Month: January 2016
Hangups: why and who
The Syria peace talks did not begin as projected in Geneva today, though they are likely to convene before the end of this week. Secretary of State Kerry is doing his damndest to make it happen. What are the hang ups? Is he wise to press so hard?
There are two big hangups: why talk and with whom. Or in diplomatese: the agenda and the shape of the table.
Why is the bigger issue. The Syrian opposition, backed by Washington, wants to talk about transition of power away from Bashar al Asad to a “governing body with full executive powers.” That 2012 formula has been repeated ad infinitum since, either explicitly or implicitly (by reference to the June 2012 United Nations communique in which it first appeared). The regime has made it clear it will not negotiate about transition in Geneva. Nor did it last time the UN tried for a political solution, two years ago. Bashar al Asad’s delegation will stick with an anti-terrorist pitch, backed by the Russians and Iranians. The military gains the regime has made against its opponents since Russia’s intervention in the fall mean it is feeling little pressure to yield.
While the Russians never tire of saying that they are not wedded to Bashar al Assad, everything they do suggests the opposite. There is good reason for this. Moscow has no hope of a welcome in Syria by a serious successor to the regime, so the Russians are sticking with what they’ve got.
Iran even more so. Tehran has risked Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias it supports and Revolutionary Guard forces in Syria, certainly losing thousands. Though Syrians in my experience are little inclined to sectarianism, the approximately three-quarters of the population that is at least nominally Sunni is not going to easily forget what Iran and its proxies have done to prop up a dictator. Nor will the Alawites and Shia who have backed the regime want to find out what the majority population is inclined to do in retaliation. So having Iran at the table, entirely justified by its role in the conflict, is no easy formula for a solution.
In addition, there are other “who” problems. The fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, often cited as a serious obstacle, is not such a big problem this time around. With Saudi sponsorship, the main opposition forces other than al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State have chosen a High Negotiation Commission (HNC), headed by former regime Prime Minister Hijab, and a negotiating team. The main body of the opposition is, in fact, remarkably unified this time around, at least for the moment.
The problem is that there are forces claiming to be opposition that lie outside the HNC, which does not recognize them as such. They come in two flavors: Kurdish and so-called “internal” opposition, both heavily favored by Moscow.
The Kurds who count are affiliated with the Kurdish PYD militia who are fighting in northern Syria against the Islamic State with US support. Washington doesn’t want them excluded from the talks, even if they are affiliated with the Kurdish militia waging a rebellion inside Turkey. Moscow agrees, not least to give Turkey grief.
Moscow also backs elements of the “internal” opposition who aren’t regarded by the opposition forces represented in the HNC as real opposition. Russia is trying to force internal opposition figures into the HNC delegation, likely in exchange for allowing some of what Moscow regards as extremist groups also to join. From Moscow’s point of view, the more unmanageable and fractious the HNC presence in Geneva, the better. The last thing Moscow wants is for the Syrians to choose their own delegation, which would be heavily anti-Russian.
The HNC seems determined to reject Kurdish participation in its delegation, not least because the Kurds often clash with opposition brigades represented there and collaborate with the regime in territories the Kurds largely control. But of course that may mean separate Kurdish representation, which in some ways is precisely what the mostly Arab HNC should not want to see. Separate Kurdish representation in the talks could well favor Kurdish ambitions for a separate federal unit within Syria, like the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. The Syrian Kurds are calling theirs “Rojava.”
With all these complications, is Secretary Kerry wise to insist?
Richard Gowan argues that there are reasons to proceed, despite the odds: possible progress on humanitarian issues, keeping a peace process alive because it may eventually lead somewhere, and most of all the need Washington and Moscow are feeling to limit their recent competition and try for some cooperation in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal. Even a failure, in this view, has the virtue of trying.
My own inclination is towards skepticism, not least because failure at this point will likely mean another tw0-year hiatus. Secretary Kerry is a far greater risk-taker than most of his predecessors. He tried with Israel and Palestine far beyond the point at which others would have given up. The result is an impasse that may last a long time. He pressed forward with Iran on nuclear issues to good effect. Will his Syria effort look more like the former or the latter? More likely the former, with catastrophic consequences for millions of Syrians.
