Month: January 2016
What to do about Syria?
On January 5, CFR hosted a panel discussion entitled “What to do About Syria” which also aired on HBO. The discussion was designed to resemble a National Security Council meeting. Panelists included Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, CFR, Paul Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University, and Michael Doran, Senior Fellow, the Hudson Institute. Richard Haass, President, CFR, moderated the discussion.
Paul Pillar stated that none of the multiple sides in the Syrian conflict appears poised to win in the near future. The Russian military intervention that began in September has shored up the regime. The regime still controls roughly 1/4 of the country in a North-South strip. There are non-ISIS opposition areas, largely in the northwest but also near the Golan, as well as large areas of ISIS control in the east and Kurdish control in the north. There are hundreds of opposition groups and many coalitions. Over the past year, ISIS has had neither a net loss or a net gain of territory in Syria, but has lost territory on balance when Iraq is included.
Pillar explained that on the diplomatic front, the Vienna process led to the International Syria Support Group, whose members agree on the need for a ceasefire and political settlement. The Saudis held a meeting in Riyadh in December and agreed that Assad did not have to leave until after negotiations are held. The US adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire. The recent suspension of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran shouldn’t have a huge impact beyond the enmity we already knew existed.
Philip Gordon described the current situation as a dynamic stalemate. The attrition of regime forces is unlikely to cause the regime’s collapse because of outside support from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The main battle in Syria doesn’t involve ISIS; it’s between the regime and the non-ISIS opposition. The Vienna Process is a positive step. However, the diplomatic gaps between the Saudis and the Iranians remain large.
Michael Doran believes that the US has essentially dropped its demand that Assad leave by pushing his departure so far into the future that it will not happen on Obama’s clock. This frees up the Obama administration to discuss deconfliction with Russia and Iran, a shift the Saudis dislike.
Gordon summarized US policy in Syria as such: since 2011, when Obama declared that Assad must go, US policy has been to strengthen the moderate opposition, in order to pressure the regime to negotiate. So far that hasn’t worked, but it remains US policy. Doran is right that the
definition of what a political transition would look like has evolved. As it became clearer that Russia and Iran would prop up Assad, diplomats examined other types of transitions that might be more feasible. There has been an effort to unify the opposition but it remains fragmented because our partners support different groups. We have tried to build the capacity of the opposition groups, but it has not been enough; they are fighting a professional military backed by Russia and Iran. The president has authorized force against ISIS, using the legal basis that ISIS threatens the Iraqi government; Obama lacks a legal basis to target the regime.
Doran spoke of the limits of our support for the non-ISIS opposition. Iran and Russia have backed the regime and there has not been comparable activity from our side. The train and equip program failed because we found few recruits willing to fight ISIS exclusively. We also work with the Kurds who are aligned with the PKK. We have alienated our Sunni allies. Our position on Assad is critical to mobilizing Sunni support against ISIS. The US would also need ground forces, perhaps in a 1:5 ratio with our allies.
Gordon clarified that the US does support the opposition militarily and politically. We just don’t provide specifics.
Pillar stated that even though the US is a superpower, it may not be able to satisfactorily solve Syria. It’s not in the US’s interest to take sides in the Sunni-Shia conflict. We should place more emphasis on the diplomatic track because tamping down the war is most important.
Gordon outlined two policy options going forward. First, the US could take out Assad militarily, but this could generate more refugees and cause a power vacuum. The better option is to prioritize a ceasefire to stop the war; this is more important than a political transition. Gordon clarified that he is not proposing an alliance with Russia and Iran, but ending the conflict roughly along the lines of the current reality on the ground. Local areas would gain autonomy, but this would stop short of a partition, so as not to set a precedent of carving out new states in the region.
Doran questioned Gordon’s attachment to the integrity of Syria, but largely agreed with his vision for an end state. However, he reiterated that such an arrangement wouldn’t be possible without ground forces. Haass proposed that the US think seriously about supporting an independent Kurdistan as part of a deal, since the Kurds are the most effective fighting force against ISIS.
Pillar highlighted potential positive effects of the Russian military intervention. Russia will draw the ire of radical Sunnis, and Russia will gain more leverage over Assad. Russia also has an interest in tamping down the conflict; it doesn’t want to prop up a beleaguered Assad forever.
