Day: January 28, 2016
The confessional/ethnic temptation
Henri Barkey writes in The American Interest:
The U.S. government [should commit] itself to the creation of a confederal democratic Syria that is divided along confessional and ethnic lines. In its most elementary form, the new Syria would be divided along three main areas, Alawi/Christian, Sunni, and Kurdish, with Damascus remaining as the capital although temporarily run by a UN administration.
How simple! How neat! How symmetrical!
How homicidal.
I’d be the first to admit that something like this confessional/ethnic cantonalization is emerging from the chaos of Syria’s civil war. The Kurds have established several cantons of what they are calling “Rojava” along the Turkish border. Alawites, Shiites and Christians are retreating from central Syria to the west. The Islamic State dominates a good part of the east, though there is no single “Sunni” area but rather a patchwork of them. Ultimately some sort of equilibrium may emerge organically that resembles what us conflict management nerds call a mutually hurting stalemate, one of the key conditions for a negotiated outcome.
But that is a different proposition from US advocacy of confessional and ethnic cantonalization, which implies someone in Washington or New York drawing lines. That would lead quickly to ethnic cleansing, because each group would seek to establish unquestioned dominance over its own territory. There is no single concentration of Sunnis. Creating one can be done, but only by force. What will happen to Alawites and Christians who have managed to survive in Sunni areas through the war, but now find themselves on the wrong side of some line drawn in Washington? What will happen to the Sunnis who inhabit western areas of Syria, none of whose provinces were majority Alawite before the war? Those who don’t “belong” will be chased out, forced across the lines into what someone in Washington or New York has designated as their homeland.
If you don’t like Sykes-Picot, you are sure not to like Henri’s proposition.
The only group in Syria that would jump at it is the Islamic State. It would get recognition of its dominance in parts of eastern Syria. That alone should give any American pause. It should also have made the editors of a publication called The American Interest hesitate.
Worst off would be Damascus, where Henri proposes the UN govern, temporarily. But Damascus is as mixed as all of Syria, with significant populations of Sunnis, Shia, Alawites, Kurds and Christians. Ethnic cleansing there would take particularly brutal and unforgiving forms as each of those groups tries to protect itself from others and dominate the capital. Where would UN capability to prevent that from happening come from? Who is going to deploy peacekeeping forces quickly and effectively to back up a UN administration?
Consider also the regional impact. The Kurdish PKK would get official recognition of its safe haven in Syria, from which it could continue to attack Turkey. Ankara won’t go along with that. Islamic State ambitions to control Anbar and Ninewa provinces in Iraq would get a big boost. Baghdad wouldn’t accept that. Some in Beirut would be tempted to think about a “greater” Lebanon, incorporating turf from Syria. The Jordanian border, on both sides of which there are the same tribes, would be at risk.
The United States already has a perfectly good vision for the future of Syria: an inclusive, pluralistic polity that settles its issues peacefully within well-established institutions. That’s not what is lacking. It is the political will and resources to make it happen that are missing.
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Indonesia has a plan
On Monday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) hosted its annual Fullerton Forum in Singapore. The keynote address was delivered by Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs and a retired general in the anti-terror squad of the Indonesian special forces. Pandjaitan was introduced by both Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia and by Ng Eng Hen, the Defense Minister of Singapore.
Pandjaitan stated that the goal of terror groups is always to destabilize countries and demoralize their populations. ISIS has not succeeded in doing this so far in Indonesia because the Indonesian government is clear that it does not negotiate with terrorists and will respond immediately to any attacks. ISIS recruitment is a global problem; the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS doubled between 2014 and 2015. Brookings estimates there are 46,000 Twitter accounts that support ISIS. In Indonesia, even some middle-class people have joined ISIS, including a policeman who died in Syria.
Indonesia is a huge country with many poorly-educated people; ISIS’s propaganda concerning the caliphate is powerful among lower-class people. Syria and Iraq are included in Islamic “end times” prophecies, and ISIS convinces people to fight the West and all countries that lack Sharia. ISIS wants to see the caliphate expand to Southeast Asia. Its fighters are hard to deal with because they have what Pandjaitan refers to as a “one-way ticket”: they are prepared to die.
