Approaches to fighting ISIS

The Middle East Policy Council hosted The ISIS Threat to U.S. National Security: Policy Choices event on Thursday. William F. Wechsler, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, gave an overall assessment on the U.S. position towards handling ISIS. Mark N. Katz, professor at George Mason University, talked about Russia’s position and its thoughts on U.S. foreign policy. Charles Lister, Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute, focused on ISIS within the Syrian context. Audrey Cronin, Director of the International Security Program at George Mason University, discussed how the U.S. should approach the ISIS situation. Patrick Theros, former ambassador to Qatar, moderated.

Wechsler believes ISIS poses a significant direct threat to the US. The US priority however has been the fight against the Syrian leader, Bashar al-Asad, and the recent scuffle between Saudi Arabia and Iran. He posited that Salafi jihadist groups would turn to external attacks because of their need to prove leadership and look impressive. Conducting successful attacks attracts new members and shows authority. The use of indirect action, in his opinion, is the best option moving forward, but indirect action leads to a much longer time frame for fighting ISIS. Understanding what is happening on the ground—the changing scenarios, the history of the people, religious sects, and the ethnic composition—is critical to success if the US wants to bring real change to the region.

Katz agreed with Wechsler that ISIS has not been the top US priority. He began his discussion with Russia, its relationship with the US, and how that plays into the Syrian conflict by examining Putin’s September speech. Putin recognized Asad as the vital component in fighting ISIS. Russia’s priority in Syria is to ensure Asad remains in power, not to defeat ISIS. The US and Russia strongly disagree on who should lead Syria, though there is the commonality of keeping ISIS from gaining power. Russia thinks that the US only wants Russia involved in Syria so the US does not have to become directly involved in the conflict. The US wants to defeat Asad, ISIS, and install a pro-Western regime, yet wants to dedicate hardly any resources in doing so. Katz stated that as long as each side thinks it is superior, cooperation would not go very far. But Katz thinks Russia ultimately can be pragmatic and compromise. Russia did not support the Arab Spring but had good relations with President Morsi of Egypt. Moscow can compromise if it is in Russia’s best interests.

Lister has personally dealt with over 100 Syrian armed opposition groups on the ground. ISIS feels the pressure from opposition groups, Russia, and the US, but that does not necessarily mean ISIS is losing. Indirect action has not been implemented to the highest degree. The partnership with Kurdish forces has been successful. Lister believes other Syrian armed groups could be just as successful if given the same resources the Kurds have received. Giving support only to the Kurds shows US lack of understanding of what is really happening on the ground and of how the Kurds are perceived by their Arab neighbors. For example, the education system implemented by the Kurdish territory contains socialist elements, which makes the Arab tribes surrounding them unhappy.

Other people within Syria may not see Kurds as legitimate. Lister wants the US to team up with local Syrian allies, attack ISIS momentum, and stop ISIS from fighting on multiple fronts. He also urges that the US not forget about Al Qaeda in Syria, which has allied itself with the anti-Asad revolutionaries. He believes Al Qaeda will be in Syria after ISIS is gone because they have operated so quietly and have deep roots in communities.

Cronin said that so far, the US has attempted to use the same strategies to fight ISIS as it did Al Qaeda. This is problematic, as Al Qaeda and ISIS are not affiliated and have different traits and origins. Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization, generally does not hold territory, and relies on outside funding. ISIS is a conventional army with infrastructure, holds territory, and funds itself by utilizing resources within its territory. Taking down ISIS leaders through drone strikes will not work because leaders mainly hide in urban areas, use civilians as cover, and the pseudo-state can go on without particular leaders. ISIS kills journalists publicly because their core message is all about power and revenge. Public killings suppress dissent. When the US focuses on these brutal killings, it helps ISIS become more powerful and respected to the people it wants to attract. ISIS does not care if it is popular, but that it is powerful.

Cronin suggested that best way to combat this sort of group is by offensive containment, which would entail a major diplomatic effort and indirect military effort. Cronin, along with the rest of the panelists, agreed that fighting ISIS is a long-term problem and instant solutions are not in the cards.