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Peace picks January 25-29
Government closing today, but still lots of good events later in the week:
- U.S.-Russia Cooperation in Syria | Wednesday, January 27th | 9:00-10:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After a year that has seen increased turmoil in the Middle East, there is growing attention in the region from outside powers. A distinguished Russian delegation, led by Vitaliy Naumkin, will present their views on the geopolitical challenges in the region. In particular, they will discuss Russia’s role in resolving the Syrian crisis, and outline opportunities for collaboration with the United States. Vitaly Naumkin is the head of the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. Other speakers include Vassily A. Kuznetsov, head of the Centre for Political Systems and Cultures at Moscow State University, and Irina Zvyagelskaya, professor at Moscow State University.
- Local Responses to Libya’s Instability | Wednesday, January 27th | 2:30-4:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Since its 2011 revolts and the overthrow of former ruler Muammar Qaddafi, Libya has experienced a series of weak governments, internal fighting factions, and extremist violence. In the attempts to resolve Libya’s complex political and security challenges, the voices of Libyan citizens often go unheard. Please join the Atlantic Council for a discussion with Jeffrey Vanness and Jakob Wichmann. Wichmann will present his findings from a nationwide survey conducted in Libya in August and September 2015, and Vanness will respond to the survey’s results from a US government perspective. The survey includes representative samples for Tripoli, Misrata, and Benghazi, allowing for a comparison of perceptions and demonstrating differences in attitudes in Libya. The survey, conducted through phone interviews with 2,507 Libyan respondents, was commissioned by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Topics explored include political efficacy and engagement, preferences for the future constitution, gender issues, perceptions of local and national actors, evaluation of public services, perceptions of armed groups, and responses to insecurity. Jeffrey Vanness serves as Democracy and Governance Field Advisor with the Elections and Political Transitions Division of USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance. Jakob Wichmann is a consultant for Social Impact and a partner at JMW Consulting. Karim Mezran focuses on the politics of North Africa at the Atlantic Council, where he is the lead expert on Libya.
- Saudi Arabia’s Regional Role and the Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations | Wednesday, January 27th | 2:30-4:00 | Project on Middle East Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Saudi Arabia has long been one of the United States’ closest allies in the Middle East, among the largest recipients of U.S. arms sales globally, and perceived as a crucial partner in the war on terrorism. Nonetheless, there have always been serious questions regarding the costs of the U.S.-Saudi military relationship, which have become more pronounced over the past year. The Saudi military intervention in Yemen has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, and recent executions in the Kingdom, including of nonviolent dissidents, have renewed longstanding concerns about the state of human rights in the Kingdom. In addition, concerns remain about Saudi support for extremist networks in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, as well as the impact of Saudi militarism on divisions throughout the region. How has Saudi Arabia’s role in the region changed in recent years, and what has driven these changes? What relationships have various factions in Saudi Arabia had with extremist movements throughout the Middle East and North Africa? What impact does U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia have on the Kingdom’s role in the region, as well as on human rights concerns within the country? How have recent events, such as the ongoing conflict in Yemen, Saudi’s role in the Syrian conflict, and mass executions within Saudi Arabia, affected the U.S.-Saudi relationship? And what might we expect for the future of bilateral relations? The panel includes Nadia Oweidat, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, Andrea Prasow, Deputy Washington Director of Human Rights Watch, and Stephen Seche, Executive Vice President of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.
