to protect itself from others and dominate the capital. Where would UN capability to prevent that from happening come from? Who is going to deploy peacekeeping forces quickly and effectively to back up a UN administration?
Consider also the regional impact. The Kurdish PKK would get official recognition of its safe haven in Syria, from which it could continue to attack Turkey. Ankara won’t go along with that. Islamic State ambitions to control Anbar and Ninewa provinces in Iraq would get a big boost. Baghdad wouldn’t accept that. Some in Beirut would be tempted to think about a “greater” Lebanon, incorporating turf from Syria. The Jordanian border, on both sides of which there are the same tribes, would be at risk.
The United States already has a perfectly good vision for the future of Syria: an inclusive, pluralistic polity that settles its issues peacefully within well-established institutions. That’s not what is lacking. It is the political will and resources to make it happen that are missing.
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Indonesia has a plan
On Monday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) hosted its annual Fullerton Forum in Singapore. The keynote address was delivered by Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs and a retired general in the anti-terror squad of the Indonesian special forces. Pandjaitan was introduced by both Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia and by Ng Eng Hen, the Defense Minister of Singapore.
Pandjaitan stated that the goal of terror groups is always to destabilize countries and demoralize their populations. ISIS has not succeeded in doing this so far in Indonesia because the Indonesian government is clear that it does not negotiate with terrorists and will respond immediately to any attacks. ISIS recruitment is a global problem; the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS doubled between 2014 and 2015. Brookings estimates there are 46,000 Twitter accounts that support ISIS. In Indonesia, even some middle-class people have joined ISIS, including a policeman who died in Syria.
Indonesia is a huge country with many poorly-educated people; ISIS’s propaganda concerning the caliphate is powerful among lower-class people. Syria and Iraq are included in Islamic “end times” prophecies, and ISIS convinces people to fight the West and all countries that lack Sharia. ISIS wants to see the caliphate expand to Southeast Asia. Its fighters are hard to deal with because they have what Pandjaitan refers to as a “one-way ticket”: they are prepared to die.
In the January 14 attacks in Jakarta, Indonesian security forces responded rapidly, eliminating the terrorists in less than 12 minutes. They killed four terrorists, and using one of their cell phones, were able to track down and arrest others. This sets an example for terrorists. The attackers were previously linked with Jemaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian affiliate of Al Qaeda. Even though ISIS and AQ are fighting each other in Syria, their affiliates are capable of cooperation; Indonesia believes the local ISIS and AQ leaders have merged their work.
Terrorists in Indonesia operate in cells to maintain secrecy; cells do not have contact with other cells, making it difficult for the police to crack down on networks. So far, the authorities have had success in mapping terror networks, but Pandjaitan cannot promise that Indonesia is immune from attacks. Terror groups also communicate their final decisions to stage attacks via couriers, which are hard to intercept.
Fighting terror effectively involves three components:
- A soft approach.
- International intelligence cooperation.
- A hard approach.
The soft approach to fighting terror is Indonesia’s strategy of first resort. This includes counter-radicalization and deradicalization campaigns that are holistic in nature and will partially be conducted using the media. They are working with Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah to spread the message, including on television, that ISIS is not Islam and Islam is not ISIS. Indonesia has freedom of religion, so people have the freedom to follow sharia law.
The government is also campaigning against religious intolerance. Indonesia is the largest archipelago country in the world, which makes it difficult to manage. The government is working on categorizing terrorists as ideologues, militants and sympathizers. Ideologues will be imprisoned separately to help stop radicalization in prisons. The government is also cracking down on social media content supporting terror, including videos that provide instructions on how to build bombs.
The ASEAN countries already have a platform for intelligence sharing regarding threats, attacks, and terror financing. Intelligence cooperation in the region is already very good.
The hard approach is a secondary approach, but is one that Indonesia is prepared to use. Indonesia has prepared its special forces to conduct operations anytime and anywhere within the country. If terrorists take hostages, the special forces will free them immediately. The Indonesian government is also altering counterterrorism legislation so that the authorities will be able to detain those suspected of plotting terror attacks for 7-30 days. Those found to have no terror links will be released. New legislation also allows the government to revoke the citizenship of Indonesians who join groups of foreign fighters.