An audience member asked how we might prevent revenge attacks once the conflict ends. Pillar pointed out that under Gordon’s autonomous regions proposal, groups would have a diminished ability on the ground to carry out revenge attacks. Haass contended that, contrary to Western notions of pluralism, a future map of Syria must reflect more homogeneity than heterogeneity.
Gordon addressed an audience question about why the US sees fighting ISIS as in its national interest versus fighting the regime. The US has identified ISIS as a threat because it kidnaps Americans and seeks to destabilize regional partners. We have identified discrete steps we can take to degrade and destroy ISIS. Taking out Assad would require an effort like the invasion of Iraq; we should not minimize the cost and consequences of such an effort. The notion that taking out Assad would yield a positive outcome requires a larger suspension of disbelief than the notion that the Iranians and Russians might agree to a ceasefire if the US drops its demand that they abandon Assad.
Another audience member asked whether we need the Saudis to agree that ISIS is a fundamental threat to their existence. Pillar contended that it would be ideal if the Saudis would follow their own interests more intelligently. In the past, the Saudis have faced the threat posed by Al Qaeda; persistent diplomacy and tough love talks will be required to get them to do the same with ISIS. Gordon noted that it is difficult to explain to countries what we think their interests should be. Saudi Arabia is more concerned about Iran than ISIS and Turkey is more concerned about the Kurds. Doran contended that the Saudis and the Turks have defined their interests correctly; we are wrong about what their interests are.
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Peace Picks, January 11-15
- Japan-South Korea Relations and Prospects for a U.S. Role in Historical Reconciliation in East Asia | Monday, January 11th | 9:00-12:00 | The Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Expectations are high that a landmark agreement on the legacies of World War II reached between Japan and South Korea will allow the two countries to further bilateral relations. Under the December 2015 agreement, Tokyo and Seoul stated they reached a “final and irrevocable resolution” regarding Korean women who were forced to serve as sex slaves under Japanese occupation. The deal is expected to allow the two countries to work more closely together on issues of mutual concern amid a rapidly changing economic, political, and security landscape in East Asia. For the United States too, successful implementation of the agreement is critical to bring its two closest allies in the region together and to establish a strong trilateral alliance that would work together to face common challenges. In this forum, scholars of history and international relations will discuss how to address issues of historical contention, and they will also discuss what role the United States could play to ensure that historical reconciliation between South Korea and Japan continues to move forward. See here for a full list of panels and speakers.
- Guantanamo Bay: Year 14 | Monday, January 11th | 3:00-4:45 | New America | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On January 22, 2009, just days after becoming president, Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13492, ordering the closure of the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Now in the last year of his presidency, 107 detainees remain. January 11th marks the 14th anniversary of the prison’s creation.New America is pleased to welcome Dr. Karen Greenberg, Director of the Center on National Security at Fordham University and author of The Least Worst Place: Guantanamo’s First 100 Days, Thomas B. Wilner, a lawyer with Shearman & Sterling LLP and co-founder of Close Guantanamo, who was the Counsel of Record to Guantanamo detainees in two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and Andy Worthington, co-founder of Close Guantanamo and the author of The Guantanamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison, for a discussion about what can or can’t be done in the next year, and whether President Obama’s promise will ever be fulfilled. Peter Bergen, Vice President of New America, will moderate the discussion Join the conversation online using #GTMO14th and following @NatSecNAF.