- The Impact of Low Oil Prices on the Middle East | Thursday, January 28th | 9:00-10:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center on Thursday, January 28 from 9:00 am – 10:30 am for a panel discussion on the impact of low oil prices in the Middle East. The collapse in crude oil prices since mid-2014 has shaken the foundation of global energy markets, with sweeping economic and political implications for the Middle East. Amidst falling oil revenues, governments from the Gulf to Iraq and beyond face fiscal crises, market upheaval, disruption of traditional ways of doing business, challenges to longstanding fuel subsidy programs, and slumping economic growth. In the midst of this volatile landscape, energy producers in the region face an uncertain future that will have ramifications in the years to come. The discussion will touch on the following questions and more: How are low prices impacting the economic health of and internal political dynamics in Saudi Arabia? What is the future of Saudi Aramco? How are other major producing countries across the GCC, Iraq, Iran, and North Africa adapting and faring in today’s price environment? Are fiscal constraints inducing major changes in government policies and/or driving macroeconomic and energy policy trends across the Middle East? To what degree are low oil prices driving geopolitical calculations in the region? Panelists include Denise Natali, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Jean-Francois Seznec, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Global Energy Center, and Jamie Webster, Senior Director of HIS Energy Downstream Research. Annie Megdalia, Deputy Director of the Global Energy Center, will moderate.
- Women and Extremism: A Tale of Two Experiences | Thursday, January 28th | 3:30-4:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Women are often the victims of terrorism and extremism by states and international actors. At times, they are also the perpetuators of violence and terrorism. This discussion will focus on the intersection between women and extremism at a time of increasing volatility in the Middle East and around the world. Join us as we explore how women are recruited and used by terrorist organizations, and how women become trapped in cycles of violence and conflict. Our panel of experts will look at ways to address the problem and how to engage women and girls in conflict prevention and resolution. Speakers include Farah Pandisth, Adjunct Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, Timothy B. Curry, Deputy Director of Counterterrorism for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Co-founder and Executive Director of the International Civil Society Action Network, Fatima Sadiqi, Fellow at the Wilson Center, and Tara Sonenshine, Distinguished Fellow at George Washington University. Join the conversationon Twitter by following @WPSProject.
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Ethics matter
On Wednesday, the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs in New York hosted a talk by Jean-Pierre Filiu, Professor of Middle East Studies, Sciences Po.
Filiu related that he chose this topic months before the Paris Attacks; he knew the ISIS threat was unprecedented.
Thirty years ago, Filiu met the first jihadis while doing humanitarian work in Afghanistan. He was introduced to the disturbing Arab “volunteers” who had already begun to sneak in. He heard about Bin Laden and Zawahiri but never met them. He concluded that they lived on a different planet and wished to annihilate our way of life. Nobody took his warnings seriously.
The jihadists founded Al Qaeda (AQ) in the last month of the Soviet occupation. Al Qaeda means “the base,” which refers to a territorial base and a transnational network.
In 2001, the US and its allies responded appropriately by hitting AQ in its base in Kandahar. It is important to strike such threats at the source, the territorial base, before going after the global network. The decision to rely on local forces in the Northern Alliance was prudent. This action prevented a second wave of planned attacks.
Then the US launched the Global War on Terror and invaded Iraq. France warned against this and was correct, as it opened the Middle East to AQ. It also provided the instability that led to the London and Madrid attacks. French jihadis who had fought in Iraq were the masterminds of last year’s attacks.
ISIS was formed as a continuation of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), established by former Jordanian criminal Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. Unlike Bin Laden (a son of a tycoon) and Zawahiri (a doctor), he was not bourgeois. He used his expertise in crime. He was the first to behead a hostage, Nicholas Berg, in 2004.
Bin Laden thought this tactic too gory. But it made Al-Zarqawi a star. The US focused on targeting him, so other jihadis followed him. He was killed in 2006. His successors were killed in 2010 and were succeeded by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who had been detained in Camp Bucca in 2004, but was released for good conduct. Al-Baghdadi was able to maintain order in the camp by making other inmates listen to him; this would have made Filiu suspicious.
When Al-Baghdadi took over, AQI was losing ground because of the surge of US troops. AQI was later able to regain ground with the help of former Baathists alienated by the sectarianism of the Maliki government. AQI also gained ground in Syria thanks to Assad, who preferred to be up against jihadis rather than peaceful protesters for propaganda reasons. The more dictators you have in the Arab world, the more jihadis you will have. Ethics in international relations is not a luxury, but could be a real solution to many problems.