In the January 14 attacks in Jakarta, Indonesian security forces responded rapidly, eliminating the terrorists in less than 12 minutes. They killed four terrorists, and using one of their cell phones, were able to track down and arrest others. This sets an example for terrorists. The attackers were previously linked with Jemaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian affiliate of Al Qaeda. Even though ISIS and AQ are fighting each other in Syria, their affiliates are capable of cooperation; Indonesia believes the local ISIS and AQ leaders have merged their work.
Terrorists in Indonesia operate in cells to maintain secrecy; cells do not have contact with other cells, making it difficult for the police to crack down on networks. So far, the authorities have had success in mapping terror networks, but Pandjaitan cannot promise that Indonesia is immune from attacks. Terror groups also communicate their final decisions to stage attacks via couriers, which are hard to intercept.
Fighting terror effectively involves three components:
- A soft approach.
- International intelligence cooperation.
- A hard approach.
The soft approach to fighting terror is Indonesia’s strategy of first resort. This includes counter-radicalization and deradicalization campaigns that are holistic in nature and will partially be conducted using the media. They are working with Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah to spread the message, including on television, that ISIS is not Islam and Islam is not ISIS. Indonesia has freedom of religion, so people have the freedom to follow sharia law.
The government is also campaigning against religious intolerance. Indonesia is the largest archipelago country in the world, which makes it difficult to manage. The government is working on categorizing terrorists as ideologues, militants and sympathizers. Ideologues will be imprisoned separately to help stop radicalization in prisons. The government is also cracking down on social media content supporting terror, including videos that provide instructions on how to build bombs.
The ASEAN countries already have a platform for intelligence sharing regarding threats, attacks, and terror financing. Intelligence cooperation in the region is already very good.
The hard approach is a secondary approach, but is one that Indonesia is prepared to use. Indonesia has prepared its special forces to conduct operations anytime and anywhere within the country. If terrorists take hostages, the special forces will free them immediately. The Indonesian government is also altering counterterrorism legislation so that the authorities will be able to detain those suspected of plotting terror attacks for 7-30 days. Those found to have no terror links will be released. New legislation also allows the government to revoke the citizenship of Indonesians who join groups of foreign fighters.
Another key to stopping terror in Indonesia is economic improvement. Economic growth has stopped slowing. The economy grew by about 5.5% this year. Consumer confidence and confidence in the government have increased. The government has been trying to distribute economic growth more evenly between Indonesia’s regions and improve the country’s infrastructure. There has historically been a large gap between the haves and the have-nots. Many terrorists come from poor backgrounds. This year, Indonesia will spend $70 billion or 36% of the national budget on outlying regions. Funding for villages has increased from $2 billion to $4.5 billion in 2016. This will give each village around $100,000 to spend, which will help reduce rural poverty and boost economic growth. Poverty reduction is crucial. Indonesia has 230 million Muslims. If 2% live in extreme poverty and are brainwashed by ISIS, one can imagine how many will become terrorists and stage domestic and regional attacks.
An audience member asked Pandjaitan about links that had been discovered between the terrorists in the recent Jakarta attacks and terrorists from Mindanao in the Philippines. Pandjaitan stated that radicals in Mindanao are supporting radicals in Indonesia, including through the smuggling of weapons and explosives. Indonesian authorities are working to crack down on weapons smuggling.
Another audience member asked about Indonesia’s position regarding China’s actions in the South China Sea. Because of Indonesia’s territory in the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has declared that its Special Economic Zone extends into the South China Sea. There were reports that Indonesia was considering pursuing international arbitration against China. Pandjaitan replied that China acknowledges the Natuna Islands are part of Indonesia, so China and Indonesia are not in conflict regarding this matter. However, Indonesia views the South China Sea as an important area for global shipping. Indonesia does not wish to see power projection in this area and views freedom of navigation as very important.
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