- Building Afghanistan’s Economy Through Regional Connectivity | Tuesday, January 12th | 3:00-4:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join the Atlantic Council for a special conversation with Dr. Mohammad Humayon Qayoumi on the economy of Afghanistan. More than a year after coming into power, Afghanistan’s National Unity Government has sought to re-establish Afghanistan’s role as a roundabout for economic connectivity between Central, South and East Asia, and Europe. With new progress made in the areas of power and gas transmission, fiber-optic linkages and movement of goods, the government has also launched a Jobs for Peace Plan, which seeks to provide near term economic opportunity across the country and soften the economic impact caused by the military drawdown. How will Afghanistan’s plans advance its self-reliance reform agenda, link its economy to the region, and provide jobs to its citizens? How can the US-Afghan strategic partnership best advance common security and economic interests? Join us for a special session with Dr. Qayoumi, Chief Advisor to President Ghani for infrastructure, IT and human capital who will provide firsthand what the Afghan government has in store to revive the Afghan economy. The conversation will be moderated by the Hon. James Cunningham, Senior Fellow and Khalilzad Chair, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.On Twitter? Follow @ACSouthAsia and use #ACAfghanistan
- Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules that Run the World | Tuesday, January 12th | 4:00-5:30 | Center for Global Development | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The slave trade, colonial rule and apartheid were once all legal. Hard power then won lawful authority: might literally made legal rights. The global revolutions that abolished those coercive rights were extraordinary—yet they left today’s multi-trillion trade in oil and minerals untouched. Current law incentivizes authoritarianism, conflict and corruption so strongly that oil states in the developing world today are no freer, no richer and no more peaceful than they were in 1980. All of the recent reforms around extractives—from transparency to certification to oil-to-cash—point toward the modern idea that the people, not power, should have the ultimate right to control a country’s resources. Can the US lead the West toward the next global revolution, by abolishing its legal trade in authoritarian oil and conflict minerals? Join us for a conversation with Leif Wenar, Chair of Philosophy and Law, King’s College London and author of Blood Oil, and Todd Moss, Chief Operating Officer and Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development and author of Oil to Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse through Cash Transfers.
- The Europe-Russia Relationship: From the Ukraine Crisis and the Rise of the Far Right to the War in Syria | Thursday, January 15th | 12:30-2:00 | GWU Elliot School of International Affairs | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Two years ago, Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution set off a new era in the Europe- Russia relationship. Europe responded to the annexation of Crimea with economic sanctions, prompting Russia to ban some European imports. Last fall, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine was overshadowed by Europe’s refugee crisis, Moscow’s strikes in Syria, and the Paris attacks. Taking advantage of rising anti-immigration sentiment and Islamophobia, Europe’s far-right parties, whose leaders express their admiration for President Putin, have fared well at the polls. European leaders must now work with Russia on conflict resolution in the Middle East while managing growing political polarization at home and helping Ukraine stabilize. Join us for a discussion on the topic featuring Marie Mendras, Transatlantic Academy; Alina Polyakova, Atlantic Council; and Marlene Laruelle, Research Professor of International Affairs; Director, Central Asia Program; Associate Director, Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, GW. Jeff Mankoff of the Center for Strategic and International Studies will moderate the discussion.
- Book Launch: The Outcast Majority: War, Development, and Youth in Africa | Thursday, January 14th | 2:00-3:00 | The Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | While African youth are demographically dominant, most see themselves as members of an outcast minority. Their outlier perspective directly informs the fresh and compelling new thinking about war, development, and youth in The Outcast Majority: War, Development, and Youth in Africa by former Wilson Center fellow and youth expert Dr. Marc Sommers. Featuring interviews with development experts and young people, this book contrasts forces that shape and propel youth lives in war and post-war Africa with those that influence and constrain the international development aid enterprise. With an eye on the colossal populations of excluded and profoundly undervalued youth in conflict-affected Africa and far beyond, the concluding framework delivers practical steps for making development work significantly more relevant and effective.Please join the Wilson Center Africa Program in the 5th floor conference room as we speak with Dr. Sommers about his latest publication and examine the implications of his research for international development policy. This event will feature a conversation between Dr. Sommers and Mr. Mark Hannafin, Executive Secretary and Senior National Security Adviser at USAID and co-chair of the new USAID policy on youth in development. Monde Muyangwa, Africa Program Director, will moderate the conversation.
- Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution: On 5th Anniversary, What’s Next? | Thursday, January 14th | 2:30-4:00 | US Institute of Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Five years ago this month, the Tunisian people’s protests calling for respect of their civil liberties resulted in the downfall of the 24-year authoritarian regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and the start of a rocky but largely peaceful process toward an inclusive political system. Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the International Republican Institute on Jan. 14 as we commemorate the 5th Anniversary of the Jasmine Revolution and examine the issues facing the country in the coming year and how the international community can help.Tunisia is confronting the regional rise of violent extremism that has led to terrorist attacks in its own country, spotlighting the struggle to balance security and human rights. Its frail economy remains a danger to social peace, with unemployment even higher than when the Jasmine Revolution began. Many of Tunisia’s youth are especially vulnerable to these factors.The panelists will consider these issues as well as specific decisions coming up in 2016, including the political situation, decentralization and economic reform. Join the conversation on Twitter with #Tunisia5. Speakers include: Ambassador Faycal Gouia, Embassy of the Republic of Tunisia; Scott Mastic, International Republican Institute; and Amy Hawthorne, Project on Middle East Democracy; Linda Bishai, U.S. Institute of Peace, will moderate the discussion, and Ambassador William B. Taylor will give opening remarks.
- Kazakhstan Nationbuilding and Kazakh Nationalism: A Debate | Thursday, January 14th | 3:00-6:00 | GWU Elliot School of International Affairs | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A new social activism has emerged in Kazakhstan, organized by different small groups self-defining as Kazakh nationalists. Who are they? What is their audience? What political and national projects do they advance? How do they position themselves toward the current authorities, the relationship to Russia, to the Islamic world, and to their Central Asian neighbors?Join us for a discussion with activists representative of this new trend and a roundtable with DC-based experts. Speakers include: Aidos Sarym, Altynbek Sarsenbayuly Foundation; Valikhan Tuleshov, Almaty Management University; Serik Beissembayev, Central Asia Program Visiting Fellow and Center of Social and Political Studies ‘Strategy’ in Almaty; Ulan Bigozhin, Doctoral Student at Indiana University; and Marat Raimkhanov, Hubert Humphrey Fellow at the University of Maryland.
- Foreign Intervention in South Asia: A Case Study from Sri Lanka | Thursday, January 14th | 3:30-5:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join the Atlantic Council for a conversation with a panel of experts to discuss Norway’s experience mediating conflict in Sri Lanka, and explore the role foreign actors play in South Asia more broadly.Across South Asia, external actors have often intervened to mediate conflict and build stability. Despite best efforts and often better resources, international involvement in South Asian conflicts has often faltered from lack of local support or consensus coupled with concerns over sovereignty. This was the case in Sri Lanka, where a five-year long Norwegian-led mediation process between the Tamil Tigers and Sri Lankan government unraveled, in part, due to a failure in securing bipartisan political support. The South Asia Center will convene a panel of experts to discuss Norway’s experience mediating conflict in Sri Lanka, and explore the role foreign actors play in South Asia more broadly. Speakers include Mark Salter, Author of To End a Civil War; Richard L. Armitage, President, Armitage International, L.C.; and Erik Solheim, Development Assistance Committee Chair, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The discussion will be moderated by Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council.
On Twitter? Follow @ACSouthAsia and use #ACSriLanka. - The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Towards Greater Inclusiveness | Friday, January 15th | 10:15-11:45 | The Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Five years have passed since the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia sparked revolts around the Arab world and the beginning of the Arab Spring. Despite high hopes that the Arab world was entering a new era of freedom, economic growth, and social justice, the transition turned out to be long and difficult, with the Arab world now in turmoil with revolutions, counter revolutions, wars, civil strife, and the worst refugee crisis of our times. The response to the Arab Spring and its aftermath has focused almost exclusively on political and security issues, and on the very divisive questions of national identity and political regimes. Economic and social questions have been put on the back burner. On January 15, Global Economy and Development at Brookings will host a discussion on a new book, The Arab Spring Five Years Later, which explores the critical economic and social issues driving the Arab Spring agenda and the real economic grievances that must be addressed in order to achieve peace, stability, and successful political transitions as well as provides an approach to addressing those grievances. Hafez Ghanem and Shinchi Yamanaka will present the key findings of the book, followed by a panel discussion featuring Masood Ahmed, Director of the Middle East Department, IMF; Sanjay Pradhan, CEO, Open Government Partnership; and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. The panel will be moderated by Shanta Devarajan, Chief Economist, Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank.
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Ready or not, here comes transitional justice
I got to Colombo just two days ago. I’ve spent most of the time walking and exploring this bustling town that eats lots of very spicy curry and somehow manages to ignore the spectacular Indian Ocean that lies just off its far too rundown shores. This is not Beirut, Tel Aviv or Miami, despite the gaggle of high-rise hotels in the central Fort district.