The US lost moral leverage after it did not act on its red line regarding chemical weapons in Syria. ISIS recruitment exploded. ISIS argued that the US and its allies were letting Syrians be gassed and presented its mission as humanitarian. ISIS learned from AQ not to depend on an external force, like the Taliban. ISIS runs its own totalitarian regime in a region more symbolic for Muslims than Khorasan.
The Levant is key to Muslim “end times” narratives. ISIS now incorporates much of this apocalyptic material into its propaganda; they talk about places mentioned in prophecies. In their narrative, the final battle will be in Jerusalem. The Israeli strategy of hoping ISIS and Hezbollah will just fight each other is shortsighted. ISIS is now recruiting inside Israel. Read more
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Approaches to fighting ISIS
The Middle East Policy Council hosted The ISIS Threat to U.S. National Security: Policy Choices event on Thursday. William F. Wechsler, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, gave an overall assessment on the U.S. position towards handling ISIS. Mark N. Katz, professor at George Mason University, talked about Russia’s position and its thoughts on U.S. foreign policy. Charles Lister, Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute, focused on ISIS within the Syrian context. Audrey Cronin, Director of the International Security Program at George Mason University, discussed how the U.S. should approach the ISIS situation. Patrick Theros, former ambassador to Qatar, moderated.
Wechsler believes ISIS poses a significant direct threat to the US. The US priority however has been the fight against the Syrian leader, Bashar al-Asad, and the recent scuffle between Saudi Arabia and Iran. He posited that Salafi jihadist groups would turn to external attacks because of their need to prove leadership and look impressive. Conducting successful attacks attracts new members and shows authority. The use of indirect action, in his opinion, is the best option moving forward, but indirect action leads to a much longer time frame for fighting ISIS. Understanding what is happening on the ground—the changing scenarios, the history of the people, religious sects, and the ethnic composition—is critical to success if the US wants to bring real change to the region.
Katz agreed with Wechsler that ISIS has not been the top US priority. He began his discussion with Russia, its relationship with the US, and how that plays into the Syrian conflict by examining Putin’s September speech. Putin recognized Asad as the vital component in fighting ISIS. Russia’s priority in Syria is to ensure Asad remains in power, not to defeat ISIS. The US and Russia strongly disagree on who should lead Syria, though there is the commonality of keeping ISIS from gaining power. Russia thinks that the US only wants Russia involved in Syria so the US does not have to become directly involved in the conflict. The US wants to defeat Asad, ISIS, and install a pro-Western regime, yet wants to dedicate hardly any resources in doing so. Katz stated that as long as each side thinks it is superior, cooperation would not go very far. But Katz thinks Russia ultimately can be pragmatic and compromise. Russia did not support the Arab Spring but had good relations with President Morsi of Egypt. Moscow can compromise if it is in Russia’s best interests.
Lister has personally dealt with over 100 Syrian armed opposition groups on the ground. ISIS feels the pressure from opposition groups, Russia, and the US, but that does not necessarily mean ISIS is losing. Indirect action has not been implemented to the highest degree. The partnership with Kurdish forces has been successful. Lister believes other Syrian armed groups could be just as successful if given the same resources the Kurds have received. Giving support only to the Kurds shows US lack of understanding of what is really happening on the ground and of how the Kurds are perceived by their Arab neighbors. For example, the education system implemented by the Kurdish territory contains socialist elements, which makes the Arab tribes surrounding them unhappy.
Other people within Syria may not see Kurds as legitimate. Lister wants the US to team up with local Syrian allies, attack ISIS momentum, and stop ISIS from fighting on multiple fronts. He also urges that the US not forget about Al Qaeda in Syria, which has allied itself with the anti-Asad revolutionaries. He believes Al Qaeda will be in Syria after ISIS is gone because they have operated so quietly and have deep roots in communities.
