Sound and fury

Josh Rogin has pretty much nailed the North Korea nuclear issue with his inspired application of the stages of grief. Bottom line: we’ll end up accepting what we can’t change. Sound and fury will signify nothing.

Does it matter?

Yes. Allowing the North Korean dictatorship to persist in thumbing its nose at the UN Security Council and the international community breaches important international norms. The Security Council, which has mandated that North Korea not conduct nuclear or missile tests, is supposed to be authoritative. Non-nuclear states once signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty (as North Korea was) are supposed to stay non-nuclear. Pyongyang’s defiance will be an inspiration to others and risks confirming a new international norm: once a state acquires nuclear weapons it is virtually immune to pressure, because it can unleash devastating destruction on its neighbors and other adversaries, provided it has the required delivery vehicles.

But that doesn’t mean there is a lot the United States, or anyone else, can do about it. Barack Obama is thought to be holding his tongue because he doesn’t want to give Kim Jong-un the satisfaction of getting a rise out of the US president. That seems to me wise, especially given the difficulty the President has had making his other red lines stick. A lot of noise about North Korea now would only encourage more misbehavior. What would the President do then? Any parent knows the risks of escalation with an unruly teenager.

No doubt it has been made clear to the North Koreans that US nuclear weapons may now target their homeland. It is even said that was a motive for the latest test. Few Americans realize it, but the US does not have a doctrine of no first use against nuclear states, only against non-nuclear states. The North Koreans certainly know that and are ready to run the risk, which they will presume low given the consequences for Washington if it were to use its nuclear capabilities.

There are of course other options. We could re-tighten financial sanctions, which in the past seemed to be having a serious impact. We could destroy North Korean nuclear facilities or any nuclear-capable missiles Pyongyang seeks to test, as former Sectary of Defense Bill Perry urged years ago. We could undertake a much more concerted effort to undermine the North Korean regime and its iron grip on its people. I imagine there are officials within the US government working on all these options, which could be undertaken either overtly or covertly.

But the sad fact is that these well-known options have downsides and none are guaranteed to work. Tightening sanctions and undermining the North Korean regime run the risk of causing collapse, which from the Chinese and South Korean perspectives is almost as frightening as Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal. Beijing and Seoul don’t like the North Korean regime, but they don’t want millions of North Koreans fleeing uncontrollably. Destroying nuclear facilities can cause serious radioactive contamination. Missiles are a better target, but we’d have to be pretty sure the response would not be a nuclear strike on one of North Korea’s neighbors (its missiles cannot yet hit the US, so far as I am aware).

I’m afraid the only serious option at the moment, other than ignoring the bastards, is to talk with the North Koreans and try to get them to back down from their current defiance of the Security Council and other international pressures. Yes, that will unavoidably give them some of the international acknowledgment and recognition they crave. Nuclear weapons confer privileges. One of them is not being ignored completely.