Friday afternoon I made it over to the Sri Lanka Foundation for a discussion of transitional justice chaired by Colombo University law professor Dinesha Samaratne, with Centre for Policy Alternatives lawyer Bhavani Fonseka and NYU professor Allen Feldman presenting. The focus of the session was on the applicability (or not) of South Africa’s experience with its Truth and Reconciliation Commission and amnesty, but it in fact ranged far more widely.
Sri Lanka ended its war against the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in 2009 with a government victory over the insurgents, who were trying to establish an independent Tamil state. A year ago (almost to the day), President Rajapakse, who won the war, stepped aside, defeated at the polls by one of his sidekicks, now President Sirisena. He and parts of Rajapakse political coalition cooperated with the leader of the opposition, now Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, to form a “consensual” government, whose forces won a clear parliamentary majority in August.
By all reports, the atmosphere in Sri Lanka has changed dramatically since last January. Repression is far less in evidence. People feel free to speak their minds. The Rajapaksa government, which included close relatives of the president, was triumphalist, centralizing and moving in the direction of autocracy. A constitutional amendment has undone at least part of the damage and strengthened independent commissions. The Sirisena government has said it is committed to truth, justice and reconciliation. It wants a new constitution.
Whereas Rajapaksa rejected international involvement in the war’s aftermath, the Sirisena government agreed to a UN Human Rights Council resolution that lays out a process that includes a special court with still undefined international participation, a truth and reconciliation process, accounting for missing persons (about 16,000) and compensation to victims. All who spoke agreed there can be no backing away from this commitment.
But none of this has happened yet, and lots of important details are still undecided. Fonseka emphasized that those decisions are up to Sri Lankans, who need to make it clear what they want, including things that go beyond what the UN suggested like security sector reform and vetting of officials. What will the balance be between truth and justice? While it is clear that there can be no amnesty for the most serious crimes, what incentives will perpetrators have to talk? How will it be possible to avoid prioritizing some victims over others? It is not even clear what time period the transitional justice process will cover (the civil war lasted, off and on, for 26 years). A government task force has been formed for public consultations, which will last however only two and a half months.
Discussion of the South African experience, led principally by Feldman, underlined that there was no blanket amnesty there. Relatively few people who sought amnesty received it. Forensic investigations are still going on, a South African embassy official said, that sometimes contradict the testimony perpetrators provided to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The main impact of the South African process was to make it impossible to continue to deny what had happened and to clarify the political motives that underlay the behavior of both sides. Citizens, Feldman underlined with reference to Solon, need to participate in the post-war process, as they did in the war. The consequences should be democratizing, equalizing the voices of victims with those of perpetrators.
Samaratne and others in the audience made it clear that the issues the war raised did not end with the war. There have been reports Feldman cited of post-war cases of torture, even some abuses during the last year Fonseka said. The problem is that the justice system has crumbled. It needs to be reconstructed. The current Sri Lankan legal framework and institutions are not adequate to the challenges they face.
Sri Lanka is not ready for transitional justice, one participant concluded. The state should be held accountable for what was done in its name. From this perspective, even limited amnesty risks reducing deterrence, which depends on punishment.The situation in South Africa was dramatically different: there the oppressed came to power and magnanimously agreed to a generous Truth and Reconciliation process. In Sri Lanka , many of the same people are in power and are likely to want to protect themselves. People in the north of the country (where the insurgency was concentrated) are still abused and still afraid.The victims want justice before reconciliation.
That expectation will not be easy to fulfill. Ready or not, transitional justice in some form is on its way.
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Sound and fury
Josh Rogin has pretty much nailed the North Korea nuclear issue with his inspired application of the stages of grief. Bottom line: we’ll end up accepting what we can’t change. Sound and fury will signify nothing.
Does it matter?
Yes. Allowing the North Korean dictatorship to persist in thumbing its nose at the UN Security Council and the international community breaches important international norms. The Security Council, which has mandated that North Korea not conduct nuclear or missile tests, is supposed to be authoritative. Non-nuclear states once signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty (as North Korea was) are supposed to stay non-nuclear. Pyongyang’s defiance will be an inspiration to others and risks confirming a new international norm: once a state acquires nuclear weapons it is virtually immune to pressure, because it can unleash devastating destruction on its neighbors and other adversaries, provided it has the required delivery vehicles.