Cronin said that so far, the US has attempted to use the same strategies to fight ISIS as it did Al Qaeda. This is problematic, as Al Qaeda and ISIS are not affiliated and have different traits and origins. Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization, generally does not hold territory, and relies on outside funding. ISIS is a conventional army with infrastructure, holds territory, and funds itself by utilizing resources within its territory. Taking down ISIS leaders through drone strikes will not work because leaders mainly hide in urban areas, use civilians as cover, and the pseudo-state can go on without particular leaders. ISIS kills journalists publicly because their core message is all about power and revenge. Public killings suppress dissent. When the US focuses on these brutal killings, it helps ISIS become more powerful and respected to the people it wants to attract. ISIS does not care if it is popular, but that it is powerful.
Cronin suggested that best way to combat this sort of group is by offensive containment, which would entail a major diplomatic effort and indirect military effort. Cronin, along with the rest of the panelists, agreed that fighting ISIS is a long-term problem and instant solutions are not in the cards.
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North Africa’s stumbling transitions
On Wednesday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) launched North Africa in Transition: The Struggle for Democracies and Institutions. The panel discussion included editor Ben Fishman, Haim Malka, contributing author and Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and John Desrocher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Egypt and Maghreb Affairs. Mark Fitzpatrick, Executive Director of IISS, moderated.
Fishman kicked off by explaining the premise of North Africa in Transition. He aimed to show the differences between the states of the Maghreb, including Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya, after the 2011 uprisings. Institution building should be the key lesson learned from the Arab Spring. The US should devote more time to North Africa. Fishman focused in particular on Libya, where he thought the US should be more assertive, interacting with the Libyan government, coordinating with the international community, and empowering local governments in Libya by implementing decentralization.
Malka urged more investment in the Maghreb, which requires greater understanding of regional politics, economics, and society. Malka predicts 2016 will be a turbulent year for the region. He explained four factors that brought him to this conclusion:
- The continued appeal of radical groups. Radical ideology entices youth as it presents solutions to them that they have never been offered before. The counterterrorism response has contributed to increased radicalization. With intelligence communities remaining uncoordinated and erratic arrests, radicalization has spread even more throughout the region.
- Failure to address economic and social grievances. Reforms of privatization, banking laws, etc., are too slow and prolonging the challenges countries face.
- The four main states are shaky. They lack strong institutions.
- The 2011 uprisings did not satisfactorily change the status quo for most people. For instance, in Morocco the monarch contributed to stabilizing the country by instituting constitutional reforms, but failed to grapple with socio-economic issues. Injustice, favoritism, and corruption endure.
Desrocher believes the US has to examine each country’s case separately and carefully. Morocco has a high rate of youth unemployment, relies mainly on Europe for trade, and worries about extremism. Tunisia has its internal economic challenges and unmet expectations of the Arab Spring. Washington wants to build partnerships with the Maghreb by assisting with security issues and boosting economies.
As its instability makes it difficult for the other regional countries to accomplish their goals, Desrocher identified the Libya as key to stability in the Maghreb, . He nevertheless has a positive outlook and believes much has been accomplished in the past four months. He thinks that there are fewer divisions among the international and regional partners on how to address the problems in Libya.
Malka also expressed an overall positive sentiment. Popular pressure on governments now carries significant weight. People in the Maghreb are willing to express their grievances in a public manner and to the governing body. Malka’s advice regarding US policy in the Maghreb is to take the long-term approach and not to overact to any small sign of instability. Change in the region will ultimately take time and much effort.
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Diplomacy v war
I am pleased to publish this contribution from Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA nuclear safeguards inspector who holds a PhD in nuclear physics from the University of Vienna. Peacefare.net is, as always, interested in publishing well-argued contrary views:
“The IAEA has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.”
This Statement was made by Yukiya Amano, the Director General (DG) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Board of Governors (BoGs) of the autonomous UN Organisation on 15 December 2015 in Vienna. It was the conclusion of his report on the “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme.” Amano’s Statement has satisfied the six world powers (P5+1) China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States plus Germany, members of the IAEA BoGs and parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Agreement with Iran of 14 July 2015.