Another key to stopping terror in Indonesia is economic improvement. Economic growth has stopped slowing. The economy grew by about 5.5% this year. Consumer confidence and confidence in the government have increased. The government has been trying to distribute economic growth more evenly between Indonesia’s regions and improve the country’s infrastructure. There has historically been a large gap between the haves and the have-nots. Many terrorists come from poor backgrounds. This year, Indonesia will spend $70 billion or 36% of the national budget on outlying regions. Funding for villages has increased from $2 billion to $4.5 billion in 2016. This will give each village around $100,000 to spend, which will help reduce rural poverty and boost economic growth. Poverty reduction is crucial. Indonesia has 230 million Muslims. If 2% live in extreme poverty and are brainwashed by ISIS, one can imagine how many will become terrorists and stage domestic and regional attacks.
An audience member asked Pandjaitan about links that had been discovered between the terrorists in the recent Jakarta attacks and terrorists from Mindanao in the Philippines. Pandjaitan stated that radicals in Mindanao are supporting radicals in Indonesia, including through the smuggling of weapons and explosives. Indonesian authorities are working to crack down on weapons smuggling.
Another audience member asked about Indonesia’s position regarding China’s actions in the South China Sea. Because of Indonesia’s territory in the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has declared that its Special Economic Zone extends into the South China Sea. There were reports that Indonesia was considering pursuing international arbitration against China. Pandjaitan replied that China acknowledges the Natuna Islands are part of Indonesia, so China and Indonesia are not in conflict regarding this matter. However, Indonesia views the South China Sea as an important area for global shipping. Indonesia does not wish to see power projection in this area and views freedom of navigation as very important.
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Coexistence on the border of war
My colleagues at the International Repubican Institutehad me do a facilitation training workshop in December with some of their staff and collaborators, focused on growing frictions between Syrian refugees and their Jordanian hosts. This brief description of the workshop on “Promoting Coexistence Between Syrian Refugees and Jordanians” was published originally on the IRI website.
With more than 630,000 registered Syrian refugees out of a population of 6.5 million, Jordan faces inevitable tensions between its own citizens and the people it has sheltered from the civil war tearing apart its northern neighbor.
Most of the Syrian refugees live in cities near the border, not in camps. Populations of Jordanian towns have doubled and even tripled. Syrians and Jordanians compete for housing, jobs, water, electricity, waste disposal, health and education in a country whose economic performance has been middling at best. Local governments and the services they provide are overwhelmed. For the Syrians, a seemingly temporary emergency is turning into a long-term nightmare.
Jordanians and IRI staff concerned about this situation and its longer term risks met recently in Amman to consider possible solutions. Their energetic brainstorming session identified six goals that, if realized, would significantly reduce the risks involved and promote coexistence between Syrian refugees and Jordanians:
- Improve community-level conflict management
- Build local governance capacity
- Increase awareness of legal rights and responsibilities
- Promote social and economic integration
- Expand economic opportunity
- Enlarge donor assistance and make it more effective
Little is being done along these lines yet. Few Jordanians and Syrians are prepared to manage local conflicts. Local governments have limited resources and little interest in meeting the needs of Syrians, who Jordanians sometimes view as privileged by international donors. Rights are ignored and responsibilities neglected. The Syrian and Jordanian communities are largely segregated from each other and enjoy little communication or mutual exchange. Economic opportunities are limited for both communities in a country that has a high fixed exchange rate with the dollar and little appetite for economic reform. Donors are neither transparent nor accountable from the local community perspective.
A far more intense focus on these issues is required. Training in conflict management of key people in both communities, perhaps to work in tandem, would provide a quick response capability as well as a longer-term capacity to reduce tensions. Overwhelmed local governments need help, including from local civil society organizations, in analyzing and responding to needs. More integration in win/win economic enterprises and social services would reduce tensions. Donor transparency and accountability would give both Jordanians and Syrians confidence that they are being treated fairly.
This dialogue among Jordanians was just the start of a much broader process of consultation. Syrian refugees should meet to brainstorm their own goals, which are likely to be different from those the Jordanians outlined. Then they will together need to look for ways in which both groups can cooperate to turn their difficult challenges into opportunities. Syrians may be in Jordan for a long time, like the Palestinians and Iraqis who preceded them. Both countries can ultimately gain from the talents and enterprise Syrians have to offer.
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