But that doesn’t mean there is a lot the United States, or anyone else, can do about it. Barack Obama is thought to be holding his tongue because he doesn’t want to give Kim Jong-un the satisfaction of getting a rise out of the US president. That seems to me wise, especially given the difficulty the President has had making his other red lines stick. A lot of noise about North Korea now would only encourage more misbehavior. What would the President do then? Any parent knows the risks of escalation with an unruly teenager.
No doubt it has been made clear to the North Koreans that US nuclear weapons may now target their homeland. It is even said that was a motive for the latest test. Few Americans realize it, but the US does not have a doctrine of no first use against nuclear states, only against non-nuclear states. The North Koreans certainly know that and are ready to run the risk, which they will presume low given the consequences for Washington if it were to use its nuclear capabilities.
There are of course other options. We could re-tighten financial sanctions, which in the past seemed to be having a serious impact. We could destroy North Korean nuclear facilities or any nuclear-capable missiles Pyongyang seeks to test, as former Sectary of Defense Bill Perry urged years ago. We could undertake a much more concerted effort to undermine the North Korean regime and its iron grip on its people. I imagine there are officials within the US government working on all these options, which could be undertaken either overtly or covertly.
But the sad fact is that these well-known options have downsides and none are guaranteed to work. Tightening sanctions and undermining the North Korean regime run the risk of causing collapse, which from the Chinese and South Korean perspectives is almost as frightening as Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal. Beijing and Seoul don’t like the North Korean regime, but they don’t want millions of North Koreans fleeing uncontrollably. Destroying nuclear facilities can cause serious radioactive contamination. Missiles are a better target, but we’d have to be pretty sure the response would not be a nuclear strike on one of North Korea’s neighbors (its missiles cannot yet hit the US, so far as I am aware).
I’m afraid the only serious option at the moment, other than ignoring the bastards, is to talk with the North Koreans and try to get them to back down from their current defiance of the Security Council and other international pressures. Yes, that will unavoidably give them some of the international acknowledgment and recognition they crave. Nuclear weapons confer privileges. One of them is not being ignored completely.
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Gulf style
Saudi Arabia’s decision to break diplomatic relations with Iran raises the question of how much worse things can get. It depends of course on Riyadh’s and Tehran’s objectives and what they are willing to risk to gain them.
Marc Lynch at Monkey Cage today suggests the Saudi motives for escalating its conflict with Iran by executing Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr are three: to isolate and contain Iran even as the nuclear deal proceeds, to distract from foreign policy failures and to rally regional Sunni support. He regards domestic repression as a relatively unimportant factor, which I find hard to credit. Only four of those executed last weekend are known to be Shia. The other 43 were presumably Sunni, many of them extremists responsible for attacks that occurred a decade or more ago. Someone is surely trying to send a strong signal to Sunni extremists about the consequences of targeting the Kingdom.
But let’s examine the international factors and their consequences.
Executing a nonviolent Shia cleric isn’t a likely way to isolate or contain Iran. But Tehran helped the Saudi cause when it allowed Riyadh’s embassy to be sacked. That’s a surefire way of getting negative diplomatic attention, especially from the US and UK. Score one own goal for Riyadh. The Supreme Leader also threatened Saudi Arabia with God’s wrath. That puts him in good company with some right-wing American politicians who are likewise convinced that God acts on their behalf (and maybe even at their behest).
Riyadh is getting some regional support. Bahrain, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates have downgraded their relations with Tehran. That doesn’t count for much more than an improved field position in my book. Nor are the executions likely to distract much from foreign policy failures, and then only temporarily. The wars in Syria and Yemen are not going well from the Kingdom’s perspective. Riyadh is going to have to throw even more money and hardware into them, while encouraging others to do likewise, if it wants to have a serious impact.