Ironically, this very statement was repeatedly made, almost 14 years earlier, by the then IAEA DG Mohamed ElBaradei during the decisive sessions of the UN Security Council on the Iraqi crisis in February 2003 in New York. ElBaradei was then requesting more time to enable the drawing of a credible IAEA broader conclusion on a Possible Military Dimension (PMD) in the Iraqi nuclear programme. The Council was deeply divided. While its permanent members, France, Russia and China and a number of other member States were in favour of providing more time to the Agency’s nuclear inspectors, the response from the United States, backed by Great Britain and Spain, was firmly negative.
The IAEA Statement was then insufficient to prevent a war. Combined forces from United States, Great Britain, Australia and Poland, the so-called “coalition of the willing,” invaded and in March 2003 without endorsement by the Security Council. The war did not confirm existence of any nuclear weapons or related activities in Iraq.
Colin Powell, at that time US Secretary of State and former head of US Army, regrettably admitted before his resignation from politics in 2005 that, in February 2003 there was “no doubt in my mind” that Saddam Hussein was working to obtain key components to produce nuclear weapons. Later on, declassified US intelligence documents on the 2003 Iraq war affirmed the wrong assessment of the responsible US agencies on the country’s virtually non-existent weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The basic reason for this inability was analysts’ misinterpretation of the deceptive Iraqi behavior due to their failure to examine the situation “through an Iraqi prism.
In 2005 ElBaradei and the IAEA inspectors were awarded the Nobel Prise for Peace. IAEA’s current report about the “Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” a programme comprising sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities with PMD, led to a resolution submitted by the P5+1 and adopted by consensus by IAEA BoGs.
In comparison to the outcome of the Iraqi crisis, this resolution constitutes a major historic diplomatic achievement, which brings an end to a dangerous nuclear crisis. The Iran nuclear deal is a positive example of effective multilateral dialogue and negotiations. It alleviates tensions and leads to the removal of vital sanctions on Iran. At the same time, it leaves hundreds of billions of dollars in postential sanctions in place through an agreed mechanism to snap sanctions back if Iran does not cooperate. Last Saturday January 16, DG Amano announced in a special IAEA session that “inspectors on the ground verified that Iran has carried out all measures required under the JCPOA … to enable Implementation Day to occur.”
Successful implementation of the Agreement would have a twofold consequence. Firstly, Iran would not be able to “sneak-out” by developing clandestine nuclear weapons related activities without detection. Secondly, in case of a “break-out” of the Agreement by Iran, as North Korea did in 2003, the time required for the production of one Significant Quantity of nuclear material for building a nuclear weapon has been now practically increased from two to ten months or longer. It is well understood by all parties involved, including, that this new reality provides enough time for dynamic “corrective” reactions.
In consequence, new parameters emerge in the geopolitical equation allowing for effective and efficient response to regional conflicts and to rising threats. This important diplomatic achievement offers realistic chances for peaceful developments on the road paved by extensive effort of all parties involved in the JCPOA agreement, including Iran. However, a potential threatening “failure-factor” would be the burning out of the advantages gained by both sites through the Agreement during a continuance of the Syrian crisis.
According to the last paragraph of the pertinent resolution, the Agreement is in effect “…until ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day (18 October 2015) or until the date on which the Director General reports that the Agency has reached the Broader Conclusion for Iran, whichever is earlier.” In other words, until the DG would make the Statement: “the IAEA is able to provide credible assurance that all nuclear material and facilities in Iran remain in peaceful activities.” This means a direct and solid confirmation of both the “correctness” and “completeness” of Iran’s nuclear declarations, based upon continues monitoring and verification during an honest and flawless cooperation of Teheran with the IAEA inspectors, requiring sustained effort of both sites.
One could argue that the historic Agreement, including the Vienna IAEA resolution of the 15 December 2015, enabled a power shift in the wider area of Middle East which might contain dangerous developments in a persistently dynamic world. Even so, no development would be worse than possible nuclear proliferation.
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