peacefare.net

Diplomacy v war

I am pleased to publish this contribution from Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA nuclear safeguards inspector who holds a PhD in nuclear physics from the University of Vienna. Peacefare.net is, as always, interested in publishing well-argued contrary views:

“The IAEA has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.”

This Statement was made by Yukiya Amano, the Director General (DG) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Board of Governors (BoGs) of the autonomous UN Organisation on 15 December 2015 in Vienna. It was the conclusion of his report on the “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme.” Amano’s Statement has satisfied the six world powers (P5+1) China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States plus Germany, members of the IAEA BoGs and parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Agreement with Iran of 14 July 2015.

Ironically, this very statement was repeatedly made, almost 14 years earlier, by the then IAEA DG Mohamed ElBaradei during the decisive sessions of the UN Security Council on the Iraqi crisis in February 2003 in New York. ElBaradei was then requesting more time to enable the drawing of a credible IAEA broader conclusion on a Possible Military Dimension (PMD) in the Iraqi nuclear programme. The Council was deeply divided. While its permanent members, France, Russia and China and a number of other member States were in favour of providing more time to the Agency’s nuclear inspectors, the response from the United States, backed by Great Britain and Spain, was firmly negative.

The IAEA Statement was then insufficient to prevent a war. Combined forces from United States, Great Britain, Australia and Poland, the so-called “coalition of the willing,” invaded and in March 2003 without endorsement by the Security Council. The war did not confirm existence of any nuclear weapons or related activities in Iraq.

Colin Powell, at that time US Secretary of State and former head of US Army, regrettably admitted before his resignation from politics in 2005 that, in February 2003 there was “no doubt in my mind” that Saddam Hussein was working to obtain key components to produce nuclear weapons. Later on, declassified US intelligence documents on the 2003 Iraq war affirmed the wrong assessment of the responsible US agencies on the country’s virtually non-existent weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The basic reason for this inability was analysts’ misinterpretation of the deceptive Iraqi behavior due to their failure to examine the situation “through an Iraqi prism.

In 2005 ElBaradei and the IAEA inspectors were awarded the Nobel Prise for Peace. IAEA’s current report about the “Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” a programme comprising sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities with PMD, led to a resolution submitted by the P5+1 and adopted by consensus by IAEA BoGs.

In comparison to the outcome of the Iraqi crisis, this resolution constitutes a major historic diplomatic achievement, which brings an end to a dangerous nuclear crisis. The Iran nuclear deal is a positive example of effective multilateral dialogue and negotiations. It alleviates tensions and leads to the removal of vital sanctions on Iran. At the same time, it leaves hundreds of billions of dollars in postential sanctions in place through an agreed mechanism to snap sanctions back if Iran does not cooperate. Last Saturday January 16, DG Amano announced in a special IAEA session that “inspectors on the ground verified that Iran has carried out all measures required under the JCPOA … to enable Implementation Day to occur.”

Successful implementation of the Agreement would have a twofold consequence. Firstly, Iran would not be able to “sneak-out” by developing clandestine nuclear weapons related activities without detection. Secondly, in case of a “break-out” of the Agreement by Iran, as North Korea did in 2003, the time required for the production of one Significant Quantity of nuclear material for building a nuclear weapon has been now practically increased from two to ten months or longer. It is well understood by all parties involved, including, that this new reality provides enough time for dynamic “corrective” reactions.

In consequence, new parameters emerge in the geopolitical equation allowing for effective and efficient response to regional conflicts and to rising threats. This important diplomatic achievement offers realistic chances for peaceful developments on the road paved by extensive effort of all parties involved in the JCPOA agreement, including Iran. However, a potential threatening “failure-factor” would be the burning out of the advantages gained by both sites through the Agreement during a continuance of the Syrian crisis.

According to the last paragraph of the pertinent resolution, the Agreement is in effect “…until ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day (18 October 2015) or until the date on which the Director General reports that the Agency has reached the Broader Conclusion for Iran, whichever is earlier.” In other words, until the DG would make the Statement: “the IAEA is able to provide credible assurance that all nuclear material and facilities in Iran remain in peaceful activities.” This means a direct and solid confirmation of both the “correctness” and “completeness” of Iran’s nuclear declarations, based upon continues monitoring and verification during an honest and flawless cooperation of Teheran with the IAEA inspectors, requiring sustained effort of both sites.

One could argue that the historic Agreement, including the Vienna IAEA resolution of the 15 December 2015, enabled a power shift in the wider area of Middle East which might contain dangerous developments in a persistently dynamic world. Even so, no development would be worse than possible nuclear proliferation.