The US failed to condemn the Saudi executions, though it regretted their contribution to increasing sectarian tensions in the region. Friends don’t condemn friends, I guess. It certainly would not have helped Washington’s relations with Riyadh, which are already tense because the Saudis are feeling sold out in the Iran nuclear deal. The question is how much longer friendship will trump honesty. The Americans are in no position to object to executions per se, but no one in Washington thinks much of the Saudi justice system. At least from what is readily available in public, it is hard to picture how anything al Nimr said would justify the death penalty.
The blowup between Iran and Saudi Arabia puts at risk the UN-sponsored Syria peace talks, which are scheduled to being January 25 in Geneva. But it also makes them all the more important. You wouldn’t know it from the headlines, but the Saudis and Iranians have a common enemy in the Islamic State. If only they could agree on how to fight it.
On BBC Five Live last night I was asked whether the current downward spiral could lead to war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It’s hard to rule that out, as breaking diplomatic relations can be a prelude to war and feelings are certainly running high. But both countries seem much keener to fight on third-country turf than on their own. Iran has Revolutionary Guard forces commanding and training in Syria, but most of the actual fighting is done by Hizbollah on Tehran’s behalf. The Saudis are bombing Houthi forces in Yemen, but they seem to have kept their ground forces mostly out of the fight. Some naval dueling in the Gulf, possibly involving tankers, might be in the offing, but proxy war through intermediaries is more the Gulf style.
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A bad way to start the new year
2015 was a disastrous year for the Middle East. Uncivil war in Syria raged on, with Russia pitching in on behalf of the Assad regime. Yemen also descended into full-fledged war, with Saudi Arabia pitching in on behalf of President (or former President, depending whose side you are on) Hadi. Libya’s UN-brokered peace agreement seems far from implementation, with two parliaments, two governments and many militias, as well as a growing Islamic State presence. The Islamic State lost territory in Syria (to Kurds) and in Iraq (to Kurds Yezidis, Shia militias and Iraqi government forces), but it would be hard to claim the tide of war has changed direction. Egypt continues to crack down on not only the Muslim Brotherhood and more extremist Islamist threats but also on moderate secularists. Israel and the Palestinians are at an impasse, one in which deadly violence on both sides is escalating.
Can it get worse?
The weekend’s events answer that question: yes. Friday Saudi Arabia, current chair of the UN Human Rights Council, executed 47 people, one of whom was a Shia cleric whose commitment to nonviolence seems uncontested, even if he was no friend of the (Sunni) monarchy. Yesterday Iranians responded by sacking part of the Saudi Embassy, a move that will remind the world of how little the Islamic Republic can be relied upon to protect diplomatic facilities. Today the Saudis claimed that Iran executed hundreds last year with little legal basis. The Iranians are promising that God will punish the Saudi monarchy.
We are clearly in the midst of a downward spiral that could well end in more sectarian bloodletting. Iran can pump more weapons and fighters (both Hizbollah and its own Revolutionary Guards) into Syria. Saudi Arabia can beef up support for insurgents there and escalate its attacks on the Houthis in Yemen. The more regional conflict and chaos, the stronger the Islamic State and Al Qaeda grow in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Afghanistan, even if they are losing territory in Iraq and northern Syria. Instability breeds instability.
President Obama wants to keep the United States out of the fray, except to attack those who directly threaten the homeland. That means the Islamic State as well as Al Qaeda and its affiliates. His astoundingly disciplined refusal to engage otherwise leaves a vacuum that militants expand to fill. Those who think the President indecisive or irresolute have misunderstood. He is determined not to get drawn back in to the Middle East. Watching the Iranians and Saudis go at it should be enough to make many Americans sympathize.
But not doing things is just as much a policy as doing them. It has consequences. The downward spiral is unlikely to stop of its own accord. The Middle East is a high wire act without a net. There is no regional security framework or even a loose association like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to help de-escalate. The Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation is far too weak a reed. The Gulf Cooperation Council is an adversary of Iran, not a neutral. Neither Europe nor the U.S. has had much success in getting the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom to temper their conflict.
It is difficult to see how this ends well. It may well be we are heading for a conflagration with much more catastrophic consequences than we have seen so far. Only when the Saudis and Iranians see that happening are they likely to stop. And then it may be too late.
We haven’t seen much yet of 2016. Just enough to know it is a bad way to start a new year.
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